



HISTORY OF THE REIGN  
OF  
FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

*The Catholic of Spain*

BY  
WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

A NEW EDITION.

LONDON:  
G. ROUTLEDGE & CO. FARRINGTON STREET.  
1858.



# CONTENTS.

---

## PART THE SECOND.

THE PERIOD WHEN, THE INTERIOR ORGANISATION OF THE MONARCHY HAVING BEEN COMPLETED, THE SPANISH NATION ENTERED ON ITS SCHEMES OF DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST; OR THE PERIOD ILLUSTRATING MORE PARTICULARLY THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA.

### CHAPTER I.

ITALIAN WARS—GENERAL VIEW OF EUROPE—INVASION OF ITALY  
BY CHARLES VIII. OF FRANCE.

Foreign politics directed by Ferdinand—Europe at the close of the fifteenth century—Character of the reigning Sovereigns—Improved political and moral condition—More intimate relations between states—Foreign relations conducted by the Sovereign—Italy the school of politics—Her most powerful states—Character of Italian politics—Internal prosperity—Intrigues of Sforza—Charles VIII. of France—His pretensions to Naples—Negotiations respecting Roussillon—Charles's counsellors in the pay of Ferdinand—Treaty of Barcelona—Its importance to Spain—Alarm at the French invasion, in Italy—In Europe, especially Spain—Preparations of Charles—An envoy sent to the French court—Announces Ferdinand's views—Charles's dissatisfaction—The French cross the Alps—Italian tactics—The Swiss infantry—French artillery—Sforza jealous of the French—The pope confers the title of Catholic—Naval preparations in Spain—Second mission to Charles VIII.—Bold conduct of the envoys—The king of Naples flies to Sicily—The French enter Naples—General hostility to them—League of Venice—Zurita's Life and Writings—Page 3—26.

### CHAPTER II.

ITALIAN WARS—RETREAT OF CHARLES VIII.—CAMPAIGNS OF GONSAI'VO DE CORDOVA—FINAL EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH.

Conduct of Charles—Plunders the works of art—Retreat of the French—Gonsalvo de Cordova—His brilliant qualities—Raised to the Italian



command—Arrives in Italy—Lands in Calabria—Marches on Seminara—Gonsalvo's prudence—Battle of Seminara—Defeat of the Neapolitans—Gonsalvo retreats to Reggio—Ferdinand recovers his capital—Gonsalvo in Calabria—His successes—Decline of the French—Besieged in Atella—Gonsalvo surprises Laino—Arrives before Atella—Receives the title of Great Captain—Beats a detachment of Swiss—Capitulation of Montpensier—Miserable state of the French—Death of Ferdinand of Naples—Accession of Frederic II.—Total expulsion of the French—Remarks on Guicciardini and Giovo—Sismondi—*Page 27—46.*

### CHAPTER III.

ITALIAN WARS—GONSALVO SUCCOURS THE POPE—TREATY WITH FRANCE—ORGANISATION OF THE SPANISH MILITIA.

War on the side of Roussillon—The pope asks the aid of Gonsalvo—Storming and capture of Ostia—Gonsalvo enters Rome—His reception by the pope—Returns to Spain—Peace with France—Ferdinand's views respecting Naples—His fame acquired by the war—Influence of the war on Spain—Organisation of the militia—*Page 46—53.*

### CHAPTER IV.

ALLIANCES OF THE ROYAL FAMILY—DEATH OF PRINCE JOHN AND PRINCESS ISABELLA.

Royal family of Castile—Joanna Beltraneja—Marriage of the princess Isabella—Death of her husband—Alliances with the house of Austria—And that of England—Joanna embarks—The queen's anxiety—Margaret of Austria—Returns in the fleet—Marriage of John and Margaret—Second marriage of Princess Isabella—Sudden illness of Prince John—His death—His amiable character—The king and queen of Portugal visit Spain—Objections to their recognition—Isabella displeased—Her daughter's death—Its effects on Isabella—Prince Miguel's recognition—*Page 53—67.*

### CHAPTER V.

DEATH OF CARDINAL MENDOZA—RISE OF XIMENES—  
ECCLESIASTICAL REFORM.

Death of Mendoza—His early life—And character—His amours—The queen his executor—Birth of Ximenes—He visits Rome—His return and imprisonment—Established at Sigüenza—Enters the Franciscan order—His severe penance—His ascetic life—He is made guardian of Salzeda—Introduced to the queen—Made her confessor—Elected provincial—Corruption of the monasteries—Attempt at reform—See of Toledo vacant—Offered to Ximenes—He reluctantly accepts—Characteristic anecdotes of Ximenes—His austere life—Reform in his diocese—Example of his severity—Reform of the monastic orders—Great excitement caused by it—Visit of the Franciscan general—Insults the queen—The pope's interference—Consents to the reform—Its operation and effects—Alvaro Gomez, and biographers of Ximenes—*Page 67—85.*

## CHAPTER VI.

XIMENES IN GRANADA—PERSECUTION, INSURRECTION, AND  
CONVERSION OF THE MOORS.

Introductory remarks—Ximenes, his constancy of purpose—Tranquil state of Granada—Tendilla—Talavera, archbishop of Granada—His mild policy—The clergy dissatisfied with it—Temperate sway of the Sovereigns—Ximenes in Granada—His violent measures—Destroys Arabic books—Mischievous effects—Revolt of the Albaycin—Ximenes besieged in his palace—The insurgents appeased by Talavera—Displeasure of the Sovereigns—Ximenes hastens to court—Conversion of Granada—Applauded by the Spaniards—Page 88—99.

## CHAPTER VII.

RISING IN THE ALPUXARRAS—DEATH OF ALONSO DE AGUILAR—  
EDICT AGAINST THE MOORS.

The Alpuxarras—Rising of the Moors—Huejar sacked—Ferdinand marches into the mountains—Carries Lanjaron—Punishment of the rebels—Revolt of the Sierra Vermeja—Rendezvous at Ronda—Expedition into the Sierra—The Moors retreat up the mountains—Return on the Spaniards—Alonse de Aguilar—His gallantry and death—His noble character—Bleedy rout of the Spaniards—Dismay of the nation—The rebels submit to Ferdinand—Banishment or conversion—Commemorative ballads—Melancholy reminiscences—Edict against the Moors of Castile—Christianity and Mahometanism—Causes of intolerance—Aggravated in the fifteenth century—Effects of the Inquisition—Doctrines of the treaty of Granada—Evasion of it by the Christians—Priestly casuistry—Last notice of the Moors in the present reign—Page 100—118.

## CHAPTER VIII.

COLUMBUS—PROSECUTION OF DISCOVERY—HIS TREATMENT BY  
THE COURT.

Progress of discovery—Miscconduct of the colonists—Complaints against Columbus—His second return—The queen's confidence in him unshaken—Honours conferred on him—His third voyage—Discovers *terra firma*—Mutiny in the colony—Leud complaints against Columbus—Bigoted views in regard to the heathen—More liberal sentiments of Isabella—She sends back the Indian slaves—Authority to Bobadilla—Outrage on Columbus—Deep regret of the Sovereigns—Reception of Columbus—Vindication of the Sovereigns—Commission to Ovando—Groundless imputations on the government—The admiral's despondency—His fourth and last voyage—Remarkable fate of his enemies—Page 119—134.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SPANISH COLONIAL POLICY.

Careful provision for the colonies—Liberal grants—License for private voyages—Their success—Indian department—Casa de Contratacion

—Important papal concessions—Spirit of the colonial legislation—The queen's zeal for converting the natives—Unhappily defeated—Immediate profits from the discoveries—Origin of the venereal disease—Moral consequences of the discoveries—Their geographical extent—Historians of the New World—Peter Martyr—Herrera and Muñoz—Page 135—148.

## CHAPTER X.

ITALIAN WARS—PARTITION OF NAPLES—GONSALVO OVERRUNS CALABRIA.

Louis XII.'s designs on Italy—Politics of that country—The French conquer Milan—Alarm of the Spanish court—Remonstrance to the pope—Boldness of Garcilasso de la Vega—Negotiations with Venice and the emperor—Louis openly menaces Naples—Views of Ferdinand—Fleet fitted out under Gonsalvo de Cordova—Partition of Naples—Ground of Ferdinand's claim—Gonsalvo sails against the Turks—Storming of St. George—Honours paid to Gonsalvo—The pope confirms the partition—Astonishment of Italy—Success and cruelties of the French—Fate of Frederic—Gonsalvo invades Calabria—Invests Tarento—Discontents in the army—Magnificence of Gonsalvo—He punishes a mutiny—Bolder plan of attack—Tarento surrenders—Perjury of Gonsalvo—Page 149—166.

## CHAPTER XI.

ITALIAN WARS—RUPTURE WITH FRANCE—GONSALVO BESIEGED IN BARLETTA.

Mutual distrust of the French and Spaniards—Cause of rupture—The French begin hostilities—The Italians favour them—The French army—Inferiority of the Spaniards—Gonsalvo retires to Barletta—Siege of Canosa—Chivalrous character of the war—Tournament near Trani—Duel between Bayard and Sotomayor—Distress of the Spaniards—Spirit of Gonsalvo—The French reduce Calabria—Constancy of the Spaniards—Nemours defies the Spaniards—Rout of the French rear-guard—Arrival of supplies—Design on Ruvo—Gonsalvo storms and takes it—His treatment of the prisoners—Prepares to leave Barletta—Page 167—181.

## CHAPTER XII.

ITALIAN WARS—NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE—VICTORY OF SERIGNOLA—SURRENDER OF NAPLES.

Birth of Charles V.—Philip and Joanna visit Spain—Recognised by Cortes—Philip's discontent—Leaves Spain for France—Negotiates a treaty with Louis XII.—Treaty of Lyons—The Great Captain refuses to comply with it—Marches out of Barletta—Distress of the troops—Encamps before Cerignola—Nemours pursues—The Spanish forces—The French forces—Battle of Cerignola—Death of Nemours—Rout of the French—Their loss—Pursuit of the enemy—D'Aubigny defeated—Submission of Naples—Triumphant entry of Gonsalvo—Fortresses of Naples—Castel Nuove stormed—Nearly all the kingdom reduced—Page 182—196.

## CHAPTER XIII.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE—UNSUCCESSFUL INVASION OF SPAIN  
—TRUCE.

Treaty of Lyons—Rejected by Ferdinand—His policy examined—Joanna's despondency—First symptoms of her insanity—The queen hastens to her—Isabella's distress—Her illness and fortitude—The French invade Spain—Siege of Salas—Isabella's exertions—Ferdinand's successes—Truce with France—Reflections on the campaign—Impediments to historic accuracy—Speculative writers—Page 197—209.

## CHAPTER XIV.

ITALIAN WARS—CONDITION OF ITALY—FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES  
ON THE GARIGLIANO.

Melancholy condition of Italy—Views of the Italian states—Of the emperor—Great preparations of Louis XII.—Death of Alexander VI.—Electioneering intrigues—Julius II.—Gonsalvo repulsed before Gaeta—Strength of his forces—Occupies San Germano—The French encamp on the Garigliano—Passage of the bridge—Desperate resistance—The French resume their quarters—Anxious expectation of Italy—Gonsalvo strengthens his position—Great distress of the army—Gonsalvo's resolution—Remarkable instance of it—Patience of the Spaniards—Situation of the French—Their insubordination—Saluzzo takes the command—Heroism of Paredes and Bayard—Page 209—225.

## CHAPTER XV.

ITALIAN WARS—ROUT OF THE GARIGLIANO—TREATY WITH FRANCE—  
GONSALVO'S MILITARY CONDUCT.

Gonsalvo secures the Orsini—Assumes the offensive—Plan of attack—Consternation of the French—They retreat on Gaeta—Action at the bridge of Mola—Hotly contested—Arrival of the Spanish rear—The French routed—Their loss—Gallantry of their chivalry—Capitulation of Gaeta—Gonsalvo's courtesy—Chagrin of Louis XII.—Sufferings of the French—The Spaniards occupy Gaeta—Public enthusiasm—Exhortation of the Spanish troops—Gonsalvo's liberality to his officers—Apprehensions of Louis XII.—Treaty with France—Gallantry of Louis d'Ars—Causes of the French failures—Review of Gonsalvo's conduct—His reform of the service—Influence over the army—His confidence in their character—Position of the army—Results of the campaigns—Memoirs of Gonsalvo de Cordova—French chronicles—Page 225—243.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## ILLNESS AND DEATH OF ISABELLA—HER CHARACTER.

Decline of the queen's health—Mad conduct of Joanna—The queen seized with a fever—Retains her energies—Alarm of the nation—Her testament—Settles the succession—Ferdinand named regent—Pro-

vision for him—Her codicil—She falls rapidly—Her resignation and death—Her remains transported to Granada—Laid in the Alhambra—Isabella's person—Her manners—Her magnanimity—Her piety—Her bigotry—Common to her age—And later times—Her strength of principle—Her practical sense—Her unwearied activity—Her courage—Her sensibility—Parallel with Queen Elizabeth—Universal homage to her virtues—*Page 244—265.*

## CHAPTER XVII.

FERDINAND REGENT—HIS SECOND MARRIAGE—DISSENSIONS WITH PHILIP—RESIGNATION OF THE REGENCY.

Philip and Joanna proclaimed—Discontent of the nobles—Don Juan Manuel—Philip's pretensions—His party increases—He tampers with Gonsalvo de Córdoba—Ferdinand's perplexities—Proposals for a second marriage—Policy of Louis XII.—Treaty with France—Its impolicy—Concord of Salamanca—Philip and Joanna embark—Reach Coruña—Philip joined by the nobles—His character—Ferdinand unpopular—Interview with Philip—Courteous deportment of Ferdinand—Philip's distrust—Ferdinand resigns the regency—His private protest—His motives—Second interview—Departure of Ferdinand—Authorities for the account of Philip—*Page 266—282.*

## CHAPTER XVIII.

COLUMBUS—HIS RETURN TO SPAIN—HIS DEATH.

Columbus's last voyage—He learns Isabella's death—His illness—He visits the court—Ferdinand's unjust treatment of him—He declines in health and spirits—His death—His person and habits—His enthusiasm—His lofty character—*Page 283—289.*

## CHAPTER XIX.

REIGN AND DEATH OF PHILIP I.—PROCEEDINGS IN CASTILE—FERDINAND VISITS NAPLES.

Philip and Joanna—Philip's arbitrary government—Reckless extravagance—Troubles from the Inquisition—Ferdinand's distrust of Gonsalvo—He sails for Naples—Gonsalvo's loyalty—Death of Philip—His character—Provisional government—Joanna's condition—Convocation of Cortes—Ferdinand received with enthusiasm—His entry into Naples—Restores the Angevins—General dissatisfaction—*Page 289—302.*

## CHAPTER XX.

FERDINAND'S RETURN AND REGENCY—GONSALVO'S HONOURS AND RETIREMENT.

Meeting of Cortes—Joanna's insane conduct—She changes her ministers—Disorderly state of Castile—Distress of the kingdom—Ferdinand's politic behaviour—He leaves Naples—Gonsalvo de Córdoba—Grief of the Neapolitans—Brilliant interview of Ferdinand and Louis—Compliments to Gonsalvo—The king's reception in Castile—Joanna's retirement—Irregularity of Ferdinand's proceedings—General

amnesty—Ho establishes a guard—His excessive severity—Disgust of the nobles—Gonsalvo's progress through the country—Ferdinand breaks his word—The queen's coolness—Gonsalvo withdraws from court—Splendour of his retirement—*Page 302—318.*

## CHAPTER XXI.

XIMENES—CONQUESTS IN AFRICA—UNIVERSITY OF ALCALA—  
POLYGLOT BIBLE.

Policy of Ferdinand's severity—Enthusiasm of Ximenes—His designs against Oran—His warlike preparations—His perseverance—Sends an army to Africa—Addresses the troops—The command left to Navarro—Battle before Oran—The city stormed—Moorish loss—Ximenes enters Oran—Opposition of his general—His distrust of Ferdinand—Ximenes returns to Spain—Refuses public honours—Navarro's African conquests—College of Ximenes at Alcalá—Its magnificence—Provisions for education—The king visits the university—Polyglot edition of the Bible—Difficulties of the task—Grand projects of Ximenes—*Page 318—336.*

## CHAPTER XXII.

WARS AND POLITICS OF ITALY.

Projects against Venice—League of Cambray—Its origin—Louis XII. invades Italy—Resolution of Venice—Alarm of Ferdinand—Investiture of Naples—Holy league—Gaston de Foix—Battle of Ravenna—Death of Gaston de Foix—His character—The French retreat—Venice disgusted—Battle of Novara—Of La Motta—The Spaniards victorious—Daru's "*Histoire de Venise*"—*Page 337—347.*

## CHAPTER XXIII.

CONQUEST OF NAVARRE.

Sovereigns of Navarre—Distrust of Spain—Negotiations with France—Ferdinand demands a passage—Navarro allied to France—Invaded and conquered by Alva—Character of Jean d'Albret—Discontent of the English—Discomfiture of the French—Treaty of Orthes—Ferdinand settles his conquests—United with Castile—The king's conduct examined—Right of passage—Imprudence of Navarre—It authorises war—Gross abuse of victory—Authorities for the history of Navarre—*Page 348—360.*

## CHAPTER XXIV.

DEATH OF GONSALVO DE CORDOVA—ILLNESS AND DEATH OF  
FERDINAND—HIS CHARACTER.

Maximilian's pretensions—Gonsalvo ordered to Italy—General enthusiasm—The king's distrust—Gonsalvo goes into retirement—The king's desire for children—Decline of his health—Gonsalvo's illness and death—Public grief—His character—His private virtues—His want of faith—His loyalty—Ferdinand's illness increases—His insensibility to his situation—His last hours—His death and testament—

His body transported to Granada—His person and character—His temperance and economy—His bigotry—Accused of hypocrisy—His perfidy—His shrewd policy—His insensibility—Contrast with Isabella—His kingly qualities—Judgment of his contemporaries—*Page* 360—382.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, AND CHARACTER OF CARDINAL XIMENES.

Disputes respecting the regency—Charles proclaimed king—Anecdote of Ximenes—His military ordinance—His domestic policy—His foreign policy—Assumes the sole power—Intimidates the nobles—Public discontents—Treaty of Noyon—Charles lands in Spain—His ungrateful letter—The cardinal's last illness—His death—His character—His versatility of talent—His despotic government—His moral principle—His disinterestedness—His monastic austerities—His economy of time—His person—Parallol with Richelieu—Notice of Galindez de Carbajal—*Page* 382—397.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA.

Policy of the crown—Depression of the nobles—Their great power—Treatment of the Church—Care of morals—State of the commons—Their consideration—Royal ordinances—Arbitrary measures of Ferdinand—Advancement of prerogative—Legal compilations—Organisation of councils—Legal profession advanced—Character of the laws—Erroneous principles of legislation—Principal exports—Manufactures—Agriculture—Economical policy—Internal improvements—Increase of empire—Government of Naples—Revenues from the Indies—Spirit of adventure—Progress of discovery—Excesses of the Spaniards—Slavery in the colonies—Colonial administration—General prosperity—Public embellishments—Augmentation of revenue—Increase of population—Patriotic principle—Chivalrous spirit of the people—Spirit of bigotry—Beneficent impulse—The period of national glory—*Page* 397—439.

HISTORY OF THE REIGN  
OF  
FERDINAND AND ISABELLA.

---

PART THE SECOND.

1493—1517.

THE PERIOD WHEN, THE INTERIOR ORGANISATION OF THE MONARCHY HAVING BEEN COMPLETED, THE SPANISH NATION ENTERED ON ITS SCHEMES OF DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST; OR THE PERIOD ILLUSTRATING MORE PARTICULARLY THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA.





## CHAPTER I.

### ITALIAN WARS.—GENERAL VIEW OF EUROPE.—INVASION OF ITALY BY CHARLES VIII. OF FRANCE.

1493—1495.

Europe at the Close of the Fifteenth Century—More intimate Relations between States—Italy the School of Politics—Pretensions of Charles VIII. to Naples—Treaty of Barcelona—The French invade Naples—Ferdinand's Dissatisfaction—Tactics and Arms of the different Nations—Preparations of Spain—Mission to Charles VIII.—Bold Conduct of the Envoys—The French enter Naples.

WE have now reached that memorable epoch, when the different nations of Europe, surmounting the barriers which had hitherto confined them within their respective limits, brought their forces, as if by a simultaneous impulse, against each other on a common theatre of action. In the preceding part of this work we have seen in what manner Spain was prepared for the contest, by the concentration of her various states under one government, and by such internal reforms as enabled the government to act with vigour. The genius of Ferdinand will appear as predominant in what concerns the foreign relations of the country, as was that of Isabella in its interior administration. So much so, indeed, that the accurate and well-informed historian who has most copiously illustrated this portion of the national annals, does not even mention, in his introductory notice, the name of Isabella, but refers the agency in these events exclusively to her more ambitious consort.<sup>(1)</sup> In this he is abundantly justified, both by the prevailing character of the policy pursued, widely differing from that which distinguished the queen's measures, and by the circumstance that the foreign conquests, although achieved by the united efforts of both crowns, were undertaken on behalf of Ferdinand's own dominions of Aragon, to which in the end they exclusively appertained.

The close of the fifteenth century presents, on the whole, the most striking point of view in modern history; one from which we may contemplate the consummation of an important revolution in the structure of political society, and the first application of several inventions destined to exercise the widest influence on human civilisation. The feudal institutions, or rather the

(1) Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando el Cathólico* (Anales, tom. v. vi. Zaragoza, 1580), lib. 1, Introd.

feudal principle, which operated even where the institutions, strictly speaking, did not exist, after having wrought its appointed uses, had gradually fallen into decay; for it had not the power of accommodating itself to the increased demands and improved condition of society. However well suited to a barbarous age, it was found that the distribution of power among the members of an independent aristocracy was unfavourable to that degree of personal security and tranquillity indispensable to great proficiency in the higher arts of civilisation. It was equally repugnant to the principle of patriotism, so essential to national independence, but which must have operated feebly among a people whose sympathies, instead of being concentrated on the state, were claimed by a hundred masters, as was the case in every feudal community. The conviction of this reconciled the nation to the transfer of authority into other hands; not those of the people indeed, who were too ignorant, and too long accustomed to a subordinate, dependent situation to admit of it,—but into the hands of the sovereign. It was not until three centuries more had elapsed, that the condition of the great mass of the people was to be so far improved as to qualify them for asserting and maintaining the political consideration which of right belongs to them.

In whatever degree public opinion and the progress of events might favour the transition of power from the aristocracy to the monarch, it is obvious that much would depend on his personal character; since the advantages of his station alone made him by no means a match for the combined forces of his great nobility. The remarkable adaptation of the characters of the principal sovereigns of Europe to this exigency, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, would seem to have something providential in it. Henry the Seventh of England, Louis the Eleventh of France, Ferdinand of Naples, John the Second of Aragon and his son Ferdinand, and John the Second of Portugal, however differing in other respects, were all distinguished by a sagacity which enabled them to devise the most subtle and comprehensive schemes of policy, and which was prolific in expedients for the circumvention of enemies too potent to be encountered by open force.

Their operations, all directed towards the same point, were attended with similar success, resulting in the exaltation of the royal prerogative at the expense of the aristocracy, with more or less deference to the rights of the people, as the case might be; in France, for example, with almost total indifference to them; while in Spain they were regarded, under the parental administration of Isabella, which tempered the less scrupulous policy of her husband, with tenderness and respect. In every country, however, the nation at large gained greatly by the revolution, which came on insensibly, at least without any violent shock to the fabric of society, and which, by securing internal tranquillity

and the ascendancy of law over brute force, gave ample scope for those intellectual pursuits that withdraw mankind from sensual indulgence and too exclusive devotion to the animal wants of our nature.

No sooner was the internal organisation of the different nations of Europe placed on a secure basis, than they found leisure to direct their views, hitherto confined within their own limits, to a bolder and more distant sphere of action. Their international communication was greatly facilitated by several useful inventions coincident with this period, or then first extensively applied. Such was the art of printing, diffusing knowledge with the speed and universality of light; the establishment of posts, which, after its adoption by Louis the Eleventh, came into frequent use in the beginning of the sixteenth century; and lastly, the compass, which, guiding the mariner unerringly through the trackless wastes of the ocean, brought the remotest regions into contact. With these increased facilities for intercommunication, the different European states might be said to be brought into as intimate relation with one another, as the different provinces of the same kingdom were before. They now for the first time regarded each other as members of one great community, in whose action they were all mutually concerned. A greater anxiety was manifested to detect the springs of every political movement of their neighbours. Missions became frequent; and accredited agents were stationed as a sort of honourable spies, at the different courts. The science of diplomacy, on narrower grounds indeed than it is now practised, began to be studied. (1) Schemes of aggression and resistance, leading to political combinations the most complex and extended, were gradually formed. We are not to imagine, however, the existence of any well-defined ideas of a balance of power at this early period. The object of these combinations was some positive act of aggression or resistance for purposes of conquest or defence, not for the maintenance of any abstract theory of political equilibrium. This was the result of much deeper reflection and of prolonged experience.

The management of the foreign relations of the nation at the close of the fifteenth century, was resigned wholly to the sovereign. The people took no further part or interest in the matter, than if it had concerned only the disposition of his private property. His measures were, therefore, often characterised by a degree of temerity and precipitation that could

(1) The "Legazione," or official correspondence of Machiavelli, while stationed at the different European courts, may be regarded as the most complete manual of diplomacy as it existed at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It affords more copious and curious information respecting the interior workings of the governments with whom he resided, than is to be found in any regular history; and it shows the variety and extent of duties attached to the office of resident minister, from the first moment of its creation.

not have been permitted under the salutary checks afforded by popular interposition. A strange insensibility, indeed, was shown to the rights and interests of the nation. War was regarded as a game, in which the sovereign parties engaged, not on behalf of their subjects, but exclusively on their own. Like desperate gamblers, they contended for the spoils or the honours of victory, with so much the more recklessness as their own station was too elevated to be materially prejudiced by the results. They contended with all the animosity of personal feeling; every device, however paltry, was resorted to, and no advantage was deemed unwarrantable which could tend to secure the victory. The most profligate maxims of state policy were openly avowed by men of reputed honour and integrity. In short, the diplomacy of that day is very generally characterised by a low cunning, subterfuge, and petty trickery, which would leave an indelible stain on the transactions of private individuals.

Italy was, doubtless, the great school where this political morality was taught. That country was broken up into a number of small states, too nearly equal to allow the absolute supremacy of any one; while, at the same time, it demanded the most restless vigilance on the part of each to maintain its independence against its neighbours. Hence such a complexity of intrigues and combinations as the world had never before witnessed. A subtle, refined policy was conformable to the genius of the Italians. It was partly the result, moreover, of their higher cultivation, which naturally led them to trust the settlement of their disputes to superior intellectual dexterity, rather than to brute force, like the *barbarians* beyond the Alps.(1) From these and other causes, maxims were gradually established, so monstrous in their nature as to give the work, which first embodied them in a regular system, the air of a satire rather than a serious performance, while the name of its author has been converted into a byword of political knavery.(2)

At the period before us, the principal states of Italy were the republics of Venice and Florence, the duchy of Milan, the papal see, and the kingdom of Naples. The others may be regarded

(1) "Sed diu," says Sallust, noticing the similar consequence of increased refinement among the ancients, "magnum inter mortales certamen fuit, vine corporis an virtute animi res militaris magis procederet. \* \* \* Tum demum periculo atque negotiis compertum est, in bello plurimum ingenium posse."—*Bellum Catilinarium*, cap. 1, 2.

(2) Machiavelli's political treatises, his "Principe" and "Discorsi sopra Tito Livio," which appeared after his death, excited no scandal at the time of their publication. They came into the world, indeed, from the pontifical press, under the privilege of the reigning pope, Clement VII. It was not until thirty years later that they were placed on the Index; and this not from any exceptions taken at the immorality of their doctrines, as Ginguené has well proved (*Histoire Littéraire d'Italie*; Paris, 1811-19; tom. viii. pp. 32, 74), but from the imputations they contained on the court of Rome.

merely as satellites, revolving round some one or other of these superior powers, by whom their respective movements were regulated and controlled. Venice may be considered as the most formidable of the great powers, taking into consideration her wealth, her powerful navy, her territory in the north, and princely colonial domain. There was no government in that age which attracted such general admiration, both from natives and foreigners, who seemed to have looked upon it as affording the very best model of political wisdom.(1) Yet there was no country where the citizen enjoyed less positive freedom; none whose foreign relations were conducted with more absolute selfishness, and with a more narrow, bargaining spirit, savouring rather of a company of traders than of a great and powerful state. But all this was compensated in the eyes of her contemporaries, by the stability of her institutions, which still remained unshaken amidst revolutions, which had convulsed or overturned every other social fabric in Italy.(2)

The government of Milan was at this time under the direction of Ludovico Sforza, or Ludovico the Moor, as he is commonly called; an epithet suggested by his complexion, but which he willingly retained, as indicating the superior craftiness on which he valued himself.(3) He held the reins in the name of his nephew, then a minor, until a convenient season should arrive for assuming them in his own. His cool, perfidious character was stained with the worst vices of the most profligate class of Italian statesmen of that period.

The central parts of Italy were occupied by the republic of Florence, which had ever been the rallying-point of the friends of freedom, too often of faction; but which had now resigned itself to the dominion of the Medici, whose cultivated tastes and munificent patronage shed a splendid illusion over their administration, which has blinded the eyes of contemporaries and even of posterity.

(1) "Aquel Senado ó Señoría de Venecianos," says Gonzalo de Oviedo, "donde me parece á mí que esta recogido todo el saber é prudencia de los hombres humanos; porque és la gente del mundo que mejor se sabe gobernar: é la república, que mas tiempo há durado en el mundo por la buena forma de su regimiento, é donde con mejor manera llán los hombres vivido en comunidad sin tener Rey," &c.—Quineuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dist. 44.

(2) Of all the incense which poets and politicians have offered to the Queen of the Adriatic, none is more exquisite than that conveyed in these few lines, where Sannazaro notices her position as the bulwark of Christendom:—

"Una Italum regina, altæ pulcherrima Romæ  
Æmula, quæ terris, quæ dominaris aquis!  
Tu tibi vel reges civis facis; O decus! O lux  
Ausonice, per quam libera turba sumus;  
Per quam barbaries nobis non imperat, et Sol  
Exoriens nostro clarius orbe micat!"

Opera Latina, lib. 3, eleg. 1, 95.

(3) Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 3, p. 147.

The papal chair was filled by Alexander the Sixth, a pontiff whose licentiousness, avarice, and unblushing effrontery have been the theme of unmingled reproach with Catholic as well as Protestant writers. His preferment was effected by lavish bribery, and by his consummate address, as well as energy of character. Although a native Spaniard, his election was extremely unpalatable to Ferdinand and Isabella, who deprecated the scandal it must bring upon the church, and who had little to hope for themselves, in a political view, from the elevation of one of their own subjects even, whose mercenary spirit placed him at the control of the highest bidder. (1)

The Neapolitan sceptre was swayed by Ferdinand the First, whose father Alfonso the Fifth, the uncle of Ferdinand of Aragon, had obtained the crown by the adoption of Joanna of Naples, or rather by his own good sword. Alfonso settled his conquest on his illegitimate son Ferdinand, to the prejudice of the rights of Aragon, by whose blood and treasure he had achieved it. Ferdinand's character, the very opposite of his noble father's, was dark, wily, and ferocious. His life was spent in conflict with his great feudal nobility, many of whom supported the pretensions of the Angevin family. But his superior craft enabled him to foil every attempt of his enemies. In effecting this, indeed, he shrunk from no deed of treachery or violence, however atrocious; and in the end had the satisfaction of establishing his authority, undisputed, on the fears of his subjects. He was about seventy years of age at the period of which we are treating, 1493. The heir apparent, Alfonso, was equally sanguinary in his temper, though possessing less talent for dissimulation than his father.

Such was the character of the principal Italian courts at the close of the fifteenth century. The politics of the country were necessarily regulated by the temper and views of the leading powers. They were essentially selfish and personal. The ancient republican forms had been gradually effaced during this century, and more arbitrary ones introduced. The name of freedom, indeed, was still inscribed on their banners, but the spirit had disappeared. In almost every state, great or small, some military adventurer or crafty statesman had succeeded in raising his own authority on the liberties of his country; and his sole aim seemed to be to enlarge it still further, and to secure it against the conspiracies and revolutions which the

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 119, 123.—Fleury, *Hist. Ecclesiastique*, contin. (Paris, 1723), tom. xxiv. lib. 117, p. 545.—Peter Martyr, whose residence and rank at the Spanish court gave him access to the best sources of information as to the repute in which the new pontiff was held there, expresses himself in one of his letters to Cardinal Sforza, who had assisted at his election, in the following unequivocal language: "*Sed hoc habeto, principes illustrissime, non placuisse meis Regibus pontificatum ad Alexandrum, quamvis eorum dictionarium, pervenisse. Verentur namque ne illius cupiditas, ne ambitio, ne (quod gravius) molities filialis Christianam religionem in præcepis trahat.*"—*Epist.* 119.

reminiscence of ancient independence naturally called forth. Such was the case with Tuscany, Milan, Naples, and the numerous subordinate states. In Rome, the pontiff proposed no higher object than the concentration of wealth and public honours in the hands of his own family. In short, the administration of every state seemed to be managed with exclusive reference to the personal interests of its chief. Venice was the only power of sufficient strength and stability to engage in more extended schemes of policy, and even these were conducted, as has been already noticed, in the narrow and calculating spirit of a trading corporation.

But, while no spark of generous patriotism seemed to warm the bosoms of the Italians; while no sense of public good, or even menace of foreign invasion, could bring them to act in concert with one another,(1) the internal condition of the country was eminently prosperous. Italy had far outstripped the rest of Europe in the various arts of civilised life; and she everywhere afforded the evidence of faculties developed by unceasing intellectual action. The face of the country itself was like a garden; "cultivated through all its plains to the very tops of the mountains; teeming with population, with riches, and an unlimited commerce; illustrated by many munificent princes, by the splendour of many noble and beautiful cities, and by the majesty of religion; and adorned with all those rare and precious gifts which render a name glorious among the nations." (2) Such are the glowing strains in which the Tuscan historian celebrates the prosperity of his country, ere yet the storm of war had descended on her beautiful valleys.

This scene of domestic tranquillity was destined to be changed by that terrible invasion which the ambition of Ludovico Sforza brought upon his country. He had already organised a coalition of the northern powers of Italy, to defeat the interference of the king of Naples in behalf of his grandson, the rightful duke of Milan, whom his uncle held in subjection during a protracted minority, while he exercised all the real functions of sovereignty in his name. Not feeling sufficiently secure from his Italian confederacy, Sforza invited the king of France to revive the hereditary claims of the house of Anjou to the crown of Naples, promising to aid him in the enterprise with all his resources. In this way, this wily politician proposed to divert the storm from his own head, by giving Ferdinand sufficient occupation at home.

The throne of France was at that time filled by Charles the

(1) A remarkable example of this occurred in the middle of the 15th century, when the inundation of the Turks, which seemed ready to burst upon them, after overwhelming the Arabian and Greek empires, had no power to still the voice of faction, or to concentrate the attention of the Italian state, even for a moment.

(2) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 1, p. 2.



Eighth, a monarch scarcely twenty-two years of age. His father, Louis the Eleventh, had given him an education unbecoming not only a great prince, but even a private gentleman. He would allow him to learn no other Latin, says Brantôme, than his favourite maxim, "*Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare.*" (1) Charles made some amends for this, though with little judgment, in later life, when left to his own disposal. His favourite studies were the exploits of celebrated conquerors, of Cæsar and Charlemagne particularly, which filled his young mind with vague and visionary ideas of glory. These dreams were still further nourished by the tournaments and other chivalrous spectacles of the age, in which he delighted, until he seems to have imagined himself some doughty paladin of romance, destined to the achievement of a grand and perilous enterprise. It affords some proof of this exalted state of his imagination, that he gave his only son the name of Orlando, after the celebrated hero of *Roncesvalles*. (2)

With a mind thus excited by chimerical visions of military glory, he lent a willing ear to the artful propositions of Sforza. In the extravagance of vanity, fed by the adulation of interested parasites, he affected to regard the enterprise against Naples as only opening the way to a career of more splendid conquests, which were to terminate in the capture of Constantinople, and the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre. He even went so far as to purchase of Andrew Paleologus, the nephew and heir of Constantine, the last of the Cæsars, his title to the Greek empire. (3)

Nothing could be more unsound, according to the principles of the present day, than Charles's claims to the crown of Naples. Without disavowing the original pretensions of the rival houses of Aragon and Anjou, it is sufficient to state, that, at the time of Charles the Eighth's invasion, the Neapolitan throne had been in the possession of the Aragonese family more than half a century, under three successive princes solemnly recognised by the people, sanctioned by repeated investitures of the papal suzerain, and admitted by all the states of Europe. If all this did not give validity to their title, when was the nation to expect repose? Charles's claim, on the other hand, was derived originally from a testamentary bequest of René, count of Provence, operating to the exclusion of the son of his

(1) Brantôme, *Vies des Hommes Illustres, Œuvres complètes* (Paris, 1822-3), tom. ii. disc. 1, pp. 2, 20.

(2) Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. p. 112.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. pp. 2, 3.

(3) Daru, *Histoire de la République de Venise* (Paris, 1821), tom. iii. liv. 20.—See the deed of cession, in the memoir of M. de Foncemagne (*Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, tom. xvii. pp. 539—579). This document, as well as some others which appeared on the eve of Charles's expedition, breathes a tone of Quixotic and religious enthusiasm, that transports us back to the days of the crusades.

own daughter, the rightful heir of the house of Anjou; Naples being too notoriously a female fief to afford any pretext for the action of the Salic law. The pretensions of Ferdinand of Spain, as representative of the legitimate branch of Aragon, were far more plausible.(1)

Independently of the defects in Charles's titles, his position was such as to make the projected expedition every way impolitic. A misunderstanding had for some time subsisted between him and the Spanish sovereigns, and he was at open war with Germany and England; so that it was only by large concessions that he could hope to secure their acquiescence in an enterprise most precarious in its character, and where even complete success could be of no permanent benefit to his kingdom. "He did not understand," says Voltaire, "that a dozen villages adjacent to one's territory, are of more value than a kingdom four hundred leagues distant."(2) By the treaties of Etaples and Senlis, he purchased a reconciliation with Henry the Seventh of England, and with Maximilian, the emperor elect; and finally, by that of Barcelona, effected an amicable adjustment of his difficulties with Spain.(3)

This treaty, which involved the restoration of Roussillon and Cerdagne, was of great importance to the crown of Aragon. These provinces, it will be remembered, had been originally mortgaged by Ferdinand's father, King John the Second, to Louis the Eleventh of France, for the sum of three hundred thousand crowns, in consideration of aid to be afforded by the latter monarch against the Catalan insurgents. Although the stipulated sum had never been paid by Aragon, yet a plausible pretext for requiring the restitution was afforded by Louis the Eleventh's incomplete performance of his engagements, as well as by the ample reimbursement which the French government had already derived from the revenues of these countries.(4)

(1) The conflicting claims of Anjou and Aragon are stated at length by Gaillard, with more candour and impartiality than were to be expected from a French writer. (*Histoire de François I.*; Paris, 1769; tom. i. pp. 71—92.) They form the subject of a juvenile essay of Gibbon, in which we may discern the germs of many of the peculiarities which afterwards characterised the historian of the Decline and Fall.—*Miscellaneous Works* (London, 1814), vol. iii. pp. 206—222.

(2) *Essai sur les Mœurs*, chap. 107.—His politic father, Louis XI., acted on this principle, for he made no attempt to maintain his pretensions to Naples; although Mably affects to doubt whether this were not the result of necessity rather than policy: "Il est douteux si cette modération fut l'ouvrage d'une connoissance approfondie de ses vrais intérêts, ou seulement de cette défiance qu'il avoit des grands de son royaume, et qu'il n'osoit perdre de vue."—*Observations sur l'Histoire de France, Œuvres* (Paris, 1794-5, liv. 6, chap. 4).

(3) Flissan, *Histoire de la Diplomatie Française* (Paris, 1809), tom. i. pp. 254—259.—Dumont, *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens* (Amsterdam, 1726-31), tom. iii. pp. 297—300.

(4) See the narrative of these transactions in the Fifth and Sixth Chapters of Part I. of this History. Most historians seem to take it for granted that Louis XI. advanced a sum of money to the king of Aragon; and some state that payment of the debt for which the provinces were mortgaged was subse-

This treaty had long been a principal object of Ferdinand's policy. He had not, indeed, confined himself to negotiation, but had made active demonstrations more than once of occupying the contested territory by force. Negotiation, however, was more consonant to his habitual policy; and, after the termination of the Moorish war, he pressed it with the utmost vigour, repairing with the queen to Barcelona, in order to watch over the deliberations of the envoys of the two nations at Figueras.(1)

The French historians accuse Ferdinand of bribing two ecclesiastics, in high influence at their court, to make such a representation of the affair as should alarm the conscience of the young monarch. These holy men insisted on the restoration of Roussillon as an act of justice; since the sums for which it had been mortgaged, though not repaid, had been spent in the common cause of Christendom,—the Moorish war. The soul, they said, could never hope to escape from purgatory, until restitution was made of all property unlawfully held during life. His royal father, Louis the Eleventh, was clearly in this predicament, as he himself would hereafter be, unless the Spanish territories should be relinquished; a measure, moreover, the more obligatory on him, since it was well known to be the dying request of his parent. These arguments made a suitable impression on the young monarch, and a still deeper on his sister, the duchess of Beaujeu, who exercised great influence over him, and who believed her own soul in peril of eternal damnation by deferring the act of restoration any longer. The effect of this cogent reasoning was no doubt greatly enhanced by the reckless impatience of Charles, who calculated no cost in the prosecution of his chimerical enterprise. With these amicable dispositions an arrangement was at length concluded, and received the signatures of the respective monarchs on the same day, being signed by Charles at Tours, and by Ferdinand and Isabella at Barcelona, Jan. 19th, 1493.(2)

guently tendered to the French king. (See among others, Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xii. p. 93; Roscoe, *Life and Pontificate of Leo X.*; London, 1827; vol. i. p. 147.) The first of these statements is a palpable error; and I find no evidence of the last in any Spanish authority, where, if true, it would naturally have been noticed. I must, indeed, except Bernaldez, who says that Ferdinand having repaid the money borrowed by his father from Louis XI. to Charles VIII., the latter monarch returned it to Isabella, in consideration of the great expenses incurred by the Moorish war. It is a pity that this romantic piece of gallantry does not rest on any better foundation than the curate of Los Palacios, who shows a degree of ignorance in the first part of his statement, that entitles him to little credit in the last. Indeed, the worthy curate, although much to be relied on for what passed in his own province, may be found frequently tripping in the details of what passed out of it.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 117.

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 4, 7, 10.

(2) Fleury, *Histoire Ecclésiastique*, contin. tom. xxiv. pp. 533—555.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 14.—Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii.

The principal articles of the treaty provided, that the contracting parties should mutually aid each other against all enemies; that they should reciprocally prefer this alliance to that with any other, *the vicar of Christ excepted*; that the Spanish sovereigns should enter into no understanding with any power, *the vicar of Christ excepted*, prejudicial to the interests of France; that their children should not be disposed of in marriage to the kings of England or of the Romans, or to any enemy of France, without the French king's consent. It was finally stipulated that Roussillon and Cerdagne should be restored to Aragon; but that, as doubts might be entertained to which power the possession of these countries rightfully appertained, arbitrators *named by Ferdinand and Isabella* should be appointed, if requested by the French monarch, with full power to decide the question; by whose judgment the contracting parties mutually promised to abide. This last provision, obviously too well guarded to jeopard the interests of the Spanish sovereigns, was introduced to allay in some measure the discontents of the French, who loudly inveighed against their cabinet, as sacrificing the interests of the nation; accusing, indeed, the cardinal D'Albi, the principal agent in the negotiation, of being in the pay of Ferdinand.(1)

The treaty excited equal surprise and satisfaction in Spain, where Roussillon was regarded as of the last importance, not merely from the extent of its resources, but from its local position, which made it the key of Catalonia. The nation, says Zurita, looked on its recovery as scarcely less important than the conquest of Granada; and they doubted some sinister motive, or deeper policy than appeared in the conduct of the French king. He was influenced, however, by no deeper policy than the cravings of a puerile ambition.(2)

The preparations of Charles, in the mean while, excited gene-

pp. 51, 52.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 10.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 6. Comines, alluding to the affair of Roussillon, says that Ferdinand and Isabella, whether from motives of economy or hypocrisy, always employed priests in their negotiations: "Car toutes leurs œuvres ont fait mener et conduire par telles gens (religieux), ou par hypocrisie, ou afin de moins despendre." (*Mémoires*, p. 211.) The French king, however, made more use of the clergy in this very transaction than the Spanish.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 10.

(1) Paolo Giovio, *Historia sui Temporis* (Basiliæ, 1578), lib. 1, p. 16.—The treaty of Barcelona is given at length by Dumont. (*Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iii. pp. 297—300.) It is reported with sufficient inaccuracy by many historians, who make no hesitation in saying that Ferdinand expressly bound himself, by one of the articles, not to interfere with Charles's meditated attempt on Naples. (Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 11.—Voltaire, *Essai sur les Mœurs*, chap. 107.—Comines, *Mémoires*, lib. 8, chap. 23.—Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 1, p. 16.—Varillas, *Politique de l'Espagne*, ou du Roi Ferdinand; Amsterdam, 1688; pp. 11, 12.—Roscoe, *Life of Leo X.* tom. i. chap. 3.) So far from this, there is no allusion whatever to the proposed expedition in the treaty, nor is the name of Naples once mentioned in it.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 13.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, ubi supra.

ral alarm throughout Italy. Ferdinand, the old king of Naples, who in vain endeavoured to arrest them by negotiation, had died in the beginning of 1494. He was succeeded by his son Alfonso, a prince of bolder but less political character, and equally odious, from the cruelty of his disposition, with his father. He lost no time in putting his kingdom in a posture of defence; but he wanted the best of all defences, the attachment of his subjects. His interests were supported by the Florentine republic and the pope, whose family had intermarried with the royal house of Naples. Venice stood aloof, secure in her remoteness, unwilling to compromise her interests by too precipitate a declaration in favour of either party.

The European powers regarded the expedition of Charles the Eighth with somewhat different feelings; most of them were not unwilling to see so formidable a prince waste his resources in a remote and chimerical expedition; Ferdinand, however, contemplated with more anxiety an event, which might terminate in the subversion of the Neapolitan branch of his house, and bring a powerful and active neighbour in contact with his own dominions in Sicily. He lost no time in fortifying the faltering courage of the pope by assurances of support. His ambassador, then resident at the papal court, was Gareilasso de la Vega, father of the illustrious poet of that name, and familiar to the reader by his exploits in the Granadine war. This personage with rare political sagacity combined an energy of purpose, which could not fail to infuse courage into the hearts of others. He urged the pope to rely on his master, the king of Aragon, who, he assured him, would devote his whole resources, if necessary, to the protection of his person, honour, and estate. Alexander would gladly have had this promise under the hand of Ferdinand; but the latter did not think it expedient, considering his delicate relations with France, to put himself so far in the power of the wily pontiff.(1)

In the mean time, Charles's preparations went forward with the languor and vacillation resulting from divided councils and multiplied embarrassments. "Nothing essential to the conduct of a war was at hand," says Comines. The king was very young, weak in person, headstrong in will, surrounded by few discreet counsellors, and wholly destitute of the requisite funds.(2) His own impatience, however, was stimulated by that of the youthful chivalry of his court, who burned for an opportunity of distinction; as well as by the representations of the Neapolitan exiles, who hoped under his protection to re-establish themselves in their own country. Several of these, weary with the delay already experienced, made overtures to

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 28.—Bembo, *Istoria Veneziana* (Milano, 1809), tom. i. lib. 2, pp. 118, 119.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 43.

(2) Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 7, Introd.

King Ferdinand to undertake the enterprize on his own behalf, and to assert his legitimate pretensions to the crown of Naples, which, they assured him, a large party in the country was ready to sustain. The sagacious monarch, however, knew how little reliance was to be placed on the reports of exiles, whose imaginations readily exaggerated the amount of disaffection in their own country. But, although the season had not yet arrived for asserting his own paramount claims, he was determined to tolerate those of no other potentate. (1)

Charles entertained so little suspicion of this, that, in the month of June, he despatched an envoy to the Spanish court, requiring Ferdinand's fulfilment of the treaty of Barcelona, by aiding him with men and money, and by throwing open his ports in Sicily for the French navy. "This gracious proposition," says the Aragonese historian, "he accompanied with information of his proposed expedition against the Turks; stating incidentally, as a thing of no consequence, his intention to take Naples by the way." (2)

Ferdinand saw the time was arrived for coming to an explicit declaration with the French court. He appointed a special mission, in order to do this in the least offensive manner possible. The person selected for this delicate task was Alonso de Silva, brother of the count of Cifuentes, and *clavero* of Calatrava, a cavalier possessed of the coolness and address requisite for diplomatic success. (3)

The ambassador, on arriving at the French court, found it at Vienne in all the bustle of preparation for immediate departure. After seeking in vain a private audience from King Charles, he explained to him the purport of his mission in the presence of his courtiers. He assured him of the satisfaction which the king of Aragon had experienced at receiving intelligence of his projected expedition against the infidel. Nothing gave his master so great contentment as to see his brother monarchs employing their arms and expending their revenues against the enemies of the Cross; where even failure was greater gain than success in other wars. He offered Ferdinand's assistance in the prosecution of such wars, even though they should be directed against the Mahometans of Africa, over whom the papal sanction had given Spain exclusive rights of

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 20.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 123.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 7, chap. 3.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 6.—Zurita concludes the arguments which decided Ferdinand against assuming the enterprize, with one which may be considered the gist of the whole matter: "El Rey entendia bien que no era tan facil la causa que se proponia."—Lib. 1, cap. 20.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 31.

(3) Oviedo notices Silva as one of three brothers, all gentle cavaliers, of unblemished honour, remarkable for the plainness of their persons, the elegance and courtesy of their manners, and the magnificence of their style of living. This one, Alonso, he describes as a man of a singularly clear head.—Quincunagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 4.

conquest. He besought the king not to employ his forces, destined to so glorious a purpose, against any one of the princes of Europe, but to reflect how great a scandal this must necessarily bring on the Christian cause; above all, he cautioned him against forming any designs on Naples, since that kingdom was a fief of the church, in whose favour an exception was expressly made by the treaty of Barcelona, which recognised her alliance and protection as paramount to every other obligation. Silva's discourse was responded to by the president of the parliament of Paris in a formal Latin oration, asserting generally Charles's right to Naples, and his resolution to enforce it previously to his crusade against the infidel. As soon as it was concluded, the king rose, and abruptly quitted the apartment.(1)

Some days after, he interrogated the Spanish ambassador whether his master would not, in case of a war with Portugal, feel warranted by the terms of the late treaty in requiring the co-operation of France, and on what plea the latter power could pretend to withhold it. To the first of these propositions the ambassador answered in the affirmative, if it were a defensive war; but not, if an offensive one, of his own seeking: an explanation by no means satisfactory to the French monarch. Indeed he seems not to have been at all prepared for this interpretation of the compact. He had relied on this, as securing without any doubt the non-interference of Ferdinand, if not his actual co-operation in his designs against Naples. The clause touching the rights of the church was too frequent in public treaties to excite any particular attention; and he was astounded at the broad ground which it was now made to cover, and which defeated the sole object proposed by the cession of Ronssillon. He could not disguise his chagrin and indignation at what he deemed the perfidy of the Spanish court. He refused all further intercourse with Silva, and even stationed a sentinel at his gate, to prevent his communication with his subjects; treating him as the envoy, not of an ally, but of an open enemy.(2)

The unexpected and menacing attitude, however, assumed by Ferdinand, failed to arrest the operations of the French monarch, who, having completed his preparations, left Vienne in the month of August, 1494, and crossed the Alps at the head of the most formidable host which had scaled that mountain barrier since the irruption of the northern barbarians.(3)

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, ubi supra.

(2) *Id. id. lib. 1, cap. 31, 41.*

(3) Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xiv. pp. 255, 256. The French army consisted of 3,600 gens d'armes, 20,000 French infantry, and 8,000 Swiss, without including the regular camp followers. (Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xii. p. 132.) The splendour and novelty of their appearance excited a degree of admiration which disarmed in some measure the terror of the Italians. Peter Martyr, whose distance from the theatre of action enabled him to contemplate more calmly the operation of events, beheld with a prophetic eye the magnitude of the calamities impending

It will be unnecessary to follow his movements in detail. It is sufficient to remark, that his conduct throughout was equally defective in principle and in sound policy. He alienated his allies by the most signal acts of perfidy, seizing their fortresses for himself, and entering their capitals with all the vaunt and insolent port of a conqueror. On his approach to Rome, the pope and the cardinals took refuge in the castle of St. Angelo, and, on the 31st of December, 1494, Charles defiled into the city at the head of his victorious chivalry; if victorious they could be called, when, as an Italian historian remarks, they had scarcely broken a lance, or spread a tent, in the whole of their progress. (1)

The Italians were panic-struck at the aspect of troops so different from their own, and so superior to them in organisation, science, and military equipment; and still more in a remorseless ferocity of temper, which had rarely been witnessed in their own feuds. Warfare was conducted on peculiar principles in Italy, adapted to the character and circumstances of the people. The business of fighting, in her thriving communities, instead of forming part of the regular profession of a gentleman, as in other countries at this period, was intrusted to the hands of a few soldiers of fortune,—*condottieri*, as they were called, who hired themselves out, with the forces under their command, consisting exclusively of heavy-armed cavalry, to whatever state would pay them best. These forces constituted the capital, as it were, of the military chief, whose obvious interest it was to economise as far as possible all unnecessary expenditure of his resources. Hence the science of defence was almost exclusively studied. The object seemed to be not so much the annoyance of the enemy, as self-preservation. The common interests of the *condottieri* being paramount to every obligation towards the state which they served, they easily came to an understanding with one another to spare their troops as much as possible; until at length battles were fought with little more personal hazard than would be incurred in an ordinary tourney. The man-at-arms was riveted into plates of steel of sufficient thickness to turn a musket-ball. The ease of the soldier was so far consulted, that the artillery, in a siege, was not allowed to be fired on either side from sunset to sunrise, for fear of disturbing his repose. Prisoners were made for the sake of their ransom, and but little blood was spilled in an

over his country. In one of his letters he writes thus: "Scribitur exercitum visum fuisse nostrâ tempestate nullum unquam nitidiorum. Et qui futuri sunt calamitatis participes, Carorum aciesque illius ac peditum turmas laudibus extollunt; sed Italorum impensâ instructas." (Opus Epist. epist. 143.) He concludes another with this remarkable prediction: "Perimeris, Gallie, ex majori parte, nec in patriam redibis. Jacobis insepultus; sed tua non restituetur strages Italia."—Epist. 123.

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 1, p. 71.—Scipione Ammirato, *Istorie Fiorentine* (Firenze, 1647), p. 205.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, tom. iii. lib. 29, Introd.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 7, chap. 17.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3 dial. 43.



action. Machiavelli records two engagements, at Anghiari and Castracaro, among the most noted of the time for their important consequences. The one lasted four hours, and the other half a day. The reader is hurried along through all the bustle of a well-contested fight, in the course of which the field is won and lost several times; but when he comes to the close, and looks for the list of killed and wounded, he finds to his surprise not a single man slain in the first of these actions; and in the second, only one, who, having tumbled from his horse, and being unable to rise, from the weight of his armour, was suffocated in the mud! Thus war became disarmed of its terrors. Courage was no longer essential in a soldier; and the Italian, made effeminate, if not timid; was incapable of encountering the adventurous daring and severe discipline of the northern warrior.(1)

The astonishing success of the French was still more imputable to the free use and admirable organization of their infantry, whose strength lay in the Swiss mercenaries. Machiavelli ascribes the misfortunes of his nation chiefly to its exclusive reliance on cavalry.(2) This service, during the whole of the middle ages, was considered among the European nations the most important; the horse being styled by way of eminence "the battle." The memorable conflict of Charles the Bold with the Swiss mountaineers, however, in which the latter broke in pieces the celebrated Burgundian *ordonnance*, constituting the finest body of chivalry of the age, demonstrated the capacity of infantry; and the Italian wars, in which we are now engaged, at length fully re-established its ancient superiority.

The Swiss were formed into battalions varying from three to eight thousand men each. They wore little defensive armour, and their principal weapon was the pike, eighteen feet long. Formed into these solid battalions, which, bristling with spears all round, received the technical appellation of the *hedgehog*, they presented an invulnerable front on every quarter. In the level field, with free scope allowed for action, they bore down all opposition, and received unshaken the most desperate charges of the steel-clad cavalry on their terrible array of pikes. They were too unwieldy, however, for rapid or complicated manœuvres; they were easily disconcerted by any unforeseen impediment, or irregularity of the ground; and the event proved, that the Spanish foot, armed with its short swords and bucklers, by breaking in under the long pikes of its enemy, could succeed in bringing him to close action, where his formidable weapon was of no avail. It was repeating the ancient lesson of the Roman legion and the Macedonian phalanx.(3)

(1) Du Bos, Histoire de la Ligue faite à Cambray (Paris, 1728), tom. 1. dissert. prélim.—Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine, lib. 5.—Denina, Rivoluzioni d'Italia, lib. 18, cap. 3.

(2) Arte della Guerra, lib. 2.

(3) Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra, lib. 3.—Du Bos, Ligue de Cambray,

In artillery, the French were at this time in advance of the Italians, perhaps of every nation in Europe. The Italians, indeed, were so exceedingly defective in this department, that their best field-pieces consisted of small copper tubes, covered with wood and hides. They were mounted on unwieldy carriages drawn by oxen, and followed by cars or waggons loaded with stone balls. These guns were worked so awkwardly, that the besieged, says Guicciardini, had time between the discharges to repair the mischief inflicted by them. From these circumstances, artillery was held in so little repute, that some of the most competent Italian writers thought it might be dispensed with altogether in field engagements.(1)

The French, on the other hand, were provided with a beautiful train of ordnance, consisting of bronze cannon about eight feet in length, and many smaller pieces.(2) They were lightly mounted, drawn by horses, and easily kept pace with the rapid movements of the army. They discharged iron balls, and were served with admirable skill, intimidating their enemies by the rapidity and accuracy of their fire, and easily demolishing their fortifications, which, before this invasion, were constructed with little strength or science.(3)

The rapid successes of the French spread consternation among the Italian states, who now for the first time, seemed to feel the existence of a common interest, and the necessity of efficient concert. Ferdinand was active in promoting these dispositions, through his ministers, Garcilasso de la Vega and Alonso de Silva. The latter had quitted the French court on its entrance into Italy, and withdrawn to Genoa. From this point he opened a correspondence with Ludovico Sforza, who now began to understand that he had brought a terrible engine into play, the movements of which, however mischievous to himself, were beyond his strength to control. Silva endeavoured to inflame still further his jealousy of the French, who had already given him many serious causes of disgust; and, in order to detach him more effectually from Charles's interests, encouraged him with the hopes of forming a matrimonial alliance for his son with one of the infantas of Spain. At the same time he used every effort to bring about a co-operation between the duke and

tom. i. dis. prélim.—Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 2, p. 41. Polybius, in his minute account of this celebrated military institution of the Greeks, has recapitulated nearly all the advantages and defects imputed to the Swiss *hérisson* by modern European writers. (See lib. 17, sec. 25, et seq.) It is singular that these exploded arms and tactics should be revived, after the lapse of nearly seventeen centuries, to be foiled again in the same manner as before.

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. pp. 45, 46.—Machiavelli, *Arte della Guerra*, lib. 3.—Du Bos, *Ligue de Cambray*, ubi supra.

(2) Guicciardini speaks of the name of "cannon," which the French gave to their pieces, as a novelty at that time in Italy.—*Istoria*, pp. 45, 46.

(3) Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 2, p. 42.—Machiavelli, *Arte della Guerra*, lib. 7.

the republic of Venice, thus opening the way to the celebrated league which was concluded in the following year.(1)

The Roman pontiff had lost no time, after the appearance of the French army in Italy, in pressing the Spanish court to fulfil its engagements. He endeavoured to propitiate the good-will of the sovereigns by several important concessions. He granted to them and their successors the *tercias*, or two-ninths of the tithes, throughout the dominions of Castile; an impost still forming part of the regular revenue of the crown.(2) He caused bulls of crusade to be promulgated throughout Spain, granting at the same time a tenth of the ecclesiastical rents, with the understanding that the proceeds should be devoted to the protection of the Holy See. Towards the close of this year, 1494, or the beginning of the following, he conferred the title of Catholic on the Spanish sovereigns, in consideration, as is stated, of their eminent virtues, their zeal in defence of the true faith and the apostolic see, their reformation of conventual discipline, their subjugation of the Moors of Granada, and the purification of their dominions from the Jewish heresy. This orthodox title, which still continues to be the jewel most prized in the Spanish crown, has been appropriated in a peculiar manner to Ferdinand and Isabella, who are universally recognised in history as *Los Reyes Católicos*.(3)

Ferdinand was too sensible of the peril to which the occupa-

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 1, cap. 35.—Alonso de Silva acquitted himself to the entire satisfaction of the sovereigns in his difficult mission. He was subsequently sent on various others to the different Italian courts, and uniformly sustained his reputation for ability and prudence. He did not live to be old.—Oviedo, *Quineuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 4.

(2) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 6.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Monarquía*, lib. 3, cap. 14. This branch of the revenue yields at the present day, according to Laborde, about 6,000,000 reals, or 1,500,000 francs.—*Itinéraire*, tom. vi. p. 51.

(3) Zurita, *Abarca*, and other Spanish historians, fix the date of Alexander's grant at the close of 1496. (*Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 40.—*Reyes de Aragón*, rey 30, cap. 9.) Martyr notices it with great particularity as already conferred, in a letter of February, 1495. (*Opus Epist. epist.* 157.) The pope, according to Comines, designed to compliment Ferdinand and Isabella for their conquest of Granada, by transferring to them the title of Most Christian, hitherto enjoyed by the kings of France. He had even gone so far as to address them thus in more than one of his briefs. This produced a remonstrance from a number of the cardinals, which led him to substitute the title of Most Catholic. The epithet of Catholic was not new in the royal house of Castile, nor indeed of Aragón; having been given to the Asturian prince Alfonso I., about the middle of the eighth, and to Pedro II. of Aragón, at the beginning of the thirteenth century. I will remark, in conclusion, that although the phrase *Los Reyes Católicos*, as applied to a female equally with a male, would have a whimsical appearance literally translated into English, it is perfectly consonant to the Spanish idiom, which requires that all words having reference to both a masculine and a feminine noun should be expressed in the former gender. So also in the ancient languages; *Ἡμεν Τύραννοι*, says Queen Hecuba (Euripides, *ΤΡΩΑΔ.* v. 476). But it is clearly incorrect to render *Los Reyes Católicos*, as usually done by English writers, by the corresponding term of "Catholic kings."

tion of Naples by the French would expose his own interests, to require any stimulant to action from the Roman pontiff. Naval preparations had been going forward during the summer, in the ports of Galicia and Guipuscoa. A considerable armament was made ready for sea by the latter part of December at Alicant, and placed under the command of Gálceran de Requesens, count of Trevento. The land forces were intrusted to Gonsalvo de Cordova, better known in history as the Great Captain. Instructions were at the same time sent to the viceroy of Sicily, to provide for the security of that island, and to hold himself in readiness to act in concert with the Spanish fleet.(1)

Ferdinand, however, determined to send one more embassy to Charles the Eighth, before coming to an open rupture with him. He selected for this mission Juan de Albion and Antonio de Fonseca, brother of the bishop of that name, whom we have already noticed as superintendent of the Indian department. The two envoys reached Rome, January 28th, 1495, the same day on which Charles set out on his march for Naples. They followed the army, and on arriving at Velctri, about twenty miles from the capital, were admitted to an audience by the monarch, who received them in the presence of his officers. The ambassadors freely enumerated the various causes of complaint entertained by their master against the French king; the insult offered to him in the person of his minister, Alonso de Silva; the contumelious treatment of the pope, and forcible occupation of the fortresses and estates of the church; and, finally, the enterprise against Naples, the claims to which, as a papal fief, could of right be determined in no other way than by the arbitration of the pontiff himself. Should King Charles consent to accept this arbitration, they tendered the good offices of their master as mediator between the parties; should he decline it, however, the king of Spain stood absolved from all further obligations of amity with him, by the terms of the treaty of Barcelona, which expressly recognised his right to interfere in defence of the church.(2)

Charles, who could not dissemble his indignation during this discourse, retorted with great acrimony, when it was concluded, on the conduct of Ferdinand, which he stigmatised as perfidious; accusing him, at the same time, of a deliberate design to circumvent him, by introducing into their treaty the clause respecting the pope. As to the expedition against Naples, he had now gone too far to recede; and it would be soon enough to canvas the question of right when he had got possession of

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, cap. 41.—Quintana, *Vidas de Españoles Célebres* (Madrid, 1807, 1830), tom. i. p. 222.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1495.

(2) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 136.—Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xii. pp. 192—194.—Garibay, *Compendio*, lib. 19, cap. 4.

it. His courtiers, at the same time, with the impetuosity of their nation, heightened by the insolence of success, told the envoys that they knew well enough how to defend their rights with their arms, and that King Ferdinand would find the French chivalry enemies of quite another sort from the holiday tilers of Granada.

These taunts led to mutual recrimination, until at length Fonseca, though naturally a sedate person, was so far transported with anger that he exclaimed, "The issue then must be left to God, — arms must decide it;" and, producing the original treaty, bearing the signatures of the two monarchs, he tore it in pieces before the eyes of Charles and his court. At the same time he commanded two Spanish knights who served in the French army to withdraw from it, under pain of incurring the penalties of treason. The French cavaliers were so much incensed by this audacious action, that they would have seized the envoys, and, in all probability, offered violence to their persons, but for Charles's interposition, who with more coolness caused them to be conducted from his presence, and sent back under a safe escort to Rome. Such are the circumstances reported by the French and Italian writers of this remarkable interview. They were not aware that the dramatic exhibition, as far as the ambassadors were concerned, was all previously concerted before their departure from Spain. (1)

Charles pressed forward on his march without further delay. Alfonso the Second, losing his confidence and martial courage, the only virtues that he possessed, at the crisis when they were most demanded, had precipitately abandoned his kingdom while the French were at Rome, and taken refuge in Sicily, where he formally abdicated the crown in favour of his son, Ferdinand the Second. This prince, then twenty-five years of age, whose amiable manners were rendered still more attractive by contrast with the ferocious temper of his father, was possessed of talent and energy competent to the present emergency, had he been sustained by his subjects. But the latter, besides being struck with the same panic which had paralysed the other people of Italy, had too little interest in the government to be willing to hazard much in its defence. A change of dynasty was only a change of masters, by which they had little either to gain or to lose. Though favourably inclined to Ferdinand, they refused to stand by him in his perilous

(1) Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 43.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 1, cap. 43.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 138.—Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 2, p. 46.—Lanuzza, Historias, tom. 1. lib. 1, cap. 6. This appears from a letter of Martyr's, dated three months before the interview; in which he says, "Antonius Fonseca, vir equestris ordinis, et armis clarus, destinatus est orator, qui, cum moneat, ne priusquam de jure inter ipsum et Alfonso regem Neapolitanum decernatur, ulterius procedat. Fert in mandatis Antonius Fonseca, ut Carlo capitulum id sonans ostendat, antequam ipsius oculos (si detrectaverit) pacti veteris chirographum laceret, atque indicat inimicitias."—Opus Epist. epist. 144.

extremity. They gave way in every direction as the French advanced, rendering hopeless every attempt of their spirited young monarch to rally them, till at length no alternative was left, but to abandon his dominions to the enemy without striking a blow in their defence. He withdrew to the neighbouring island of Ischia, whence he soon after passed into Sicily, and occupied himself there in collecting the fragments of his party, until the time should arrive for more decisive action.(1)

Charles the Eighth made his entrance into Naples at the head of his legions February 22nd, 1495, having traversed this whole extent of hostile territory in less time than would be occupied by a fashionable tourist of the present day. The object of his expedition was now achieved. He seemed to have reached the consummation of his wishes; and, although he assumed the titles of King of Sicily and of Jerusalem, and affected the state and authority of emperor, he took no measures for prosecuting his chimerical enterprise further. He even neglected to provide for the security of his present conquest; and, without bestowing a thought on the government of his new dominions, resigned himself to the licentious and effeminate pleasures so congenial with the soft voluptuousness of the climate and his own character.(2)

While Charles was thus wasting his time and resources in frivolous amusements, a dark storm was gathering in the north. There was not a state through which he had passed, however friendly to his cause, which had not complaints to make of his insolence, his breach of faith, his infringement of their rights, and his exorbitant exactions. His impolitic treatment of Sforza had long since alienated that wily and restless politician, and raised suspicions in his mind of Charles's designs against his own duchy of Milan. The emperor elect, Maximilian, whom the French king thought to have bound to his interests by the treaty of Senlis, took umbrage at his assumption of the imperial title and dignity. The Spanish ambassadors, Garcilasso de la Vega, and his brother Lorenzo Suarez, the latter of whom resided at Venice, were indefatigable in stimulating the spirit of discontent. Suarez, in particular, used every effort to secure the co-operation of Venice; representing to the government, in the most urgent terms, the necessity of general concert and instant action among the great powers of Italy, if they would preserve their own liberties.(3)

(1) Comines, Mémoires, lib. 7, chap. 16.—Villeneuve, Mémoires, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xii. p. 260.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 26.—Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 1, 2.

(2) Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 2, p. 55.—Giamone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 1, 2.—André de la Vigne, Histoire de Charles VIII. (Paris, 1617), p. 201.

(3) Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. ii. p. 56.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. pp. 86, 87.—Bembo, Istoria Veneziana, tom. i. lib. 2, p. 129.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 3, 5.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 7, chap. 19.

Venice, from its remote position, seemed to afford the best point for coolly contemplating the general interests of Italy. Envoys of the different European powers were assembled there, as if by common consent, with the view of concerting some scheme of operation for their mutual good. The conferences were conducted by night, and with such secrecy as to elude for some time the vigilant eye of Comines, the sagacious minister of Charles, then resident at the capital. The result was the celebrated league of Venice.<sup>(1)</sup> It was signed the last day of March, 1495, on the part of Spain, Austria, Rome, Milan, and the Venetian republic. The ostensible object of the treaty, which was to last twenty-five years, was the preservation of the estates and rights of the confederates, especially of the Roman see. A large force, amounting in all to thirty-four thousand horse and twenty thousand foot, was to be assessed in stipulated proportions on each of the contracting parties. The secret articles of the treaty, however, went much further, providing a formidable plan of offensive operations. It was agreed in these, that King Ferdinand should employ the Spanish armament, now arrived in Sicily, in re-establishing his kinsman on the throne of Naples; that a Venetian fleet, of forty galleys, should attack the French positions on the Neapolitan coasts; that the duke of Milan should expel the French from Asti, and blockade the passes of the Alps, so as to intercept the passage of further reinforcements; and that the emperor and the king of Spain should invade the French frontiers, and their expenses be defrayed by subsidies from the allies.<sup>(2)</sup> Such were the terms of this treaty, which may be regarded as forming an era in modern political history, since it exhibits the first example of those extensive combinations among European princes, for mutual defence, which afterwards became so frequent. It shared the fate of many other coalitions, where the name and authority of the whole have been made subservient to the interests of some one of the parties more powerful or more cunning than the rest.

The intelligence of the new treaty diffused general joy throughout Italy. In Venice, in particular, it was greeted with *fêtes*, illuminations, and the most emphatic public rejoicing, in the very eyes of the French minister, who was compelled to witness this unequivocal testimony of the detestation in which his countrymen were held.<sup>(2)</sup> The tidings fell

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 2, p. 88.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 7, chap. 20.—Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. i. lib. 2, pp. 122, 123.—Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. pp. 255, 256.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 5.

(2) Comines, *Mémoires*, p. 96.—Comines takes great credit to himself for his perspicacity in detecting the secret negotiations carried on at Venice against his master. According to Bembo, however, the affair was managed with such profound caution as to escape his notice until it was officially announced by the doge himself; when he was so much astounded by the

heavily on the ears of the French at Naples. It dispelled the dream of idle dissipation in which they were dissolved. They felt little concern, indeed, on the score of their Italian enemies, whom their easy victories taught them to regard with the same insolent contempt that the paladins of romance are made to feel for the unknighly rabble, myriads of whom they could overturn with a single lance. But they felt serious alarm as they beheld the storm of war gathering from other quarters,—from Spain and Germany, in defiance of the treaties by which they had hoped to secure them. Charles saw the necessity of instant action. Two courses presented themselves; either to strengthen himself in his new conquests, and prepare to maintain them until he could receive fresh reinforcements from home, or to abandon them altogether and retreat across the Alps, before the allies could muster in sufficient strength to oppose him. With the indiscretion characteristic of his whole enterprise, he embraced a middle course, and lost the advantages which would have resulted from the exclusive adoption of either.

The principal light by which we are to be guided through the remainder of this history is the Aragonese annalist Zurita, whose great work, although less known abroad than those of some more recent Castilian writers, sustains a reputation at home, unsurpassed by any other, in the great substantial qualities of an historian. The notice of his life and writings has been swelled into a bulky quarto by Dr. Diego Dormer, in a work entitled, "*Prograssos de la Historia en el Reyno de Aragon: Zaragoza, 1680*;" from which I extract a few particulars.

Gerónimo Zurita, descended from an ancient and noble family, was born at Saragossa, December 4th, 1512. He was matriculated at an early age in the university of Alcalá. He there made extraordinary proficiency under the immediate instruction of the learned Nuñez de Guzman, commonly called El Pinciano. He became familiar with the ancient, and a variety of modern tongues, and attracted particular attention by the purity and elegance of his Latinity. His personal merits and his father's influence recommended him, soon after quitting the university, to the notice of the emperor Charles V. He was consulted and employed in affairs of public importance, and subsequently raised to several posts of honour, attesting the entire confidence reposed in his integrity and abilities. His most honourable appointment, however, was that of national historiographer.

In 1547, an act passed the cortes general of Aragon, providing for the office of national chronicler, with a fixed salary, whose duty it should be to compile, from authentic sources, a faithful history of the monarchy. The talents and eminent qualifications of Zurita recommended him to this post, and he was raised to it by the unanimous consent of the legislature in the following year, 1548. From this time he conscientiously devoted himself to the execution of his great task. He visited every part of his own country, as well as Sicily and Italy, for the purpose of collecting materials. The public archives, and every accessible source of information, were freely thrown open to his inspection by order of the government; and he returned from his literary pilgrimage with a large accumulation of rare and original documents. The first portion of his

intelligence, that he was obliged to ask the secretary of the senate, who accompanied him home, the particulars of what the doge had said, as his ideas were so confused at the time that he had not perfectly comprehended it.—*Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 2, pp. 128, 129.



Annals was published at Saragossa, in two volumes folio, 1562. The work was not completed until nearly twenty years later; and the last two volumes were printed under his own eye at Saragossa, in 1580, a few months only before his death. This edition, being one of those used in the present history, is in large folio, fairly executed, with double columns on the page, in the fashion of most of the ancient Spanish historians. The whole work was again published, as before, at the expense of the state, in 1585, by his son, amended and somewhat enlarged, from the manuscripts left by his father. Bouterwek has fallen into the error of supposing that no edition of Zurita's Annals appeared till after the reign of Philip II., who died in 1592. (*Geschichte der Poesie und Beredsamkeit*, band iii. p. 319).

No incidents worthy of note seem to have broken the peaceful tenor of Zurita's life; which he terminated at Saragossa, in the sixty-eighth year of his age, in the monastery of Santa Eulracia, to which he had retired during a temporary residence in the city, to superintend the publication of his Annals. His rich collection of books and manuscripts was left to the Carthusian monastery of Aula Dei: but, from accident or neglect, the greater part have long since perished. His remains were interred in the convent where he died; and a monument, bearing a modest inscription, was erected over them by his son.

The best monument of Zurita, however, is his Annals. They take up the history of Aragon from its first rise after the Arabic conquest, and continue it to the death of Ferdinand the Catholic. The reign of this prince, as possessing the largest interest and importance, is expanded into two volumes folio; being one-third of the whole work.

The minuteness of Zurita's investigations has laid him open to the charge of prolixity, especially in the earlier and less important periods. It should be remembered, however, that his work was to be the great national repository of facts, interesting to his own countrymen, but which, from difficulty of access to authentic sources, could never before be fully exhibited to their inspection. But, whatever be thought of his redundancy in this or the subsequent parts of his narrative, it must be admitted that he has uniformly and emphatically directed the attention of the reader to the topics most worthy of it; sparing no pains to illustrate the constitutional antiquities of the country, and to trace the gradual formation of her liberal polity, instead of wasting his strength on mere superficial gossip, like most of the chroniclers of the period.

There is no Spanish historian less swayed by party or religious prejudice, or by the feeling of nationality, which is so apt to overflow in the loyal effusions of the Castilian writers. This laudable temperance, indeed, has brought on him the rebuke of more than one of his patriotic countrymen. There is a sobriety and coolness in his estimate of historical evidence, equally removed from temerity on the one hand, and credulity on the other; in short, his whole manner is that of a man conversant with public business, and free from the closet pedantry which too often characterises the monkish annalists. The greater part of his life was passed under the reign of Charles V., when the spirit of the nation was not yet broken by arbitrary power, nor debased by the melancholy superstition which settled on it under his successor; an age in which the memory of ancient liberty had not wholly faded away, and when, if men did not dare express all they thought, they at least thought with a degree of independence which gave a masculine character to their expression. In this, as well as in the liberality of his religious sentiments, he may be compared favourably with his celebrated countryman Mariana, who, educated in the cloister, and at a period when the nation was schooled to maxims of despotism, exhibits few glimpses of the sound criticism and reflection which are to be found in the writings of his Aragonese rival. These seductions of style, however, the more fastidious selection of incidents; in short, the superior graces of narration, have given a wider fame to the former, whose works have passed into most of the cultivated languages of Europe, while those of Zurita remain, as far as I am aware, still undisturbed in the vernacular.

## CHAPTER II.

ITALIAN WARS.—RETREAT OF CHARLES VIII.—CAMPAIGNS OF GONSALVO DE CORDOVA.—FINAL EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH.

1495—1496.

Impolitic Conduct of Charles—He plunders the Works of Art—Gonsalvo de Cordova.—His brilliant Qualities—Raised to the Italian command—Battle of Seminara—Gonsalvo's Successes—Decline of the French—He receives the title of Great Captain—Expulsion of the French from Italy.

CHARLES THE EIGHTH might have found abundant occupation, during his brief residence at Naples, in placing the kingdom in a proper posture of defence, and in conciliating the good-will of the inhabitants, without which he could scarcely hope to maintain himself permanently in his conquest. So far from this, however, he showed the utmost aversion to business, wasting his hours, as has been already noticed, in the most frivolous amusements. He treated the great feudal aristocracy of the country with utter neglect; rendering himself difficult of access, and lavishing all dignities and emoluments with partial prodigality on his French subjects. His followers disgusted the nation still further by their insolence and unbridled licentiousness. The people naturally called to mind the virtues of the exiled Ferdinand, whose temperate rule they contrasted with the rash and rapacious conduct of their new masters. The spirit of discontent spread more widely, as the French were too thinly scattered to enforce subordination. A correspondence was entered into with Ferdinand in Sicily, and in a short time several of the most considerable cities of the kingdom openly avowed their allegiance to the house of Aragon.(1)

In the mean time Charles and his nobles, satiated with a life of inactivity and pleasure, and feeling that they had accomplished the great object of the expedition, began to look with longing eyes towards their own country. Their impatience was converted into anxiety on receiving tidings of the coalition mustering in the north. Charles, however, took care to secure to himself some of the spoils of victory, in a manner which we have seen practised on a much greater scale by his countrymen in our day. He collected the various works of art with which Naples was adorned, precious antiques, sculptured marble and alabaster, gates of bronze curiously wrought, and such archi-

(1) Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 7, chap. 17.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 2.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 2.

tectural ornaments as were capable of transportation, and caused them to be embarked on board his fleet for the south of France, "endeavouring," says the curate of Los Palacios, "to build up his own renown on the ruins of the kings of Naples, of glorious memory." His vessels, however, did not reach their place of destination, but were captured by a Bisoayan and Genoese fleet off Pisa.(1)

Charles had entirely failed in his application to Pope Alexander the Sixth for a recognition of his right to Naples by a formal act of investiture.(2) He determined, however, to go through the ceremony of a coronation; and, on the 12th of May, he made his public entrance into the city, arrayed in splendid robes of scarlet and ermine, with the imperial diadem on his head, a sceptre in one hand, and a globe, the symbol of universal sovereignty, in the other; while the adulatory populace saluted his royal ear with the august title of Emperor. After the conclusion of this farce, he made preparations for his instant departure from Naples. On the 20th of May he set out on his homeward march, at the head of one half of his army, amounting in all to not more than nine thousand fighting men. The other half was left for the defence of his new conquest. This arrangement was highly impolitic, since he neither took with him enough to cover his retreat, nor left enough to secure the preservation of Naples.(3)

It is not necessary to follow the French army in its retrograde movement through Italy. It is enough to say, that this was not conducted with sufficient despatch to anticipate the junction of the allied forces, who assembled to dispute its passage on the banks of the Taro, near Fornovo. An action was there fought, in which King Charles, at the head of his loyal chivalry, achieved such deeds of heroism as shed a lustre over his ill-concerted enterprise, and which, if they did not gain him an undisputed victory, secured the fruits of it, by

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 140—143.—Cicero, in his charges against Verres, makes a remark of the Greeks, that may well apply to the plundered Italians of Charles VIII.'s day, and our own: "Deinde hic ornatus, hæc opera, atque artificia, signa, tabulæ pictæ, Græcos homines nimio opere delectant. Itaque ex illorum querimoniis intelligere possumus hæc illis acerbissima videri, quæ nobis forsitan levia et contemnenda esse videantur. Mihi credite, iudices, cum multas acceperint per hosce annos socii atque externæ nationes calamitates et injurias, nullas Græci homines gravius tulerunt, nec ferunt, quam hujuscemodi spoliaciones sanorum atque oppidorum."—Actio ii. lib. 4, cap. 59.

(2) Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 2. According to Giannone (Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 2), he did obtain the investiture from the pope; but this statement is contradicted by several, and confirmed by none, of the authorities I have consulted.

(3) Brantôme, Hommes Illustres, Œuvres, tom. ii. pp. 3—5.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 2. The particulars of the coronation are recorded with punctilious precision by André de la Vigne, secretary of Queen Anne. (Hist. de Charles VIII. p. 201.) Daru has confounded this farce with Charles's original entry into Naples in February.—Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. liv. 20 p. 247.

enabling him to effect his retreat without further molestation. At Turin he entered into negotiation with the calculating duke of Milan, which terminated in the treaty of Vercelli, October 10th, 1495. By this treaty Charles obtained no other advantage than that of detaching his cunning adversary from the coalition. The Venetians, although refusing to accede to it, made no opposition to any arrangement which would expedite the removal of their formidable foe beyond the Alps. This was speedily accomplished; and Charles, yielding to his own impatience and that of his nobles, recrossed that mountain rampart which nature has so ineffectually provided for the security of Italy, and reached Grenoble with his army on the 27th of the month. Once more restored to his own dominions, the young monarch abandoned himself without reserve to the licentious pleasures to which he was passionately addicted, forgetting alike his dreams of ambition, and the brave companions in arms whom he had deserted in Italy. Thus ended this memorable expedition, which, though crowned with complete success, was attended with no other permanent result to its authors than that of opening the way to those disastrous wars which wasted the resources of their country for a great part of the sixteenth century.(1)

Charles the Eighth had left as his viceroy in Naples Gilbert de Bourbon, duke of Montpensier, a prince of the blood, and a brave and loyal nobleman, but of slender military capacity, and so fond of his bed, says Comines, that he seldom left it before noon. The command of the forces in Calabria was intrusted to M. d'Aubigny, a Scottish cavalier of the house of Stuart, raised by Charles to the dignity of grand constable of France. He was so much esteemed for his noble and chivalrous qualities, that he was styled by the annalists of that day, says Brantôme, "grand chevalier sans reproche." He had large experience in military matters, and was reputed one of the best officers in the French service. Besides these principal commanders, there were others of subordinate rank stationed at the head of small detachments on different points of the kingdom, and especially in the fortified cities along the coasts.(2)

Scarcely had Charles the Eighth quitted Naples, when his rival, Ferdinand, who had already completed his preparations in Sicily, made a descent on the southern extremity of Calabria. He was supported in this by the Spanish levies under the admiral Requesens, and Gonsalvo of Cordova, who reached

(1) Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, apud Petitot, *Collection de Mémoires*, tom. xiv. pp. 262, 263.—Flaßan, *Diplomatie Française*, tom. i. pp. 267—269.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 10—12, 18. "Les conquêtes," observes Montesquieu, "sont aisées à faire, parce qu'on les fait avec toutes ses forces: elles sont difficiles à conserver, parce qu'on ne les défend qu'avec une partie de ses forces."—Grandeur et Décadence des Romains, chap. 4.

(2) Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 1.—Brantôme, *Hommes Illustres*, tom. ii. p. 59.

Sicily in the month of May. As the latter of these commanders was destined to act a most conspicuous part in the Italian wars, it may not be amiss to give some account of his early life.

Gonzalo Fernández de Cordova, or Aguilar, as he is sometimes styled from the territorial title assumed by his branch of the family, was born at Montilla, in 1453. His father died early, leaving two sons, Alonso de Aguilar, whose name occurs in some of the most brilliant passages of the war of Granada, and Gonsalvo, three years younger than his brother. During the troubled reigns of John the Second and Henry the Fourth, the city of Cordova was divided by the feuds of the rival families of Cabra and Aguilar; and it is reported that the citizens of the latter faction, after the loss of their natural leader, Gonsalvo's father, used to testify their loyalty to his house by bearing the infant children along with them in their rencontres; thus Gonsalvo may be said to have been literally nursed amid the din of battle.(1)

On the breaking out of the civil wars, the two brothers attached themselves to the fortunes of Alfonso and Isabella. At their court, the young Gonsalvo soon attracted attention by the uncommon beauty of his person, his polished manners, and proficiency in all knightly exercises. He indulged in a profuse magnificence in his apparel, equipage, and general style of living; a circumstance which, accompanied with his brilliant qualities, gave him the title at the court of *el príncipe de los caballeros*, the prince of cavaliers. This carelessness of expense, indeed, called forth more than once the affectionate remonstrance of his brother Alonso, who, as the elder son, had inherited the *mayorazgo*, or family estate, and who provided liberally for Gonsalvo's support. He served during the Portuguese war under Alonso de Cardenas, grand master of St. James, and was honoured with the public commendations of his general for his signal display of valour at the battle of Albuera; where, it is remarked, the young hero incurred an unnecessary degree of personal hazard by the ostentatious splendour of his armour. Of this commander, and of the count of Tendilla, Gonsalvo always spoke with the greatest deference, acknowledging that he had learned the rudiments of war from them.(2)

The long war of Granada, however, was the great school in which his military discipline was perfected. He did not, it is true, occupy so eminent a position in these campaigns as some other chiefs of riper years and more enlarged experience; but on various occasions he displayed uncommon proofs both of address and valour. He particularly distinguished himself at the capture of Tájara, Illora, and Monte Frio. At the last

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 7.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 204, 205.

(2) Pulgar, *Sumario de las Hazañas del Gran Capitan* (Madrid, 1834), p. 145.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 205, et seq.

place he headed the sealing party, and was the first to mount the walls in the face of the enemy. He well-nigh closed his career in a midnight skirmish before Granada, which occurred a short time before the end of the war. In the heat of the struggle his horse was slain; and Gonsalvo, unable to extricate himself from the morass in which he was entangled, would have perished, but for a faithful servant of the family, who mounted him on his own horse, briefly commending to his master the care of his wife and children. Gonsalvo escaped, but his brave follower paid for his loyalty with his life. At the conclusion of the war, he was selected, together with Ferdinand's secretary Zafra, in consequence of his plausible address, and his familiarity with the Arabic, to conduct the negotiation with the Moorish government. He was secretly introduced for this purpose by night into Granada, and finally succeeded in arranging the terms of capitulation with the unfortunate Abdallah, as has been already stated. In consideration of his various services, the Spanish sovereigns granted him a pension, and a large landed estate in the conquered territory.(1)

After the war, Gonsalvo remained with the court, and his high reputation and brilliant exterior made him one of the most distinguished ornaments of the royal circle. His manners displayed all the romantic gallantry characteristic of the age, of which the following, among other instances, is recorded. The queen accompanied her daughter Joanna on board the fleet which was to bear her to Flanders, the country of her destined husband. After bidding adieu to the infanta, Isabella returned in her boat to the shore; but the waters were so swollen that it was found difficult to make good a footing for her on the beach. As the sailors were preparing to drag the bark higher up the strand, Gonsalvo, who was present, and dressed, as the Castilian historians are careful to inform us, in a rich suit of brocade and crimson velvet, unwilling that the person of his royal mistress should be profaned by the touch of such rude hands, waded into the water, and bore the queen in his arms to the shore, amid the shouts and plaudits of the spectators. The incident may form a counterpart to the well-known anecdote of Sir Walter Raleigh.(2)

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 90.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 211, 212.—Coudé, *Dominacion de los Arabes*, tom. iii. cap. 42.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 207—216.—Pulgar, *Sumario*, p. 193. Florian has given circulation to a popular error by his romance of "Gonsalve de Cordove," where the young warrior is made to play a part he is by no means entitled to, as hero of the Granadine war. Graver writers, who cannot lawfully plead the privilege of romancing, have committed the same error. See, among others, Varillas, *Politique de Ferdinand*, p. 3.

(2) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, p. 214.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan Gonzalo Hernandez de Cordove y Aguilar* (Alcalá de Henares, 1584), cap. 23. Another example of his gallantry occurred during the Granadine war, when the fire of Santa Fe had consumed the royal tent, with the greater part of the queen's apparel and other valuable effects. Gonsalvo, on learning the disaster, at his

Isabella's long and intimate acquaintance with Gonsalvo enabled her to form a correct estimate of his great talents. When the Italian expedition was resolved on, she instantly fixed her eyes on him as the most suitable person to conduct it. She knew that he possessed the qualities essential to success in a new and difficult enterprise,—courage, constancy, singular prudence, dexterity in negotiation, and inexhaustible fertility of resource. She accordingly recommended him, without hesitation, to her husband, as the commander of the Italian army. He approved her choice, although it seems to have caused no little surprise at the court, which, notwithstanding the favour in which Gonsalvo was held by the sovereigns, was not prepared to see him advanced over the heads of veterans of so much riper years and higher military renown than himself. The event proved the sagacity of Isabella. (1)

The part of the squadron destined to convey the new general to Sicily was made ready for sea in the spring of 1495. After a tempestuous voyage, he reached Messina on the 24th of May. He found that Ferdinand of Naples had already begun operations in Calabria, where he had occupied Reggio with the assistance of the admiral Requesens, who reached Sicily with a part of the armament a short time previous to Gonsalvo's arrival. The whole effective force of the Spaniards did not exceed six hundred lances and fifteen hundred foot, besides those employed in the fleet, amounting to about three thousand and five hundred more. The finances of Spain had been too freely drained in the late Moorish war to authorise any extraordinary expenditure; and Ferdinand designed to assist his kinsman rather with his name, than with any great accession of numbers. Preparations, however, were going forward for raising additional levies, especially among the hardy peasantry of the Asturias and Galicia, on which the war of Granada had fallen less heavily than on the south. (2)

On the 26th of May, Gonsalvo de Cordova crossed over to Reggio, in Calabria, where a plan of operation was concerted

castle of Illora, supplied the queen so abundantly from the magnificent wardrobe of his wife, Doña Maria Manrique, as led Isabella pleasantly to remark, that "the fire had done more execution in his quarters than in her own."—Pulgar, Sumario, p. 187.

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, p. 214.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 23.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 7, 24. Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 222.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, ubi supra. Giovio, in his biography of Gonsalvo, estimates these forces at 5,000 foot and 600 horse, which last in his History he raises to 700. I have followed Zurita as presenting the more probable statement, and as generally more accurate in all that relates to his own nation. It is a hopeless task to attempt to reconcile the manifold inaccuracies, contradictions, and discrepancies, which perplex the narratives of the writers on both sides in everything relating to numerical estimates. The difficulty is greatly increased by the extremely vague application of the term *lance*; as we meet with it including six, four, three, or even a less number of followers, as the case might be.

between him and the Neapolitan monarch. Before opening the campaign, several strong places in the province, which owed allegiance to the Aragonese family, were placed in the hands of the Spanish general, as security for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by his government in the war. As Gonsalvo placed little reliance on his Calabrian or Sicilian recruits, he was obliged to detach a considerable part of his Spanish forces to garrison these places.(1)

The presence of their monarch revived the dormant loyalty of his Calabrian subjects. They thronged to his standard, till at length he found himself at the head of six thousand men, chiefly composed of the raw militia of the country. He marched at once with Gonsalvo on St. Agatha, which opened its gates without resistance. He then directed his course towards Seminara, a place of some strength, about eight leagues from Reggio. On his way he cut in pieces a detachment of French on its march to reinforce the garrison there. Seminara imitated the example of St. Agatha, and, receiving the Neapolitan army without opposition, unfurled the standard of Aragon on its walls. While this was going forward, Antonio Grimani, the Venetian admiral, scoured the eastern coasts of the kingdom with a fleet of four-and-twenty galleys, and attacking the strong town of Monopoli, in the possession of the French, put the greater part of the garrison to the sword.

D'Aubigny, who lay at this time with an inconsiderable body of French troops in the south of Calabria, saw the necessity of some vigorous movement to check the further progress of the enemy. He determined to concentrate his forces, scattered through the province, and march against Ferdinand, in the hope of bringing him to a decisive action. For this purpose, in addition to the garrisons dispersed among the principal towns, he summoned to his aid the forces, consisting principally of Swiss infantry, stationed in the Basilicate, under Précý, a brave young cavalier, esteemed one of the best officers in the French service. After the arrival of this reinforcement, aided by the levies of the Angevin barons, D'Aubigny, whose effective strength now greatly surpassed that of his adversary, directed his march towards Seminara.(2)

(1) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 10.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 7. The occupation of these places by Gonsalvo excited the pope's jealousy as to the designs of the Spanish sovereigns. In consequence of his remonstrances, the Castilian envoy, Garcilasso de la Vega, was instructed to direct Gonsalvo, that, "in case any inferior places had been since put into his hands, he should restore them; if they were of importance, however, he was first to confer with his own government." King Ferdinand, as Abarca assures his readers, "was unwilling to give cause of complaint to any one, *unless he were greatly a gainer by it*."—Reyes de Aragón, rey 30, cap. 8.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. v. lib. 2, cap. 8.

(2) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, pp. 215—217.—Idem, *Hist. sui Temporis*, pp. 83—85.—Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 3, pp. 160, 185.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 8.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 2, pp. 88, 92.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 25.



Ferdinand, who had received no intimation of his adversary's junction with Pr  cy, and who considered him much inferior to himself in numbers, no sooner heard of his approach, than he determined to march out at once before he could reach Seminara, and give him battle. Gonsalvo was of a different opinion. His own troops had too little experience in war with the French and Swiss veterans to make him willing to risk all on the chances of a single battle. The Spanish heavy-armed cavalry, indeed, were a match for any in Europe, and were even said to surpass every other in the beauty and excellence of their appointments, at a period when arms were finished to luxury. (1) He had but a handful of these, however; by far the greatest part of his cavalry, consisting of *g  netes*, or light-armed troops, of inestimable service in the wild guerilla warfare to which they had been accustomed in Granada, but obviously incapable of coping with the iron *gendarm  rie* of France. He felt some distrust, too, in bringing his little corps of infantry without further preparation, armed, as they were, only with short swords and bucklers, and much reduced, as has been already stated, in number, to encounter the formidable phalanx of Swiss pikes. As for the Calabrian levies, he did not place the least reliance on them. At all events, he thought it prudent, before coming to action, to obtain more accurate information than they now possessed of the actual strength of the enemy. (2)

In all this, however, he was overruled by the impatience of Ferdinand and his followers. The principal Spanish cavaliers, indeed, as well as the Italian, among whom may be found names which afterwards rose to high distinction in these wars, urged Gonsalvo to lay aside his scruples; representing the impolicy of showing any distrust of their own strength at this crisis, and of balking the ardour of their soldiers now hot for action. The Spanish chief, though far from being convinced, yielded to these earnest remonstrances, and King Ferdinand led out his little army without further delay against the enemy.

After traversing a chain of hills, stretching in an easterly direction from Seminara, at the distance of about three miles, he arrived before a small stream, on the plains beyond which he discerned the French army in rapid advance against him. He resolved to wait its approach; and, taking position on the slope of the hills towards the river, he drew up his horse on the right wing, and his infantry on the left. (3)

The French generals, D'Aubigny and Pr  cy, putting themselves at the head of their cavalry on the left, consisting of about four hundred heavy-armed and twice as many light horse,

(1) Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1.—Du Bos, Ligue de Cambray, Introd. p. 58.

(2) Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 7.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, ubi supra.

(3) Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 216, 217.—Cr  nica del Gran Capitan, cap. 24.—Quintana, Espa  oles C  lebres, tom. i. pp. 223—227.

dashed into the water without hesitation. Their right was occupied by the bristling phalanx of Swiss spearmen in close array; behind these were the militia of the country. The Spanish *ginetes* succeeded in throwing the French *gendarmes* into some disorder, before it could form after crossing the stream; but no sooner was this accomplished, than the Spaniards, incapable of withstanding the charge of their enemy, suddenly wheeled about and precipitately retreated, with the intention of again returning on their assailants, after the fashion of the Moorish tactics. The Calabrian militia, not comprehending this manœuvre, interpreted it into a defeat. They thought the battle lost, and, seized with a panic, broke their ranks, and fled to a man, before the Swiss infantry had time so much as to lower its lances against them.

King Ferdinand in vain attempted to rally the dastardly fugitives. The French cavalry was soon upon them, making frightful slaughter in their ranks. The young monarch, whose splendid arms and towering plumes made him a conspicuous mark in the field, was exposed to imminent peril. He had broken his lance in the body of one of the foremost of the French cavaliers, when his horse fell under him, and as his feet were entangled in the stirrups, he would inevitably have perished in the mêlée, but for the prompt assistance of a young nobleman, named Juan de Altavilla, who mounted his master on his own horse, and calmly waited the approach of the enemy, by whom he was immediately slain. Instances of this affecting loyalty and self-devotion not unfrequently occur in these wars, throwing a melancholy grace over the darker and more ferocious features of the time. (1)

Gonsalvo was seen in the thickest of the fight, long after the king's escape, charging the enemy briskly at the head of his handful of Spaniards, not in the hope of retrieving the day, but of covering the flight of the panic-struck Neapolitans. At length he was borne along by the rushing tide, and succeeded in bringing off the greater part of his cavalry safe to Seminara. Had the French followed up the blow, the greater part of the royal army, with probably King Ferdinand and Gonsalvo at its head, would have fallen into their hands; and thus not only the fate of the campaign, but of Naples itself, would have been permanently decided by this battle. Fortunately the French did not understand so well how to use a victory as to gain it. They made no attempt to pursue. This is imputed to the illness of their general, D'Aubigny, occasioned by the extreme unhealthiness of the climate. He was too feeble to sit long on his horse, and was removed into a litter as soon as the action

(1) Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 3, pp. 83, 85.—*Chronica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 24.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 2.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 2, p. 112.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, p. 699.

was decided. Whatever was the cause, the victors, by this inaction, suffered the golden fruits of victory to escape them. Ferdinand made his escape on the same day on board a vessel which conveyed him back to Sicily; and Gonsalvo, on the following morning before break of day, effected his retreat across the mountains to Reggio, at the head of four hundred Spanish lances. Thus terminated the first battle of importance in which Gonsalvo of Cordova held a distinguished command; the only one which he lost during his long and fortunate career. Its loss, however, attached no discredit to him, since it was entered into in manifest opposition to his judgment. On the contrary, his conduct throughout this affair tended greatly to establish his reputation, by showing him to be no less prudent in council than bold in action.(1)

King Ferdinand, far from being disheartened by this defeat, gained new confidence from his experience of the favourable dispositions existing towards him in Calabria. Relying on a similar feeling of loyalty in his capital, he determined to hazard a bold stroke for its recovery; and that too, instantly, before his late discomfiture should have time to operate on the spirits of his partisans. He accordingly embarked at Messina, with a handful of troops only, on board the fleet of the Spanish admiral Requesens. It amounted in all to eighty vessels, most of them of inconsiderable size. With this armament, which, notwithstanding its formidable show, carried little effective force for land operations, the adventurous young monarch appeared off the harbour of Naples before the end of June.

Charles's viceroy, the duke of Montpensier, at that time garrisoned Naples with six thousand French troops. On the appearance of the Spanish navy, he marched out to prevent Ferdinand's landing, leaving a few only of his soldiers to keep the city in awe. But he had scarcely quitted it before the inhabitants, who had waited with impatience an opportunity for throwing off the yoke, sounded the tocsin, and, rising to arms through every part of the city, and massacring the feeble remains of the garrison, shut the gates against him; while Ferdinand, who had succeeded in drawing off the French commander in another direction, no sooner presented himself before the walls, than he was received with transports of joy by the enthusiastic people.(2)

The French, however, though excluded from the city, by making a circuit, effected an entrance into the fortresses which commanded it. From these posts Montpensier sorely annoyed the town, making frequent attacks on it, day and night, at the

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 1, p. 112.—Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 3, p. 85.—Lanuzza, *Historia*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 7.

(2) Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. vi. p. 519.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. ii. pp. 113, 114.—Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 3, pp. 87, 88.—Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xiv. pp. 264, 265.

head of his gendarmerie, until they were at length checked in every direction by barricades which the citizens hastily constructed with waggons, casks of stones, bags of sand, and whatever came most readily to hand. At the same time, the windows, balconies, and house-tops, were crowded with combatants, who poured down such a deadly shower of missiles on the heads of the French as finally compelled them to take shelter in their defences. Montpensier was now closely besieged, till at length, reduced by famine, he was compelled to capitulate. Before the term prescribed for his surrender had arrived, however, he effected his escape at night by water, to Salerno, at the head of twenty-five hundred men. The remaining garrison, with the fortresses, submitted to the victorious Ferdinand the beginning of the following year. And thus, by one of those sudden turns which belong to the game of war, the exiled prince, whose fortunes a few weeks before appeared perfectly desperate, was again established in the palace of his ancestors.(1)

Montpensier did not long remain in his new quarters. He saw the necessity of immediate action, to counteract the alarming progress of the enemy. He quitted Salerno before the end of winter, strengthening his army by such reinforcements as he could collect from every quarter of the country. With this body he directed his course towards Apulia, with the intention of bringing Ferdinand, who had already established his headquarters there, to a decisive engagement. Ferdinand's force, however, was so far inferior to that of his antagonist, as to compel him to act on the defensive, until he had been reinforced by a considerable body of troops from Venice. The two armies were then so equally matched, that neither cared to hazard all on the fate of a battle; and the campaign wasted away in languid operations, which led to no important result.

In the mean time, Gonsalvo de Cordova was slowly fighting his way up through southern Calabria. The character of the country, rough and mountainous, like the Alpuxarras, and thickly sprinkled with fortified places, enabled him to bring into play the tactics which he had learned in the war of Granada. He made little use of heavy-armed troops, relying on his *ginetes*, and still more on his foot; taking care, however, to avoid any direct encounter with the dreaded Swiss battalions. He made amends for paucity of numbers and want of real strength, by rapidity of movement, and the wily tactics of Moorish warfare; darting on the enemy where least expected, surprising his strongholds at dead of night, entangling him in ambuscades, and desolating the country with those terrible forays whose effects he had so often witnessed on the fair vegas of Granada. He adopted the policy practised by his master, Ferdinand the Catholic, in the Moorish war, lenient to the

(1) Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 3, pp. 38—90, 114—119.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 2, pp. 114—117.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. vi. pp. 520, 521.

submissive foe, but wreaking terrible vengeance on such as resisted.(1)

The French were sorely disconcerted by these irregular operations, so unlike anything to which they were accustomed in European warfare. They were further disheartened by the continued illness of D'Aubigny, and by the growing disaffection of the Calabrians, who in the southern provinces contiguous to Sicily were particularly well-inclined to Spain.

Gonsalvo, availing himself of these friendly dispositions, pushed forward his successes, carrying one stronghold after another, until by the end of the year he had overrun the whole of Lower Calabria.\* His progress would have been still more rapid but for the serious embarrassments which he experienced from want of supplies. He had received some reinforcements from Sicily, but very few from Spain; while the boasted Galician levies, instead of fifteen hundred, had dwindled to scarcely three hundred men, who arrived in the most miserable plight, destitute of clothing and munitions of every kind. He was compelled to weaken still further his inadequate force by garrisoning the conquered places; most of which, however, he was obliged to leave without any defence at all. In addition to this, he was so destitute of the necessary funds for the payment of his troops, that he was detained nearly two months at Nicastro, until February, 1496, when he received a remittance from Spain. After this, he resumed operations with such vigour, that by the end of the following spring he had reduced all Upper Calabria, with the exception of a small corner of the province, in which D'Aubigny still maintained himself. At this crisis he was summoned from the scene of his conquest to the support of the king of Naples, who lay encamped before Atella, a town intrenched among the Apennines, on the western borders of the Basilicate.(2)

The campaign of the preceding winter had terminated without any decisive results, the two armies of Montpensier and King Ferdinand having continued in sight of each other without ever coming to action. These protracted operations were fatal to the French. Their few supplies were intercepted by the peasantry of the country; their Swiss and German mercenaries mutinied and deserted for want of pay; and the Neapolitans in their service went off in great numbers, disgusted with the insolent and overbearing manners of their new allies. Charles the Eighth, in the mean while, was wasting his hours and health in the usual round of profligate pleasures. From the moment of recrossing the Alps he seemed to have shut out

(1) Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 3, pp. 173, 174.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 26.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 218.—Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, p. 313.—Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xii. p. 386.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 11, 20.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 2, p. 140.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 219, 220.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 25, 26.

Italy from his thoughts. He was equally insensible to the supplications of the few Italians at his court, and the remonstrances of his French nobles; many of whom, although opposed to the first expedition, would willingly have undertaken a second to support their brave comrades, whom the heedless young monarch now abandoned to their fate. (1)

At length Montpensier, finding no prospect of relief from home, and straitened by the want of provisions, determined to draw off from the neighbourhood of Benevento, where the two armies lay encamped, and retreat to the fruitful province of Apulia, whose principal places were still garrisoned by the French. He broke up his camp secretly at dead of night, and gained a day's march on his enemy, before the latter began his pursuit. This Ferdinand pushed with such vigour, however, that he overtook the retreating army at the town of Atella, and completely intercepted its further progress. This town, which, as already noticed, is situated on the western skirts of the Basilicate, lies in a broad valley encompassed by a lofty amphitheatre of hills, through which flows a little river, tributary to the Ofanto, watering the town, and turning several mills which supplied it with flour. At a few miles' distance was the strong place of Ripa Candida, garrisoned by the French, through which Montpensier hoped to maintain his communications with the fertile regions of the interior.

Ferdinand, desirous if possible to bring the war to a close by the capture of the whole French army, prepared for a vigorous blockade. He disposed his forces so as to intercept supplies, by commanding the avenues to the town in every direction. He soon found, however, that his army, though considerably stronger than his rival's, was incompetent to this without further aid. He accordingly resolved to summon to his support Gonsalvo de Cordova, the fame of whose exploits now resounded through every part of the kingdom. (2)

The Spanish general received Ferdinand's summons while encamped with his army at Castrovallari, in the north of Upper Calabria. If he complied with it, he saw himself in danger of losing all the fruits of his long campaign of victories; for his active enemy would not fail to profit by his absence to repair

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, pp. 140, 157, 158.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 23, 24.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 183. Du Bos discriminates between the character of the German levies, or *landsknechts*, and the Swiss, in the following terms:—"Les lansquenets étoient même de beaucoup mieux faits, généralement parlant, et de bien meilleure mine sous les armes, que les fantassins Suisses; mais ils étoient incapables de discipline. Au contraire des Suisses, ils étoient sans obéissance pour leurs chefs, et sans amitié pour leurs camarades." (*Ligue de Cambray*, tom. i. dissert. prélim. p. 66.) Comines confirms the distinction with a high tribute to the loyalty of the Swiss, which has continued their honourable characteristic to the present day.—*Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 21.

(2) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 218, 219.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 28.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 226.—Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 3, p. 184.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 158.

his losses. If he refused obedience, however, it might defeat the most favourable opportunity which had yet presented itself for bringing the war to a close. He resolved, therefore, at once to quit the field of his triumphs, and march to King Ferdinand's relief. But, before his departure, he prepared to strike such a blow as should, if possible, incapacitate his enemy for any effectual movement during his absence.

He received intelligence that a considerable number of Angevin lords, mostly of the powerful house of San Severino, with their vassals and a reinforcement of French troops, were assembled at the little town of Laino, on the north-western borders of Upper Calabria; where they lay awaiting a junction with D'Aubigny. Gonsalvo determined to surprise this place, and capture the rich spoils which it contained, before his departure. His road lay through a wild and mountainous country. The passes were occupied by the Calabrian peasantry in the interest of the Angevin party. The Spanish general, however, found no difficulty in forcing a way through this undisciplined rabble, a large body of whom he surrounded and cut to pieces as they lay in ambush for him in the valley of Murano. Laino, whose basin is washed by the waters of the Lao, was defended by a strong castle built on the opposite side of the river, and connected by a bridge with the town. All approach to the place by the high road was commanded by this fortress. Gonsalvo obviated this difficulty, however, by a circuitous route across the mountains. He marched all night, and fording the waters of the Lao about two miles above the town, entered it with his little army before break of day, having previously detached a small corps to take possession of the bridge. The inhabitants, startled from their slumbers by the unexpected appearance of the enemy in their streets, hastily seized their arms and made for the castle on the other side of the river. The pass, however, was occupied by the Spaniards; and the Neapolitans and French, hemmed in on every side, began a desperate resistance, which terminated with the death of their chief, Americo San Severino, and the capture of such of his followers as did not fall in the *mêlée*. A rich booty fell into the hands of the victors. The most glorious prize, however, was the Angevin barons, twenty in number, whom Gonsalvo after the action, sent prisoners to Naples. This decisive blow, whose tidings spread like wildfire throughout the country, settled the fate of Calabria. It struck terror into the hearts of the French, and crippled them so far as to leave Gonsalvo little cause for anxiety during his proposed absence.(1)

The Spanish general lost no time in pressing forward on his

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, pp. 219, 220.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, cap. 27.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 2, cap. 26.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. 1. pp. 227, 228.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, pp. 158, 159.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 12.

march towards Atella. Before quitting Calabria he had received a reinforcement of five hundred soldiers from Spain; and his whole Spanish forces, according to Giovio, amounted to one hundred men-at-arms, five hundred light cavalry, and two thousand foot, picked men, and well schooled in the hardy service of the late campaign.(1) Although a great part of his march lay through a hostile country, he encountered little opposition; for the terror of his name, says the writer last quoted, had everywhere gone before him. He arrived before Atella at the beginning of July. The king of Naples was no sooner advised of his approach, than he marched out of the camp, attended by the Venetian general, the marquis of Mantua, and the papal legate, Caesar Borgia, to receive him. All were eager to do honour to the man who had achieved such brilliant exploits; who, in less than a year, had made himself master of the larger part of the kingdom of Naples, and that, with the most limited resources, in defiance of the bravest and best-disciplined soldiery in Europe. It was then, according to the Spanish writers, that he was by general consent greeted with the title of the Great Captain; by which he is much more familiarly known in Spanish, and, it may be added, in most histories of the period, than by his own name.(2)

Gonsalvo found the French sorely distressed by the blockade, which was so strictly maintained as to allow few supplies from abroad to pass into the town. His quick eye discovered at once, however, that, in order to render it perfectly effectual, it would be necessary to destroy the mills in the vicinity, which supplied Atella with flour. He undertook this, on the day of his arrival, at the head of his own corps. Montpensier, aware

(1) Giovio, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 4, p. 132.

(2) Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 223.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. i. p. 220.—The Aragonese historians are much ruffled by the irreverent manner in which Guicciardini notices the origin of the cognomen of the Great Captain; which even his subsequent panegyric cannot atone for: "Era capitano Consalvo Ernandes, di casa d'Aghilar, di patria Cordovese, uomo di molto valore, ed esercitato lungamente nelle guerre di Granata, il quale nel principio della venuta sua in Italia, cognominato dalla juttanza Spagnuola il Gran Capitano, per significare con questo titola la suprema podestà sopra loro, meritò per le preclare vittorie che ebbe dopo, che per consentimento universale gli fosse confermato e perpetuato questo soprannome, per significazione di virtù grande, e di grande eccellenza nella disciplina militare." (*Istoria*, tom. i. p. 112.) According to Zurita, the title was not conferred till the Spanish general's appearance before Atella, and the first example of its formal recognition was in the instrument of capitulation at that place.—(*Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 27.) This seems to derive support from the fact that Gonsalvo's biographer and contemporary, Giovio, begins to distinguish him by that epithet from this period. Abarca assigns a higher antiquity to it, quoting the words of the royal grant of the duchy of Sessa, made to Gonsalvo, as authority.—(*Reyes de Aragon*, rey 39, cap. 9.) In a former edition, I intimated my doubt of the historian's accuracy. A subsequent inspection of the instrument itself, in a work since come into my possession, shows this distrust to have been well founded; for it is there simply said that the title was conferred in Italy.—Pulgar, *Sumario*, p. 138.



of the importance of these mills, had stationed a strong guard for their defence, consisting of a body of Gascon archers and the Swiss pikemen. Although the Spaniards had never been brought into direct collision with any large masses of this formidable infantry, yet occasional rencontres with small detachments, and increased familiarity with its tactics, had stripped it of much of its terrors. Gonsalvo had even so far profited by the example of the Swiss, as to strengthen his infantry by mingling the long pikes with the short swords and bucklers of the Spaniards.(1)

He made two divisions of his cavalry, posting his handful of heavy-armed, with some of the light horse, so as to check any sally from the town, while he destined the remainder to support the infantry in the attack upon the enemy. Having made these arrangements, the Spanish chieftain led on his men confidently to the charge. The Gascon archery, however, seized with a panic, scarcely awaited his approach, but fled shamefully before they had time to discharge a second volley of arrows, leaving the battle to the Swiss. These latter exhausted by the sufferings of the siege, and dispirited by long reverses, and by the presence of a new and victorious foe, did not behave with their wonted intrepidity; but, after a feeble resistance, abandoned their position, and retreated towards the city. Gonsalvo, having gained his object, did not care to pursue the fugitives, but instantly set about demolishing the mills, every vestige of which, in a few hours, was swept from the ground. Three days after, he supported the Neapolitan troops in an assault on Ripa Candida, and carried that important post, by means of which Atella maintained a communication with the interior.(2)

Thus cut off from all their resources, and no longer cheered by hopes of succour from their own country, the French, after suffering the severest privations, and being reduced to the most loathsome aliment for subsistence, made overtures for a capitulation. The terms were soon arranged with the king of Naples, who had no desire but to rid his country of the invaders. It was agreed that if the French commander did not receive assistance in thirty days, he should evacuate Atella, and cause every place holding under him in the kingdom of Naples, with all its artillery, to be surrendered to King Ferdinand; and that, on these conditions, his soldiers should be furnished with vessels to transport them back to France; that the foreign merce-

(1) This was improving on the somewhat similar expedient ascribed by Polybius to King Pyrrhus, who mingled alternate cohorts, armed with short weapons after the Roman fashion, with those of his Macedonian spearmen.—*Lib. 17, sec. 24.*

(2) *Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 4, p. 133.*—*Idem, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, pp. 220, 221.*—*Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 27.*—*Crónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 28.*—*Quintana, Españoles Célebres, tom. i. p. 229.*—*Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 9.*

naries should be permitted to return to their own homes; and that a general amnesty should be extended to such Neapolitans as returned to their allegiance in fifteen days.(1)

Such were the articles of capitulation signed on the 21st of July, 1496, which Comines, who received the tidings at the court of France, does not hesitate to denounce as "a most disgraceful treaty, without parallel, save in that made by the Roman consuls at the Caudine Forks, which was too dishonourable to be sanctioned by their countrymen." The reproach is certainly unmerited, and comes with ill grace from a court which was wasting in riotous indulgence the very resources indispensable to the brave and loyal subjects who were endeavouring to maintain its honour in a foreign land.(2)

Unfortunately Montpensier was unable to enforce the full performance of his own treaty; as many of the French refused to deliver up the places intrusted to them, under the pretence that their authority was derived, not from the viceroy, but from the king himself. During the discussion of this point, the French troops were removed to Baia and Pozzuolo, and the adjacent places on the coast. The unhealthiness of the situation, together with that of the autumnal season, and an intemperate indulgence in fruits and wine, soon brought on an epidemic among the soldiers, which swept them off in great numbers. The gallant Montpensier was one of the first victims. He refused the earnest solicitations of his brother-in-law, the marquis of Mantua, to quit his unfortunate companions, and retire to a place of safety in the interior. The shore was literally strewn with the bodies of the dying and the dead. Of the whole number of Frenchmen, amounting to not less than five thousand, who marched out of Atella, not more than five hundred ever reached their native country. The Swiss and other mercenaries were scarcely more fortunate. "They made their way back as they could through Italy," says a writer of the period, "in the most deplorable state of destitution and suffering, the gaze of all, and a sad example of the caprice of fortune." (3) Such was the miserable fate of that brilliant and formidable array, which scarcely two years before had poured down on the fair fields of Italy in all the insolence of expected conquest. Well would it be, if the name of every conqueror, whose successes, though built on human misery, are so dazzling to the imagination, could be made to point a moral for the instruction of his species, as effectually as that of Charles the Eighth.

(1) Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, p. 318.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 21.—Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 4, p. 136.

(2) Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 21.

(3) Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, p. 137.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 21.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 221.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 160.—Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, apud Petitot, tom. xiv. p. 312.

The young king of Naples did not live long to enjoy his triumphs. On his return from Atella, he contracted an inauspicious marriage with his aunt, a lady nearly of his own age, to whom he had been long attached. A careless and somewhat intemperate indulgence in pleasure, succeeding the hardy life which he had been lately leading, brought on a flux, which carried him off in the twenty-eighth year of his age, and second of his reign (September 7th, 1496). He was the fifth monarch who, in the brief compass of three years, had sat on the disastrous throne of Naples.

Ferdinand possessed many qualities suited to the turbulent times in which he lived. He was vigorous and prompt in action, and naturally of a high and generous spirit. Still, however, he exhibited glimpses, even in his last hours, of an obliquity, not to say ferocity of temper, which characterised many of his line, and which led to ominous conjectures as to what would have been his future policy.(1) He was succeeded on the throne by his uncle Frederic, a prince of a gentle disposition, endeared to the Neapolitans by repeated acts of benevolence, and by a magnanimous regard for justice, of which the remarkable fluctuations of his fortune had elicited more than one example. His amiable virtues, however, required a kindlier soil and season for their expansion; and, as the event proved, made him no match for the subtle and unscrupulous politicians of the age.

His first act was a general amnesty to the disaffected Neapolitans, who felt such confidence in his good faith, that they returned, with scarcely an exception, to their allegiance. His next measure was to request the aid of Gonsalvo de Cordova in suppressing the hostile movements made by the French during his absence from Calabria. At the name of the Great Captain, the Italians flocked from all quarters, to serve without pay under a banner which was sure to lead them to victory. Tower and town, as he advanced, went down before him; and the French general, D'Aubigny, soon saw himself reduced to the necessity of making the best terms he could with his conqueror, and evacuating the province altogether. The submission of Calabria was speedily followed by that of the few remaining cities, in other quarters, still garrisoned by the French; comprehending the last rood of territory possessed by Charles the Eighth in the kingdom of Naples.(2)

(1) Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 39, cap. 2.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, lib. 6, cap. 2.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 188. While stretched on his deathbed, Ferdinand, according to Bembo, caused the head of his prisoner, the bishop of Teano, to be brought to him, and laid at the foot of his couch, that he might be assured with his own eyes of the execution of the sentence.—*Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 3, p. 189.

(2) Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 4, p. 139.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 30, 33.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 160.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 3.

Our narrative now leads us on the beaten track of Italian history. I have endeavoured to make the reader acquainted with the peculiar character and pretensions of the principal Spanish authorities on whom I have relied in the progress of the work. This would be superfluous in regard to the Italian, who enjoy the rank of classics, not only in their own country, but throughout Europe, and have furnished the earliest models among the moderns of historic composition. Fortunately, two of the most eminent of them, Guicciardini and Paolo Giovio, lived at the period of our narrative, and have embraced the whole extent of it in their histories. These two writers, besides the attractions of elegant scholarship and talent, occupied a position which enabled them to take a clear view of all the principal political movements of their age; circumstances which have made their accounts of infinite value in respect to foreign transactions, as well as domestic. Guicciardini was a conspicuous actor in the scenes he describes; and a long residence at the court of Ferdinand the Catholic opened to him the most authentic sources of information in regard to Spain. Giovio, from his intimate relations with the principal persons of his time, had also access to the best sources of knowledge; while, in the notice of foreign transactions, he was but little exposed to those venal influences which led him too often to employ the golden or iron pen of history, as interest dictated. Unfortunately, a lamentable hiatus occurs in his greatest work, "*Historia sui Temporis*," embracing the whole period intervening between the end of Charles VIII.'s expedition and the accession of Leo X. in 1513. At the time of the memorable sack of Rome by the duke of Bourbon, in 1527, Giovio deposited his manuscript, with a quantity of plate, in an iron chest, which he hid in an obscure corner of the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva. The treasure, however, did not escape the searching eyes of two Spanish soldiers, who broke open the chest; and one of them seized on the plate, regarding the papers as of no value. The other, not being quite such a fool, says Giovio, preserved such of the manuscripts as were on vellum, and ornamented with rich bindings, but threw away what was written on paper.

The part thus thrown away contained six books, relating to the period above mentioned, which were never afterwards recovered. The soldier brought the remainder to their author, who bought them at the price of a vacant benefice, which he persuaded the pope to confer on the freebooter, in his native land of Cordova. It is not often that simony has found so good an apology. The deficiency, although never repaired by Giovio, was in some degree supplied by his biographies of eminent men, and, among others, by that of Gonsalvo de Cordova, in which he has collected, with great industry, all the events of any interest in the life of this great commander. The narrative is in general corroborated by the Spanish authorities, and contains some additional particulars, especially respecting his early life, which Giovio's personal intimacy with the principal characters of the period might easily have furnished.

This portion of our story is, moreover, illustrated by the labours of M. Sismondi, in his "*Républiques Italiennes*," which may undoubtedly claim to be ranked among the most remarkable historical achievements of our time; whether we consider the dexterous management of the narrative, or the admirable spirit of philosophy by which it is illumined. It must be admitted that he has perfectly succeeded in unravelling the intricate web of Italian politics; and, notwithstanding the complicated, and, indeed, motley character of his subject, the historian has left a uniform and harmonious impression on the mind of the reader. This he has accomplished by keeping constantly in view the principle which regulated all the various movements of the complex machinery; so that his narrative becomes, what he terms it in his English abridgment, a history of Italian liberty. By keeping this principle steadily before him, he has been able to solve much that hitherto was dark and problematical in his subject; and, if he has occasionally sacrificed something to theory, he has, on the whole, pursued the investigation in a truly philosophical manner, and arrived at results the most honourable and cheering to humanity.

Fortunately, his own mind was deeply penetrated with reverence for the free institutions which he has analysed. If it is too much to say that the

historian of republics should be himself a republican, it is at least true that his soul should be penetrated to its very depths with the spirit which animates them. No one, who is not smitten with the love of freedom, can furnish the key to much that is enigmatical in her character, and reconcile his readers to the harsh and repulsive features that she sometimes wears, by revealing the beauty and grandeur of the soul within.

That portion of our narrative which is incorporated with Italian story is too small to occupy much space on Sismondi's plan. He has discussed it, moreover, in a manner not very favourable to the Spaniards, whom he seems to have regarded with somewhat of the aversion with which an Italian of the sixteenth century viewed the ultra-montane barbarians of Europe. Perhaps the reader may find some advantage in contemplating another side of the picture, and studying the less familiar details presented by the Spanish authorities.

## CHAPTER III.

ITALIAN WARS.—GONSALVO SUCCOURS THE POPE.—TREATY WITH FRANCE.—ORGANISATION OF THE SPANISH MILITIA.

1496—1498.

Gonsalvo succours the Pope—Storms Ostia—Reception in Rome—Peace with France—Ferdinand's Reputation advanced by his Conduct in the War—Organisation of the Militia.

It had been arranged by the treaty of Venice, that, while the allies were carrying on the war in Naples, the emperor elect and the king of Spain should make a diversion in their favour, by invading the French frontiers. Ferdinand had performed his part of the engagement. Ever since the beginning of the war, he had maintained a large force along the borders from Fontarabia to Perpignan. In 1496, the regular army kept in pay amounted to ten thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot; which, together with the Sicilian armament, necessarily involved an expenditure exceedingly heavy under the financial pressure occasioned by the Moorish war. The command of the levies in Roussillon was given to Don Enrique Enriquez de Guzman, who, far from acting on the defensive, carried his men repeatedly over the border, sweeping off fifteen or twenty thousand head of cattle in a single foray, and ravaging the country as far as Carcassona and Narbonne.<sup>(1)</sup> The French, who had concentrated a considerable force in the south, retaliated by similar inroads, in one of which they succeeded in surprising the forti-

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 12—14, 16, 21. Giovio says, in allusion to King Ferdinand's show of preparation on the frontier, "Ferdinandus, maxime cautus et pecunie tenax, speciem ingentis coacti exercitus ad deterrendos hostes præbere, quam bellum gerere mallet, quum id sine ingenti pecunia administrari non posse intelligeret."—*Hist. sui Temporis*, p. 140.

fied town of Salsas. The works, however, were in so dilapidated a state, that the place was scarcely tenable, and it was abandoned on the approach of the Spanish army. A truce soon followed, which put an end to further operations in that quarter.(1)

The submission of Calabria seemed to leave no further occupation for the arms of the Great Captain in Italy. Before quitting that country, however, he engaged in an adventure, which, as narrated by his biographers, forms a brilliant episode to his regular campaigns. Ostia, the seaport of Rome, was, among the places in the papal territory, forcibly occupied by Charles the Eighth, and on his retreat, had been left to a French garrison under the command of a Biscayan adventurer named Menaldo Guerri. The place was so situated as entirely to command the mouth of the Tiber, enabling the piratical horde who garrisoned it almost wholly to destroy the commerce of Rome, and even to reduce the city to great distress for want of provisions. The imbecile government, incapable of defending itself, implored Gonsalvo's aid in dislodging this nest of formidable freebooters. The Spanish general, who was now at leisure, complied with the pontiff's solicitations, and soon after presented himself before Ostia, with his little corps of troops, amounting in all to three hundred horse and fifteen hundred foot.(2)

Guerri, trusting to the strength of his defences, refused to surrender. Gonsalvo, after coolly preparing his batteries, opened a heavy cannonade on the place, which, at the end of five days, effected a practicable breach in the walls. In the mean time, Garcilasso de la Vega, the Castilian ambassador at the papal court, who could not bear to remain inactive so near the field where laurels were to be won, came to Gonsalvo's support, with a handful of his own countrymen resident in Rome. This gallant little band, scaling the walls on the opposite side to that assailed by Gonsalvo, effected an entrance into the town, while the garrison was occupied with maintaining the breach against the main body of the Spaniards. Thus surprised, and hemmed in on both sides, Guerri and his associates made no further resistance, but surrendered themselves prisoners of war; and Gonsalvo, with more clemency than was usually shown on such occasions, stopped the carnage, and reserved his captives to grace his entry into the capital.(3)

This was made a few days after, with all the pomp of a

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 35, 36.—Abarcá, *Reyes de Aragón*, rey 30, cap. 9.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 5.—Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 23.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 309.

(2) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 221.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, cap. 30.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 3, cap. 1.—Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, p. 317.

(3) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, p. 222.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 234.

Roman triumph. The Spanish general entered by the gate of Ostia, at the head of his martial squadrons in battle array, with colours flying and music playing, while the rear was brought up by the captive chief and his confederates, so long the terror, now the derision of the populace. The balconies and windows were crowded with spectators, and the streets lined with multitudes, who shouted forth the name of Gonsalvo de Cordova, the "deliverer of Rome!" The procession took its way through the principal streets of the city towards the Vatican, where Alexander the Sixth awaited its approach, seated under a canopy of state in the chief saloon of the palace, surrounded by his great ecclesiastics and nobility. On Gonsalvo's entrance, the cardinals rose to receive him. The Spanish general knelt down to receive the benediction of the pope, but the latter, raising him up, kissed him on the forehead, and complimented him with the golden rose, which the Holy See was accustomed to dispense as a reward of its most devoted champions.

In the conversation which ensued, Gonsalvo obtained the pardon of Guerri and his associates, and an exemption from taxes for the oppressed inhabitants of Ostia. In a subsequent part of the discourse, the pope taking occasion most inopportunistly to accuse the Spanish sovereigns of unfavourable dispositions towards himself, Gonsalvo replied with much warmth, enumerating the various good offices rendered by them to the church; and roundly taxing the pope with ingratitude, somewhat bluntly advised him to reform his life and conversation, which brought scandal on all Christendom. His holiness testified no indignation at this unsavoury rebuke of the Great Captain, though, as the historians with some *naïveté* inform us, he was greatly surprised to find the latter so fluent in discourse, and so well instructed in matters foreign to his profession. (1)

Gonsalvo experienced the most honourable reception from King Frederic on his return to Naples. During his continuance there, he was lodged and sumptuously entertained in one of the royal fortresses; and the grateful monarch requited his services with the title of duke of St. Angelo, and an estate, in Abruzzo, containing three thousand vassals. He had before pressed these honours on the victor, who declined accepting them till he had obtained the consent of his own sovereigns. Soon after, Gonsalvo, quitting Naples, revisited Sicily, where he adjusted certain differences which had arisen betwixt the viceroy and the inhabitants respecting the revenues of the island. Then embarking with his whole force, he reached the shores of Spain in the month of August, 1498. His return to his native land

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, p. 222.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 3, cap. 1.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 175.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 30.

was greeted with a general enthusiasm far more grateful to his patriotic heart than any homage or honours conferred by foreign princes. Isabella welcomed him with pride and satisfaction, as having fully vindicated her preference of him to his more experienced rivals for the difficult post of Italy; and Ferdinand did not hesitate to declare, that the Calabrian campaigns reflected more lustre on his crown than the conquest of Granada.(1)

The total expulsion of the French from Naples brought hostilities between that nation and Spain to a close. The latter had gained her point, and the former had little heart to resume so disastrous an enterprise. Before this event, indeed, overtures had been made by the French court for a separate treaty with Spain. The latter, however, was unwilling to enter into any compact without the participation of her allies. After the total abandonment of the French enterprise, there seemed to exist no further pretext for prolonging the war. The Spanish government, moreover, had little cause for satisfaction with its confederates. The emperor had not co-operated in the descent on the enemy's frontier, according to agreement; nor had the allies ever reimbursed Spain for the heavy charges incurred in fulfilling her part of the engagements. The Venetians were taken up with securing to themselves as much of the Neapolitan territory as they could, by way of indemnification for their own expenses.(2) The duke of Milan had already made a separate treaty with King Charles. In short, every member of the league, after the first alarm subsided, had shown itself ready to sacrifice the common weal to its own private ends. With these causes of disgust, the Spanish government consented to a truce with France, to begin for itself on the 5th of March, and for the allies, if they chose to be included in it, seven weeks later, and to continue till the end of October, 1497. This truce was subsequently prolonged, and, after the death of Charles the Eighth, terminated in a definitive treaty of peace, signed at Marcoussi, August 5th, 1498.(3)

In the discussions to which these arrangements gave rise, the project is said to have been broached for the conquest and division of the kingdom of Naples by the combined powers of France and Spain, which was carried into effect some years later. According to Comines, the proposition originated with the Spanish court, although it saw fit, in a subsequent period

(1) Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 223.—Crónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 31, 32.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 32.

(2) Comines says, with some *naïveté*, in reference to the places in Naples which the Venetians had got into their possession, "Je croy que leur intention n'est point de les rendre; car ils ne l'ont point de coutume quand elles leur sont bienséantes comme sont cellescy, qui sont du costé de leur goufre de Venise."—Mémoires, p. 194.

(3) Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 178.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 44; lib. 3, cap. 13, 19, 21, 26.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.



of the negotiations, to disavow the fact. (1) The Spanish writers, on the other hand, impute the first suggestion of it to the French, who, they say, went so far as to specify the details of the partition subsequently adopted; according to which the two Calabrias were assigned to Spain. However this may be, there is little doubt that Ferdinand had long since entertained the idea of asserting his claim, at some time or other, to the crown of Naples. He, as well as his father, and, indeed, the whole nation, had beheld with dissatisfaction the transfer of what they deemed their rightful inheritance, purchased by the blood and treasure of Aragon, to an illegitimate branch of the family. The accession of Frederic, in particular, who came to the throne with the support of the Angevin party, the old enemies of Aragon, had given great umbrage to the Spanish monarch.

The Castilian envoy, Garcilasso de la Vega, agreeably to the instructions of his court, urged Alexander the Sixth to withhold the investiture of the kingdom from Frederic, but unavailingly, as the pope's interests were too closely connected by marriage with those of the royal family of Naples. Under these circumstances, it was somewhat doubtful what course Gonsalvo should be directed to pursue in the present exigency. That prudent commander, however, found the new monarch too strong in the affections of his people to be disturbed at present. All that now remained for Ferdinand, therefore, was to rest contented with the possession of the strong posts pledged for the reimbursement of his expenses in the war, and to make such use of the correspondence which the late campaigns had opened to him in Calabria, that, when the time arrived for action, he might act with effect. (2)

Ferdinand's conduct through the whole of the Italian war had greatly enhanced his reputation throughout Europe for sagacity and prudence. It afforded a most advantageous comparison with that of his rival, Charles the Eighth, whose very first act had been the surrender of so important a territory as Roussillon. The construction of the treaty relating to this, indeed, laid the Spanish monarch open to the imputation of artifice. But this, at least, did no violence to the political maxims of the age, and only made him regarded as the more shrewd and subtle diplomatist; while, on the other hand, he appeared before the world in the imposing attitude of the defender of the church, and of the rights of his injured kins-

(1) Combes gives some curious details respecting the French embassy, which he considers to have been completely outwitted by the superior management of the Spanish government, who intended nothing further at this time by the proposal of a division, than to amuse the French court until the fate of Naples should be decided.—*Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 23.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Fernando*, lib. 2, cap. 26, 33.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, lib. 26, cap. 16.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Monarquía*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 10.

man. His influence had been clearly discernible in every operation of moment, whether civil or military. He had been most active, through his ambassadors at Genoa, Venice, and Rome, in stirring up the great Italian confederacy, which eventually broke the power of King Charles; and his representations had tended, as much as any other cause, to alarm the jealousy of Sforza, to fix the vacillating politics of Alexander, and to quicken the cautious and dilatory movements of Venice. He had shown equal vigour in action; and contributed mainly to the success of the war by his operations on the side of Roussillon, and still more in Calabria. On the latter, indeed, he had not lavished any extraordinary expenditure; a circumstance partly attributable to the state of his finances, severely taxed, as already noticed, by the Granadine war, as well as by the operations in Roussillon, but in part, also, to his habitual frugality, which with a very different spirit from that of his illustrious consort, always stinted the measure of his supplies to the bare exigency of the occasion. Fortunately the genius of the Great Captain was so fruitful in resources as to supply every deficiency; enabling him to accomplish such brilliant results as effectually concealed any poverty of preparation on the part of his master.

The Italian wars were of signal importance to the Spanish nation. Until that time, they had been cooped up within the narrow limits of the Peninsula, uninstructed and taking little interest in the concerns of the rest of Europe. A new world was now opened to them. They were taught to measure their own strength by collision with other powers on a common scene of action; and success inspiring them with greater confidence, seemed to beckon them on towards the field where they were destined to achieve still more splendid triumphs.

This war afforded them also a most useful lesson of tactics. The war of Granada had insensibly trained up a hardy militia, patient and capable of every privation and fatigue, and brought under strict subordination. This was a great advance beyond the independent and disorderly habits of the feudal service. A most valuable corps of light troops had been formed, schooled in all the wild, irregular movements of guerilla warfare. But the nation was still defective in that steady well-disciplined infantry, which, in the improved condition of military science, seemed destined to decide the fate of battles in Europe thenceforward.

The Calabrian campaigns, which were suited in some degree to the display of their own tactics, fortunately gave the Spaniards opportunity for studying at leisure those of their adversaries. The lesson was not lost. Before the end of the war, important innovations were made in the discipline and arms of the Spanish soldier. The Swiss pike, or lance, which, as has been already noticed, Gonsalvo de Cordova had mingled

with the short sword of his own legions, now became the regular weapon of one-third of the infantry. The division of the various corps in the cavalry and infantry services was arranged on more scientific principles, and the whole, in short, completely re-organised.(1)

Before the end of the war, preparations were made for embodying a national militia, which should take the place of the ancient *hermandad*. Laws were passed regulating the equipment of every individual according to his property. A man's arms were declared not liable for debt, even to the crown; and smiths and other artificers were restricted, under severe penalties, from working them up into other articles.(2) In 1496, a census was taken of all persons capable of bearing arms; and by an ordinance dated at Valladolid, February 22nd in the same year, it was provided that one out of every twelve inhabitants, between twenty and forty-five years of age, should be enlisted in the service of the state, whether for foreign war, or the suppression of disorders at home. The remain-

(1) Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 6.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 6. The ancient Spaniards, who were as noted as the modern for the temper and finish of their blades, used short swords, in the management of which they were very adroit. "Hispano," says Livy, "punctum magis quam easim, adsecto petere hostem, brevitate habiles [gladii] et cum mucronibus." (Hist. lib. 22, cap. 47.) Sandoval notices the short sword, "*cortas espadas*," as the peculiar weapon of the Spanish soldier in the twelfth century.—Historia de los Reyes de Castilla y de Leon (Madrid, 1792), tom. ii. p. 240.

(2) Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 83, 127, 129. The former of these ordinances, dated Tarazona, Sept. 18th, 1495, is extremely precise in specifying the appointments required for each individual. Among other improvements introduced somewhat earlier, may be mentioned that of organising and thoroughly training a small corps of heavy-armed cavalry, amounting to twenty-five hundred. The number of men-at-arms had been greatly reduced in the kingdom of late years, in consequence of the exclusive demand for the *gineles* in the Moorish war. (Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.) Ordinances were also passed for encouraging the breed of horses, which had suffered greatly from the preference very generally given by the Spaniards to mules. This had been carried to such a length, that, while it was nearly impossible, according to Bernaldez, to mount ten or twelve thousand cavalry on horses, ten times that number could be provided with mules. (Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 184.) "E porque si a esto se diese lugar," says one of the *pragmáticas*, adverting to this evil, "muy prestamente se perderia en nuestros reynos la nobleza de la cavalleria que en ellos suele auer, e se olvidaria el exercicio militar de que en los tiempos passados nuestra nacion de España ha alcanzado gran fama e loor;" it was ordered that no person in the kingdom should be allowed to keep a mule, unless he owned a horse also; and that none but ecclesiastics and women should be allowed the use of mules in the saddle. These edicts were enforced with the utmost rigour, the king himself setting the example of conformity to them. By these seasonable precautions, the breed of Spanish horses, so long noted throughout Europe, was restored to its ancient credit, and the mule consigned to the humble and appropriate offices of drudgery, or raised only for exportation. For these and similar provisions, see Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 127—132. Matéo Aleman's whimsical *picaresco* novel, Guzman d'Alfarache, contains a comic adventure, showing the excessive rigour with which the edict against mules was enforced, as late as the times of Philip II.'s reign. The passage is extracted in Roscoe's elegant version of the Spanish novelists, vol. i. p. 132.

ing eleven were liable to be called on in case of urgent necessity. These recruits were to be paid during actual service, and excused from taxes; the only legal exemptions were the clergy, hidalgos, and paupers. A general review and inspection of arms were to take place every year, in the months of March and September, when prizes were to be awarded to those best accoutred, and most expert in the use of their weapons. Such were the judicious regulations by which every citizen, without being withdrawn from his regular occupation, was gradually trained up for the national defence; and which, without the oppressive incumbrance of a numerous standing army, placed the whole effective force of the country, prompt and fit for action, at the disposal of the government, whenever the public good should call for it.(1)

## CHAPTER IV.

### ALLIANCES OF THE ROYAL FAMILY.—DEATH OF PRINCE JOHN AND PRINCESS ISABELLA.

Royal Family of Castile—Matrimonial Alliances with Portugal—With Austria—Marriage of John and Margaret—Death of Prince John—The Queen's Resignation—Independence of the Cortes of Aragon.—Death of the Princess Isabella—Recognition of her infant son Miguel.

THE credit and authority which the Castilian sovereigns established by the success of their arms, were greatly raised by the matrimonial connections which they formed for their children. This was too important a spring of their policy to be passed over in silence. Their family consisted of one son and four daughters, whom they carefully educated in a manner befitting their high rank; and who repaid their solicitude by exemplary filial obedience, and the early manifestation of virtues rare even in a private station.(2) They seem to have inherited many of

(1) See a copy of the ordinance taken from the Archives of Simancas, apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Apend. 13. When Francis I., who was destined to feel the effects of this careful military discipline, beheld, during his detention in Spain, in the beginning of the following century, striplings with scarce down upon the chin, all armed with swords at their sides, he is said to have cried out, "O bienaventurada España, que pare y cria los hombres armados!" (L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, lib. 5.) An exclamation not unworthy of a Napoleon,—or an Attila.

(2) The princess Doña Isabel, the eldest daughter, was born at Dueñas, October, 1st, 1470. Their second child and only son, Juan, prince of the Asturias, was not born until eight years later, June 30th, 1478, at Seville. Doña Juana, whom the queen used playfully to call her "mother-in-law," *suegra*, from her resemblance to King Ferdinand's mother, was born at Toledo, November, 6th, 1479. Doña Maria was born at Cordova, in 1482; and Doña

the qualities which distinguished their illustrious mother; great decorum and dignity of manners, combined with ardent sensibilities and unaffected piety, which, at least in the eldest and favourite daughter Isabella, was unhappily strongly tinged with bigotry. They could not, indeed, pretend to their mother's comprehensive mind and talent for business, although there seems to have been no deficiency in these respects; or, if any, it was most effectually supplied by their excellent education.(1)

The marriage of the princess Isabella with Alonso, the heir of the Portuguese crown, in 1490, has been already noticed. This had been eagerly desired by her parents, not only for the possible contingency, which it afforded, of bringing the various monarchies of the Peninsula under one head (a design of which they never wholly lost sight), but from the wish to conciliate a formidable neighbour, who possessed various means of annoyance, which he had shown no reluctance to exert. The reigning monarch, John the Second, a bold and crafty prince, had never forgotten his ancient quarrel with the Spanish sovereigns in support of their rival, Joanna Beltraneja, or Joanna the Nun, as she was generally called in the Castilian court after she had taken the veil. John, in open contempt of the treaty of Alcantara, and indeed of all monastic rule, had not only removed his relative from the convent of Santa Clara, but had permitted her to assume a royal state, and subscribe herself "I the Queen." This empty insult he accompanied with more serious efforts to form such a foreign alliance for the liberated princess as should secure her the support of some arm more powerful than his own, and enable her to renew the struggle for her inheritance with better chance of success.(2) These flagrant proceedings had provoked the admonitions of the Roman see, and had formed the topic, as may be believed, of repeated, though ineffectual remonstrance from the court of Castile.(3)

It seemed probable that the union of the princess of the

Catalina, the fifth and last child, at Alcalá de Henares, December 5th, 1485. The daughters all lived to reign; but their brilliant destinies were clouded with domestic afflictions, from which royalty could afford no refuge.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. loc. mult.

(1) The only exception to these remarks was that afforded by the infanta Joanna, whose unfortunate eccentricities, developed in later life, must be imputed indeed to bodily infirmity.

(2) Nine different matches were proposed for Joanna in the course of her life; but they all vanished into air, and "the excellent lady," as she was usually called by the Portuguese, died, as she had lived, in single blessedness, at the ripe age of sixty-eight. In the *Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. the nineteenth illustration is devoted to this topic, in regard to which Father Florez shows sufficient ignorance or inaccuracy.—*Reynas Cathólicas*, tom. ii. p. 780.

(3) Instructions relating to this matter, written with the queen's own hand, still exist in the archives of Simancas.—*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* ubi supra.

Asturias with the heir of Portugal, as originally provided by the treaty of Alcantara, would so far identify the interests of the respective parties as to remove all further cause of disquietude. The new bride was received in Portugal in a spirit which gave cordial assurance of these friendly relations for the future; and the court of Lisbon celebrated the auspicious nuptials with the gorgeous magnificence for which, at this period of its successful enterprise, it was distinguished above every other court in Christendom.(1) (Nov. 22, 1490.)

Alonso's death, a few months after this event, however, blighted the fair hopes which had begun to open of a more friendly feeling between the two countries. His unfortunate widow, unable to endure the scenes of her short-lived happiness, soon withdrew into her own country to seek such consolation as she could find in the bosom of her family. There, abandoning herself to the melancholy regrets to which her serious and pensive temper naturally disposed her, she devoted her hours to works of piety and benevolence, resolved to enter no more into engagements which had thrown so dark a cloud over the morning of her life.(2)

On King John's death, in 1495, the crown of Portugal devolved on Emanuel, that enlightened monarch, who had the glory in the very commencement of his reign of solving the grand problem, which had so long perplexed the world, of the existence of an undiscovered passage to the East. This prince had conceived a passion for the young and beautiful Isabella during her brief residence in Lisbon; and, soon after his accession to the throne, he despatched an embassy to the Spanish court inviting her to share it with him. But the princess, wedded to the memory of her early love, declined the proposals, notwithstanding they were strongly seconded by the wishes of her parents, who, however, were unwilling to constrain their daughter's inclinations on so delicate a point, trusting perhaps to the effects of time, and the perseverance of her royal suitor.(3)

(1) La Clède, *Histoire de Portugal*, tom. iv. p. 100. The Portuguese historian Faria y Sousa expends half a dozen folio pages on these royal revelries, which cost six months' preparation, and taxed the wits of the most finished artists and artificers in France, England, Flanders, Castile, and Portugal. (*Europa Portuguesa*, tom. ii. pp. 452 et seq.) We see, throughout, the same luxury of spectacle, the same elegant games of chivalry, as the tilt of reeds, the rings, and the like, which the Castilians adopted from the Spanish Arabs.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. v. fol. 38.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 312.

(3) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. v. fol. 78, 82.—La Clède, *Hist. de Portugal*, tom. iv. p. 95.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist. 146*. Martyr, in a letter written at the close of 1496, thus speaks of the princess Isabella's faithful attachment to her husband's memory: "*Mira fuit hujus femine in abjiciendis secundis nuptiis constantia. Tanta est ejus modestia, tanta vidualis castitas, ut nec mensâ post mariti mortem comederit, nec lauti quicquam degustaverit. Jejunii sese vigiliisque ita mizeravit, ut sicco stipite siccor sit*

In the mean while the Catholic sovereigns were occupied with negotiations for the settlement of the other members of their family. The ambitious schemes of Charles the Eighth established a community of interests among the great European states, such as had never before existed, or, at least, been understood; and the intimate relations thus introduced naturally led to intermarriages between the principal powers, who, until this period, seem to have been severed almost as far asunder as if oceans had rolled between them. The Spanish monarchs in particular had rarely gone beyond the limits of the Peninsula for their family alliances. The new confederacy into which Spain had entered, now opened the way to more remote connections, which were destined to exercise a permanent influence on the future politics of Europe. It was while Charles the Eighth was wasting his time at Naples, that the marriages were arranged between the royal houses of Spain and Austria, by which the weight of these great powers was thrown into the same scale, and the balance of Europe unsettled for the greater part of the following century.(1)

The treaty provided that Prince John, the heir of the Spanish monarchies, then in his eighteenth year, should be united with the princess Margaret, daughter of the emperor Maximilian: and that the archduke Philip, his son and heir, and sovereign of the Low Countries in his mother's right, should marry Joanna, second daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella. No dowry was to be required with either princess.(2)

In the course of the following year, arrangements were also concluded for the marriage of the youngest daughter of the Castilian sovereigns with a prince of the royal house of England, the first example of the kind for more than a century.(3) Ferdinand had cultivated the good-will of Henry the Seventh, in the hope of drawing him into the confederacy against the French monarch; and in this had not wholly failed, although the wary king seems to have come into it rather as a silent partner, if we may so say, than with the

effecta. Suffulta rubore perturbatur, quandocunque de jugali thalamo sermo intexitur. Parentum tamen aliquando precibus, veluti officinus, infectetur. Viget fama, futuram vestri regis Emmanuelis uxorem."—Epist. 171.

(1) Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. fol. 63.

(2) Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 2, cap. 5.—Ferrerias, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 166.

(3) I believe there is no instance of such a union, save that of John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, with Doña Constanza, daughter of Peter the Cruel, in 1371, from whom Queen Isabella was lineally descended on the father's side. The title of *Prince of the Asturias*, appropriated to the heir apparent of Castile, was first created for the infant Don Henry, afterwards Henry III., on occasion of his marriage with John of Gaunt's daughter in 1388. It was professedly in imitation of the English title of Prince of Wales; and the Asturias was selected, as that portion of the ancient Gothic monarchy which had never bowed beneath the Saracen yoke.—Florez, Reynas Cathólicas, tom. ii. pp. 708—715.—Mendoza, Dignidades, lib. 3, cap. 23.

intention of affording any open or very active co-operation.(1) The relations of amity between the two courts were still further strengthened by the treaty of marriage above alluded to, finally adjusted October 1st, 1496, and ratified the following year, between Arthur prince of Wales, and the infanta Dona Catalina, conspicuous in English history, equally for her misfortunes and her virtues, as Catharine of Aragon.(2) The French viewed with no little jealousy the progress of these various negotiations, which they zealously endeavoured to thwart by all the artifices of diplomacy. But King Ferdinand had sufficient address to secure in his interests persons of the highest credit at the courts of Henry and Maximilian, who promptly acquainted him with the intrigues of the French government, and effectually aided in counteracting them.(3)

The English connection was necessarily deferred for some years, on account of the youth of the parties, neither of whom exceeded eleven years of age. No such impediment occurred in regard to the German alliances; and measures were taken at once for providing a suitable conveyance for the infanta Joanna into Flanders, which should bring back the princess Margaret on its return. By the end of summer, in 1496, a fleet consisting of one hundred and thirty vessels, large and small, strongly manned and thoroughly equipped, with all the means of defence against the French cruisers, was got ready for sea in the ports of Guipuscoa and Biscay.(4) The whole was

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 25.—Rymer, *Fœdera* (London, 1727), vol. xii. pp. 638—642. Ferdinand used his good offices to mediate a peace between Henry VII. and the king of Scots; and it is a proof of the respect entertained for him by both these monarchs, that they agreed to refer their disputes to his arbitration. (Rymer, *Fœdera*, vol. xii. p. 671.) "And so," says the old chronicler Hall, of the English prince, "beying confederate and allied by treatie and league with all his neighbors, he gratified with his moost heartie thanks kyng Ferdinand and the queene his wife, to which woman none other was comparable in her tyme, for that they were the mediators, organes, and instruments by the which the truce was concluded betwene the Scottish kynge and him, and rewarded his ambassadours moost liberally and bountefully."—Chronicle, p. 483.

(2) See the marriage treaty in Rymer (*Fœdera*, vol. xii. pp. 652—666). The marriage had been arranged between the Spanish and English courts as far back as March, 1489, when the elder of the parties had not yet reached the fifth year of her age. This was confirmed by another, more full and definite, in the following year, 1490. By this treaty it was stipulated that Catharine's portion should be 200,000 gold crowns, one-half to be paid down at the date of her marriage, and the remainder in two equal payments in the course of the two years ensuing. The prince of Wales was to settle on her one-third of the revenues of the principality of Wales, the dukedom of Cornwall, and earldom of Chester.—Rymer, *Fœdera*, vol. xii. pp. 411—417.

(3) "Procuero," says Zurita, "que se efectuassen los matrimonios de sus hijos, no solo con promesas, pero con dadivas que se hizieron a los privados de aquellos principes, que en ello entendian."—*Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 3.

(4) Historians differ, as usual, as to the strength of this armament. Martyr makes it 110 vessels, and 10,000 soldiers (*Opus Epist. epist.* 168); while Bernaldez carries the number to 130 sail, and 25,000 soldiers (*Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 153). Ferreras adopts the latter estimate (tom. viii. p. 173). Martyr



placed under the direction of Don Fadrique Enriquez, admiral of Castile, who carried with him a splendid show of chivalry, chiefly drawn from the northern provinces of the kingdom. A more gallant and beautiful armada never before quitted the shores of Spain. The infanta Joanna, attended by a numerous suite, arrived on board the fleet towards the end of August, at the port of Laredo, on the eastern borders of the Asturias, where she took a last farewell of the queen her mother, who had postponed the hour of separation as long as possible, by accompanying her daughter to the place of embarkation.

The weather, soon after her departure, became extremely rough and tempestuous; and it was so long before any tidings of the squadron reached the queen, that her affectionate heart was filled with the most distressing apprehensions. She sent for the oldest and most experienced navigators in these boisterous northern seas, consulting them, says Martyr, day and night on the probable causes of delay, the prevalent courses of the winds at that season, and the various difficulties and dangers of the voyage; bitterly regretting that the troubles with France prevented any other means of communication than the treacherous element to which she had trusted her daughter.(1) Her spirits were still further depressed at this juncture by the death of her own mother, the dowager Isabella, who, under the mental infirmity with which she had been visited for many years, had always experienced the most devoted attention from her daughter, who ministered to her necessities with her own hands, and watched over her declining years with the most tender solicitude.(2)

At length the long-desired intelligence came of the arrival of the Castilian fleet at its place of destination. It had been so grievously shattered, however, by tempests, as to require being refitted in the ports of England. Several of the vessels were lost, and many of Joanna's attendants perished, from the inclemency of the weather, and the numerous hardships to which they were exposed. The infanta, however, happily reached Flanders in safety, and, not long after, her nuptials with the archduke Philip were celebrated in the city of Lisle with all suitable pomp and solemnity.

The fleet was detained until the ensuing winter, to transport the destined bride of the young prince of the Asturias to Spain. This lady, who had been affianced in her cradle to Charles the Eighth of France, had received her education in the court of Paris. On her intended husband's marriage with the heiress of

may have intended only the galleys and regular troops, while Bernaldez, more loosely, included vessels and seamen of every description. See also the royal ordinances, ap. Coleccion de Cédulas (tom. i. Nos. 79, 80, 82), whose language implies a very large number, without specifying it.

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 172.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1496 Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 12.

(2) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1496.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 172.

Brittany, she had been returned to her native land under circumstances of indignity never to be forgiven by the house of Austria. She was now in the seventeenth year of her age, and had already given ample promise of those uncommon powers of mind which distinguished her in riper years, and of which she has left abundant evidence in various written compositions.(1)

On her passage to Spain, in mid-winter, the fleet encountered such tremendous gales, that part of it was shipwrecked, and Margaret's vessel had well-nigh foundered. She retained, however, sufficient composure, amidst the perils of her situation, to indite her own epitaph, in the form of a pleasant distich, which Fontenelle has made the subject of one of his amusing dialogues, where he affects to consider the fortitude displayed by her at this awful moment as surpassing that of the philosophic Adrian in his dying hour, or the vaunted heroism of Cato of Utica.(2) Fortunately, however, Margaret's epitaph was not needed; she arrived in safety at the port of Santander, in the Asturias, early in March 1497.

The young prince of the Asturias, accompanied by the king his father, hastened towards the north to receive his royal mistress, whom they met and escorted to Burgos, where she was received with the highest marks of satisfaction by the queen and the whole court. Preparations were instantly made for solemnising the nuptials of the royal pair, after the expiration of Lent, in a style of magnificence such as had never before been witnessed under the present reign. The marriage ceremony took place on the 3rd of April, and was performed by the archbishop of Toledo, in the presence of the grandees and principal nobility of Castile, the foreign ambassadors, and the delegates from Aragon. Among these latter were the magistrates of the principal cities, clothed in their municipal insignia and crimson robes of office, who seem to have had quite as important parts assigned them by their democratic communities, in this and all similar pageants, as any of the nobility or gentry. The nuptials were followed by a brilliant succession of *fêtes*, tourneys, tilts of reeds, and other warlike spectacles, in which the matchless chivalry of Spain poured into the lists

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 174.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 6.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iii. pp. 416, 423.—Sandoval, *Historia del Emperador Carlos V.* (Amberes, 1661), tom. i. p. 2. These, comprehending her verses, public addresses, and discourse on her own life, have been collected into a single volume, under the title of "*La Couronne Margaritique*," Lyons, 1549, by the French writer Jean la Maire de Belges, her faithful follower, but whose greatest glory it is to have been the instructor of Clement Marot.

(2) Fontenelle, *Œuvres*, tom. i. dial. 4.

"Ci gist Margot, la gentil' damoiselle,  
Qu'a deux maris, et encore est pucelle."

It must be allowed that Margaret's quiet *nonchalance* was much more suited to Fontenelle's habitual taste, than the imposing scene of Cato's death. Indeed, the French satirist was so averse to *scenes* of all kinds, that he has contrived to find a ridiculous side in this last act of the patriot Roman.

to display their magnificence and prowess in the presence of their future queen.(1) The chronicles of the day remark on the striking contrast exhibited at these entertainments, between the gay and familiar manners of Margaret and her Flemish nobles, and the pomp and stately ceremonial of the Castilian court, to which, indeed, the Austrian princess, nurtured as she had been in a Parisian atmosphere, could never be wholly reconciled.(2)

The marriage of the heir apparent could not have been celebrated at a more auspicious period. It was in the midst of negotiations for a general peace, when the nation might reasonably hope to taste the sweets of repose, after so many uninterrupted years of war. Every bosom swelled with exultation in contemplating the glorious destinies of their country under the beneficent sway of a prince, the first heir of the hitherto divided monarchies of Spain. Alas! at the moment when Ferdinand and Isabella, blessed in the affections of their people, and surrounded by all the trophies of a glorious reign, seemed to have reached the very zenith of human felicity, they were doomed to receive one of those mournful lessons which admonish us that all earthly prosperity is but a dream.(3)

Not long after Prince John's marriage, the sovereigns had the satisfaction to witness that of their daughter Isabella, who, notwithstanding her repugnance to a second union, had yielded at length to the urgent entreaties of her parents to receive the addresses of her Portuguese lover. She required as the price of this, however, that Emanuel should first banish the Jews from his dominions, where they had bribed a resting-place since their expulsion from Spain; a circumstance to which the super-

(1) That these were not mere holiday sports, was proved by the melancholy death of Alonso de Cardenas, son of the comendador of Lema, who lost his life in a tourney.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 1.

(2) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1497.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 16.—Lanuz, *Historias*, lib. 1, cap. 8.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragón*, tom. ii. fol. 336.—"Y aunque," says the last author, "a la princesa se le dexaron todos sus criados, estilos, y entretencimientos, se la advirtió, que en las ceremonias no havia de tratar a las personas Reales y Grandes con la familiaridad y llaneza de las casas de Austria, Borgoña, y Francia, sino con la gravedad y mesurada autoridad de los Reyes y naciones de España!" The sixth volume of the Spanish Academy of History contains an inventory, taken from the archives of Simancas, of the rich plate and jewels presented to the princess Margaret on the day of her marriage. They are said to be "of such value and perfect workmanship, that the like was never before seen." (Iust. 11, pp. 338—342.) Isabella had turned these baubles to good account in the war of Granada. She was too simple in her taste to attach much value to luxury of apparel.

(3) It is precisely this period, or rather the whole period from 1493 to 1497, which Oviedo selects as that of the greatest splendour and festivity at the court of the Catholic sovereigns:—"El año de 1493, y uno ó dos despues, y aun hasta el de 1497 años fué quando la corte de los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando é Doña Isabel de gloriosa memoria, mas alegres tiempos é mas regozijados, vino en su corte, é mas encumbrada andubo la gala é las fiestas é servicios de galanes é damas."—*Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 4, dial. 44.

stitious princess imputed the misfortunes which had fallen of late on the royal house of Portugal. Emanuel, whose own liberal mind revolted at this unjust and impolitic measure, was weak enough to allow his passion to get the better of his principles, and passed sentence of exile on every Israelite in his kingdom; furnishing, perhaps, the only example in which love has been made one of the thousand motives for persecuting this unhappy race.(1)

The marriage, ushered in under such ill-omened auspices, was celebrated at the frontier town of Valencia de Alicantara, in the presence of the Catholic sovereigns, without pomp or parade of any kind. While they were detained there, an express arrived from Salamanca, bringing tidings of the dangerous illness of their son, the prince of the Asturias. He had been seized with a fever in the midst of the public rejoicings to which his arrival with his youthful bride in that city had given rise. The symptoms speedily assumed an alarming character. The prince's constitution, naturally delicate, though strengthened by a life of habitual temperance, sunk under the violence of the attack; and when his father, who posted with all possible expedition to Salamanca, arrived there, no hopes were entertained of his recovery.(2)

Ferdinand, however, endeavoured to cheer his son with hopes which he did not feel himself; but the young prince told him that it was too late to be deceived; that he was prepared to part with a world which, in its best estate, was filled with vanity and vexation; and that all he now desired was, that his parents might feel the same sincere resignation to the divine will which he experienced himself. Ferdinand gathered new fortitude from the example of his heroic son, whose presages were unhappily too soon verified. He expired on the 4th of October, 1497, in the twentieth year of his age, in the same spirit of Christian philosophy which he had displayed during his whole illness.(3)

(1) Faria y Sousa, *Europa Portuguesa*, tom. ii. pp. 499, 499.—*La Clède*, *Hist. de Portugal*, tom. iv. p. 95.—*Zurita*, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 6.—*Lanuzza*, *Historias*, ubi supra.

(2) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1497.—*Florez*, *Reynas Cathólicas*, tom. ii. pp. 846, 848.—*Zurita*, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. v. fol. 127, 128.—*La Clède*, *Hist. de Portugal*, tom. iv. p. 101.—The physicians recommended a temporary separation of John from his young bride, a remedy, however, which the queen opposed from conscientious scruples somewhat singular: "*Hortantur medici Reginam, hortatur et Rex, ut a principis latere Margaritam aliquando semoveat, interpellet. Inducias precantur. Protestantur periculum ex frequenti copulâ ephebo imminere; qualiter eum suxerit, quamve subtristis incedat, consideret iterum atque iterum monent; medullas lædi, stomachum hebetari se sentire Reginæ renunciant. Intercedat, dnm licet, obstetque principis, instant. Nil proficiunt. Respondet Regina, homines non oportere, quos Deus jugali vinculo junxerit, separare.*"—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* cp. 176.

(3) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 182.—*L. Marinco*, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 182.—*Carbajal*, *Anales*, MS. año 1497.—*Oviedo*, *Quincuagenas*, MS. dial. de

By the death of John without heirs, the succession devolved on his eldest sister, the queen of Portugal.<sup>(1)</sup> Intelligence, however, was received soon after that event, that the archduke Philip, with the restless ambition which distinguished him in later life, had assumed for himself and his wife Joanna the title of "princes of Castile." Ferdinand and Isabella, disgusted with this proceeding, sent to request the attendance of the king and queen of Portugal in Castile, in order to secure a recognition of their rights by the national legislature. The royal pair, accordingly, in obedience to the summons, quitted their capital of Lisbon early in the spring of 1498. In their progress through the country they were magnificently entertained at the castles of the great Castilian lords, and towards the close of April reached the ancient city of Toledo, where the cortes had been convened to receive them.<sup>(2)</sup>

After the usual oaths of recognition had been tendered, without opposition, by the different branches to the Portuguese princes, the court adjourned to Saragossa, where the legislature of Aragon was assembled for a similar purpose.

Some apprehensions were entertained, however, of the un-

lib. 19, cap. 6.—L. Marinca, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 182.—Blancas, *Coronaciones*, p. 248. It must be allowed to furnish no mean proof of the excellence of Prince John's heart, that it was not corrupted by the liberal doses of flattery with which his worthy tutor was in the habit of regalling him from time to time. Take the beginning of one of Martyr's letters to his pupil in the following modest strain: "Mirande in pueritiâ senex, salve. Quotquot tecum versantur homines, sive genere poileant, sive ad obsequium fortune humiliores destituti ministri, te laudant, extollunt, admirantur."—*Opus Epist.* epist. 98.

(1) Hopes were entertained of a male heir at the time of John's death, as his widow was left pregnant; but these were frustrated by her being delivered of a still-born infant at the end of a few months. Margaret did not continue long in Spain. She experienced the most affectionate treatment from the king and queen, who made her an extremely liberal provision. (Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 4.) But her Flemish followers could not reconcile themselves to the reserve and burdensome ceremonial of the Castilian court, so different from the free and jocund life to which they had been accustomed at home; and they prevailed on their mistress to return to her native land in the course of the year 1499. She was subsequently married to the duke of Savoy, who died without issue in less than three years; and Margaret passed the remainder of her life in widowhood, being appointed by her father, the emperor, to the government of the Netherlands, which she administered with ability. She died in 1530.

(2) Marina has transcribed from the archives of Toledo the writ of summons to that city on this occasion.—Teoria, tom. ii. p. 16.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 18.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 154.—La Clède, *Hist. de Portugal*, tom. iv. p. 101.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1498.—Faria y Sousa, *Europa Portuguesa*, tom. ii. pp. 500, 501. The last writer ex-patiates with great satisfaction on the stately etiquette observed at the reception of the Portuguese monarchs and their suite by the Spanish sovereigns. "Queen Isabella," he says, "appeared leaning on the arm of her old favourite Gutierre de Cardenas, comendador of Leon, and of a Portuguese noble, Don Juan de Sousa. The latter took care to acquaint her with the rank and condition of each of his countrymen, as they were presented, in order that she might the better adjust the measure of condescension and courtesy due to each; a perilous obligation," he continues, "with all nations, but with the Portuguese most perilous!"

favourable disposition of that body, since the succession of females was not countenanced by the ancient usage of the country; and the Aragonese, as Martyr remarks in one of his Epistles, "were well known to be a pertinacious race, who would leave no stone unturned in the maintenance of their constitutional rights." (1)

These apprehensions were fully realised; for, no sooner was the object of the present meeting laid before cortes in a speech from the throne, with which parliamentary business in Aragon was always opened, than decided opposition was manifested to a proceeding which it was declared had no precedent in their history. The succession of the crown, it was contended, had been limited by repeated testaments of their princes to male heirs; and practice and public sentiment had so far coincided with this, that the attempted violation of the rule by Peter the Fourth, in favour of his own daughters, had plunged the nation in a civil war. It was further urged, that by the will of the very last monarch, John the Second, it was provided that the crown should descend to the male issue of his son Ferdinand, and, in default of such, to the male issue of Ferdinand's daughters, to the entire exclusion of the females. At all events, it was better to postpone the consideration of this matter until the result of the queen of Portugal's pregnancy, then far advanced, should be ascertained; since, should it prove to be a son, all doubts of constitutional validity would be removed.

In answer to these objections, it was stated, that no express law existed in Aragon, excluding females from the succession; that an example had already occurred, as far back indeed as the twelfth century, of a queen who held the crown in her own right; that the acknowledged power of females to transmit the right of succession necessarily inferred that right existing in themselves; that the present monarch had doubtless as competent authority as his predecessors to regulate the law of inheritance, and that his act, supported by the supreme authority of cortes, might set aside any former disposition of the crown; that this interference was called for by the present opportunity of maintaining the permanent union of Castile and Aragon, without which they must otherwise return to their ancient divided state, and comparative insignificance. (2)

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 194.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 334.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 3.

(2) Blancas, *Commentarii*, p. 273.—Idem, *Coronaciones*, lib. 1, cap. 18. Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 3.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Fernando*, tom. v. fol. 55, 56. It is remarkable that the Aragonese should so readily have acquiesced in the right of females to convey a title to the crown which they could not enjoy themselves. This was precisely the principle on which Edward III. set up his claim to the throne of France, a principle too repugnant to the commonest rules of inheritance to obtain any countenance. The exclusion of females in Aragon could not pretend to be founded on any express law, as in France; but the practice, with the exception of a single example three centuries old, was quite as uniform.

These arguments, however cogent, were far from being conclusive with the opposite party; and the debate was protracted to such length, that Isabella, impatient of an opposition to what the practice in her own dominions had taught her to regard as the inalienable right of her daughter, inconsiderately exclaimed, "It would be better to reduce the country by arms at once, than endure this insolence of the cortes." To which Antonio de Fonseca, the same cavalier who spoke his mind so fearlessly to King Charles the Eighth on his march to Naples, had the independence to reply, "That the Aragonese had only acted as good and loyal subjects, who, as they were accustomed to mind their oaths, considered well before they took them; and that they must certainly stand excused if they moved with caution in an affair which they found so difficult to justify by precedent in their history." (1) This blunt expostulation of the honest courtier, equally creditable to the sovereign who could endure, and the subject who could make it, was received in the frank spirit in which it was given, and probably opened Isabella's eyes to her own precipitancy, as we find no further allusion to coercive measures.

Before anything was determined, the discussion was suddenly brought to a close by an unforeseen and most melancholy event, — the death of the queen of Portugal, the unfortunate subject of it. That princess had possessed a feeble constitution from her birth, with a strong tendency to pulmonary complaints. She had early felt a presentiment that she should not survive the birth of her child; this feeling strengthened as she approached the period of her delivery; and in less than one hour after that event, which took place on the 23rd of August, 1498, she expired in the arms of her afflicted parents. (2)

This blow was almost too much for the unhappy mother, whose spirits had not yet had time to rally since the death of her only son. She, indeed, exhibited the outward marks of composure, testifying the entire resignation of one who had learned to rest her hopes of happiness on a better world. She schooled herself so far as to continue to take an interest in all her public duties, and to watch over the common weal with the same maternal solicitude as before; but her health gradually sunk under this accumulated load of sorrow, which threw a deep shade of melancholy over the evening of her life.

The infant, whose birth had cost so dear, proved a male, and received the name of Miguel, in honour of the saint on whose

(1) Blancas, Coronaciones, lib. 3, cap. 18. — Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 30. It is a proof of the high esteem in which Isabella held this independent statesman, that we find his name mentioned in her testament among half a dozen others, whom she particularly recommended to her successors for their meritorious and loyal services. See the document in Dormer, Discursos Varios, p. 354.

(2) Carbajal, Auales, MS. años 1470, 1498. — Florez, Reynas Cathólicas, tom. ii. pp. 846, 847. — Faria y Sousa, Europa Portuguesa, tom. ii. p. 504.

day he first saw the light. In order to dissipate, in some degree, the general gloom occasioned by the late catastrophe, it was thought best to exhibit the young prince before the eyes of his future subjects; and he was accordingly borne in the arms of his nurse, in a magnificent litter, through the streets of the city, escorted by the principal nobility. Measures were then taken for obtaining the sanction of his legitimate claims to the crown. Whatever doubts had been entertained of the validity of the mother's title, there could be none whatever of the child's; since those who denied the right of females to inherit for themselves, admitted their power of conveying such a right to male issue. As a preliminary step to the public recognition of the prince, it was necessary to name a guardian, who should be empowered to make the requisite engagements, and to act in his behalf. The Justice of Aragon, in his official capacity, after due examination, appointed the grand-parents, Ferdinand and Isabella, to the office of guardians during his minority, which would expire by law at the age of fourteen. (1)

On Saturday, the 22nd of September, when the queen had sufficiently recovered from a severe illness, brought on by her late sufferings, the four *arms* of the cortes of Aragon assembled in the house of deputation at Saragossa; and Ferdinand and Isabella made oath as guardians of the heir apparent before the Justice, not to exercise any jurisdiction whatever in the name of the young prince during his minority; engaging, moreover, as far as in their power, that, on his coming of age, he should swear to respect the laws and liberties of the realm, before entering on any of the rights of sovereignty himself. The four estates then took the oath of fealty to Prince Miguel, as lawful heir and successor to the crown of Aragon; with the protestation that it should not be construed into a precedent for exacting such an oath hereafter during the minority of the heir apparent. With such watchful attention to constitutional forms of procedure did the people of Aragon endeavour to secure their liberties; forms which continued to be observed in later times, long after those liberties had been swept away. (2)

In the month of January of the ensuing year, the young prince's succession was duly confirmed by the cortes of Castile,

(1) Blancas, *Commentarii*, pp. 510, 511.—Idem, *Coronaciones*, lib. 3, cap. 19.—Gerónimo Martel, *Forma de Celebrar Cortes en Aragon* (Zaragoza, 1641), cap. 44.—Alvaro Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis a Francisco Ximeno Cisnerio* (Compluti, 1569), fol. 28.—Lanuza, *Historias*, lib. 1, cap. 9.

(2) Blancas, *Coronaciones*, ubi *supra*.—Idem, *Commentarii*, pp. 510, 511. The reverence of the Aragonese for their institutions is shown in their observance of the most insignificant ceremonies. A remarkable instance of this occurred in the year 1481, at Saragossa, when the queen having been constituted *lieutenant-general* of the kingdom, and duly qualified to hold a cortes in the absence of the king her husband, who, by the ancient laws of the land, was required to preside over it in person, it was deemed necessary to obtain a formal act of the legislature, for opening the door for her admission.—See Blancas, *Modo de Proceder en Cortes de Aragon* (Zaragoza, 1641), fol. 82, 83.



and, in the following March, by that of Portugal. Thus, for once, the crowns of the three monarchies of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal, were suspended over one head. The Portuguese retaining the bitterness of ancient rivalry, looked with distrust at the prospect of a union; fearing, with some reason, that the importance of the lesser state would be wholly merged in that of the greater. But the untimely death of the destined heir of these honours, which took place before he had completed his second year, removed the causes of jealousy, and defeated the only chance, which had ever occurred, of bringing under the same rule three independent nations, which, from their common origin, their geographical position, and, above all, their resemblance in manners, sentiments, and language, would seem to have originally been intended to form but one. (1)

## CHAPTER V.

### DEATH OF CARDINAL MENDOZA.—RISE OF XIMENES.— ECCLESIASTICAL REFORM.

Death of Mendoza—His early Life, and Character—The Queen his Executor—Origin of Ximenes—He enters the Franciscan Order—His Ascetic Life—Confessor to the Queen—Made Archbishop of Toledo—Austerity of his Life—Reform of the Monastic Orders—Insults offered to the Queen—She consents to the Reform.

IN the beginning of 1495, the sovereigns lost their old and faithful minister, the grand cardinal of Spain, Don Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza. He was the fourth son of the celebrated marquis of Santillana, and was placed by his talents at the head of a family, every member of which must be allowed to have exhibited a rare union of public and private virtue. The cardinal reached the age of sixty-six, when his days were terminated, after a long and painful illness, on the 11th of January, at his palace of Guadalaxara. (2)

(1) Faria y Sousa, *Europa Portuguesa*, tom. ii. pp. 504, 507.—Bernabiez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 154.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1499.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. v. lib. 3, cap. 33.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 4.

(2) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1495.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Crón. del Gran Cardenal*, lib. 2, cap. 45, 46.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. fol. 61.—Pulgar, *Claros Varones*, tit. 4. His disorder was an abscess on the kidneys, which confined him to the house nearly a year before his death. When this event happened, a white cross of extraordinary magnitude and splendour, shaped precisely like that on his arms, was seen in the heavens directly over his house, by a crowd of spectators, for more than two hours; a full account of which was duly transmitted to Rome by the Spanish court, and has obtained easy credit with the principal Spanish historians.

In the unhappy feuds between Henry the Fourth and his younger brother Alfonso, the cardinal had remained faithful to the former; but, on the death of that monarch, he threw his whole weight, with that of his powerful family, into the scale of Isabella, whether influenced by a conviction of her superior claims, or her capacity for government. This was a most important acquisition to the royal cause; and Mendoza's consummate talents for business, recommended by the most agreeable address, secured him the confidence of both Ferdinand and Isabella, who had long been disgusted with the rash and arrogant bearing of their old minister Carillo.

On the death of that turbulent prelate, Mendoza succeeded to the archiepiscopal see of Toledo. His new situation naturally led to still more intimate relations with the sovereigns, who uniformly deferred to his experience, consulting him on all important matters, not merely of a public, but of a private nature. In short, he gained such ascendancy in the cabinet, during a long ministry of more than twenty years, that he was pleasantly called by the courtiers the "third king of Spain." (1)

The minister did not abuse the confidence so generously reposed in him. He called the attention of his royal mistress to objects most deserving it. His views were naturally grand and lofty; and, if he sometimes yielded to the fanatical impulse of the age, he never failed to support her heartily in every generous enterprise for the advancement of her people. When raised to the rank of primate of Spain, he indulged his natural inclination for pomp and magnificence. He filled his palace with pages, selected from the noblest families in the kingdom, whom he carefully educated. He maintained a numerous body of armed retainers, which, far from being a mere empty pageant, formed a most effective corps for public service on all requisite occasions. He dispensed the immense revenues of his bishopric with the same magnificent hand which has so frequently distinguished the Spanish prelacy, encouraging learned men, and endowing public institutions. The most remarkable of these were the college of Santa Cruz at Valladolid, and the hospital of the same name for foundlings at Toledo, the erection of which, completed at his sole charge, consumed more than ten years each. (2)

The cardinal, in his younger days, was occasionally seduced

(1) Alvaro Gomez says of him, "Nam præter clarissimum, tum natalium, tum fortunæ, tum dignitatis splendorem, quæ in illo ornamenta summa crant, incredibilem animi sublimitatem cum pari morum facilitate, elegantiaque conjunxerat; ut merito locum in republicâ summo proximum ad supremum usque diem tenuerit." (*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 9.) Martyr, noticing the cardinal's death, bestows the following brief but comprehensive panegyric on him:—"Periit Gonsalus, Mendotius domus splendor et lucida fax; periit quem universa colebat Hispania, quem exteri etiam principes venerabantur, quem ordo cardineus collegam sibi esse gloriabatur."—*Opus Epist. epist.* 158.

(2) Salazar de Mendoza, *Crón. del Gran Cardenal*, pp. 262-273, 381-410.

by those amorous propensities in which the Spanish clergy freely indulged, contaminated, perhaps, by the example of their Mahometan neighbours. He left several children by his amours with two ladies of rank, from whom some of the best houses in the kingdom are descended.(1) A characteristic anecdote is recorded of him in relation to this matter. An ecclesiastic, who one day delivered a discourse in his presence, took occasion to advert to the laxity of the age, in general terms indeed, but bearing too pertinent an application to the cardinal, to be mistaken. The attendants of the latter boiled with indignation at the preacher's freedom, whom they determined to chastise for his presumption. They prudently, however, postponed this until they should see what effect the discourse had on their master. The cardinal, far from betraying any resentment, took no other notice of the preacher than to send him a dish of choice game, which had been served up at his own table, where he was entertaining a party of friends that day, accompanying it at the same time, by way of sauce, with a substantial donative of gold doblas; an act of Christian charity not at all to the taste of his own servants. It wrought its effects on the worthy divine, who at once saw the error of his ways, and, the next time he mounted the pulpit, took care to frame his discourse in such a manner as to counteract the former unfavourable impressions, to the entire satisfaction, if not edification of his audience. "Nowadays," says the honest biographer who reports the incident, himself a lineal descendant of the cardinal, "the preacher would not have escaped so easily. And with good reason; for the Holy Gospel should be discreetly preached, 'cum grano salis,' that is to say, with the decorum and deference due to majesty and men of high estate." (2)

When Cardinal Mendoza's illness assumed an alarming aspect, the court removed to the neighbourhood of Guadalajara, where he was confined. The king and queen, especially the latter, with the affectionate concern which she manifested for more than one of her faithful subjects, used to visit him in person, testifying her sympathy for his sufferings, and benefiting by the lights of the sagacious mind which had so long helped to guide her. She still further showed her regard for her old

(1) "Gran varon, y muy experimentado y prudente en negocios," says Oviedo of the cardinal, "*pero á vueltas de las negociaciones desta vida, tuvo trës hijos varones*," &c. Then follows a full notice of this graceless progeny. —Quineuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quine. 1, dial. 8.

(2) Salazar de Mendoza, *Crón. del Gran Cardenal*, lib. 2, cap. 66. The doctor Pedro Salazar de Mendoza's biography of his illustrious relative is a very fair specimen of the Spanish style of bookmaking in ancient times. One event seems to suggest another with about as much cohesion as the rhymes of "The House that Jack built." There is scarcely a place or personage of note that the grand cardinal was brought in contact with in the course of his life, whose history is not made the theme of profuse dissertation. Nearly fifty chapters are taken up, for example, with the distinguished men who graduated at the college of Santa Cruz

minister by condescending to accept the office of his executor, which she punctually discharged, superintending the disposition of his effects according to his testament, (1) and particularly the erection of the stately hospital of Santa Cruz, before mentioned, not a stone of which was laid before his death. (2)

In one of her interviews with the dying minister, the queen requested his advice respecting the nomination of his successor. The cardinal, in reply, earnestly cautioned her against raising any one of the principal nobility to this dignity, almost too exalted for any subject, and which, when combined with powerful family connections, would enable a man of factious disposition to defy the royal authority itself, as they had once bitter experienced in the case of Archbishop Carrillo. On being pressed to name the individual whom he thought best qualified in every point of view for the office, he is said to have recommended Fray Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros, a friar of the Franciscan order, and confessor of the queen. As this extraordinary personage exercised a more important control over the destinies of his country than any other subject during the remainder of the present reign, it will be necessary to put the reader in possession of his history. (3)

Ximenez de Cisneros, or Ximenes, as he is usually called, was born at the little town of Tordelaguna, in the year 1436, (4) of an ancient but decayed family. (5) He was early destined

(1) "Non hoc," says Tacitus with truth, "præcipuum amicorum munus est, prosequi defunctum ignavo questu: sed quæ voluerit meminisse, quæ mandaverit exsequi."—*Annales*, lib. 2, sect. 71.

(2) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 143.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1494.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Crón. del Gran Cardenal*, lib. 2, cap. 45.—A founding hospital does not seem to have come amiss in Spain, where, according to Salazar, the wretched parents frequently destroyed their offspring by casting them into wells and pits, or exposing them in desert places to die of famine. "The more compassionate," he observes, "laid them at the doors of churches, where they were too often worried to death by dogs and other animals." The grand cardinal's nephew, who founded a similar institution, is said to have furnished an asylum in the course of his life to no less than 13,000 of these little victims!—*Ibid.* cap. 61.

(3) Salazar de Mendoza, *Crón. del Gran Cardenal*, lib. 2, cap. 46.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 8. The dying cardinal is said to have recommended, among other things, that the queen should repair any wrong done to Joanna Beltraneja, by marrying her with the young prince of the Asturias; which suggestion was so little to Isabella's taste that she broke off the conversation, saying, "the good man wandered and talked nonsense."

(4) It is singular that Fiechier should have blundered some twenty years in the date of Ximenes' birth, which he makes 1457. (*Hist. de Ximenes*, liv. 1, p. 3.) It is not singular that Marsollier should.—*Histoire du Ministère du Cardinal Ximenez* (Toulouse, 1694), liv. 1, p. 3.

(5) The honourable extraction of Ximenes is intimated in Juan Vergara's verses at the end of the *Complutensian Polyglot*:—

"Nomine Cisnerinis clarâ de stirpe parentum,  
Et meritis factus clarior ipse suis."

Fray Pedro de Quintanilla y Mendoza makes a goodly genealogical tree for his hero, of which King Pelayo, King Pepin, Charlemagne, and other royal worthies, are the respectable roots. (*Procemia Dedicatoria*, pp. 5—35.) According to Gonzalo de Oviedo, his father was a poor hidalgo, who, having

by his parents or the church, and, after studying grammar at Alcalá, was removed at fourteen to the university of Salamanca. Here he went through the regular course of instruction then pursued, devoting himself assiduously to the civil and canon law, and at the end of six years received the degree of bachelor in each of them, a circumstance at that time of rare occurrence.(1)

Three years after quitting the university, the young bachelor removed by the advice of his parents to Rome, as affording a better field for ecclesiastical preferment than he could find at home. Here he seems to have attracted some notice by the diligence with which he devoted himself to his professional studies and employments. But still he was far from reaping the golden fruits presaged by his kindred; and at the expiration of six years he was suddenly recalled to his native country by the death of his father, who left his affairs in so embarrassed a condition, as to require his immediate presence.(2)

Before his return, Ximenes obtained a papal bull, or *expectative*, preferring him to the first benefice of a specified value which should become vacant in the see of Toledo. Several years elapsed before such a vacancy offered itself by the death of the archpriest of Uzeda (1473); and Ximenes took possession of that living by virtue of the apostolic grant.

This assumption of the papal court to dispose of the church livings at its own pleasure, had been long regarded by the Spaniards as a flagrant imposition; and Carillo, the archbishop of Toledo, in whose diocese the vacancy occurred, was not likely tamely to submit to it. He had, moreover, promised this very place to one of his own followers. He determined, accordingly, to compel Ximenes to surrender his pretensions in favour of the latter; and, finding argument ineffectual, resorted to force, confining him in the fortress of Uzeda, whence he was subsequently removed to the strong tower of Santorcaz, then used as a prison for contumacious ecclesiastics. But Carillo understood little of the temper of Ximenes, which was too inflexible to be broken by persecution. The archbishop in time became convinced of this, and was persuaded to release him, but not till after an imprisonment of more than six years.(3)

spent his little substance on the education of his children, was obliged to take up the profession of an advocate.—Quincuagenas, MS.

(1) Quintanilla, Archetypo, p. 6.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, Ximen. fol. 2.—Idem, Miscellaneæ, MS. ex Bibliothecâ Regiâ Matritensi, tom. ii. fol. 169.

(2) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 2.—Idem, Miscellaneæ, MS. ubi supra.—Eugenio de Robles, Compendio de la Vida y Hazañas del Cardenal Don Fray Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros (Toledo, 1604), cap. 11.

(3) Quintanilla, Archetypo, pp. 8, 10.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 2.—Flécher, Hist. de Ximenes, pp. 8—10.—Suma de la Vida del R.S. Cardenal Don Fr. Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros, sacada de los Memoriales de Juan de Valledo, Paje de Cámara, é de algunas Personas que en su Tiempo lo vieron: para la Nustrisima Señora Doña Catalina de la Zerda, Condesa de Coruña, a quien Dios guarde, y de su Gracia, por un Criado de su Casa, MS.

Ximenes, thus restored to freedom, and placed in undisturbed possession of his benefice, was desirous of withdrawing from the jurisdiction of his vindictive superior; and not long after effected an exchange for the chaplainship of Sigüenza, 1480. In this new situation he devoted himself with renewed ardour to his theological studies, occupying himself diligently, moreover, with Hebrew and Chaldean, his knowledge of which proved of no little use in the concoction of his famous Polyglot.

Mendoza was at that time bishop of Sigüenza. It was impossible that a man of his penetration should come in contact with a character like that of Ximenes, without discerning its extraordinary qualities. It was not long before he appointed him his vicar, with the administration of his diocese; in which situation he displayed such capacity for business, that the count of Cifuentes, on falling into the hands of the Moors, after the unfortunate affair of the Axarquía, confided to him the sole management of his vast estates during his captivity. (1)

But these secular concerns grew more and more distasteful to Ximenes, whose naturally austere and contemplative disposition had been deepened, probably, by the melancholy incidents of his life, into stern religious enthusiasm. He determined, therefore, to break at once from the shackles which bound him to the world, and seek an asylum in some religious establishment, where he might devote himself unreservedly to the service of Heaven. He selected for this purpose the Observantines of the Franciscan order, the most rigid of the monastic societies. He resigned his various employments and benefices, with annual rents to the amount of two thousand ducats, and, in defiance of the arguments and entreaties of his friends, entered on his novitiate in the convent of San Juan de los Reyes, at Toledo; a superb pile then erecting by the Spanish sovereigns, in pursuance of a vow made during the war of Granada. (2)

He distinguished his novitiate by practising every ingenious variety of mortification with which superstition has contrived to swell the inevitable catalogue of human sufferings. He slept on the ground, or on the hard floor, with a billet of wood for his pillow. He wore haircloth next his skin; and exercised himself with fasts, vigils, and stripes, to a degree scarcely sur-

(1) *Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS.—Gomez, de *Rebus Gestis*, fol. 3.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 11.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. dial. de Ximenes.

(2) *Quintanilla*, Archetypo, p. 11.—Gomez, *Miscellaneous*, MS. ubi supra.—Idem, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 4.—This edifice, says Salazar de Mendoza, in respect to its sacristy, choir, cloisters, library, &c., was the most sumptuous and noted of its time. It was originally destined by the Catholic sovereigns for the place of sepulture; an honour afterwards reserved for Granada, on its recovery from the infidels. The great chapel was garnished with the fetters taken from the dungeons of Malaga, in which the Moors confined their Christian captives.—*Monarquía*, tom. i. p. 410.

passed by the fanatical founder of his order. At the end of the year he regularly professed, adopting then for the first time the name of Francisco, in compliment to his patron saint, instead of that of Gonzalo, by which he had been baptised.

No sooner had this taken place, than his reputation for sanctity, which his late course of life had diffused far and wide, attracted multitudes of all ages and conditions to his confessional; and he soon found himself absorbed in the same vortex of worldly passions and interests from which he had been so anxious to escape. At his solicitation, therefore, he was permitted to transfer his abode to the convent of Our Lady of Castañar, so called from a deep forest of chestnuts in which it was embosomed. In the midst of these dark mountain solitudes he built with his own hands a little hermitage or cabin, of dimensions barely sufficient to admit his entrance. Here he passed his days and nights in prayer, and in meditations on the sacred volume; sustaining life, like the ancient anchorites, on the green herbs and running waters. In this state of self-mortification, with a frame wasted by abstinence, and a mind exalted by spiritual contemplation, it is no wonder that he should have indulged in ecstasies and visions, until he fancied himself raised into communion with celestial intelligences. It is more wonderful that his understanding was not permanently impaired by these distempered fancies. This period of his life, however, seems to have been always regarded by him with peculiar satisfaction; for, long after, as his biographer assures us, when reposing in lordly palaces, and surrounded by all the appliances of luxury, he looked back with fond regret on the hours which glided so peacefully in the hermitage of Castañar.<sup>(1)</sup>

Fortunately, his superiors choosing to change his place of residence according to custom, transferred him at the end of three years to the convent of Salzeda. Here he practised, indeed, similar austerities, but it was not long before his high reputation raised him to the post of guardian of the convent. This situation necessarily imposed on him the management of the institution; and thus the powers of his mind, so long wasted in unprofitable reverie, were again called into exercise for the benefit of others. An event which occurred some years later, in 1492, opened to him a still wider sphere of action.

By the elevation of Talavera to the metropolitan see of Granada, the office of queen's confessor became vacant. Cardinal Mendoza, who was consulted on the choice of a successor, well knew the importance of selecting a man of the highest integrity and talent; since the queen's tenderness of conscience led her to take counsel of her confessor, not merely in regard

(1) Fléchier, *Hist. de Ximenes*, p. 14.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, pp. 13, 14.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 4.—*Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS.

to her own spiritual concerns, but all the great measures of her administration. He at once fixed his eye on Ximenes, of whom he had never lost sight, indeed, since his first acquaintance with him at Sigüenza. He was far from approving his adoption of the monastic life, and had been heard to say that "parts so extraordinary would not long be buried in the shades of a convent." He is said, also, to have predicted that Ximenes would one day succeed him in the chair of Toledo; a prediction which its author contributed more than any other to verify. (1)

He recommended Ximenes in such emphatic terms to the queen, as raised a strong desire in her to see and converse with him herself. An invitation was accordingly sent him from the cardinal to repair to the court at Valladolid, without intimating the real purpose of it. Ximenes obeyed the summons, and, after a short interview with his early patron, was conducted, as if without any previous arrangement, to the queen's apartment. On finding himself so unexpectedly in the royal presence, he betrayed none of the agitation or embarrassment to have been expected from the secluded inmate of a cloister; but exhibited a natural dignity of manners, with such discretion and fervent piety in his replies to Isabella's various interrogatories, as confirmed the favourable prepossessions she had derived from the cardinal.

Not many days after, Ximenes was invited to take charge of the queen's conscience (1492). Far from appearing elated by this mark of royal favour, and the prospects of advancement which it opened, he seemed to view it with disquietude, as likely to interrupt the peaceful tenor of his religious duties; and he accepted it only with the understanding that he should be allowed to conform in every respect to the obligations of his order, and to remain in his own monastery when his official functions did not require attendance at court. (2)

Martyr, in more than one of his letters dated at this time, notices the impression made on the courtiers by the remarkable appearance of the new confessor, in whose wasted frame, and pallid, care-worn countenance they seemed to behold one of the primitive anchorites from the deserts of Syria or Egypt. (3) The austerities and the blameless purity of Ximenes' life had

(1) Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, cap. 63.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 4.—*Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 12.

(2) Fléchier, *Hist. de Ximenes*, pp. 18, 19.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 108.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, ubi supra.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS.

(3) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 108.—"Præterea," says Martyr, in a letter to Don Fernando Alvarez, one of the royal secretaries, "nonne tu sanctissimum quendam virum a solitudine abstrusisque silvis, in acie ob abstinentiam confectum, relictis Granatensis loco fuisse suffectum, scriptitasti? In istius facie obdueta, nonne Hilarionis te imaginem aut primi Pauli vultum conspexisse fateris?"—*Opus Epist.* epist. 105.



given him a reputation for sanctity throughout Spain ;(1) and Martyr indulges the regret that a virtue, which had stood so many trials, should be exposed to the worst of all, in the seductive blandishments of a court. But Ximenes' heart had been steeled by too stern a discipline to be moved by the fascinations of pleasure, however it might be by those of ambition.

Two years after this event he was elected provincial of his order in Castile, which placed him at the head of its numerous religious establishments. In his frequent journeys for their inspection he travelled on foot, supporting himself by begging alms, conformably to the rules of his order. On his return he made a very unfavourable report to the queen of the condition of the various institutions, most of which he represented to have grievously relaxed in discipline and virtue. Contemporary accounts corroborate this unfavourable picture, and accuse the religious communities of both sexes throughout Spain, at this period, of wasting their hours, not merely in unprofitable sloth, but in luxury and licentiousness. The Franciscans, in particular, had so far swerved from the obligations of their institute, which interdicted the possession of property of any description, that they owned large estates in town and country, living in stately edifices, and in a style of prodigal expense not surpassed by any of the monastic orders. Those who indulged in this latitude were called *Conventuals*, while the comparatively small number who put the strictest construction on the rule of their founder were denominated *Observantines*, or *Brothers of the Observance*. Ximenes, it will be remembered, was one of the latter.(2)

The Spanish sovereigns had long witnessed with deep regret the scandalous abuses which had crept into these ancient institutions, and had employed commissioners for investigating and reforming them, but ineffectually. Isabella now gladly availed herself of the assistance of her confessor in bringing them into a better state of discipline. In the course of the same year, 1494, she obtained a bull with full authority for this purpose from Alexander the Sixth, the execution of which she intrusted to Ximenes. The work of reform required all the energies of his powerful mind, backed by the royal authority ; for, in

(1) "Todos hablaban," says Oviedo, "de la sanctimonia é vida de este religioso." The same writer says that he saw him at Medina del Campo, in 1494, in a solemn procession, on the day of Corpus Christi, his body much emaciated, and walking barefooted in his coarse friar's dress. In the same procession was the magnificent cardinal of Spain, little dreaming how soon his proud honours were to descend on the head of his more humble companion.—Quincuagenas, MS.

(2) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 291.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Mosheim, Ecclesiastical History, vol. iii. cent. 14, p. 2.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 163.—L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, fol. 165.—Oviedo, Epilogo Real, Imperial y Pontifical, MS. apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 8.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 15.

addition to the obvious difficulty of persuading men to resign the good things of this world for a life of penance and mortification, there were other impediments, arising from the circumstance that the Conventuals had been countenanced in their lax interpretation of the rules of their order by many of their own superiors, and even the popes themselves. They were besides sustained in their opposition by many of the great lords, who were apprehensive that the rich chapels and masses, which they or their ancestors had founded in the various monasteries, would be neglected by the Observantines, whose scrupulous adherence to the vow of poverty excluded them from what, in church as well as state, is too often found the most cogent incentive to the performance of duty.(1)

From these various causes, the work of reform went on slowly; but the untiring exertions of Ximenes gradually effected its adoption in many establishments; and, where fair means could not prevail, he sometimes resorted to force. The monks of one of the convents in Toledo, being ejected from their dwelling, in consequence of their pertinacious resistance, marched out in solemn procession, with the crucifix before them, chanting at the same time the psalm *In exitu Israël*, in token of their persecution. Isabella resorted to milder methods. She visited many of the nunneries in person, taking her needle or distaff with her, and endeavouring by her conversation and example to withdraw their inmates from the low and frivolous pleasures to which they were addicted.(2)

While the reformation was thus silently going forward, the vacancy in the archbishopric of Toledo, already noticed, occurred by the death of the grand cardinal (1495). Isabella deeply felt the responsibility of providing a suitable person to this dignity, the most considerable not merely in Spain, but probably in Christendom, after the papacy; and which, moreover, raised its possessor to eminent political rank, as high chancellor of Castile.(3) The right of nomination to benefices was vested in the queen by the original settlement of the crown. She had uniformly discharged this trust with the most conscientious impartiality, conferring the honours of the church on none but persons of approved piety and learning.(4) In the present

(1) Fléchier, *Hist. de Ximenes*, pp. 25, 26.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, pp. 21, 22.—Gomez, de *Rebus Gestis*, fol. 6, 7.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 12.

(2) Fléchier, *Hist. de Ximenes*, p. 25.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 1, cap. 11.—*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. *Illustr.* 8.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, ubi supra.

(3) Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quine. 2, dial. 1.—Ferdinand and Isabella annexed the dignity of high chancellor in perpetuity to that of archbishop of Toledo. It seems, however, at least in later times, to have been a mere honorary title. (Mendoza, *Dignidades*, lib. 2, cap. 8.) The revenues of the archbishopric at the beginning of the sixteenth century amounted to 80,000 ducats (Navagiero, *Viaggio*, fol. 9.—L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 23), equivalent to about 702,200 dollars at the present day.

(4) "De mas desto," says Lucio Marino, "tenia por costumbre, que

instance, she was strongly solicited by Ferdinand in favour of his natural son Alfonso, archbishop of Saragossa. But this prelate, although not devoid of talent, had neither the age nor experience, and still less the exemplary morals demanded for this important station; and the queen mildly but unhesitatingly resisted all entreaty and expostulation of her husband on his behalf.<sup>(1)</sup>

The post had always been filled by men of high family. The queen, loth to depart from this usage, notwithstanding the dying admonition of Mendoza, turned her eyes on various candidates before she determined in favour of her own confessor, whose character presented so rare a combination of talent and virtue as amply compensated any deficiency of birth.

As soon as the papal bull reached Castile, confirming the royal nomination, Isabella summoned Ximenes to her presence, and delivering to him the parcel, requested him to open it before her. The confessor, who had no suspicion of their real purport, took the letters and devoutly pressed them to his lips; when his eye falling on the superscription, "To our venerable brother Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros, archbishop elect of Toledo," he changed colour, and involuntarily dropped the packet from his hands, exclaiming, "There is some mistake in this, it cannot be intended for me;" and abruptly quitted the apartment.

The queen, far from taking umbrage at this unceremonious proceeding, waited a while, until the first emotions of surprise should have subsided. Finding that he did not return, however, she despatched two of the grandees, who she thought would have the most influence with him, to seek him out and persuade him to accept the office. The nobles instantly repaired to his convent in Madrid, in which city the queen then kept her court. They found, however, that he had already left the place. Having ascertained his route, they mounted their horses, and following as fast as possible, succeeded in overtaking him at three leagues' distance from the

quando avia de dar alguna dignidad, o obispado, mas mirava en virtud, honestidad, y sciencia de las personas, que las riquezas y generosidad, aun que fuesen sus deudos. Lo qual fue causa que muchos de los que hablaban poco, y tenian los cabellos mas cortos que las cejas, comenzaron a traer los ojos bajos mirando la tierra, y andar con mas gravedad, y hazer mejor vida *simulando por ventura algunos mas la virtud, que exercitando la.*" (Cosas Memorables, fol. 182.) "L'hypocrisie est l'hommage que le vice rend à la vertu." The maxim is now somewhat stale, like most others of its profound author.

(1) Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, c. 16.—Salazar de Mendoza, Crón. del Gran Cardenal, lib. 2, c. 65. This prelate was at this time only twenty-four years of age. He had been raised to the see of Saragossa when only six. This strange abuse of preferring infants to the highest dignities of the church seems to have prevailed in Castile as well as Aragon; for the tombs of five archdeacons might be seen in the church of Madre de Dios at Toledo, in Salazar's time, whose united ages amounted only to thirty years.—See Crón. del Gran Cardenal, ubi supra.

city, as he was travelling on foot at a rapid rate, though in the noontide heat, on his way to the Franciscan monastery at Ocana.

After a brief expostulation with Ximenes on his abrupt departure, they prevailed on him to retrace his steps to Madrid; but, upon his arrival there, neither the arguments nor entreaties of his friends, backed as they were by the avowed wishes of his sovereign, could overcome his scruples, or induce him to accept an office of which he professed himself unworthy. "He had hoped," he said, "to pass the remainder of his days in the quiet practice of his monastic duties; and it was too late now to call him into public life, and impose a charge of such heavy responsibility on him, for which he had neither capacity nor inclination." In this resolution he pertinaciously persisted for more than six months, until a second bull was obtained from the pope, commanding him no longer to decline an appointment which the church had seen fit to sanction. This left no further room for opposition; and Ximenes acquiesced, though with evident reluctance, in his advancement to the first dignity in the kingdom. (1)

There seems to be no good ground for charging Ximenes with hypocrisy in this singular display of humility. The *nolo episcopari*, indeed, has passed into a proverb; but his refusal was too long and sturdily maintained to be reconciled with affectation or insincerity. He was, moreover, at this time, in the sixtieth year of his age, when ambition, though not extinguished, is usually chilled in the human heart. His habits had been long accommodated to the ascetic duties of the cloister, and his thoughts turned from the business of this world to that beyond the grave. However gratifying the distinguished honour conferred on him might be to his personal feelings, he might naturally hesitate to exchange the calm sequestered way of life to which he had voluntarily devoted himself, for the turmoil and vexations of the world.

But, although Ximenes showed no craving for power, it must be confessed he was by no means diffident in the use of it. One of the very first acts of his administration is too characteristic to be omitted. The government of Cazorla, the most considerable place in the gift of the archbishop of Toledo, had been intrusted by the grand cardinal to his younger brother, Don Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza. The friends of this nobleman applied to Ximenes to confirm the appointment, reminding him at the same time of his own obligations to the cardinal, and enforcing their petition by the recommendation which

(1) Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 4.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 7.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, cap. 16.—Gomez, de Rebus Gestis, fol. 11.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1495.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 18.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.

they had obtained from the queen. This was not the way to approach Ximenes, who was jealous of any improper influence over his own judgment, and; above all, of the too easy abuse of the royal favour. He was determined, in the outset, effectually to discourage all such applications; and he declared that "the sovereigns might send him back to the cloister again, but that no personal considerations should ever operate with him in distributing the honours of the church." The applicants, nettled at this response, returned to the queen, complaining in the bitterest terms of the arrogance and ingratitude of the new primate. Isabella, however, evinced no symptoms of disapprobation, not altogether displeased, perhaps, with the honest independence of her minister; at any rate, she took no further notice of the affair.(1)

Some time after, the archbishop encountered Mendoza, in one of the avenues of the palace, and, as the latter was turning off to avoid the meeting, he saluted him with the title of *adelantado* of Cazorla. Mendoza stared with astonishment at the prelate, who repeated the salutation, assuring him, "that, now he was at full liberty to consult his own judgment, without the suspicion of any sinister influence, he was happy to restore him to a station for which he had shown himself well qualified." It is scarcely necessary to say, that Ximenes was not importuned after this with solicitations for office. Indeed, all personal application he affected to regard as of itself sufficient ground for a denial, since it indicated "the want either of merit or of humility in the applicant."(2)

After his elevation to the primacy, he retained the same simple and austere manners as before, dispensing his large revenues in public and private charities, but regulating his domestic expenditure with the severest economy,(3) until he was admonished by the Holy See to adopt a state more consonant with the dignity of his office, if he would not disparage it in popular estimation. In obedience to this, he so far changed his habits as to display the usual magnificence of his predecessors in all that met the public eye—his general style of living, equipage, and the number and pomp of his retainers; but he relaxed nothing of his own personal mortifications. He maintained the same abstemious diet amidst all the luxuries of his table. Under his robes of silk or costly furs he wore the coarse frock of St. Francis, which he used to mend with his own hands. He used no linen about his person or bed; and he slept on a miserable pallet like that used by the monks of his fraternity, and so contrived as to be concealed

(1) Gomez, de Rebus Gestis, fol. 11.

(2) Ibid. ubi supra.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 13, 14.

(3) "He kept five or six friars of his order," says Gonzalo de Oviedo, "in his palace with him, and as many asses in his stables; but the latter all grew sleek and fat, for the archbishop would not ride himself, nor allow his brethren to ride either."—Quineuagenas, MS.

from observation under the luxurious couch in which he affected to repose. (1)

As soon as Ximenes entered on the duties of his office, he bent all the energies of his mind to the consummation of the schemes of reform which his royal mistress, as well as himself, had so much at heart. His attention was particularly directed to the clergy of his diocese, who had widely departed from the rule of St. Augustine, by which they were bound. His attempts at reform, however, excited such a lively dissatisfaction in this reverend body, that they determined to send one of their own number to Rome, to prefer their complaints against the archbishop at the papal court. (2)

The person selected for this delicate mission was a shrewd and intelligent canon by the name of Alborno. It could not be conducted so privately as to escape the knowledge of Ximenes. He was no sooner acquainted with it, than he despatched an officer to the coast, with orders to arrest the emissary. In case he had already embarked, the officer was authorised to fit out a fast-sailing vessel, so as to reach Italy, if possible, before him. He was at the same time fortified with despatches from the sovereigns to the Spanish minister Garcilasso de la Vega, to be delivered immediately on his arrival.

The affair turned out as had been foreseen. On arriving at the port, the officer found the bird had flown. He followed, however, without delay, and had the good fortune to reach Ostia several days before him. He forwarded his instructions at once to the Spanish minister, who in pursuance of them caused Alborno to be arrested the moment he set foot on shore, and sent him back as a prisoner of state to Spain; where a close confinement for two and twenty months admonished the worthy canon of the inexpediency of thwarting the plans of Ximenes. (3)

His attempts at innovation among the regular clergy of his own order, were encountered with more serious opposition. The reform fell most heavily on the Franciscans, who were

(1) *Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS. — Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 2, cap. 8, p. 9. — *Gomez, De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 13. — *Oviedo, Quincuagenas*, MS. — *Robles, Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 13. He commonly slept in his Franciscan habit. Of course, his toilet took no long time. On one occasion, as he was travelling, and up as usual long before dawn, he urged his muleteer to dress himself quickly; at which the latter irreverently exclaimed, "Cuérpo de Dios! does your holiness think I have nothing more to do, than to shake myself like a wet spaniel, and tighten my cord a little?" — Quintanilla, Archetypo, ubi supra.

(2) *Gomez, De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 16. The Venetian minister Navagiero, noticing the condition of the canons at Toledo, some few years later, celebrates them as "lording it above all others in their own city, being especial favourites with the ladies, dwelling in stately mansions, passing, in short, the most agreeable lives in the world, without any one to trouble them." — *Viaggio*, fol. 9.

(3) *Gomez, De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 17.

interdicted by their rules from holding property, whether as a community, or as individuals; while the members of other fraternities found some compensation for the surrender of their private fortunes, in the consequent augmentation of those of their fraternity. There was no one of the religious orders, therefore, in which the archbishop experienced such a dogged resistance to his plans as in his own. More than a thousand friars, according to some accounts, quitted the country, and passed over to Barbary, preferring rather to live with the infidel than conform to the strict letter of the founder's rules. (1)

The difficulties of the reform were perhaps augmented by the mode in which it was conducted. Isabella, indeed, used all gentleness and persuasion; (2) but Ximenes carried measures with a high and inexorable hand. He was naturally of an austere and arbitrary temper; and the severe training which he had undergone made him less charitable for the lapses of others, especially of those who, like himself, had voluntarily incurred the obligations of monastic rule. He was conscious of the rectitude of his intentions; and, as he identified his own interests with those of the church, he regarded all opposition to himself as an offence against religion, warranting the most peremptory exertion of power.

The clamour raised against his proceedings became at length so alarming, that the general of the Franciscans, who resided at Rome, determined to anticipate the regular period of his visit to Castile for inspecting the affairs of the order (1496). As he was himself a Conventual, his prejudices were, of course, all enlisted against the measures of reform; and he came over fully resolved to compel Ximenes to abandon it altogether, or to undermine, if possible, his credit and influence at court. But this functionary had neither the talent nor temper requisite for so arduous an undertaking.

He had not been long in Castile before he was convinced that all his own power, as head of the order, would be incompetent to protect it against the bold innovations of his provincial, while supported by royal authority. He demanded, therefore, an audience of the queen, in which he declared his sentiments with very little reserve. He expressed his astonishment that she should have selected an individual for the highest dignity

(1) Quintanilla, Archetypo, pp. 22, 23.—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. p. 201.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 15. One account represents the migration as being to Italy and other Christian countries where the Conventual order was protected; which would seem the most probable, though not the best-authenticated, statement of the two.

(2) "Trataba las monjas," says Riol, "con un agrado y amor tan cariñoso, que las robaba los corazones, y hecha dueña de ellas, las persuadía con suavidad y eficacia á que votasen clausura. Y es cosa admirable, que raro ve el convento donde entró esta celebre heroína, donde no lograse en el propio día el efecto de su santo deseo."—Informe, apud Semanario Erudito, tom. iii. p. 110.

in the church, who was destitute of nearly every qualification, even that of birth; whose sanctity was a mere cloak to cover his ambition; whose morose and melancholy temper made him an enemy not only of the elegancies, but the common courtesies of life; and whose rude manners were not compensated by any tincture of liberal learning. He deplored the magnitude of the evil which his intemperate measures had brought on the church, but which it was, perhaps, not yet too late to rectify; and he concluded by admonishing her, that if she valued her own fame, or the interests of her soul, she would compel this man of yesterday to abdicate the office for which he had proved himself so incompetent, and return to his original obscurity!

The queen, who listened to this violent harangue with an indignation that prompted her more than once to order the speaker from her presence, put a restraint on her feelings, and patiently waited to the end. When he had finished, she calmly asked him, "If he was in his senses, and knew whom he was thus addressing?" "Yes," replied the enraged friar, "I am in my senses, and know very well whom I am speaking to;—the Queen of Castile, a mere handful of dust like myself!" With these words he rushed out of the apartment, shutting the door after him with furious violence.(1)

Such impotent bursts of passion could, of course, have no power to turn the queen from her purpose. The general, however, on his return to Italy, had sufficient address to obtain authority from his Holiness to send a commission of Conventuals to Castile, who should be associated with Ximenes in the management of the reform. These individuals soon found themselves mere ciphers; and, highly offended at the little account which the archbishop made of their authority, they preferred such complaints of his proceedings to the pontifical court, that Alexander the Sixth was induced, with the advice of the college of cardinals, to issue a brief, November 9th, 1496, peremptorily inhibiting the sovereigns from proceeding further in the affair until it had been regularly submitted for examination to the head of the church.(2)

Isabella, on receiving this unwelcome mandate, instantly sent it to Ximenes. The spirit of the latter, however, rose in proportion to the obstacles it had to encounter. He sought only to rally the queen's courage, beseeching her not to faint in the good work now that it was so far advanced, and assuring her that it was already attended with such beneficent fruits as could not fail to secure the protection of Heaven. Isabella, every act of whose administration may be said to have

(1) Fléclier, *Hist. de Ximenes*, pp. 56, 58.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 14.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 3, cap. 15.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 13.

(2) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 38.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 1, cap. 11.



had reference, more or less remote, to the interests of religion, was as little likely as himself to falter in a matter which proposed these interests as its direct and only object. She assured her minister that she would support him in all that was practicable; and she lost no time in presenting the affair, through her agents, in such a light to the court of Rome, as might work a more favourable disposition in it. In this she succeeded, though not till after multiplied delays and embarrassments; and such ample powers were conceded to Ximenes (1497), in conjunction with the apostolic nuncio, as enabled him to consummate his grand scheme of reform, in defiance of all the efforts of his enemies. (1)

The reformation thus introduced extended to the religious institutions of every order equally with his own. It was most searching in its operation, reaching eventually to the moral conduct of the subjects of it, no less than the mere points of monastic discipline. As regards the latter, it may be thought of doubtful benefit to have enforced the rigid interpretation of a rule, founded on the melancholy principle that the amount of happiness in the next world is to be regulated by that of self-inflicted suffering in this. But it should be remembered, that, however objectionable such a rule may be in itself, yet, where it is voluntarily assumed as an imperative moral obligation, it cannot be disregarded without throwing down the barrier to unbounded license; and that the re-assertion of it, under these circumstances, must be a necessary preliminary to any effectual reform of morals.

The beneficial changes wrought in this latter particular, which Isabella had far more at heart than any exterior forms of discipline, are the theme of unqualified panegyric with her contemporaries. (2) The Spanish clergy, as I have before had occasion to remark, were early noted for their dissolute way of life, which, to a certain extent, seemed to be countenanced by the law itself. (3) This laxity of morals was carried to a most lamentable extent under the last reign, when all orders of ecclesiastics, whether regular or secular, infected probably by the corrupt example of the court, are represented (we may hope

(1) Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 1, cap. 11—14. Riol discusses the various monastic reforms effected by Ximenes, in his Memorial to Philip V., apud *Semanario Erudito*, tom. iii. pp. 102—110.

(2) L. Marineo, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 165.—Bernáldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 201.—et al.

(3) The practice of concubinage by the clergy was fully recognised, and the ancient *fuevos* of Castile permitted their issue to inherit the estates of such parents as died intestate. (See Marina, *Ensayo Histórico-Crítico sobre la Antigua Legislación de Castilla*; Madrid, 1808; p. 184.) The effrontery of these legalised strumpets, *barraganas*, as they were called, was at length so intolerable as to call for repeated laws, regulating their apparel, and prescribing a badge for distinguishing them from honest women. (Sempert, *Hist. del Luxo*, tom. i. pp. 165—169.) Spain is probably the only country in Christendom where concubinage was ever sanctioned by law; a circumstance doubtless imputable, in some measure, to the influence of the Mahometans.

it is an exaggeration) as wallowing in all the excesses of sloth and sensuality. So deplorable a pollution of the very sanctuaries of religion could not fail to occasion sincere regret to a pure and virtuous mind like Isabella's. The stain had sunk too deep, however, to be readily purged away. Her personal example, indeed, and the scrupulous integrity with which she reserved all ecclesiastical preferment for persons of unblemished piety, contributed greatly to bring about an amelioration in the morals of the secular clergy. But the secluded inmates of the cloister were less open to these influences; and the work of reform could only be accomplished there, by bringing them back to a reverence for their own institutions, and by the slow operation of public opinion.

Notwithstanding the queen's most earnest wishes, it may be doubted whether this would have ever been achieved without the co-operation of a man like Ximenes, whose character combined in itself all the essential elements of a reformer. Happily, Isabella was permitted to see before her death, if not the completion, at least the commencement, of a decided amendment in the morals of the religious orders; an amendment which, so far from being transitory in its character, calls forth the most emphatic eulogium from a Castilian writer far in the following century; who, while he laments their ancient laxity, boldly challenges comparison for the religious communities of his own country, with those of any other, in temperance, chastity, and exemplary purity of life and conversation.(1)

---

The authority on whom the life of Cardinal Ximenes mainly rests, is Alvaro Gomez do Castro. He was born in the village of St. Eulalia, near Toledo, in 1515, and received his education at Alcalá, where he obtained great repute for his critical acquaintance with the ancient classics. He was afterwards made professor of the humanities in the university; a situation which he filled with credit, but subsequently exchanged for the rhetorical chair in a school recently founded at Toledo. While thus occupied, he was chosen by the university of Alcalá to pay the most distinguished honour which could be rendered to the memory of its illustrious founder, by a faithful record of his extraordinary life. The most authentic sources of information were thrown open to him. He obtained an intimate acquaintance with the private life of the cardinal from three of his principal domestics, who furnished abundance of reminiscences from personal observation, while the archives of the university supplied a mass of documents relating to the public services of its patron. From these and similar materials Gomez prepared his biography, after many years of patient labour. The work fully answered public expectation; and its merits are such as to lead the learned Nic. Antonio to express a doubt whether anything more excellent or perfect in its way could be achieved: "*quo opere in eo genere ar prastantius quidquam, aut perfectius, esse possit, non immerito saepe dubitavi.*" (*Bibliotheca Nova*, tom. i. p. 59.) The encomium may be thought somewhat excessive; but it cannot be denied that the narrative is written in an easy and natural manner, with fidelity and accuracy, with commendable liberality of opinion, though with a judgment sometimes warped into an undue estimate of the qualities of his hero. It is

distinguished, moreover, by such beauty and correctness of Latinity, as have made it a text-book in many of the schools and colleges of the Peninsula. The first edition, being that used in the present work, was published at Alcalá in 1569. It has since been reprinted twice in Germany, and perhaps elsewhere. Gomez was busily occupied with other literary lucubrations during the remainder of his life, and published several works in Latin prose and verse, both of which he wrote with ease and elegance. He died of a catarrh in 1586, in the sixty-sixth year of his age, leaving behind him a reputation for disinterestedness and virtue, which is sufficiently commemorated in two lines of his epitaph:—

“Nemini unquam sciens nocui,  
Prodesse quam pluribus curavi.”

The work of Gomez has furnished the basis for all those biographies of Ximenes which have since appeared in Spain. The most important of these, probably, is Quintanilla's; which, with little merit of selection or arrangement, presents a copious mass of details, drawn from every quarter whence his patient industry could glean them. Its author was a Franciscan, and employed in procuring the beatification of Cardinal Ximenes by the court of Rome; a circumstance which probably disposed him to easier faith in the *marvellous* of his story, than most of his readers will be ready to give. The work was published at Palermo in 1633.

In addition to these authorities I have availed myself of a curious old manuscript, presented to me by Mr. O. Rich, entitled “*Suma de la Vida del R. S. Cardenal Don Fr. Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros*.” It was written within half a century after the cardinal's death, by “un erlado de la casa de Coruña.” The original, in “very ancient letter,” was extant in the archives of that noble house in Quintanilla's time, and is often cited by him. (Archetype, Apend. p. 77.) Its author evidently had access to those contemporary notices, some of which furnish the basis of Castro's narrative, from which, indeed, it exhibits no material discrepancy.

The extraordinary character of Ximenes has naturally attracted the attention of foreign writers, and especially the French, who have produced repeated biographies of him. The most eminent of these is by Fléchier, the eloquent bishop of Nismes. It is written with the simple elegance and perspicuity which characterises his other compositions; and in the general tone of its sentiments, on all matters both of church and state, is quite as orthodox as the most bigoted admirer of the cardinal could desire. Another life, by Marsollier, has obtained a very undeserved repute. The author, not content with the extraordinary qualities really appertaining to his hero, makes him out a sort of universal genius, quite ridiculous, rivaling Molière's Dr. Panurge himself. One may form some idea of the historian's accuracy from the fact, that he refers the commencement and conduct of the war of Granada chiefly to the counsels of Ximenes, who, as we have seen, was not even introduced at court till after the close of the war. Marsollier reckoned largely on the ignorance and gullibility of his readers. The event proved he was not mistaken.

## CHAPTER VI.

### XIMENES IN GRANADA.—PERSECUTION, INSURRECTION, AND CONVERSION OF THE MOORS.

1499—1500.

Tranquil state of Granada—Mild Policy of Talavera—Clergy dissatisfied with it—Violent measures of Ximenes—His Fanaticism—Its mischievous Effects—Insurrection in Granada—Tranquillity restored—Baptism of the Inhabitants.

MORAL energy, or constancy of purpose, seems to be less properly an independent power of the mind, than a mode of action, by which its various powers operate with effect. But, however this may be, it enters more largely, perhaps, than mere talent, as commonly understood, into the formation of what is called character, and is often confounded by the vulgar with talent of the highest order. In the ordinary concerns of life, indeed, it is more serviceable than brilliant parts; while, in the more important, these latter are of little weight without it, evaporating only in brief and barren flashes, which may dazzle their eye by the splendour, but pass away and are forgotten.

The importance of moral energy is felt, not only where it would be expected, in the concerns of active life, but in those more exclusively of an intellectual character,—in deliberate assemblies, for example,—where talent, as usually understood, might be supposed to assert an absolute supremacy, but where it is invariably made to bend to the controlling influence of this principle. No man destitute of it can be the leader of a party; while there are few leaders, probably, who do not number in their ranks minds from which they would be compelled to shrink in a contest for purely intellectual pre-eminence.

This energy of purpose presents itself in a yet more imposing form when stimulated by some intense passion, as ambition, or the nobler principle of patriotism or religion; when the soul, spurning vulgar considerations of interest, is ready to do and to dare all for conscience' sake; when, insensible alike to all that this world can give or take away, it loosens itself from the gross ties which bind it to earth, and, however humble its powers in every other point of view, attains a grandeur and elevation, which genius alone, however gifted, can never reach.

But it is when associated with exalted genius, and under the action of the potent principles above mentioned, that this moral energy conveys an image of power which approaches nearer than anything else on earth, to that of a divine intelligence. It

is, indeed, such agents that Providence selects for the accomplishment of those great revolutions by which the world is shaken to its foundations, new and more beautiful systems created, and the human mind carried forward at a single stride in the career of improvement, further than it had advanced for centuries. It must, indeed, be confessed, that this powerful agency is sometimes for evil as well as for good. It is this same impulse which spurs guilty Ambition along his bloody track, and which arms the hand of the patriot sternly to resist him; which glows with holy fervour in the bosom of the martyr, and which lights up the fires of persecution by which he is to win his crown of glory. The direction of the impulse, differing in the same individual under different circumstances, can alone determine whether he shall be the scourge or the benefactor of his species.

These reflections have been suggested by the character of the extraordinary person brought forward in the preceding chapter, Ximenes de Cisneros, and the new and less advantageous aspect in which he must now appear to the reader. Indeflexible constancy of purpose formed, perhaps, the most prominent trait of his remarkable character. What direction it might have received under other circumstances it is impossible to say. It would be no great stretch of fancy to imagine that the unyielding spirit, which in its early days could voluntarily endure years of imprisonment, rather than submit to an act of ecclesiastical oppression, might under similar influences have been aroused, like Luther's, to shake down the ancient pillars of Catholicism, instead of lending all its strength to uphold them. The latter position; however, would seem better assimilated to the constitution of his mind, whose sombre enthusiasm naturally prepared him for the vague and mysterious in the Romish faith, as his inflexible temper did for its bold and arrogant dogmas. At any rate, it was to this cause he devoted the whole strength of his talents and commanding energies.

We have seen in the preceding chapter, with what promptness he entered on the reform of religious discipline as soon as he came into office, and with what pertinacity he pursued it, in contempt of all personal interest and popularity. We are now to see him with similar zeal devoting himself to the extirpation of heresy; with contempt, not merely of personal consequences, but also of the most obvious principles of good faith and national honour.

Nearly eight years had elapsed since the conquest of Granada, and the subjugated kingdom continued to repose in peaceful security under the shadow of the treaty, which guaranteed the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient laws and religion. This unbroken continuance of public tranquillity, especially difficult to be maintained among the jarring elements of the capital, whose motley population of Moors, renegades, and Christians,

suggested perpetual points of collision, must be chiefly referred to the discreet and temperate conduct of the two individuals whom Isabella had charged with the civil and ecclesiastical government. These were Mendoza count of Tendilla, and Talavera archbishop of Granada.

The former, the brightest ornament of his illustrious house, has been before made known to the reader by his various important services, both military and diplomatic. Immediately after the conquest of Granada, he was made alcaide and captain-general of the kingdom; a post for which he was every way qualified by his prudence, firmness, enlightened views, and long experience.(1)

The latter personage, of more humble extraction,(2) was Fray Fernando de Talavera, a Hieronymite monk, who, having been twenty years prior of the monastery of Santa Maria del Prado, near Valladolid, was made confessor of Queen Isabella, and afterwards of the king. This situation necessarily gave him considerable influence in all public measures. If the keeping of the royal conscience could be safely intrusted to any one, it might certainly be to this estimable prelate, equally distinguished for his learning, amiable manners, and unblemished piety; and if his character was somewhat tainted with bigotry, it was in so mild a form, so far tempered by the natural benevolence of his disposition, as to make a favourable contrast to the dominant spirit of the time.(3)

After the conquest, he exchanged the bishopric of Avila for the archiepiscopal see of Granada. Notwithstanding the wishes of the sovereigns, he refused to accept any increase of emolument in this new and more exalted station: his revenues, indeed, which amounted to two millions of maravedis annually, were somewhat less than he before enjoyed.(4) The greater

(1) "Hombre," says his son, the historian of him, "de prudencia en negocios graves, de animo firme, asegurado con luenga experiencia de reencuentros i batallas ganadas." (Guerra de Granada, lib. 1, p. 9.) Oviedo dwells with sufficient amplification on the personal history and merits of this distinguished individual, in his garrulous reminiscences.—Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 28.

(2) Oviedo, at least, can find no better pedigree for him than that of Adam. "Quanto á su linage él fué del linage de todos los humanos ó de aquel barro y subcesion de Adán." (Quinc. MS. dial. de Talavera.) It is a very hard case, when a Castilian can make out no better genealogy for his hero.

(3) Pedraza, Antiguiedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.—Marmol, Rebelion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Talavera's correspondence with the queen, published in various works, but most correctly, probably, in the sixth volume of the Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. (Hist. 13), is not calculated to raise his reputation. His letters are little else than homilies on the love of company, dancing; and the like heinous offences. The whole savours more of the sharp twang of Puritanism than of the Roman Catholic school. But bigotry is neutral ground, on which the most opposite sects may meet.

(4) Pedraza, Antiguiedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.—Marmol, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Equivalent to 56,000 dollars of the present day; a sum which Pedraza makes out quite as hard duty, according to its magnitude, as the 500 pounds of Pope's Man of Ross.

part of this sum he liberally expended on public improvements and works of charity; objects which, to their credit be it spoken, have rarely failed to engage a large share of the attention and resources of the higher Spanish clergy.(1)

The subject which pressed most seriously on the mind of the good archbishop was the conversion of the Moors, whose spiritual blindness he regarded with feelings of tenderness and charity, very different from those entertained by most of his reverend brethren. He proposed to accomplish this by the most rational method possible. Though late in life, he set about learning Arabic, that he might communicate with the Moors in their own language, and commanded his clergy to do the same.(2) He caused an Arabic vocabulary, grammar, and catechism, to be compiled; and a version, in the same tongue, to be made of the liturgy, comprehending the selections from the Gospels; and proposed to extend this at some future time to the whole body of the Scriptures.(3) Thus unsealing the sacred oracles, which had been hitherto shut out from their sight, he opened to them the only true sources of Christian knowledge; and, by endeavouring to effect their conversion through the medium of their understandings, instead of seducing their imaginations with a vain show of ostentatious ceremonies, proposed the only method by which conversion could be sincere and permanent.

These wise and benevolent measures of the good prelate, recommended, as they were, by the most exemplary purity of life, acquired him great authority among the Moors, who, estimating the value of the doctrine by its fruits, were well inclined to listen to it, and numbers were daily added to the church.(4)

The progress of proselytism, however, was necessarily slow and painful among a people reared from the cradle, not merely in antipathy to, but abhorrence of, Christianity; who were severed from the Christian community by strong dissimilarity, of language, habits, and institutions; and now indissolubly,

(1) Pedraza, ubi supra.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. dial. de Talavera.—The worthy archbishop's benefactions on some occasions were of rather an extraordinary character. "Pidiendole limosna," says Pedraza, "una muger que no tenia camisa, se entró en una casa, y se desnudó la suya y se la dió; diciendo con san Pedro, No tengo oro ni plata que darte, doyte lo que tengo."—Antigüedad de Granada, lib. 3, cap. 10.

(2) Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Pedraza, *Antigüedad de Granada*, ubi supra.

(3) Fléchier, *Hist. de Ximénés*, p. 17.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 2, cap. 2.—Gomez, de *Rebus Gestis*, fol. 32.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. These tracts were published at Granada, in 1505, in the European character, being the first books ever printed in the Arabic language, according to Dr. M'Crie (*Reformation in Spain*, p. 70), who cites Schnurrer, *Bibl. Arabica*, pp. 16—18.

(4) Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Pedraza, *Antigüedad de Granada*, lib. 3, cap. 10.—Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 21.—Gomez, de *Rebus Gestis*, fol. 29. "Hacia lo que predicaba, é predicó lo que hizo," says Oviedo of the archbishop, briefly, "é así fué mucho provechoso é útil en aquella ciudad para la conversion de los Moros."—*Quincuagenas*, MS.

knit together by a common sense of national misfortune. Many of the more zealous clergy and religious persons, conceiving, indeed, this barrier altogether insurmountable, were desirous of seeing it swept away at once by the strong arm of power. They represented to the sovereigns that it seemed like insensibility to the goodness of Providence, which had delivered the infidels into their hands, to allow them any longer to usurp the fair inheritance of the Christians, and that the whole of the stiff-necked race of Mahomet might justly be required to submit without exception to instant baptism, or to sell their estates and remove to Africa. This, they maintained, could be scarcely regarded as an infringement of the treaty, since the Moors would be so great gainers on the score of their eternal salvation; to say nothing of the indispensableness of such a measure to the permanent tranquillity and security of the kingdom.(1)

But these considerations, "just and holy as they were," to borrow the words of a devout Spaniard,(2) failed to convince the sovereigns, who resolved to abide by their royal word, and to trust to the conciliatory measures now in progress, and a longer and more intimate intercourse with the Christians, as the only legitimate means for accomplishing their object. Accordingly, we find the various public ordinances as low down as 1499, recognising this principle, by the respect which they show for the most trivial usages of the Moors,(3) and by their sanctioning no other stimulant to conversion than the amelioration of their condition.(4)

Among those in favour of more active measures was Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo. Having followed the court to Granada in the autumn of 1499, he took the occasion to communicate his views to Talavera, the archbishop, requesting leave at the same time to participate with him in his labour of love; to which the latter, willing to strengthen himself by so efficient an ally, modestly assented. Ferdinand and Isabella soon after removed to Seville (Nov. 1499); but, before their departure, enjoined on the prelates to observe the temperate policy hitherto pursued, and to beware of giving any occasion for discontent to the Moors.(5)

(1) Marmol, *Rebelion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 23.

(2) *Ibid.* ubi supra.

(3) In the *pragmática* dated Granada, October 30th, 1499, prohibiting silk apparel of any description, an exception was made in favour of the Moors, whose robes were usually of that material among the wealthier classes.—*Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 126.

(4) Another law, October 31st, 1499, provided against the disinheritor of Moorish children who had embraced Christianity, and secured, moreover, to the female converts a portion of the property which had fallen to the state on the conquest of Granada. (*Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 5.) Llorente has reported this *pragmatic* with some inaccuracy.—*Hist. de l'Inquisition*, tom. i. p. 334.

(5) Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 29.—*Quintanilla*, *Archetypo*, lib. 2, p. 54.—*Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS. Ferdinand and Isabella, according to Ferreras, took counsel of sundry learned theologians and jurists, whether they could lawfully compel the Mahometans



No sooner had the sovereigns left the city, than Ximenes invited some of the leading *alfaquis*, or Mussulman doctors, to a conference, in which he expounded, with all the eloquence at his command, the true foundations of the Christian faith, and the errors of their own; and, that his teaching might be the more palatable, enforced it by liberal presents, consisting mostly of rich and costly articles of dress, of which the Moors were at all times exceedingly fond. This policy he pursued for some time, till the effect became visible. Whether the preaching or presents of the archbishop had most weight, does not appear. (1) It is probable, however, that the Moorish doctors found conversion a much more pleasant and profitable business than they had anticipated; for they one after another declared their conviction of their errors, and their willingness to receive baptism. The example of these learned persons was soon followed by great numbers of their illiterate disciples, insomuch that no less than four thousand are said to have presented themselves in one day for baptism; and Ximenes, unable to administer the rite to each individually, was obliged to adopt the expedient familiar to the Christian missionaries, of christening them *en masse* by aspersion; scattering the consecrated drops from a mop, or hyssop, as it was called, which he twirled over the heads of the multitude. (2)

So far all went on prosperously; and the eloquence and largesses of the archbishop, which latter he lavished so freely, as to encumber his revenues for several years to come, brought crowds of proselytes to the Christian fold. (3) There were some,

to become Christians, notwithstanding the treaty, which guaranteed to them the exercise of their religion. After repeated conferences of this erudit body, "il fut décidé," says the historian, "qu'on solliciteroit la conversion des Mahométans de la Ville et du Royaume de Grenade, en ordonnant à ceux qui ne voudroient pas embrasser la religion Chrétienne, de vendre leurs biens et de sortir du royaume." (Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 194.) Such was the idea of *solicitation* entertained by these reverend casuists. The story, however, wants a better voucher than Ferreras.

(1) The honest Robles appears to be of the latter opinion. "Alfin," says he, with naïveté, "con halagos, dadivas, y caricias, los traxo a conocimiento del verdadero Dios."—Vida de Ximenez, p. 100.

(2) Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Marmol, Rebelion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 24.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 29.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS. Some ecclesiastical writers find no earlier trace of christening *by aspersion* than the fourteenth century. (Fleury, Histoire Ecclesiastique, liv. 98.) But Father Torquemada, in discussing the validity of this mode of baptism, finds, or imagines he finds, warrant for it as far back as the age of the Apostles. "Lo ha auido," he says of the *bautizando con hisopo*, "y huvo en la Primitiva Iglesia, en tiempo de los Apóstolos de Christo, y en otros despues. Esto dice Tertuliano averse usado, y en su tiempo se debia de usar tambien, nombrando el bautismo con el nombre de aspersion de agua. Y lo mismo lo dice San Cypriano en la Epistola 76, Ad Magnum, y dice ser Verdadero Bautismo."—Monarquia Indiana (Madrid, 1723), tom. iii. lib. 16, cap. 1.

(3) Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 14.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, fol. 55.—The sound of bells, so unusual to Mahometan ears, pealing day and night from the newly consecrated mosques, gained Ximenes the appellation of *alfaqui campu nero* from the Granadines.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.

indeed, among the Mahometans who regarded these proceedings as repugnant, if not to the letter, at least to the spirit, of the original treaty of capitulation; which seemed intended to provide, not only against the employment of force, but of any undue incentive to conversion.(1) Several of the more sturdy, including some of the principal citizens, exerted their efforts to stay the tide of defection, which threatened soon to swallow up the whole population of the city. But Ximenes, whose zeal had mounted up to fever heat in the excitement of success, was not to be cooled by any opposition, however formidable; and, if he had hitherto respected the letter of the treaty, he now showed himself prepared to trample on letter and spirit indifferently, when they crossed his designs.

Among those most active in the opposition was a noble Moor named Zegri, well skilled in the learning of his countrymen, with whom he had great consideration. Ximenes, having exhausted all his usual artillery of arguments and presents on this obdurate infidel, had him taken into custody by one of his officers named Leon, "a lion," says a punning historian, "by nature as well as by name,"(2) and commanded the latter to take such measures with his prisoner as would clear the film from his eyes. This faithful functionary executed his orders so effectually, that, after a few days of fasting, fetters, and imprisonment, he was able to present his charge to his employer, penitent to all outward appearance, and with an humble mien strongly contrasting with his former proud and lofty bearing. After the most respectful obeisance to the archbishop, Zegri informed him, that "on the preceding night he had had a revelation from Allah, who had condescended to show him the error of his ways, and commanded him to receive instant baptism;" at the same time pointing to his gaoler, he "jocularly" remarked, "Your reverence has only to turn this *lion* of yours loose among the people, and, my word for it, there will not be a Mussulman left many days within the walls of Granada."(3) "Thus," exclaims the devout Ferreras, "did

(1) Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 25.—Take, for example, the following provisions in the treaty: "Que si algun Moro tuviere alguna renegada por muger, no será apremiada á ser Christiana contra su voluntad, sino que será interrogada, en presencia de Christianos y de Moros, y se seguirá su voluntad; y lo mesmo se entenderá con los niños y niñas nacidos de Christiana y Moro. Que ningún Moro ni Mora serán apremiados á ser Christianos contra su voluntad; y que si alguna doncella, ó casada, ó viuda, por razon de algunos amores se quisiere tornar Christiana, tampoco será recebida, hasta ser interrogada." The whole treaty is given *in extenso* by Marmol, and by no other author that I have seen.

(2) Gomez, de *Rebus Gestis*, lib. 2, fol. 29.

(3) Robles, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, cap. 14.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Gomez, De *Rebus Gestis*, fol. 39.—Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 25.—Zegri assumed the baptismal name of the Great Captain, Gonzalo Hernandez, whose prowess he had experienced in a personal rencontre in the vega of Granada.—Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, ubi supra.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.

Providence avail itself of the darkness of the dungeon to pour on the benighted minds of the infidel the light of the true faith!"(1)

The work of proselytism now went on apace; for terror was added to the other stimulants. The zealous propagandist, in the mean while, flushed with success, resolved not only to exterminate infidelity, but the very characters in which its teachings were recorded. He accordingly caused all the Arabic manuscripts which he could procure, to be heaped together in a common pile in one of the great squares of the city. The largest part were copies of the Koran, or works in some way or other connected with theology; with many others, however, on various scientific subjects. They were beautifully executed, for the most part, as to their chirography, and sumptuously bound and decorated; for, in all relating to the mechanical finishing, the Spanish Arabs excelled every people in Europe. But neither splendour of outward garniture, nor intrinsic merit of composition, could atone for the taint of heresy in the eye of the stern inquisitor; he reserved for his university of Alcala three hundred works, indeed, relating to medical science, in which the Moors were as pre-eminent in that day as the Europeans were deficient; but all the rest, amounting to many thousands,(2) he consigned to indiscriminate conflagration.(3)

This melancholy *auto da fe*, it will be recollected, was celebrated, not by an unlettered barbarian, but by a cultivated prelate, who was at that very time actively employing his large revenues in the publication of the most stupendous literary work of the age, and in the endowment of the most learned university in Spain.(4) It took place, not in the darkness of the middle ages, but in the dawn of the sixteenth century, and

(1) Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 195.

(2) According to Robles (Rebelion de Moriscos, p. 104), and the Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, 1,095,000; to Conde (El Nubensc, Descripcion de España, p. 4, note), 80,000; to Gomez and others, 5,000. There are scarcely any data for arriving at probability in this monstrous discrepancy. The famous library of the Ommeiyades at Cordova was said to contain 600,000 volumes. It had long since been dissipated; and no similar collection had been attempted in Granada, where learning was never in that palmy state which it reached under the Cordovan dynasty. Still, however, learned men were to be found there, and the Moorish metropolis would naturally be the depository of such literary treasures as had escaped the general shipwreck of time and accident. On the whole, the estimate of Gomez would appear much too small, and that of Robles as disproportionately exaggerated. Conde, better instructed in Arabic lore than any of his predecessors, may be found, perhaps, here, as elsewhere, the best authority.

(3) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, lib. 2, fol. 30.—Marmol, Rebelion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 25.—Robles, Vida de Ximenes, cap. 14.—Suma de la Vida de Cisneros, MS.—Quintanilla, Archetipo, p. 63.

(4) Yet the archbishop might find some countenance for his fanaticism in the most polite capital of Europe. The faculty of Theology in Paris, some few years later, declared "que c'en était fait de la religion, si on permettait l'étude du Grec et de l'Hébreu!"—Villers, Essai sur l'Esprit et l'Influence de la Réformation de Luther (Paris, 1820), p. 64, note.

in the midst of an enlightened nation, deeply indebted for its own progress to these very stores of Arabian wisdom. It forms a counterpart to the imputed sacrilege of Omar,(1) eight centuries before, and shows that bigotry is the same in every faith and every age.

The mischief occasioned by this act, far from being limited to the immediate loss, continued to be felt still more severely in its consequences. Such as could, secreted the manuscripts in their possession till an opportunity occurred for conveying them out of the country, and many thousands in this way were privately shipped over to Barbary.(2) Thus Arabian literature became rare in the libraries of the very country to which it was indigenous; and Arabio scholarship, once so flourishing in Spain, and that too in far less polished ages, gradually fell into decay from want of aliment to sustain it. Such were the melancholy results of this literary persecution; more mischievous in one view, than even that directed against life; for the loss of an individual will scarcely be felt beyond his own generation, while the annihilation of a valuable work, or, in other words, of mind itself embodied in a permanent form, is a loss to all future time.

The high hand with which Ximenes now carried measures excited serious alarm in many of the more discreet and temperate Castilians in the city. They besought him to use greater forbearance, remonstrating against his obvious violations of the treaty, as well as against the expediency of forced conversions, which could not, in the nature of things, be lasting. But the pertinacious prelate only replied, that "a tamer policy might, indeed, suit temporal matters, but not those in which the interests of the soul were at stake; that the unbeliever, if he could not be drawn, should be driven, into the way of salvation; and that it was no time to stay the hand, when the ruins of Mahometanism were tottering to their foundations." He accordingly went on with unflinching resolution.(3)

But the patience of the Moors themselves, which had held out so marvellously under this system of oppression, began now to be exhausted. Many signs of this might be discerned by much less acute optics than those of the archbishop; but his were blinded by the arrogance of success. At length, in this inflammable state of public feeling, an incident occurred which led to a general explosion.

(1) Gibbon's argument, if it does not shake the foundations of the whole story of the Alexandrian conflagration, may at least raise a natural scepticism as to the pretended amount and value of the works destroyed.

(2) The learned Granadine, Leo Africanus, who emigrated to Fez after the fall of the capital, notices a single collection of 3000 manuscripts belonging to an individual, which he saw in Algiers, whither they had been secretly brought by the Moriscos from Spain.—Comde, *Dominacion de los Arabes*, prólogo.—Casiri, *Bibliotheca Escurialensis*, tom. i. p. 172.

(3) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 30.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, rey 30, cap. 10.

Three of Ximenes' servants were sent on some business to the Albaycin, a quarter inhabited exclusively by Moors, and encompassed by walls, which separated it from the rest of the city. (1) These men had made themselves peculiarly odious to the people by their activity in their master's service. A dispute having arisen between them and some inhabitants of the quarter, came at last to blows, when two of the servants were massacred on the spot, and their comrade escaped with difficulty from the infuriated mob. (2) The affair operated as a signal for insurrection. The inhabitants of the district ran to arms, got possession of the gates, barricaded the streets, and in a few hours the whole Albaycin was in rebellion. (3)

In the course of the following night, a large number of the enraged populace made their way into the city to the quarters of Ximenes, with the purpose of taking summary vengeance on his head for all his persecutions. Fortunately, his palace was strong, and defended by numerous resolute and well-armed attendants. The latter at the approach of the rioters, implored their master to make his escape, if possible, to the fortress of the Alhambra, where the count of Tendilla was established. But the intrepid prelate, who held life too cheap to be a coward, exclaimed, "God forbid I should think of my own safety, when so many of the faithful are perilling theirs! No, I will stand to my post, and wait there, if heaven wills it, the crown of martyrdom." (4) It must be confessed he well deserved it.

The building, however, proved too strong for the utmost efforts of the mob; and at length, after some hours of awful suspense and agitation to the beleaguered inmates, the count of Tendilla arrived in person at the head of his guards, and succeeded in dispersing the insurgents, and driving them back to their own quarters. But no exertions could restore order to the tumultuous populace, or induce them to listen to terms; and they even stoned the messenger charged with pacific proposals from the count of Tendilla. They organised themselves under leaders, provided arms, and took every possible means for maintaining their defence. It seemed as if, smitten with the recollections of ancient liberty, they were resolved to recover it again at all hazards. (5)

(1) Casiri, *Bibliotheca Escorialensis*, tom. ii. p. 291.—Pedraza, *Antigüedad de Granada*, lib. 3, cap. 10.

(2) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 31. There are some discrepancies, not important, however, between the narrative of Gomez and the other authorities. Gomez, considering his uncommon opportunities of information, is worth them all.

(3) *Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, lib. 2, fol. 31.—Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 26.

(4) Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 14.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 5.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, p. 36.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epistol.* epist. 212.

(5) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, ubi supra.—Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Mendoza, *Guerra de Granada*, p. 11.

At length, after this disorderly state of things had lasted for several days, Talavera, the archbishop of Granada, resolved to try the effect of his personal influence, hitherto so great with the Moors, by visiting himself the disaffected quarter. This noble purpose he put in execution, in spite of the most earnest remonstrances of his friends. He was attended only by his chaplain, bearing the crucifix before him, and a few of his domestics, on foot and unarmed like himself. At the sight of their venerable pastor, with his countenance beaming with the same serene and benign expression with which they were familiar when listening to his exhortations from the pulpit, the passions of the multitude were stilled. Every one seemed willing to abandon himself to the tender recollections of the past; and the simple people crowded around the good man, kneeling down and kissing the hem of his robe, as if to implore his benediction. The count of Tendilla no sooner learned the issue, than he followed into the Albaycin, attended by a handful of soldiers. When he had reached the place where the mob was gathered, he threw his bonnet into the midst of them, in token of his pacific intentions. The action was received with acclamations; and the people, whose feelings had now taken another direction, recalled by his presence to the recollection of his uniformly mild and equitable rule, treated him with similar respect to that shown the archbishop of Granada.(1)

These two individuals took advantage of this favourable change of feeling to expostulate with the Moors on the folly and desperation of their conduct, which must involve them in a struggle with such overwhelming odds as that of the whole Spanish monarchy. They implored them to lay down their arms and return to their duty; in which event they pledged themselves, as far as in their power, to allow no further repetition of the grievances complained of, and to intercede for their pardon with the sovereigns. The count testified his sincerity by leaving his wife and two children as hostages in the heart of the Albaycin; an act which must be admitted to imply unbounded confidence in the integrity of the Moors.(2) These various measures, backed, moreover, by the counsels and authority of some of the chief alfaquis, had the effect to restore tranquillity among the people, who, laying aside their hostile preparations, returned once more to their regular employments.(3)

(1) Marmol, *Rebelion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 26.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 212.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, p. 56.—Bleda, *Corónica*, ubi supra.

(2) Marmol, *Rebelion de Moriscos*, loc. cit.—Mendoza, *Guerra de Granada*, lib. 1, p. 11. That such confidence was justified, may be inferred from a common saying of Archbishop Talavera, "That Moorish works and Spanish faith were all that were wanting to make a good Christian." A bitter sarcasm this on his own countrymen!—Pedraza, *Antigüedad de Granada*, lib. 3, cap. 10.

(3) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 212.—Bleda, *Corónica*, loc. cit.—Marmol, *Rebelion de Moriscos*, ubi supra.

The rumour of the insurrection, in the mean while, with the usual exaggerations, reached Seville, where the court was then residing. In one respect rumour did justice, by imputing the whole blame of the affair to the intemperate zeal of Ximenes. That personage, with his usual promptness, had sent early notice of the affair to the queen by a negro slave uncommonly fleet of foot; but the fellow had become intoxicated by the way, and the court were several days without any more authentic tidings than general report. The king, who always regarded Ximenes's elevation to the primacy, to the prejudice, as the reader may remember, of his own son, with dissatisfaction, could not now restrain his indignation, but was heard to exclaim tauntingly to the queen, "So we are like to pay dear for your archbishop, whose rashness has lost us in a few hours what we have been years in acquiring." (1)

The queen, confounded at the tidings, and unable to comprehend the silence of Ximenes, instantly wrote to him in the severest terms, demanding an explanation of the whole proceeding. The archbishop saw his error in committing affairs of moment to such hands as those of his sable messenger; and the lesson stood him in good stead, according to his moralising biographer, for the remainder of his life. (2) He hastened to repair his fault by proceeding to Seville in person, and, presenting himself before the sovereigns, he detailed to them the history of all the past transactions; recapitulated his manifold services, the arguments and exhortations he had used, the large sums he had expended, and his various expedients, in short, for effecting conversion, before resorting to severity. He boldly assumed the responsibility of the whole proceeding, acknowledging that he had purposely avoided communicating his plans to the sovereigns for fear of opposition. If he had erred, he said, it could be imputed to no other motive, at worst, than too great zeal for the interests of religion; but he concluded with assuring them, that the present position of affairs was the best possible for their purposes, since the late conduct of the Moors involved them in the guilt, and consequently all the penalties of treason, and that it would be an act of clemency to offer pardon on the alternatives of conversion or exile! (3)

The archbishop's discourse, if we are to credit his enthusiastic biographer, not only dispelled the clouds of royal indignation, but drew forth the most emphatic expressions of approbation. (4) How far Ferdinand and Isabella were moved to this by his final recommendation, or what, in clerical language, may be called the "improvement of his discourse," does not appear.

(1) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 5.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 14.—*Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS.

(2) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 32.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 14.

(3) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, ubi supra.

(4) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 33.—*Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS.

They did not at any rate adopt it in its literal extent. In due time, however, commissioners were sent to Granada, fully authorised to inquire into the late disturbances, and punish their guilty authors. In the course of the investigation, many, including some of the principal citizens, were imprisoned on suspicion. The greater part made their peace by embracing Christianity. Many others sold their estates and migrated to Barbary; and the remainder of the population, whether from fear of punishment or contagion of example, abjured their ancient superstition and consented to receive baptism. The whole number of converts was estimated at about fifty thousand, whose future relapses promised an almost inexhaustible supply for the fiery labours of the Inquisition. From this period the name of Moors, which had gradually superseded the primitive one of Spanish Arabs, gave way to the title of Moriscos, by which this unfortunate people continued to be known through the remainder of their protracted existence in the Peninsula.(1)

The circumstances under which this important revolution in religion was effected in the whole population of this great city will excite only feelings of disgust at the present day, mingled, indeed, with compassion for the unhappy beings who so heedlessly incurred the heavy liabilities attached to their new faith. Every Spaniard, doubtless, anticipated the political advantages likely to result from a measure which divested the Moors of the peculiar immunities secured by the treaty of capitulation, and subjected them at once to the law of the land. It is equally certain, however, that they attached great value in a spiritual view to the mere show of conversion, placing implicit confidence in the purifying influence of the waters of baptism, to whomever and under whatever circumstances administered. Even the philosophic Martyr, as little tinctured with bigotry as any of the time, testifies his joy at the conversion, on the ground that, although it might not penetrate beneath the crust of infidelity, which had formed over the mind of the older, and, of course, inveterate Mussulman, yet it would have full effect on his posterity, subjected from the cradle to the searching operation of Christian discipline.(2)

(1) Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 23.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 6.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 215.—Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 27.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, lib. 2, fol. 32.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 11.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1500.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 159. The last author carries the number of converts in Granada and its environs to 70,000.

(2) "Tu vero iniquis," he says, in a letter to the cardinal of Santa Cruz, "hisidem in suum Mahometem vivunt animis, atque id jure merito suspicandam est. Durum namque majorum instituta relinquere; attamen ego existimo, consultum optime fuisse ipsorum admittere postulata: paulatim namque nova superveniente disciplina, juvenum saltem et infantum atque eo tutius nepotum, inanibus illis superstitionibus abradis, novis imbuentur ritibus. De senescentibus, qui callosis animis induruerunt, haud ego quidem id futurum



With regard to Ximenes, the real author of the work, whatever doubts were entertained of his discretion in the outset, they were completely dispelled by the results. All concurred in admiring the invincible energy of the man who, in the face of such mighty obstacles, had so speedily effected this momentous revolution in the faith of a people bred from childhood in the deadliest hostility to Christianity; (1) and the good archbishop Talavera was heard in the fulness of his heart to exclaim, that "Ximenes had achieved greater triumphs than even Ferdinand and Isabella; since they had conquered only the soil, while he had gained the souls of Granada;" (2)

inferior."—Opus Epist. epist. 215. Gonsalvo de Cordova expresses himself in a similar tone of satisfaction in a letter to the secretary Almazan, Carta fecha en Caragoça, (Siracusa?) 15th April, 1501, MS.

(1) "Magnæ deinceps," says Gomez, "apud omnes venerationi Ximenius esse cepit. Porro plus mentis acie videre quam solent homines credebatur, quod re ancipiti, neque planè confirmatâ, barbarâ civitate adhuc suum Mahumetum spirante, tantâ animi contentione, ut Christi doctrinam amplecterentur, laboraverat et effecerat." (De Rebus Gestis, fol. 33.) The panegyric of the Spaniard is endorsed by Fléchier (*Histoire de Ximenes*, p. 119), who, in the age of Louis XIV., displays all the bigotry of that of Ferdinand and Isabella.

(2) Talavera, as I have already noticed, had caused the offices, catechisms, and other religious exercises to be translated into Arabic for the use of the converts; proposing to extend the translation at some future time to the great body of the Scriptures. That time had now arrived, but Ximenes vehemently remonstrated against the measure. "It would be throwing pearls before swine," said he; "to open the Scriptures to persons in their low state of ignorance, who could not fail, as St. Paul says, to wrest them to their own destruction. The word of God should be wrapped in discreet mystery from the vulgar, who feel little reverence for what is plain and obvious. It was for this reason that our Saviour himself clothed his doctrines in parables when he addressed the people. The Scriptures should be confined to the three ancient languages, which God with mystic import permitted to be inscribed over the head of his crucified Son; and the vernacular should be reserved for such devotional and moral treatises as holy men indite, in order to quicken the soul, and turn it from the pursuit of worldly vanities to heavenly contemplation."—*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 32, 33. The narrowest opinion, as usual, prevailed, and Talavera abandoned his wise and benevolent purpose. The sagacious arguments of the primate lead his biographer, Gomez, to conclude that he had a prophetic knowledge of the coming heresy of Luther, which owed so much of its success to the vernacular versions of the Scriptures; in which probable opinion he is faithfully echoed, as usual, by the good bishop of Nismes.—Fléchier, *Hist. de Ximenes*, pp. 117—119.

ungovernable height by the public apostasy of Granada. They at length resolved to anticipate any similar attempt on themselves by a general insurrection. They accordingly seized on the fortresses and strong passes throughout the country, and began as usual with forays into the lands of the Christians.

These bold acts excited much alarm in the capital, and the count of Tendilla took vigorous measures for quenehing the rebellion in its birth. Gonsalvo de Cordova, his early pupil, but who might now well be his master in the art of war, was at that time residing in Granada; and Tendilla availed himself of his assistance to enforce a hasty muster of levies, and march at once against the enemy.

His first movement was against Huejar, a fortified town situated in one of the eastern ranges of the Alpuxarras, whose inhabitants had taken the lead in the insurrection. The enterprise was attended with more difficulty than was expected. "God's enemies," to borrow the charitable epithet of the Castilian chroniclers, had ploughed up the lands in the neighbourhood; and, as the light cavalry of the Spaniards was working its way through the deep furrows, the Moors opened the canals which intersected the fields, and in a moment the horses were floundering up to their girths in the mire and water. Thus embarrassed in their progress, the Spaniards presented a fatal mark to the Moorish missiles, which ruined on them with pitiless fury; and it was not without great efforts and considerable loss that they gained a firm landing on the opposite side. Undismayed, however, they then charged the enemy with such vivacity as compelled him to give way and take refuge within the defences of the town.

No impediment could now check the ardour of the assailants. They threw themselves from their horses, and bringing forward the scaling-ladders, planted them against the walls. Gonsalvo was the first to gain the summit; and as a powerful Moor endeavoured to thrust him from the topmost round of the ladder, he grasped the battlements firmly with his left hand, and dealt the infidel such a blow with the sword in his right, as brought him headlong to the ground. He then leapt into the place, and was speedily followed by his troops. The enemy made a brief and ineffectual resistance. The greater part were put to the sword; the remainder, including the women and children, were made slaves, and the town was delivered up to pillage. (1)

The severity of this military execution had not the effect of intimidating the insurgents; and the revolt wore so serious an

(1) Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 28. — Quintada, *Espanoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 239. — Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 23. — Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 159. — Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 338. — Mendoza, *Guerra de Granada*, p. 12.

aspect, that King Ferdinand found it necessary to take the field in person, which he did at the head of as complete and beautiful a body of Castilian chivalry as ever graced the campaigns of Granada.(1) Quitting Alhendin, the place of rendezvous, in the latter end of February, 1500, he directed his march on Lanjaron, one of the towns most active in the revolt, and perched high among the inaccessible fastnesses of the sierra south-east of Granada.

The inhabitants, trusting to the natural strength of a situation which had once baffled the arms of the bold Moorish chief El Zagal, took no precautions to secure the passes. Ferdinand, relying on this, avoided the more direct avenue to the place; and, bringing his men by a circuitous route over dangerous ravines, and dark and dizzy precipices, where the foot of the hunter had seldom ventured, succeeded at length, after incredible toil and hazard, in reaching an elevated point, which entirely commanded the Moorish fortress.

Great was the dismay of the insurgents at the apparition of the Christian banners, streaming in triumph in the upper air from the very pinnacles of the sierra. They stoutly persisted, however, in the refusal to surrender. But their works were too feeble to stand the assault of men who had vanquished the more formidable obstacles of nature; and, after a short struggle, the place was carried by storm, and its wretched inmates experienced the same dreadful fate with those of Huejar (March 8th, 1500).(2)

At nearly the same time, the count of Lerin took several other fortified places in the Alpujarras, in one of which he blew up a mosque filled with women and children. Hostilities were carried on with all the ferocity of a civil, or rather servile war; and the Spaniards, repudiating all the feelings of courtesy and generosity which they had once shown to the same men when dealing with them as honourable enemies, now regarded them only as rebellious vassals, or indeed slaves, whom the public safety required to be not merely chastised, but exterminated.

These severities, added to the conviction of their own impotence, at length broke the spirit of the Moors, who were reduced to the most humble concessions; and the Catholic king, "unwilling, out of his great clemency," says Abarcá, "to stain his sword with the blood of all these wild beasts of the Alpujarras," consented to terms which may be deemed reasonable, at least in comparison with his previous policy. These were, the sur-

(1) If we are to believe Martyr, the royal force amounted to 80,000 foot and 15,000 horse; so large an army, so promptly brought into the field, would suggest high ideas of the resources of the nation; too high indeed to gain credit, even from Martyr, without confirmation.

(2) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 215.—Abarcá, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 388.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 3. cap. 45.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1500.

render of their arms and fortresses, and the payment of the round sum of fifty thousand ducats.(1)

As soon as tranquillity was re-established, measures were taken for securing it permanently, by introducing Christianity among the natives, without which they never could remain well affected to their present government. Holy men were, therefore, sent as missionaries, to admonish them calmly and without violence, of their errors, and to instruct them in the great truths of revelation.(2) Various immunities were also proposed, as an additional incentive to conversion, including an entire exemption to the party from the payment of his share of the heavy mulct lately imposed.(3) The wisdom of these temperate measures became every day more visible in the conversion, not merely of the simple mountaineers, but of nearly all the population of the great cities of Baza, Guadix, and Almeria, who consented before the end of the year to abjure their ancient religion, and receive baptism.(4)

This defection, however, caused great scandal among the more sturdy of their countrymen, and a new insurrection broke out on the eastern confines of the Alpuxarras (Dec. 1500), which was suppressed with similar circumstances of stern severity, and a similar exaction of a heavy sum of money;—money, whose doubtful efficacy may be discerned, sometimes in staying, but more frequently in stimulating the arm of persecution.(5)

But while the murmurs of rebellion died away in the east, they were heard in thunders from the distant hills on the western borders of Granada. This district, comprehending the Sierra Vermeja and Villa Luenga, in the neighbourhood of Ronda, was peopled by a warlike race, among whom was the African tribe of Gandules, whose blood boiled with the same tropical fervour as that which glowed in the veins of their ancestors. They had early shown symptoms of discontent at the late proceedings in the capital. The duchess of Arcos, widow of the great marquis duke of Cadiz, whose estates lay in that quarter,(6) used her personal exertions to appease them; and the government made the most earnest assurances

(1) Marmol, *Rebelion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 25.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 338.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 159.—Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 24.

(2) Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 24.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 165.

(3) *Privilegios á los Moros de Valdelecin y las Alpuxarras que se convirtieron*, á 30 de Julio de 1500.—*Archivo de Simancas*, apud *Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. Apend. 14.

(4) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1500.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 10.

(5) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1501.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 27, 31.

(6) The great marquis of Cadiz was third count of Arcos, from which his descendants took their title on the resumption of Cadiz by the crown after his death.—Mendoza, *Dignidades*, lib. 3, cap. 8, 17.

of its intention to respect whatever had been guaranteed by the treaty of capitulation.(1) But they had learned to place little trust in princes; and the rapidly extending apostasy of their countrymen exasperated them to such a degree, that they at length broke out in the most atrocious acts of violence; murdering the Christian missionaries, and kidnapping, if report be true, many Spaniards of both sexes, whom they sold as slaves in Africa. They were accused, with far more probability, of entering into a secret correspondence with their brethren on the opposite shore, in order to secure their support in the meditated revolt.(2)

The government displayed its usual promptness and energy on this occasion. Orders were issued to the principal chiefs and cities of Andalusia to muster their forces with all possible despatch, and concentrate them on Ronda. The summons was obeyed with such alacrity, that in the course of a very few weeks the streets of that busy city were thronged with a shining array of warriors drawn from all the principal towns of Andalusia. Seville sent three hundred horse and two thousand foot. The principal leaders of the expedition were the count of Cifuentes, who, as assistant of Seville, commanded the troops of that city; the count of Ureña; and Alonso de Aguilar, elder brother of the Great Captain, and distinguished like him for the highest qualities of mind and person.

(1) See two letters, dated Seville, January and February, 1500, addressed by Ferdinand and Isabella to the inhabitants of the Serranía de Ronda, preserved in the archives of Simancas, apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. llist. 15.

(2) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 165.—Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 25.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 221.—The complaints of the Spanish and African Moors to the sultan of Egypt, or of Babylon, as he was then usually styled, had drawn from that prince sharp remonstrances to the Catholic sovereigns against their persecutions of the Moslems, accompanied by menaces of strict retaliation on the Christians in his dominions. In order to avert such calamitous consequences, Peter Martyr was sent as ambassador to Egypt. He left Granada in August 1501, proceeded to Venice, and embarked there for Alexandria, which place he reached in December. Though cautioned, on his arrival, that his mission, in the present exasperated state of feeling at the court, might cost him his head, the dauntless envoy sailed up the Nile under a Mameluke guard to Grand Cairo. Far from experiencing any outrage, however, he was courteously received by the sultan; although the ambassador declined compromising the dignity of the court he represented, by paying the usual humiliating mark of obeisance, in prostrating himself on the ground in the royal presence: an independent bearing highly satisfactory to the Castilian historians. (See Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 12.) He had three audiences, in which he succeeded so completely in effacing the unfavourable impressions of the Moslem prince, that the latter not only dismissed him with liberal presents, but granted, at his request, several important privileges to the Christian residents, and the pilgrims to the Holy Land, which lay within his dominions. Martyr's account of this interesting visit, which gave him ample opportunity for studying the manners of a nation, and seeing the stupendous monuments of ancient art, then little familiar to Europeans, was published in Latin, under the title of "De Legatione Babylonica," in three books, appended to his more celebrated "Decades de Rebus Oceanicis et Novo Orbe." Mazzuchelli (Scrittori d'Italia, voce Anghiera) notices an edition which he had seen published separately, without date or name of the printer.

It was determined by the chiefs to strike at once into the heart of the Sierra Vermeja, or Red Sierra, as it was called from the colour of its rocks, rising to the east of Ronda, and the principal theatre of insurrection. On the 18th of March, 1501, the little army encamped before Monarda, on the skirts of a mountain, where the Moors were understood to have assembled in considerable force. They had not been long in these quarters before parties of the enemy were seen hovering along the slopes of the mountain, from which the Christian camp was divided by a narrow river,—the Rio Verde probably, which has gained such mournful celebrity in Spanish song.(1) Aguilar's troops, who occupied the van, were so much roused by the sight of the enemy, that a small party, seizing a banner, rushed across the stream without orders, in pursuit of them. The odds, however, were so great, that they would have been severely handled, had not Aguilar, while he bitterly condemned their temerity, advanced promptly to their support with the remainder of his corps. The count of Ureña followed with the central division, leaving the count of Cifuentes with the troops of Seville to protect the camp.(2)

The Moors fell back as the Christians advanced, and retreating nimbly from point to point, led them up the rugged steepes far into the recesses of the mountains. At length they reached an open level, encompassed on all sides by a natural rampart of rocks, where they had deposited their valuable effects, together with their wives and children. The latter, at sight of the invaders, uttered dismal cries and fled into the remoter depths of the sierra.

The Christians were too much attracted by the rich spoil before them to think of following, and dispersed in every direction in quest of plunder, with all the heedlessness and insubordination of raw inexperienced levies. It was in vain that Alonso de Aguilar reminded them that their wily enemy was still unconquered; or that he endeavoured to force them into the ranks again, and restore order. No one heeded his call, or

- (1) "Rio Verde, Rio Verde,  
tinto va en sangre viva;"—

Percy, in his well-known version of one of these agreeable *romances*, adopts the same epithet of "gentle river," from the awkwardness, he says, of the literal translation of "verdant river." He was not aware, it appears, that the Spanish was a proper name.—(See *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*; London, 1812; vol. i. p. 357.) The more faithful version of "green river," however, would have nothing very unpoetical in it; though our gifted countryman Bryant seems to intimate, by his omission, somewhat of a similar difficulty, in his agreeable stanzas on the beautiful stream of that name in New England.

(2) Zuñiga, *Annales de Sevilla*, año 1501.—Abarcá, *Reyes de Aragón*, tom. ii. p. 840.—Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 26.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 165. "Fue muy gentil capitán," says Oviedo, speaking of this latter nobleman, "y valiente lanza; y muchas vezes dio testimonio grande de su animoso esfuerzo."—Quineuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36.

thought of anything beyond the present moment, and of securing as much booty to himself as he could carry.

The Moors, in the mean while, finding themselves no longer pursued, were aware of the occupation of the Christians, whom they not improbably had purposely decoyed into the snare. They resolved to return to the scene of action, and surprise their incautious enemy. Stealthily advancing, therefore, under the shadows of night, now falling thick around, they poured through the rocky defiles of the inclosure upon the astonished Spaniards. An unlucky explosion, at this crisis, of a cask of powder, into which a spark had accidentally fallen, threw a broad glare over the scene, and revealed for a moment the situation of the hostile parties;—the Spaniards in the utmost disorder, many of them without arms, and staggering under the weight of their fatal booty; while their enemies were seen gliding like so many demons of darkness through every crevice and avenue of the inclosure, in the act of springing on their devoted victims. This appalling spectacle, vanishing almost as soon as seen, and followed by the hideous yells and war-cries of the assailants, struck a panic into the hearts of the soldiers, who fled, scarcely offering any resistance. The darkness of the night was as favourable to the Moors, familiar with all the intricacies of the ground, as it was fatal to the Christians, who, bewildered in the mazes of the sierra, and losing their footing at every step, fell under the swords of their pursuers, or went down the dark gulfs and precipices, which yawned all around.<sup>(1)</sup>

Amidst this dreadful confusion, the count of Urreña succeeded in gaining a lower level of the sierra, where he halted and endeavoured to rally his panic-struck followers. His noble comrade Alonso de Aguilar still maintained his position on the heights above, refusing all entreaties of his followers to attempt a retreat. "When," said he proudly, "was the banner of Aguilar ever known to fly from the field?" His eldest son, the heir of his house and honours, Don Pedro de Cordova, a youth of great promise, fought at his side. He had received a severe wound on the head from a stone; and a javelin had pierced quite through his leg. With one knee resting on the ground, however, he still made a brave defence with his sword. The sight was too much for the father, and he implored him to suffer himself to be removed from the field. "Let not the hopes of our house be crushed at a single blow," said he; "go, my son, live as becomes a Christian knight,—live, and cherish your desolate mother." All his entreaties were fruitless, however; and the gallant boy refused to leave his father's side, till

(1) Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 340.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 33.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 10.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 165.—Marmol, Rebelion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 28.

he was forcibly borne away by the attendants, who fortunately succeeded in bringing him in safety to the station occupied by the count of Ureña. (1)

Meantime the brave little band of cavaliers, who remained true to Aguilar, had fallen one after another; and the chief, left almost alone, retreated to a huge rock which rose in the middle of the plain, and, placing his back against it, still made fight, though weakened by loss of blood, like a lion at bay against his enemies. (2) In this situation he was pressed so hard by a Moor of uncommon size and strength, that he was compelled to turn and close with him in single combat. The strife was long and desperate, till Don Alonso, whose corslet had become unlaced in the previous struggle, having received a severe wound in the breast, followed by another on the head, grappled closely with his adversary, and they came rolling on the ground together. The Moor remained uppermost; but the spirit of the Spanish cavalier had not sunk with his strength, and he proudly exclaimed, as if to intimidate his enemy, "I am Don Alonso de Aguilar;" to which the other rejoined, "And I am the Feri de Ben Estepar," a well-known name of terror to the Christians. The sound of this detested name roused all the vengeance of the dying hero; and, grasping his foe in mortal agony, he rallied his strength for a final blow; but it was too late,—his hand failed, and he was soon despatched by the dagger of his more vigorous rival. (March 18, 1501.) (3)

(1) Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 13.—Aharca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. fol. 340.—Marmol, Rebelion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 28.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36. The boy, who lived to man's estate, was afterwards created marquis of Priego by the Catholic sovereigns.—Salazar de Mendoza, Dignidades, lib. 2, cap. 13.

(2) It is the simile of the fine old ballad:—

"Solo pueda Don Alonso  
su campaña es acabada  
pelea como un Leon  
pero poco aprovechaba."

(3) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. ubi supra.—Aharca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. ubi supra.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 19.—Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 13.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 5. According to Hyta's prose, Aguilar had first despatched more than thirty Moors with his own hand. (Guerras de Granada, part i. p. 568.) The ballad, with more discretion, does not vouch for any particular number.

"Don Alonso en este tiempo  
muy gran batalla hacia,  
el cavallo le havian muerto,  
por muralla le tenia.  
y arrimado á un gran peñon  
con valor se defendia:  
muchos Moros tiene muertos,  
pero poco le valia.  
porque sobre el eargan muchos,  
y le dan grandes heridas,  
tantas que cayó allí muerto  
entre la gente enemiga."



Thus fell Alonso Hernandez de Cordova, or Alonso de Aguilar, as he is commonly called from the land where his family estates lay.(1) "He was of the greatest authority among the *grandees* of his time," says Father Abarca, "for his lineage, personal character, large domains, and the high posts which he filled both in peace and war. More than forty years of his life he served against the infidel, under the banner of his house in boyhood, and as leader of that same banner in later life, or as viceroy of Andalusia and commander of the royal armies. He was the fifth lord of his warlike and pious house who had fallen fighting for their country and religion against the accursed sect of Mahomet. And there is good reason to believe," continues the same orthodox authority, "that his soul has received the glorious reward of the Christian soldier; since he was armed on that very morning with the blessed sacraments of confession and communion." (2)

The victorious Moors, all this time, were driving the unresisting Spaniards, like so many terrified deer, down the dark steepes of the sierra. The count of Ureña, who had seen his son stretched by his side, and received a severe wound himself, made the most desperate efforts to rally the fugitives, but was at length swept away by the torrent. Trusting himself to a faithful *adalid*, who knew the passes, he succeeded with much difficulty in reaching the foot of the mountain, with such a small remnant of his followers as could keep in his track.(3) Fortu-

The warrior's death is summed up with an artless brevity that would be affectation in more studied composition.

"Muerto queda Don Alonso,  
y eterna fama ganada."

(1) Paolo Giovio finds an etymology for the name in the eagle (*aguija*), assumed as the device of the warlike ancestors of Don Alonso. St. Ferdinand of Castile, in consideration of the services of this illustrious house at the taking of Cordova, in 1236, allowed it to bear as a cognomen the name of that city. This branch, however, still continued to be distinguished by their territorial epithet of Aguilar; although Don Alonso's brother, the Great Captain, as we have seen, was more generally known by that of Cordova.—*Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, fol. 204.

(2) *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 340, 341. The hero's body, left on the field of battle, was treated with decent respect by the Moors, who restored it to King Ferdinand; and the sovereigns caused it to be interred with all suitable pomp in the church of St. Hypolito at Cordova. Many years afterwards, the marchioness of Priego, his descendant, had the tomb opened; and, on examining the mouldering remains, the iron head of a lance, received in his last mortal struggle, was found buried in the bones.—Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 26.

(3) "Tambien el Conde de Urcña,  
mal herido en demasia,  
se sale de la batalla  
llevado por una guia.  
"Que sabia bien la senda  
que de la Sierra salia:  
muchos Moros dexaba muertos  
por su grande valentia.

nately, he there found the count of Cifuentes, who had crossed the river with the rear-guard, and encamped on a rising ground in the neighbourhood. Under favour of this strong position, the latter commander and his brave Sevillians, all fresh for action, were enabled to cover the shattered remains of the Spaniards, and beat off the assaults of their enemies till the break of morn, when they vanished like so many foul birds of night into the recesses of the mountains.

The rising day, which dispersed their foes, now revealed to the Christians the dreadful extent of their own losses. Few were to be seen of all that proud array which had marched up the heights so confidently under the banners of their ill-fated chiefs the preceding evening. The bloody roll of slaughter, besides the common file, was graced with the names of the best and bravest of the Christian knighthood. Among the number was Francisco Ramirez de Madrid, the distinguished engineer, who had contributed so essentially to the success of the Granadine war. (1)

The sad tidings of the defeat soon spread throughout the country, occasioning a sensation such as had not been felt since the tragic affair of the Axarquia. Men could scarcely credit that so much mischief could be inflicted by an outcast race, who, whatever terror they once inspired, had long since been regarded with indifference or contempt. Every Spaniard seemed to consider himself in some way or other involved in the disgrace; and the most spirited exertions were made on all sides to retrieve it. By the beginning of April, King Ferdinand found himself at Ronda, at the head of a strong body of troops, which he determined to lead in person, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his courtiers, into the heart of the sierra, and take bloody vengeance on the rebels.

These latter, however, far from being encouraged, were appalled by the extent of their own success; and, as the note of warlike preparation reached them in their fastnesses, they felt their temerity in thus bringing the whole weight of the Castilian monarchy on their heads. They accordingly abandoned all thoughts of further resistance, and lost no time in sending deputies to the king's camp to deprecate his anger, and sue in the most submissive terms for pardon.

Ferdinand, though far from vindictive, was less open to pity than the queen; and in the present instance, he indulged in a

“Tambien algunos se escapan,  
que al buen Conde le seguian.”

Oviedo, speaking of this retreat of the good count and his followers, says, “Volvieron las riendas a sus caballos, y se retiraron a mas que galope por la multitud de los Infieles.”—Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36.

(1) Zuñiga, *Annales de Sevilla*, año 1501.—Carbajal, *Annales*, MS. año 1501.—Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 26.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 36. For a more particular notice of Ramirez, see Part I., Chapter 13, of this History.

full measure of the indignation with which sovereigns, naturally identifying themselves with the state, are wont to regard rebellion, by viewing it in the aggravated light of a personal offence. After some hesitation, however, his prudence got the better of his passions, as he reflected that he was in a situation to dictate the terms of victory, without paying the usual price for it. His past experience seems to have convinced him of the hopelessness of infusing sentiments of loyalty in a Mussulman towards a Christian prince; for, while he granted a general amnesty to those concerned in the insurrection, it was only on the alternative of baptism or exile, engaging at the same time to provide conveyance for such as chose to leave the country, on the payment of ten doblas of gold a head. (1)

These engagements were punctually fulfilled. The Moorish emigrants were transported in public galleys from Estepona to the Barbary coast. The number, however, was probably small, by far the greater part being obliged, however reluctantly, from want of funds, to remain and be baptised. "They would never have stayed," says Bleda, "if they could have mustered the ten doblas of gold; a circumstance," continues that charitable writer, "which shows with what levity they received baptism, and for what paltry considerations they could be guilty of such sacrilegious hypocrisy!" (2)

But although every spark of insurrection was thus effectually extinguished, it was long, very long, before the Spanish nation could recover from the blow, or forget the sad story of its disaster in the Red Sierra. It became the theme, not only of chronicle, but of song; the note of sorrow was prolonged in many a plaintive *romance*, and the names of Aguilar and his unfortunate companions were embalmed in that beautiful minstrelsy, scarcely less imperishable, and far more touching, than the stately and elaborate records of history. (3) The popular

(1) Bleda, *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 26, 27.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 16.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 165.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, lib. 27, cap. 5.—Marmol, *Rebelion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 28.

(2) *Corónica*, lib. 5, cap. 37.—The curate of Los Palacios disposes of the Moors rather summarily: "The Christians stripped them, gave them a free passage, and sent them to the devil!"—*Reyes Católicos*, cap. 165.

(3) According to one of the *romances*, cited by Hyta, the expedition of Aguilar was a piece of romantic Quixotism, occasioned by King Ferdinand's challenging the bravest of his knights to plant his banner on the summits of the Alpuxarras.

"Qual de vosotros, amigos,  
ira á la Sierra mañana,  
á poner mi Real pendon  
encima de la Alpujarra?"

All shrunk from the perilous emprise, till Alonso de Aguilar stepped forward and boldly assumed it for himself.

"A todos ticmbra la barba,  
sino fuera don Alonso,  
que de Aguilar se llamaba.  
levantóse en pie ante el Rey  
o esta manera le habla.

feeling was displayed after another fashion in regard to the count of Ureña and his followers, who were accused of deserting their posts in the hour of peril; and more than one ballad of the time reproachfully demanded an account from him of the brave companions in arms whom he had left in the sierra. (1)

The imputation on this gallant nobleman appears wholly undeserved; for certainly he was not called on to throw away his own life and those of his brave followers, in a cause perfectly desperate, for a chimerical point of honour. And, so far from forfeiting the favour of his sovereigns by his conduct on this occasion, he was maintained by them in the same high stations which he before held, and which he continued to fill with dignity to a good old age. (2)

It was about seventy years after this event, in 1570, that the duke of Arcos, descended from the great marquis of Cadiz, and from this same count of Ureña, led an expedition into the Sierra Vermeja, in order to suppress a similar insurrection of the Moriscos. Among the party were many of the descendants and kinsmen of those who had fought under Aguilar. It was the first time since, that these rude passes had been trodden by Christian feet; but the traditions of early childhood had made every inch of ground familiar to the soldiers. Some way up the eminence they recognised the point at which the count of Ureña had made his stand: and, further still, the fatal plain, belted

"Aquesa empresa, Señor,  
para mí estaba guardada,  
que mi señora la reyna  
ya me la tiene mandada.

"Alegróse mucho el Rey  
por la oferta que le daba,  
aun no era amanecido  
don Alonso ya cavalga."

These popular ditties, it cannot be denied, are slippery authorities for any important fact, unless supported by more direct historic testimony. When composed, however, by contemporaries, or those who lived near the time, they may very naturally record many true details, too insignificant in their consequences to attract the notice of history. The ballad translated with so much elaborate simplicity by Percy, is chiefly taken up, as the English reader may remember, with the exploits of a Sevilian hero named Saavedra. No such personage is noticed, as far as I am aware, by the Spanish chroniclers. The name of Saavedra, however, appears to have been a familiar one in Seville, and occurs two or three times in the muster-roll of nobles and cavaliers of that city, who joined King Ferdinand's army in the preceding year, 1500.—Zuñiga, *Annales de Sevilla*, eodem anno.

(1) Mendoza notices these splenetic effusions (*Guerra de Granada*, p. 13); and Bleda (*Corónica*, p. 836) cites the following couplet from one of them:—

"Decid, conde de Ureña,  
don Alonso donde queda."

(2) The Venetian ambassador, Navagiero, saw the count of Ureña at Ossuna in 1526. He was enjoying a green old age, or, as the minister expresses it, "molto vecchio e gentil corteggiano però." "Diseases," said the veteran good-humouredly, "sometimes visit me, but seldom tarry long; for my body is like a crazy old inn, where travellers find such poor fare that they merely touch and go."—*Viaggio*, fol. 17.

round with its dark rampart of rocks, where the strife had been hottest. Scattered fragments of arms and harness still lay rusting on the ground, which was covered with the bones of the warriors that had lain for more than half a century unburied and bleaching in the sun.(1) Here was the spot on which the brave son of Aguilar had fought so sturdily by his father's side; and there the huge rock at whose foot the chieftain had fallen, throwing its dark shadow over the remains of the noble dead, who lay sleeping around. The strongly marked features of the ground called up all the circumstances, which the soldiers had gathered from tradition; their hearts beat high as they recapitulated them one to another; and the tears, says the eloquent historian who tells the story, fell fast down their iron cheeks, as they gazed on the sad relics, and offered up a soldier's prayer for the heroic souls which once animated them.(2)

Tranquillity was now restored throughout the wide borders of Granada. The banner of the Cross floated triumphantly over the whole extent of its wild sierras, its broad valleys, and populous oases. Every Moor, in exterior at least, had become a Christian; every mosque had been converted into a Christian church. Still the country was not entirely purified from the stain of Islamism, since many professing their ancient faith were scattered over different parts of the kingdom of Castile, where they had been long resident before the surrender of their capital. The late events seemed to have no other effect than to harden them in error; and the Spanish government saw with alarm the pernicious influence of their example and persuasion in shaking the infirm faith of the new converts.

To obviate this, an ordinance was published, in the summer of 1501, prohibiting all intercourse between these Moors and the orthodox kingdom of Granada.(3) At length, however, convinced that there was no other way to save the precious seed from being choked by the thorns of infidelity, than to eradicate them altogether, the sovereigns came to the extraordinary reso-

(1) Guerra de Granada, p. 301.—Compare the similar painting of Tacitus, in the scene where Germanicus pays the last sad offices to the remains of Varus and his legions: "Dein semiruto vallo, humili fossâ, accisæ jam reliquæ consedissee intelligebantur: medio campi æbentia ossa, ut fugerant, ut restiterant, disjecta vel aggerata; adjacebant fragmina telorum, eorumque artus, simul truncis arborum antefixa ora." (Annales, lib. 1, sect. 61.) Mendoza falls nothing short of this celebrated description of the Roman historian:—

"Pau etiam Arcadiâ dicat se jndice victum."

(2) Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, pp. 300—302.—The Moorish insurrection of 1570 was attended with at least one good result, in calling forth this historic masterpiece, the work of the accomplished Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, accomplished alike as a statesman, warrior, and historian. His "Guerra de Granada," confined as it is to a barren fragment of Moorish history, displays such liberal sentiments (too liberal, indeed, to permit its publication till long after its author's death), profound reflection, and classic elegance of style, as well entitle him to the appellation of the Spanish Sallust.

(3) Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 6.

lution of offering them the alternative of baptism or exile. They issued a *pragmática* to that effect from Seville, February 12th, 1502. After a preamble, duly setting forth the obligations of gratitude on the Castilians to drive God's enemies from the land which he in his good time had delivered into their hands, and the numerous backslidings occasioned among the new converts by their intercourse with their unbaptised brethren, the act goes on to state, in much the same terms with the famous ordinance against the Jews, that all the unbaptised Moors in the kingdoms of Castile and Leon, above fourteen years of age if males, and twelve if females, must leave the country by the end of April following; that they might sell their property in the mean time, and take the proceeds in anything save gold and silver and merchandise regularly prohibited; and finally, that they might emigrate to any foreign country, except the dominions of the Grand Turk, and such parts of Africa as Spain was then at war with. Obedience to these severe provisions was enforced by the penalties of death and confiscation of property.(1)

This stern edict, so closely modelled on that against the Jews, must have been even more grievous in its application: (2) for the Jews may be said to have been denizens almost equally of every country; while the Moors excluded from a retreat among their countrymen on the African shore, were sent into the lands of enemies or strangers. The former, moreover, were far better qualified by their natural shrewdness and commercial habits for disposing of their property advantageously than the simple, inexperienced Moors, skilled in little else than husbandry or rude mechanic arts. We have nowhere met with any estimate of the number who migrated on this occasion. The Castilian writers pass over the whole affair in a very few words; not, indeed, as is too evident, from any feelings of disapprobation, but from its insignificance in a political view. Their silence implies a very inconsiderable amount of emigrants; a circumstance not to be wondered at, as there were very few, probably, who would not sooner imitate their Granadine brethren in assuming the mask of Christianity, than encounter exile under all the aggravated miseries with which it was accompanied.(3)

(1) *Pragmáticas de Reyno*, fol. 7.

(2) Bleda anxiously claims the credit of the act of expulsion for Fray Thomas de Torquemada, of inquisitorial memory.—(*Corónica*, p. 640.) That eminent personage had, indeed, been dead some years; but this edict was so obviously suggested by that against the Jews, that it may be considered as the result of his principles, if not directly taught by him. Thus it is, "the evil that men do lives after them."

(3) The Castilian writers, especially the dramatic, have not been insensible to the poetical situations afforded by the distresses of the banished Moriscos. Their sympathy for the exiles, however, is whimsically enough contrasted by an orthodox anxiety to justify the conduct of their own government. The reader may recollect a pertinent example in the story of Sancho's Moorish friend Ricote.—*Don Quixote*, part 2, chap. 54.

Castile might now boast, the first time for eight centuries, that every outward stain, at least, of infidelity was purified from her bosom. But how had this been accomplished? By the most detestable expedients which sophistry could devise, and oppression execute; and that, too, under an enlightened government, proposing to be guided solely by a conscientious regard for duty. To comprehend this more fully, it will be necessary to take a brief view of public sentiment in matters of religion at that time.

It is a singular paradox, that Christianity, whose doctrines inculcate unbounded charity, should have been made so often an engine of persecution; while Mahometanism, whose principles are those of avowed intolerance, should have exhibited, at least till later times, a truly philosophical spirit of toleration. (1) Even the first victorious disciples of the Prophet, glowing with all the fiery zeal of proselytism, were content with the exaction of tribute from the vanquished; at least, more vindictive feelings were reserved only for idolaters, who did not, like the Jews and Christians, acknowledge with themselves the unity of God. With these latter denominations they had obvious sympathy, since it was their creed which formed the basis of their own. (2) In Spain, where the fiery temperament of the Arab was gradually softened under the influence of a temperate climate and higher mental culture, the toleration of the Jews and Christians, as we have already had occasion to notice, was so remarkable, that, within a few years after the conquest, we find them not only protected in the enjoyment of civil and religious freedom, but mingling on terms almost of equality with their conquerors.

It is not necessary to inquire here how far the different policy of the Christians was owing to the peculiar constitution of their hierarchy, which, composed of a spiritual militia drawn from every country in Europe, was cut off by its position from all human sympathies, and attached to no interests but its own; which availed itself of the superior science and reputed sanctity, that were supposed to have given it the key to the dread

(1) The *spirit of toleration* professed by the Moors, indeed, was made a principal argument against them in the archbishop of Valencia's memorial to Philip III. The Mahometans would seem the better Christians of the two.—See Geddes, *Miscellaneous Tracts* (London, 1702-6), vol. i. p. 91.

(2) Heeren seems willing to countenance the learned Pluquet in regarding Islamism, in its ancient form, as one of the modifications of Christianity; placing the principal difference between that and Socinianism, for example, in the mere rites of circumcision and baptism.—(*Essai sur l'Influence des Croisades*, traduit par Villers; Paris, 1808; p. 175, not.) "The Mussulmans," says Sir William Jones, "are a sort of heterodox Christians, if Locke reasons justly, because they firmly believe the immaculate conception, divine character, and miracles of the Messiah; heterodox in denying vehemently his character of Son, and his equality, as God, with the Father, of whose unity and attributes they entertain and express the most awful ideas."—See his *Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India*, Works (London, 1790), vol. i. p. 279.

mysteries of a future life, not to enlighten, but to enslave the minds of a credulous world; and which making its own tenets the only standard of faith, its own rites and ceremonial the only evidence of virtue, obliterated the great laws of morality, written by the Divine hand on every heart, and gradually built up a system of exclusiveness and intolerance most repugnant to the mild and charitable religion of Jesus Christ.

Before the close of the fifteenth century, several circumstances operated to sharpen the edge of intolerance, especially against the Arabs. The Turks, whose political consideration of late years had made them the peculiar representatives and champions of Mahometanism, had shown a ferocity and cruelty in their treatment of the Christians, which brought general odium on all the professors of their faith, and on the Moors, of course, though most undeservedly, in common with the rest. The bold heterodox doctrines, also, which had occasionally broken forth in different parts of Europe in the fifteenth century, like so many faint streaks of light ushering in the glorious morn of the Reformation, had roused the alarm of the champions of the church, and kindled on more than one occasion the fires of persecution; and, before the close of the period, the Inquisition was introduced into Spain.

From that disastrous hour, religion wore a new aspect in this unhappy country. The spirit of intolerance, no longer hooded in the darkness of the cloister, now stalked abroad in all his terrors. Zeal was exalted into fanaticism; and a rational spirit of proselytism into one of fiendish persecution. It was not enough now, as formerly, to conform passively to the doctrines of the church, but it was enjoined to make war on all who refused them. The natural feeling of compunction in the discharge of this sad duty was a crime; and the tear of sympathy, wrung out by the sight of mortal agonies, was an offence to be expiated by humiliating penance. The most frightful maxims were deliberately engrafted into the code of morals. Any one, it was said, might conscientiously kill an apostate wherever he could meet him. There was some doubt whether a man might slay his own father, if a heretic or infidel; but none whatever as to his right, in that event, to take away the life of his son or of his brother.<sup>(1)</sup> These maxims were not a dead letter, but of most active operation, as the sad records of the dread tribunal too well prove. The character of the nation underwent a melancholy change. The milk of charity, nay, of human feeling, was soured in every

(1) See the bishop of Orihuela's treatise, "*De Bello Sacro*," etc. cited by the industrious Clemencin.—(*Mém. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. *l*ust. 15.) The Moors and Jews, of course, stood no chance in this code; the reverend father expresses an opinion, with which Bleda heartily coincides, that the government would be perfectly justified in taking away the life of every Moor in the kingdom for their shameless infidelity.—*Ubi supra*; and Bleda, *Corónica*, p. 595.



bosom. The liberality of the old Spanish cavalier gave way to the fiery fanaticism of the monk. The taste for blood, once gratified, begat a cannibal appetite in the people, who, cheered on by the frantic clergy, seemed to vie with one another in the eagerness with which they ran down the miserable game of the Inquisition.

It was at this very time, when the infernal monster, gorged but not sated with human sacrifice, was crying aloud for fresh victims, that Granada surrendered to the Spaniards, under the solemn guarantee of the full enjoyment of civil and religious liberty. The treaty of capitulation granted too much, or too little—too little for an independent state, too much for one whose existence was now merged in that of a greater; for it secured to the Moors privileges in some respects superior to those of the Castilians, and to the prejudice of the latter. Such, for example, was the permission to trade with the Barbary coast, and with the various places in Castile and Andalusia, without paying the duties imposed on the Spaniards themselves; (1) and that article, again, by which runaway Moorish slaves from other parts of the kingdom were made free and incapable of being reclaimed by their masters, if they could reach Granada. (2) The former of these provisions struck at the commercial profits of the Spaniards, the latter directly at their property.

It is not too much to say, that such a treaty, depending for its observance on the good faith and forbearance of the stronger party, would not hold together a year in any country of Christendom, even at the present day, before some flaw or pretext would be devised to evade it. How much greater was the probability of this in the present case, where the weaker party was viewed with all the accumulated odium of long hereditary hostility and religious rancour?

The work of conversion, on which the Christians, no doubt, much relied, was attended with greater difficulties than had been anticipated by the conquerors. It was now found that, while the Moors retained their present faith, they would be much better affected towards their countrymen in Africa, than to the nation with which they were incorporated. In short, Spain still had enemies in her bosom; and reports were rife in every quarter of their secret intelligence with the Barbary states, and of Christians kidnapped to be sold as slaves to Algerine corsairs. Such tales, greedily circulated and swallowed, soon begat general alarm; and men are not apt to be over-scrupulous as to measures which they deem essential to their personal safety.

The zealous attempt to bring about conversion by preaching

(1) The articles of the treaty are detailed at length by Marmol, *Rebellion de Moriscos*, lib. 1, cap. 19.

(2) *Idea*, ubi supra.

and expostulation was fair and commendable. The intervention of bribes and promises, if it violated the spirit, did not, at least, the letter of the treaty. The application of force to a few of the most refractory, who by their blind obstinacy were excluding a whole nation from the benefits of redemption, was to be defended on other grounds; and these were not wanting to cunning theologians, who considered that the sanctity of the end justified extraordinary means, and that where the eternal interests of the soul were at stake, the force of promises and the faith of treaties were equally nugatory. (1)

But the *chef-d'œuvre* of monkish casuistry was the argument imputed to Ximenes for depriving the Moors of the benefits of the treaty, as a legitimate consequence of the rebellion into which they had been driven by his own malpractices. This proposition, however, far from outraging the feelings of the nation, well drilled by this time in the metaphysics of the cloister, fell short of them, if we are to judge from recommendations of a still more questionable import, urged, though ineffectually, on the sovereigns at this very time, from the highest quarter. (2)

Such are the frightful results to which the fairest mind may be led, when it introduces the refinements of logic into the discussions of duty; when, proposing to achieve some great good, whether in politics or religion, it conceives that the importance of the object authorises a departure from the plain principles of morality, which regulate the ordinary affairs of life; and when,

(1) See the arguments of Ximenes, or of his enthusiastic biographer Fléchier, for it is not always easy to discriminate between them.—Hist. de Ximenes, pp. 108, 109. Montesquieu, in those admirable Letters, which disguise so much deep philosophy, under the pleasant veil of rallery, makes a stricture on this compulsory proselytism, worth all the arguments of its advocates: "Celui qui veut me faire changer de religion ne le fait sans doute que parce qu'il ne changeroit pas la sienne, quand on voudroit l'y forcer; il trouve donc étrange que je ne fasse pas une chose qu'il ne feroit pas lui-même, peut-être, pour l'empire du monde."—Lettres Persanes, let. 85.

(2) The duke of Medina Sidonia proposed to Ferdinand and Isabella to be avenged on the Moors, in some way not explained, after their disembarkation in Africa, on the ground, that the term of the royal safe-conduct having elapsed, they might lawfully be treated as enemies. To this proposal, which would have done honour to a college of Jesuits in the sixteenth century, the sovereigns made a reply too creditable not to be transcribed: "El Rei é la Reina. Fernando de Zafra, nuestro secretario. Vimos vuestra letra, en que nos fecistes saber lo que el duque de Medinasidonia tenia pensado que se podia facer contra los Moros de Villaluenga después de desembarcados allende. Decidle que le agradecemos y tenemos en servicio el buen deseo que tiene de nos servir: pero porqué nuestra palabra y seguro real así se debe guardar á los infieles como á los Cristianos, y faciéndose lo que él dice pareceria cantela y engaño armado sobre nuestro seguro para no le guardar, que en ninguna manera se haga eso, ni otra cosa de que pueda parecer que se quebranta nuestro seguro. De Granada veinte y nueve de Mayo de quinientos y un años.—Yo el Rei.—Yo la Reina.—Por mandado del Rei é del Reina, Miguel Perez Almazan." Would that the suggestions of Isabella's own heart, instead of the clergy, had always been the guide of her conduct in these matters!—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. llist. 15, from the original in the Archives of the family of Medina Sidonia.

blending these higher interests with those of a personal nature, it becomes incapable of discriminating between them, and is led insensibly to act from selfish motives, while it fondly imagines itself obeying only the conscientious dictates of duty. (1)

With these events may be said to terminate the history of the Moors, or the Moriscos, as henceforth called, under the present reign. Eight centuries had elapsed since their first occupation of the country : during which period they had exhibited all the various phases of civilisation, from its dawn to its decline. Ten years had sufficed to overturn the splendid remains of this powerful empire ; and ten more, for its nominal conversion to Christianity. A long century of persecution, of unmitigated and unmerited suffering, was to follow, before the whole was to be consummated by the expulsion of this unhappy race from the Peninsula. Their story, in this latter period, furnishes one of the most memorable examples in history, of the impotence of persecution, even in support of a good cause against a bad one. It is a lesson that cannot be too deeply pondered through every succeeding age. The fires of the Inquisition are, indeed, extinguished, probably to be lighted no more. But where is the land which can boast that the spirit of intolerance, which forms the very breath of persecution, is altogether extinct in its bosom ?

(1) A memorial of the archbishop of Valencia to Phillip III. affords an example of this moral obliquity, that may make one laugh, or weep, according to the temper of his philosophy. In this precious document he says, " Your Majesty may, without any scruple of conscience, make slaves of all the Moriscos, and may put them into your own galleys or mines, or sell them to strangers. And as to their children, they may be all sold at good rates here in Spain, which will be so far from being a punishment, that it will be a mercy to them, since by that means they will all become Christians ; which they would never have been, had they continued with their parents. By the holy execution of which piece of justice, a great sum of money will flow into your Majesty's treasury."—(Geddes, Miscellaneous Tracts, vol. i. p. 71). " Il n'est point d'hostilité excellente comme la Chrestienne," says old Montaigne ; " nostre zele faict merveilles, quand il va secondant nostre pente vers la haine, la cruauté, l'ambition, l'avarice, la detraction, la rebellion. Nostre religion est faicte pour extirper les vices ; elle les couvre, les nourrit, les incite."—Essais, liv. 2, chap. 12.

## CHAPTER VIII.

COLUMBUS.—PROSECUTION OF DISCOVERY.—HIS TREATMENT  
BY THE COURT.

1494—1503.

Progress of Discovery—Reaction of Public Feeling—The Queen's Confidence in Columbus—He discovers Terra Firma—Isabella sends back the Indian Slaves—Complaints against Columbus—Superseded in the Government—Vindication of the Sovereigns—His fourth and last Voyage.

THE reader will turn with satisfaction from the melancholy and mortifying details of superstition to the generous efforts which the Spanish government was making to enlarge the limits of science and dominion in the West. "Amidst the storms and troubles of Italy, Spain was every day stretching her wings over a wider sweep of empire, and extending the glory of her name to the far Antipodes." Such is the swell of exultation with which the enthusiastic Italian, Martyr, notices the brilliant progress of discovery under his illustrious countryman Columbus.(1) The Spanish sovereigns had never lost sight of the new domain, so unexpectedly opened to them, as it were, from the depths of the ocean. The first accounts transmitted by the great navigator and his companions, on his second voyage, while their imaginations were warm with the beauty and novelty of the scenes which met their eyes in the New World, served to keep alive the tone of excitement which their unexpected successes had kindled in the nation.(2) The various specimens sent home in the return ships, of the products of these unknown regions, confirmed the agreeable belief that they formed part of the great Asiatic continent, which had so long excited the cupidity of Europeans. The Spanish court, sharing in the general enthusiasm, endeavoured to promote the spirit of

(1) "*Inter has Italice procellas magis indies ac magis alas profundit Hispania, imperium auget, gloriam nomenque suum ad Antipodes porriget.*"—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 146.

(2) See, among others, a letter of Dr. Chanca, who accompanied Columbus on his second voyage. It is addressed to the authorities of Seville. After noticing the evidences of gold in Hispaniola, he says: "*Ansi que de cierto los Reyes nuestros Señores desde agora se pueden tener por los mas prosperos e mas ricos Principes del mundo, porque tal cosa hasta agora no se ha visto ni leido de ninguno en el mundo, porque verdaderamente a otro camino que los navios vuelvan puedan llevar tanta cantidad de oro que se pueden maravillar cualesquiera que lo supieren.*" In another part of the letter, the Doctor is equally sanguine in regard to the fruitfulness of the soil and climate.—*Letra de Dr. Chanca, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages*, tom. i. pp. 198—224.

discovery and colonisation, by forwarding the requisite supplies, and complying promptly with the most minute suggestions of Columbus. But, in less than two years from the commencement of his second voyage, the face of things experienced a melancholy change. Accounts were received at home of the most alarming discontent and disaffection in the colony; while the actual returns from these vaunted regions were so scanty as to bear no proportion to the expenses of the expedition.

This unfortunate result was in a great measure imputable to the misconduct of the colonists themselves. Most of them were adventurers, who had embarked with no other expectation than that of getting together a fortune as speedily as possible in the golden Indies. They were without subordination, patience, industry, or any of the regular habits demanded for success in such an enterprise. As soon as they had launched from their native shore, they seemed to feel themselves released from the constraints of all law. They harboured jealousy and distrust of the admiral as a foreigner. The cavaliers and hidalgos, of whom there were too many in the expedition, contemned him as an upstart whom it was derogatory to obey. From the first moment of their landing in Hispaniola they indulged the most wanton license in regard to the unoffending natives, who, in the simplicity of their hearts, had received the white men as messengers from Heaven. Their outrages, however, soon provoked a general resistance, which led to such a war of extermination, that in less than four years after the Spaniards had set foot on the island, one third of its population, amounting, probably, to several hundred thousands, were sacrificed! Such were the melancholy auspices under which the intercourse was opened between the civilised white man and the simple natives of the western world.(1)

These excesses, and a total neglect of agriculture,—for none would condescend to turn up the earth for any other object than the gold they could find in it,—at length occasioned an alarming scarcity of provisions; while the poor Indians neglected their usual husbandry, being willing to starve themselves, so that they could starve out their oppressors.(2) In order to avoid the famine which menaced his little colony, Columbus was obliged to resort to coercive measures, shortening the allowance of food, and compelling all to work, without distinction of rank. These unpalatable regulations soon bred general discontent: the high-mettled hidalgos, especially, complained loudly of the indignity of such mechanical drudgery, while

(1) Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 60, 62.—Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 5, sec. 25.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 2, cap. 9.—Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* lib. 1, cap. 9.

(2) The Indians had some grounds for relying on the efficacy of starvation, if, as Las Casas gravely asserts, "one Spaniard consumed in a single day as much as would suffice three families!"—Llorente, *Œuvres de Don Barthélemy de las Casas, précédées de sa Vie* (Paris, 1822), tom. i. p. 11.

Father Boil and his brethren were equally outraged by the diminution of their regular rations.(1)

The Spanish sovereigns were now daily assailed with complaints of the mal-administration of Columbus, and of his impolitic and unjust severities to both Spaniards and natives. They lent, however, an unwilling ear to these vague accusations; they fully appreciated the difficulties of his situation; and, although they sent out an agent to inquire into the nature of the troubles which threatened the existence of the colony (August, 1495), they were careful to select an individual who they thought would be most grateful to the admiral; and when the latter in the following year, 1496, returned to Spain, they received him with the most ample acknowledgments of regard. "Come to us," they said, in a kind letter of congratulation, addressed to him soon after his arrival, "when you can do it without inconvenience to yourself, for you have endured too many vexations already." (2)

The admiral brought with him, as before, such samples of the productions of the western hemisphere as would strike the public eye, and keep alive the feeling of curiosity. On his journey through Andalusia, he passed some days under the hospitable roof of the good curate Bernaldez, who dwells with much satisfaction on the remarkable appearance of the Indian chiefs, following in the admiral's train, gorgeously decorated with golden collars and coronets, and various barbaric ornaments. Among these he particularly notices certain "belts and masks of cotton and of wood with figures of the devil embroidered and carved thereon, sometimes in his own proper likeness, and at others in *that of a cat or an owl*. There is much reason," he infers, "to believe that he appears to the islanders in this guise, and that they are all idolaters, having Satan for their lord!" (3)

But neither the attractions of the spectacle, nor the glowing representations of Columbus, who fancied he had discovered in the mines of Hispaniola the golden quarries of Ophir, from which King Solomon had enriched the temple of Jerusalem, could rekindle the dormant enthusiasm of the nation. The novelty of the thing had passed. They heard a different tale, moreover, from the other voyagers, whose wan and sallow visages provoked the bitter jest, that they had returned with more gold in their faces than in their pockets. In short, the

(1) Martyr, *De Rebus Oceanicis*, dec. 1, lib. 4.—Gomara, *Hist. de las Indias*, cap. 20, tom. ii.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 2, cap. 12.

(2) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 101.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 64.—Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 5, sec. 31.

(3) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 131.—Herrera expresses the same charitable opinion: "Muy claramente se conocio que el demonio estava apoderado de aquella gente, y la traia ciega y engañada, hablandoles, y mostrandoles en diversas figuras."—*Indias Occidentales*, lib. 3, cap. 4.

seceptism of the public seemed now quite in proportion to its former overweening confidence; and the returns were so meagre, says Bernaldez, "that it was very generally believed there was little or no gold in the island."<sup>(1)</sup>

Isabella was far from participating in this unreasonable distrust. She had espoused the theory of Columbus when others looked coldly or contemptuously on it.<sup>(2)</sup> She firmly relied on his repeated assurances that the track of discovery would lead to other and more important regions. She formed a higher estimate, moreover, of the value of the new acquisitions than any founded on the actual proceeds in gold and silver; keeping ever in view, as her letters and instructions abundantly show, the glorious purpose of introducing the blessings of Christian civilisation among the heathen.<sup>(3)</sup> She entertained a deep sense of the merits of Columbus, to whose serious and elevated character her own bore much resemblance, although the enthusiasm which distinguished each was naturally tempered in hers with somewhat more of benignity and discretion.

But, although the queen was willing to give the most effectual support to his great enterprise, the situation of the country was such as made delay in its immediate prosecution unavoidable. Large expense was necessarily incurred for the actual maintenance of the colony;<sup>(4)</sup> the exchequer was liberally drained, moreover, by the Italian war, as well as by the profuse magnificence with which the nuptials of the royal family were now celebrating. It was, indeed, in the midst of the courtly revelries attending the marriage of Prince John, that the admiral presented himself before the sovereign at Burgos, after his second voyage. Such was the low condition of the treasury from these causes, that Isabella was obliged to defray the cost of an outfit for the colony at this time, from funds originally destined for the marriage of her daughter Isabella with the king of Portugal.<sup>(5)</sup>

This unwelcome delay, however, was softened to Columbus by the distinguished marks which he daily received of the royal favour; and various ordinances were passed, confirming and enlarging his great powers and privileges in the most

(1) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 131.—Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 6, sect. 1.

(2) Columbus, in his letter to Prince John's nurse, dated 1500, makes the following ample acknowledgment of the queen's early protection of him: "En todos hobo incredulidad, y a la Reina mi Señora dio Nuestro Señor el espíritu de inteligencia y esfuerzo grande, y la hizo de todo heredera como a cara y muy amada hija." "Su Alteza lo aprobaba al contrario, y lo sostuvo fasta que pudo."—Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. i. p. 266.

(3) See the letters to Columbus, dated May 14th, 1493, August, 1494, apud Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. pp. 66, 154, et mult. al.

(4) The salaries alone, annually disbursed by the crown to persons resident in the colony, amounted to six million maravedis.—Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 6, sec. 33.

(5) Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 6, sec. 2.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 64.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 3, cap. 1.

ample manner, to a greater extent, indeed, than his modesty, or his prudence, would allow him to accept.(1) The language in which these princely gratuities were conferred, rendered them doubly grateful to his noble heart, containing, as they did, the most emphatic acknowledgments of his "many, good, loyal, distinguished, and continual services," and thus testifying the unabated confidence of his sovereigns in his integrity and prudence.(2)

Among the impediments to the immediate completion of the arrangements for the admiral's departure on his third voyage, may be also noticed the hostility of Bishop Fonseca, who, at this period, had the control of the Indian department; a man of an irritable, and, as it would seem, most unforgiving temper, who, from some causes of disgust which he had conceived with Columbus previous to his second voyage, lost no opportunity of annoying and thwarting him, for which his official station unfortunately afforded him too many facilities.(3)

From these various circumstances the admiral's fleet was not ready before the beginning of 1498. Even then further embarrassment occurred in manning it, as few were found willing to embark in a service which had fallen into such general discredit. This led to the ruinous expedient of substituting convicts, whose regular punishments were commuted into transportation, for a limited period, to the Indies. No measure could possibly have been devised more effectual for the ruin of the infant settlement. The seeds of corruption, which had been so long festering in the Old World, soon shot up into a plentiful harvest in the New; and Columbus, who suggested the measure, was the first to reap the fruits of it.

At length, all being in readiness, the admiral embarked on board his little squadron, consisting of six vessels, whose complement of men, notwithstanding every exertion, was still deficient; and took his departure from the port of St. Lucar, May 30th, 1498. He steered in a more southerly direction than on his preceding voyages, and on the 1st of August succeeded in reaching *terra firma*; thus entitling himself to the glory of being the first to set foot on the great southern continent, to which he had before opened the way.(4)

(1) Such, for example, was the grant of an immense tract of land in Hispaniola, with the title of count or duke, as the admiral might prefer.—Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 5, sec. 17.

(2) The instrument establishing the *mayorazgo*, or perpetual entail of Columbus's estates, contains an injunction that "his heirs shall never use any other signature than that of 'the Admiral,' *el Almirante*, whatever other titles and honours may belong to them." That title indicated his peculiar achievements; and it was an honest pride which led him by this simple expedient to perpetuate the remembrance of them in his posterity.—See the original document, apud Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. pp. 221—235.

(3) Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 6, sec. 29.—Fernando Colón, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 64.—Zúñiga, *Annales de Sevilla*, año 1496.

(4) Peter Martyr, *De Rebus Oceanicis*, dec. 1, lib. 6.—Navarrete, *Coleccion*



It is not necessary to pursue the track of the illustrious voyager, whose career, forming the most brilliant episode to the history of the present reign, has been so recently traced by a hand which few will care to follow. It will suffice briefly to notice his personal relations with the Spanish government, and the principles on which the colonial administration was conducted.

On his arrival at Hispaniola, Columbus found the affairs of the colony in the most deplorable confusion. An insurrection had been raised by the arts of a few factious individuals against his brother Bartholomew, to whom he had entrusted the government during his absence. In this desperate rebellion, all the interests of the community were neglected. The mines, which were just beginning to yield a golden harvest, remained unwrought. The unfortunate natives were subjected to the most inhuman oppression. There was no law but that of the strongest. Columbus, on his arrival, in vain endeavoured to restore order. The very crews he brought with him, who had been unfortunately reprieved from the gibbet in their own country, served to swell the mass of mutiny. The admiral exhausted art, negotiation, entreaty, force, and succeeded at length in patching up a specious reconciliation by such concessions as essentially impaired his own authority. Among these was the grant of large tracts of land to the rebels, with permission to the proprietor to employ an allotted number of the natives in its cultivation. This was the origin of the celebrated system of *repartimientos*, which subsequently led to the foulest abuses that ever disgraced humanity.(1)

Nearly a year elapsed after the admiral's return to Hispaniola, before he succeeded in allaying these intestine feuds. In the mean while rumours were every day reaching Spain of the distractions of the colony, accompanied with most injurious imputations on the conduct of Columbus and his brother, who were loudly accused of oppressing both Spaniards and Indians, and of sacrificing the public interests in the most unscrupulous manner to their own. These complaints were rung in the very ears of the sovereigns by numbers of the disaffected colonists, who had returned to Spain, and who surrounded the king as he rode out on horseback, clamouring loudly for the discharge of the arrears, of which they said the admiral had defrauded them.(2)

de Viages, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. Nos. 116, 120.—Tereer Viage de Colon, apud Navarrete, tom. i. p. 245.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist. lib. 1, cap. 10, 11.—Herrera, Indias Occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 3, cap. 10, 11.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 19.

(1) Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 20.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist. lib. 1, cap. 10, 11.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 73—82.—Peter Martyr, De Rebus Oceaniis, dec. 1, lib. 5.—Herrera, Indias Occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 3, cap. 16.—Muñoz, Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo, lib. 6, sec. 40—42.

(2) Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, De Rebus

There were not wanting even persons of high consideration at the court, to give credence and circulation to these calumnies. The recent discovery of the pearl-fisheries of Paria, as well as of more prolific veins of the precious metals in Hispaniola, and the prospect of an indefinite extent of unexplored country, opened by the late voyage of Columbus, made the vice-royalty of the New World a tempting bait for the avarice and ambition of the most potent grandee. They artfully endeavoured, therefore, to undermine the admiral's credit with the sovereigns, by raising in their minds suspicions of his integrity, founded not merely on vague reports, but on letters received from the colony, charging him with disloyalty, with appropriating to his own use the revenues of the island, and with the design of erecting an independent government for himself.(1)

Whatever weight these absurd charges may have had with Ferdinand, they had no power to shake the queen's confidence in Columbus, or lead her to suspect his loyalty for a moment. But the long-continued distractions of the colony made her feel a natural distrust of his capacity to govern it, whether from the jealousy entertained of him as a foreigner, or from some inherent deficiency in his own character. These doubts were mingled, it is true, with sterner feelings towards the admiral, on the arrival at this juncture of several of the rebels, with the Indian slaves assigned to him by his orders.(2)

It was the received opinion among good Catholics of that period, that heathen and barbarous nations were placed by the circumstance of their infidelity without the pale both of spiritual and civil rights. Their souls were doomed to eternal perdition; their bodies were the property of the Christian nation who should occupy their soil.(3) Such, in brief, were

Oceanicis, dec. 1, lib. 7.—Gomara, *Hist. de las Indias*, cap. 23.—Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* cap. 11. Ferdinand Columbus mentions that he and his brother, who were then pages to the queen, could not stir out into the courtyard of the Alhambra without being followed by fifty of these vagabonds, who insulted them in the grossest manner, "as the sons of the adventurer who had led so many brave Spanish hidalgos to seek their graves in the land of vanity and delusion which he had found out."—*Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 85.

(1) Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* lib. 1, cap. 12. National feeling operated, no doubt, as well as avarice, to sharpen the tooth of slander against the admiral. "Ægre multi patiuntur," says Columbus's countryman, with honest warmth, "peregrinum hominem, et quidem e nostrâ Italiâ ortum, tantum honoris ac gloriæ consequuntur, ut non tantum Hispanicæ gentis, sed et cujusvis alterius, homines superaverit."—Benzoni, lib. 1, cap. 5.

(2) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 7, 10, and more especially, lib. 6, cap. 13.—Las Casas, *Œuvres*, ed. de Morente, tom. i. p. 306.

(3) "La qualité de Catholique Romain," says the philosopher Villers, "avait tout-à-fait remplacé celle d'homme, et même de Chrétien. Qui n'était pas Catholique Romain, n'était pas homme, était moins qu'homme; et eût-il été un souverain, c'était une homme à qui on ôterait la vie."—(*Essai sur la Réformation*, p. 56, ed. 1820.) Las Casas rests the title of the Spanish crown to its American possessions on the original papal grant, made on con-

the profession and the practice of the most enlightened Europeans of the fifteenth century; and such the deplorable maxims which regulated the intercourse of the Spanish and Portuguese navigators with the uncivilised natives of the western world.(1) Columbus, agreeably to these views, had, very soon after the occupation of Hispaniola, recommended a regular exchange of slaves for the commodities required for the support of the colony; representing, moreover, that in this way their conversion would be more surely effected,—an object, it must be admitted, which he seems to have ever had most earnestly at heart.

Isabella, however, entertained views on this matter far more liberal than those of her age. She had been deeply interested by the accounts she had received from the admiral himself of the gentle, unoffending character of the islanders; and she revolted at the idea of consigning them to the horrors of slavery, without even an effort for their conversion. She hesitated, therefore, to sanction his proposal; and, when a number of Indian captives were advertised to be sold in the markets of Andalusia, she commanded the sale to be suspended till the opinion of a council of theologians and doctors, learned in such matters, could be obtained, as to its conscientious lawfulness. She yielded still further to the benevolent impulses of her nature, causing holy men to be instructed, as far as possible, in the Indian languages, and sent out as missionaries for the conversion of the natives.(2) Some of them, as Father Boil and his brethren, seem indeed to have been more concerned for the welfare of their own bodies, than for the souls of their benighted flock; but others, imbued with a better spirit, wrought

dition of converting the natives to Christianity. The pope, as vicar of Jesus Christ, possesses plenary authority over all men for the safety of their souls. He might, therefore, in furtherance of this, confer on the Spanish sovereigns *imperial supremacy* over all lands discovered by them,—not, however, to the prejudice of authorities already existing there, and over such nations only as voluntarily embraced Christianity. Such is the sum of his thirty propositions, submitted to the council of the Indies for the inspection of Charles V.—(*Ouvres*, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. pp. 286—311.) One may see, in these arbitrary and whimsical limitations, the good bishop's desire to reconcile what reason told him were the natural rights of man, with what faith prescribed as the legitimate prerogative of the pope. Few Roman Catholics of the present day will be found sturdy enough to maintain this lofty prerogative, however carefully limited. Still fewer in the sixteenth century would have challenged it. Indeed, it is but just to Las Casas to admit that the general scope of his arguments, here and elsewhere, is very far in advance of his age.

(1) A Spanish casuist founds the right of his nation to enslave the Indians, among other things, on their smoking tobacco, and not trimming their beards à l'Espagnole. At least, this is Montesquieu's interpretation of it.—(*Esprit de Loix*, lib. 15, chap. 3.) The doctors of the Inquisition could hardly have found a better reason.

(2) Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 5, sec. 34.—Navarrate, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 92.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 3, cap. 4.

in the good work with disinterested zeal, and, if we may credit their accounts, with some efficacy.(1)

In the same beneficent spirit, the royal letters and ordinances urged over and over again the paramount obligation of the religious instruction of the natives, and of observing the utmost gentleness and humanity in all dealings with them. When, therefore, the queen learned the arrival of two vessels from the Indies with three hundred slaves on board, which the admiral had granted to the mutineers, she could not repress her indignation, but impatiently asked, "By what authority does Columbus venture thus to dispose of my subjects?" (June 20, 1500.) She instantly caused proclamation to be made in the southern provinces, that all who had Indian slaves in their possession, granted by the admiral, should forthwith provide for their return to their own country; while the few still held by the crown were to be restored to freedom in like manner.(2)

After a long and visible reluctance, the queen acquiesced in sending out a commissioner to investigate the affairs of the colony. The person appointed to this delicate trust was Don Francisco de Bobadilla, a poor knight of Calatrava. He was invested with supreme powers of civil and criminal jurisdiction. He was to bring to trial and pass sentence on all such as had conspired against the authority of Columbus. He was authorised to take possession of the fortresses, vessels, public stores, and property of every description; to dispose of all offices; and to command whatever persons he might deem expedient for the tranquillity of the island, without distinction of rank, to return to Spain, and present themselves before the sovereigns. Such, in brief, was the sum of the extraordinary powers intrusted to Bobadilla.(3)

It is impossible now to determine what motives could have led to the selection of so incompetent an agent for an office of such high responsibility. He seems to have been a weak and arrogant man, swelled up with unmeasurable insolence by the

(1) "Among other things that the holy fathers carried out," says Robles, "was a little organ and several bells, which greatly delighted the simple people, so that from one to two thousand persons were baptised every day."—(Vida de Ximenez, p. 120.) Ferdinand Columbus remarks, with some naïveté, that "the Indians were so obedient, from their fear of the admiral, and at the same time so desirous to oblige him, that they voluntarily became Christians!"—Hist. del Almirante, cap. 84.

(2) Herrera, Indias Occidentales, lib. 4, cap. 7.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 134. Las Casas observes, that "so great was the queen's indignation at the admiral's misconduct in this particular, that nothing but the consideration of his great public services saved him from immediate disgrace."—Œuvres, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 306.

(3) Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. Nos. 127—130. The original commission to Bobadilla was dated March 21st and May 21st, 1499; the execution of it, however, was delayed until July, 1500, in the hope, doubtless, of obtaining such tidings from Hispaniola as should obviate the necessity of a measure so prejudicial to the admiral.

brief authority thus undeservedly bestowed on him. From the very first, he regarded Columbus in the light of a convicted criminal, on whom it was his business to execute the sentence of the law. Accordingly, on his arrival at the island, after an ostentatious parade of his credentials, he commanded the admiral to appear before him, and without affecting the forms of a legal inquiry, at once caused him to be manacled, and thrown into prison (August 23, 1500). Columbus submitted without the least show of resistance, displaying in this sad reverse that magnanimity of soul which would have touched the heart of a generous adversary. Bobadilla, however, discovered no such sensibility; and, after raking together all the foul or frivolous calumnies which hatred or the hope of favour could extort, he caused the whole loathsome mass of accusation to be sent back to Spain with the admiral, whom he commanded to be kept strictly in irons during the passage; "afraid," says Ferdinand Columbus bitterly, "lest he might by any chance swim back again to the island." (1)

This excess of malice served, as usual, however, to defeat itself. So enormous an outrage shocked the minds of those most prejudiced against Columbus. All seemed to feel it as a national dishonour, that such indignities should be heaped on the man who, whatever might be his indiscretions, had done so much for Spain, and for the whole civilised world; a man who, in the honest language of an old writer, "had he lived in the days of ancient Greece or Rome, would have had statues raised, and temples and divine honours dedicated to him, as to a divinity!" (2)

None partook of the general indignation more strongly than Ferdinand and Isabella, who, in addition to their personal feelings of disgust at so gross an act, readily comprehended the whole weight of obloquy which its perpetration must necessarily attach to them. They sent to Cadiz without an instant's delay, and commanded the admiral to be released from his ignominious fetters. They wrote to him in the most benignant terms, expressing their sincere regret for the unworthy usage which he had experienced, and requesting him to appear before them as speedily as possible, at Granada, where the court was then staying. At the same time, they furnished him a thousand ducats for his expenses, and a handsome retinue to escort him on his journey.

(1) Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 86. Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, *De Rebus Oceanicis*, dec. 1, lib. 7.—Gomara, *Hist. de las Indias*, cap. 23.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 10.—Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* lib. 1, cap. 12.

(2) Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* lib. 1, cap. 12.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 6, cap. 15. Ferdinand Columbus tells us, that his father kept the fetters in which he was brought home, hanging up in an apartment of his house, as a perpetual memorial of national ingratitude, and, when he died, ordered them to be buried in the same grave with himself.—*Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 86.

Columbus, revived by these assurances of the kind dispositions of his sovereigns, proceeded without delay to Granada, which he reached on the 17th of December, 1500. Immediately on his arrival he obtained an audience. The queen could not repress her tears at the sight of the man whose illustrious services had met with such ungenerous requital, as it were at her own hands. She endeavoured to cheer his wounded spirit with the most earnest assurances of her sympathy and sorrow for his misfortunes. Columbus, from the first moment of his disgrace, had relied on the good faith and kindness of Isabella; for as an ancient Castilian writer remarks, "she had ever favoured him beyond the king her husband, protecting his interests, and showing him especial kindness and good-will." When he beheld the emotion of his royal mistress, and listened to her consolatory language, it was too much for his loyal and generous heart; and, throwing himself on his knees, he gave vent to his feelings, and sobbed aloud. The sovereigns endeavoured to soothe and tranquillise his mind, and, after testifying their deep sense of his injuries, promised him that impartial justice should be done his enemies, and that he should be reinstated in his emoluments and honours. (1)

Much censure has attached to the Spanish government for its share in this unfortunate transaction; both in the appointment of so unsuitable an agent as Bobadilla, and the delegation of such broad and indefinite powers. With regard to the first, it is now too late, as has already been remarked, to ascertain on what grounds such a selection could have been made. There is no evidence of his being indebted for his promotion to intrigue or any undue influence. Indeed, according to the testimony of one of his contemporaries, he was reputed "an extremely honest and religious man;" and the good bishop Las Casas expressly declares, that "no imputation of dishonesty or avarice had ever rested on his character." (2) It was an error of judgment; a grave one, indeed, and must pass for as much as it is worth.

But in regard to the second charge, of delegating unwarrantable powers, it should be remembered that the grievances of the colony were represented as of a most pressing nature, demanding a prompt and peremptory remedy; that a more limited and partial authority, dependent for its exercise on instructions from the government at home, might be attended with ruinous delays; that his authority must necessarily be paramount to that of Columbus, who was a party implicated; and that, although unlimited jurisdiction was given over all

(1) Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, *De Rebus Oceanicis*, dec. 1, lib. 7.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 86, 87.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 4, cap. 8—10.—Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* lib. 1, cap. 12.

(2) Oviedo, *Hist. Gen. de las Indias*, p. 1, lib. 3, cap. 6.—Las Casas, lib. 2, cap. 6, apud Navarrete, tom. i. introd. p. 99.

offences committed against him, yet neither he nor his friends were to be molested in any other way than by a temporary suspension from office, and a return to their own country, where the merits of their case might be submitted to the sovereigns themselves.

This view of the matter, indeed, is perfectly conformable to that of Ferdinand Columbus, whose solicitude, so apparent in every page, for his father's reputation, must have effectually counterbalanced any repugnance he may have felt at impugning the conduct of his sovereigns. "The only ground of complaint," he remarks, in summing up his narrative of the transaction, "which I can bring against their Catholic Highnesses, is the unfitness of the agent whom they employed, equally malicious and ignorant. Had they sent out a suitable person, the admiral would have been highly gratified; since he had more than once requested the appointment of some one with full powers of jurisdiction in an affair where he felt some natural delicacy in moving, in consequence of his own brother having been originally involved in it." And as to the vast magnitude of the powers intrusted to Bobadilla, he adds, "It can scarcely be wondered at, considering the manifold complaints against the admiral made to their Highnesses." (1)

Although the king and queen determined without hesitation on the complete restoration of the admiral's honours, they thought it better to defer his re-appointment to the government of the colony until the present disturbances should be settled, and he might return there with personal safety and advantage. In the mean time they resolved to send out a competent individual, and to support him with such a force as should overawe faction, and enable him to place the tranquillity of the island on a permanent basis.

The person selected was Don Nicolas de Ovando, *comendador* of Laredo, of the military order of Alcantara. He was a man of acknowledged prudence and sagacity, temperate in his habits, and plausible and politic in his address. It is sufficient evidence of his standing at court, that he had been one of the ten youths selected to be educated in the palace as companions for the prince of the Asturias. He was furnished with a fleet of two and thirty sail, carrying twenty-five hundred persons, many of them of the best families in the kingdom, with every variety of article for the nourishment and permanent prosperity of the colony; and the general equipment was in a style of expense and magnificence such as had never before been lavished on any armada destined for the western waters. (2)

(1) Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 86.

(2) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 4, cap. 11.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 87.—Beuzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist. lib. 1*, cap. 12.—*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. p. 395.

The new governor was instructed, immediately on his arrival, to send Bobadilla home for trial. (Sept. 1501.) Under his lax administration, abuses of every kind had multiplied to an alarming extent; and the poor natives, in particular, were rapidly wasting away under the new and most inhuman arrangement of the *repartimientos*, which he established. Isabella now declared the Indians free; and emphatically enjoined on the authorities of Hispaniola to respect them as true and faithful vassals of the crown. Ovando was especially to ascertain the amount of losses sustained by Columbus and his brothers, to provide for their full indemnification, and to secure the unmolested enjoyment in future of all their lawful rights and pecuniary perquisites. (1)

Fortified with the most ample instructions in regard to these and other details of his administration, the governor embarked on board his magnificent flotilla, and crossed the bar of St. Lucar, February 15th, 1502. A furious tempest dispersed the fleet before it had been out a week, and a report reached Spain that it had entirely perished. The sovereigns, overwhelmed with sorrow at this fresh disaster, which consigned so many of their best and bravest to a watery grave, shut themselves up in their palace for several days. Fortunately, the report proved ill founded. The fleet rode out the storm in safety, one vessel only having perished; and the remainder reached in due time the place of destination. (2)

The Spanish government has been roundly taxed with injustice and ingratitude for its delay in restoring Columbus to the full possession of his colonial authority; and that too by writers generally distinguished for candour and impartiality. No such animadversion, however, as far as I am aware, is countenanced by contemporary historians; and it appears to be wholly undeserved. Independent of the obvious inexpediency of returning him immediately to the theatre of disaffection, before the embers of ancient animosity had had time to cool, there were several features in his character which make it doubtful whether he were the most competent person, in any event, for an emergency demanding at once the greatest coolness, consummate address, and acknowledged personal authority. His sublime enthusiasm, which carried him victorious over every obstacle, involved him also in numerous embarrassments, which men of more phlegmatic temperament would have escaped. It led him to count too readily on a similar spirit in others,—and to be disappointed. It gave an exaggerated colouring to his views and descriptions, that inevitably led to a reaction in the minds of such as embarked their all on the

(1) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 11—13.—Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viajes*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. Nos. 133—144.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 87.

(2) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 5, cap. 1.



splendid dreams of a fairy land, which they were never to realise.<sup>(1)</sup> Hence a fruitful source of discontent and disaffection in his followers. It led him, in his eagerness for the achievement of his great enterprises, to be less scrupulous and politic as to the means, than a less ardent spirit would have been. His pertinacious adherence to the scheme of Indian slavery, and his impolitic regulation compelling the labour of the *hidalgos*, are pertinent examples of this.<sup>(2)</sup> He was, moreover, a foreigner, without rank, fortune, or powerful friends; and his high and sudden elevation naturally raised him up a thousand enemies among a proud, punctilious, and intensely national people. Under these multiplied embarrassments, resulting from peculiarities of character and situation, the sovereigns might well be excused for not intrusting Columbus, at this delicate crisis, with disentangling the meshes of intrigue and faction in which the affairs of the colony were so unhappily involved.

I trust these remarks will not be construed into an insensibility to the merits and exalted services of Columbus. "A world," to borrow the words, though not the application of the Greek historian, "is his monument." His virtues shine with too bright a lustre to be dimmed by a few natural blemishes; but it becomes necessary to notice these, to vindicate the Spanish government from the imputation of perfidy and ingratitude, where it has been most freely urged, and apparently with the least foundation.

It is more difficult to excuse the paltry equipment with which the admiral was suffered to undertake his fourth and last voyage. The object proposed by this expedition was the discovery of a passage to the great Indian Ocean, which he inferred

(1) The high devotional feeling of Columbus led him to trace out allusions in Scripture to the various circumstances and scenes of his adventurous life. Thus he believed his great discovery announced in the Apocalypse, and in Isaiah; he identified, as I have before stated, the mines of Hispaniola with those which furnished Solomon with materials for his temple; he fancied that he had determined the actual locality of the garden of Eden in the newly discovered region of Paria. But his greatest extravagance was his project of a crusade for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre. This he cherished from the first hour of his discovery, pressing it in the most urgent manner on the sovereigns, and making actual provision for it in his testament. This was a flight, however, beyond the spirit even of this romantic age, and probably received as little serious attention from the queen, as from her more cool and calculating husband.—Peter Martyr, *De Rebus Oceanicis*, dec. 1, lib. 6.—Tercer Viage de Colon, apud Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. i. p. 259; tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 140.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 6, cap. 15.

(2) Another example was the injudicious punishment of delinquents by diminishing their regular allowance of food, a measure so obnoxious as to call for the interference of the sovereigns, who prohibited it altogether.—(Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 97.) Herrera, who must be admitted to have been in no degree insensible to the merits of Columbus, closes his account of the various accusations urged against him and his brothers, with the remark, that, "with every allowance for calumny, they must be confessed not to have governed the Castilians with the moderation that they ought to have done."—*Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 9.

sagaciously enough from his premises, though, as it turned out, to the great inconvenience of the commercial world, most erroneously, must open somewhere between Cuba and the coast of Paria. Four caravels only were furnished for the expedition, the largest of which did not exceed seventy tons burden; a force forming a striking contrast to the magnificent armada lately intrusted to Ovando, and altogether too insignificant to be vindicated on the ground of the different objects proposed by the two expeditions.(1)

Columbus, oppressed with growing infirmities, and a consciousness, perhaps, of the decline of popular favour, manifested unusual despondency previously to his embarkation. He talked, even, of resigning the task of further discovery to his brother Bartholomew. "I have established," said he, "all that I have proposed,—the existence of land in the west. I have opened the gate, and others may enter at their pleasure; as indeed they do, arrogating to themselves the title of discoverers, to which they can have little claim, following as they do in my track." He little thought the ingratitude of mankind would sanction the claims of these adventurers so far as to confer the name of one of them on that world which his genius had revealed.(2)

The great inclination, however, which the admiral had to serve the Catholic sovereigns, and especially the most serene queen, says Ferdinand Columbus, induced him to lay aside his scruples, and encounter the perils and fatigues of another voyage. A few weeks before his departure, he received a gracious letter from Ferdinand and Isabella, the last ever

(1) Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 14.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 88. Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 5, cap. 1.—Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* cap. 14.

(2) It would be going out of our way to investigate the pretensions of Amerigo Vespucci to the honour of first discovering the South American continent. The reader will find them displayed with perspicuity and candour by Mr. Irving, in his "Life of Columbus" (Appendix, No. 9). Few will be disposed to contest the author's conclusion respecting their fallacy, though all may not have the same charity as he, in tracing its possible origin to an editorial blunder, instead of wilful fabrication on the part of Vespucci; in which light, indeed, it seems to have been regarded by the two most ancient and honest historians of the event, Las Casas and Herrera. There is no reason to suspect him, however, of pretending to anything beyond the discovery of Paria, or of anticipating in any degree the important consequence destined to result from such pretensions.—Mr. Irving's conclusions have since been confirmed in the fullest manner by M. de Humboldt, in his "Géographie du nouveau Continent," published in 1839; in which he has assembled a mass of testimony, suggesting the most favourable impressions of Vespucci's innocence of the various charges brought against him. Since the appearance of Mr. Irving's work, Señor Navarrete has published the third volume of his "Coleccion de Viajes y Descubrimientos," &c., containing, among other things, the original letters recording Vespucci's American voyages, illustrated by all the authorities and facts, that could come within the scope of his indefatigable researches. The whole weight of evidence leads irresistibly to the conviction that Columbus is entitled to the glory of being the original discoverer of the southern continent, as well as islands of the western hemisphere.—Coleccion de Viajes, tom. iii. pp. 183—334.

addressed to him by his royal mistress, assuring him of their purpose to maintain inviolate all their engagements with him, and to perpetuate the inheritance of his honours in his family. (1) Comforted and cheered by these assurances, the veteran navigator, quitting the port of Cadiz on the 9th of March, 1502, once more spread his sails for those golden regions, which he had approached so near, but was destined never to reach.

It will not be necessary to pursue his course further than to notice a singular occurrence of most extraordinary nature. The admiral had received instructions not to touch at Hispaniola on his outward voyage. The leaky condition of one of his ships, however, and the signs of an approaching storm, induced him to seek a temporary refuge there: at the same time, he counselled Ovando to delay for a few days the departure of the fleet, then riding in the harbour, which was destined to carry Bobadilla and the rebels with their ill-gotten treasures back to Spain. The churlish governor, however, not only refused Columbus admittance, but gave orders for the instant departure of the vessels. The apprehensions of the experienced mariner were fully justified by the event. Scarcely had the Spanish fleet quitted its moorings, before one of those tremendous hurricanes came on, which so often desolate these tropical regions, sweeping down everything before it, and fell with such violence on the little navy, that out of eighteen ships, of which it was composed, not more than three or four escaped. The rest all foundered, including those which contained Bobadilla and the late enemies of Columbus. Two hundred thousand *castellanos* of gold, half of which belonged to the government, went to the bottom with them. The only one of the fleet which made its way back to Spain was a crazy weather-beaten bark, which contained the admiral's property, amounting to four thousand ounces of gold. To complete these curious coincidences, Columbus with his little squadron rode out the storm in safety under the lee of the island, where he had prudently taken shelter, on being so rudely repulsed from the port. This evenhanded retribution of justice, so uncommon in human affairs, led many to discern the immediate interposition of Providence; others, in a less Christian temper, referred it all to the necromancy of the admiral. (2)

(1) Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 87.—Herrera notices this letter, written, he says, "con tanta humanidad, que parecia extraordinaria de lo que usavan con otros, y no sin razon, pues jamas nadie les hizo tal servicio."—*Indias Occidentales*, lib. 5, cap. 1. Among other instances of the queen's personal regard for Columbus, may be noticed her receiving his two sons, Diego and Fernando, as her own pages, on the death of Prince John, in whose service they had formerly been.—(Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viajes*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 125.) By an ordinance of 1503, we find Diego Colon made *caballero* of the royal household, with an annual salary of 50,000 maravedis.—*Ibid.* Doc. Dipl. No. 150.

(2) Peter Martyr, *De Rebus Oceanicis*, dec. 1, lib. 10.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii, lib. 19, cap. 14.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 88.—Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.*, cap. 12.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 5, cap. 2.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SPANISH COLONIAL POLICY.

Careful Provision for the Colonies—License for Private Voyages—Important Papal Concessions—The Queen's Zeal for Conversion—Immediate Profits from the Discoveries—Their moral Consequences—Their geographical Extent.

A CONSIDERATION of the colonial policy pursued during Isabella's lifetime has been hitherto deferred, to avoid breaking the narrative of Columbus's personal adventures. I shall now endeavour to present the reader with a brief outline of it, as far as can be collected from imperfect and scanty materials; for, however incomplete in itself, it becomes important as containing the germ of the gigantic system developed in later ages.

Ferdinand and Isabella manifested from the first an eager and enlightened curiosity in reference to their new acquisitions, constantly interrogating the admiral minutely as to their soil and climate, their various vegetable and mineral products, and especially the character of the uncivilised races who inhabited them. *They paid the greatest deference to his suggestions, as before remarked, and liberally supplied the infant settlement with whatever could contribute to its nourishment and permanent prosperity.*(1) Through their provident attention, in a very few years after its discovery, the island of Hispaniola was in possession of the most important domestic animals, as well as fruits and vegetables, of the Old World, some of which have since continued to furnish the staple of a far more lucrative commerce than was ever anticipated from its gold mines.(2)

Emigration to the new countries was encouraged by the liberal tenor of the royal ordinances passed from time to time. The settlers in Hispaniola were to have their passage free; to be excused from taxes; to have the absolute property of such

(1) See, in particular, a letter to Columbus, dated August 1494 (apud Navarrete, Colección de Viages, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 79); also an elaborate memorial presented by the admiral in the same year, setting forth the various necessities of the colony, every item of which is particularly answered by the sovereigns, in a manner showing how attentively they considered his suggestions.—Ibid. tom. i. pp. 226—241.

(2) Abundant evidence of this is furnished by the long enumeration of articles subjected to titles, contained in an ordinance dated October 5th, 1501, showing with what indiscriminate severity this heavy burden was imposed from the first on the most important products of human industry.—Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias (Madrid, 1774), tom. i. lib. 1, tit. 16, ley 2.

plantations on the island as they should engage to cultivate for four years; and they were furnished with a gratuitous supply of grain and stock for their farms. All exports and imports were exempted from duty; a striking contrast to the narrow policy of later ages. Five hundred persons, including scientific men and artisans of every description, were sent out and maintained at the expense of government. To provide for the greater security and quiet of the island, Ovando was authorised to gather the residents into towns, which were endowed with the privileges appertaining to similar corporations in the mother country; and a number of married men, with their families, were encouraged to establish themselves in them, with the view of giving greater solidity and permanence to the settlement.(1)

With these wise provisions were mingled others savouring too strongly of the illiberal spirit of the age. Such were those prohibiting Jews, Moors, or indeed any but Castilians, for whom the discovery was considered exclusively to have been made, from inhabiting, or even visiting, the New World. The government kept a most jealous eye upon what it regarded as its own peculiar perquisites, reserving to itself the exclusive possession of all minerals, dyewoods, and precious stones that should be discovered; and although private persons were allowed to search for gold, they were subjected to the exorbitant tax of two-thirds, subsequently reduced to one-fifth, of all they should obtain, for the crown.(2)

The measure which contributed more effectually than any other, at this period, to the progress of discovery and colonisation, was the license granted, under certain regulations, in 1495, for voyages undertaken by private individuals. No use was made of this permission until some years later, in 1499. The spirit of enterprise had flagged, and the nation had experienced something like disappointment on contrasting the meagre results of their own discoveries with the dazzling successes of the Portuguese, who had struck at once into the very heart of the jewelled East. The reports of the admiral's third voyage, however, and the beautiful specimens of pearls which he sent home from the coast of Paria, revived the cupidity of the nation. Private adventurers now proposed to avail themselves of the license already granted, and to follow up the track of discovery on their own account. The government, drained by its late heavy expenditures, and jealous of the spirit of

(1) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 86, April 10th, 1495.—Nos. 103, 105—108, April 23rd, 1497.—No. 110, May 6th, 1497.—No. 121, July 22nd, 1497.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 4, cap. 12.

(2) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. Nos. 86, 121.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 3, cap. 2.—Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 5, sec. 84. The exclusion of foreigners, at least all but "Catholic Christians," is particularly recommended by Columbus in his first communication to the crown.—*Primer Viage de Colon*.

maritime adventure beginning to show itself in the other nations of Europe,(1) willingly acquiesced in a measure, which, while it opened a wide field of enterprise for its subjects, secured to itself all the substantial benefits of discovery, without any of the burdens.

The ships fitted out under the general licence were required to reserve one-tenth of their tonnage for the crown, as well as two-thirds of all the gold, and ten per cent. of all other commodities which they should procure. The government promoted these expeditions by a bounty on all vessels of six hundred tons and upwards engaged in them.(2)

With this encouragement, the more wealthy merchants of Seville, Cadiz, and Palos, the old theatre of nautical enterprise, freighted and sent out little squadrons of three or four vessels each, which they intrusted to the experienced mariners who had accompanied Columbus in his first voyage, or since followed in his footsteps. \* They held in general the same course pursued by the admiral on his last expedition, exploring the coasts of the great southern continent. Some of the adventurers returned with such rich freights of gold, pearls, and other precious commodities, as well compensated the fatigues and perils of the voyage; but the greater number were obliged to content themselves with the more enduring, but barren honours of discovery.(3)

The active spirit of enterprise now awakened, and the more enlarged commercial relations with the new colonies, required a more perfect organisation of the department for Indian affairs, the earliest vestiges of which have been already noticed in a

(1) Among the foreign adventurers were the two Cabots, who sailed in the service of the English monarch, Henry VII., in 1497, and ran down the whole coast of North America, from Newfoundland to within a few degrees of Florida; thus encroaching, as it were, on the very field of discovery preoccupied by the Spaniards.

(2) Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 5, sec. 32.—Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, Doc. Dipl. No. 86.

(3) Columbus seems to have taken exceptions at the license for private voyages, as an infringement of his own prerogatives. It is difficult, however, to understand in what way. There is nothing in his original capitulations with the government having reference to the matter (see Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, Doc. Dipl. No. 5); while, in the letters patent made out previously to his second voyage, the right of granting licenses is expressly reserved to the crown, and to the superintendent, Fonseca, equally with the admiral.—(Doc. Dipl. No. 35.) The only legal claim which he could make in all such expeditions as were not conducted under him, was to one-eighth of the tonnage, and this was regularly provided for in the general license.—(Doc. Dipl. No. 86.) The sovereigns, indeed, in consequence of his remonstrances, published an ordinance, June 2nd, 1497, in which, after expressing their unabated respect for all the rights and privileges of the admiral, they declare that whatever shall be found in their previous license repugnant to these shall be null and void.—(Doc. Dipl. 113.) The hypotheticalal form in which this is stated shows that the sovereigns, with an honest desire of keeping their engagements with Columbus, had not a very clear perception in what manner they had been violated.—Peter Martyr, *De Rebus Oceanicis*, Dec. 1, lib. 9.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 11.—Benzoni, *Novi Orbis Hist.* cap. 13.

to the approbation of the Holy Sec. By these two concessions the Spanish crown was placed at once at the head of the church in its transatlantic dominions, with the absolute disposal of all its dignities and emoluments.(1)

It has excited the admiration of more than one historian, that Ferdinand and Isabella, with their reverence for the Catholic church, should have had the courage to assume an attitude of such entire independence of its spiritual chief.(2) But whoever has studied their reign, will regard this measure as perfectly conformable to their habitual policy, which never suffered a zeal for religion, or a blind deference to the church, to compromise in any degree the independence of the crown. It is much more astonishing that pontiffs could be found content to divest themselves of such important prerogatives. It was deviating widely from the subtle and tenacious spirit of their predecessors, and, as the consequences came to be more fully disclosed, furnished ample subject of regret to those who succeeded them.

Such is a brief summary of the principal regulations adopted by Ferdinand and Isabella for the administration of the colonies. Many of their peculiarities, including most of their defects, are to be referred to the peculiar circumstances under which the discovery of the New World was effected. Unlike the settlements on the comparatively sterile shores of North America, which were permitted to devise laws accommodated to their necessities, and to gather strength in the habitual exercise of political functions, the Spanish colonies were from the very first checked and controlled by the over-legislation of the parent country. The original project of discovery had been entered into with indefinite expectations of gain. The verification of Columbus's theory of the existence of land in the west, gave popular credit to his conjecture that that land was the far-famed Indies. The specimens of gold and other precious commodities found there served to maintain the delusion. The Spanish government regarded the expedition as its own private adventure, to whose benefits it had exclusive pretensions. Hence those jealous regulations for securing to itself a monopoly of the most obvious sources of profit, the dyewoods and the precious metals.

These impolitic provisions were relieved by others better suited to the permanent interests of the colony. Such was the bounty offered in various ways on the occupation and culture of land; the erection of municipalities; the right of intercolonial traffic, and of exporting and importing merchandise of every

(1) Solorzano, *Política Indiana*, tom. ii. lib. 4, cap. 2, sec. 9.—Riol, *Informe*, apud *Semanario Erudito*, tom. iii. pp. 160, 161.

(2) Among others, see Raynal, *History of the East and West Indies*, translated by Justamond (London, 1788), vol. iv. p. 277.—Robertson, *History of America* (London, 1796), vol. iii. p. 283.

description free of duty.(1) These and similar laws show that the government, far from regarding the colonies merely as a foreign acquisition to be sacrificed to the interests of the mother country, as at a later period, was disposed to legislate for them on more generous principles, as an integral portion of the monarchy.

Some of the measures, even of a less liberal tenor, may be excused, as sufficiently accommodated to existing circumstances. No regulation, for example, was found eventually more mischievous in its operation than that which confined the colonial trade to the single port of Seville, instead of permitting it to find a free vent in the thousand avenues naturally opened in every part of the kingdom; to say nothing of the grievous monopolies and exactions, for which this concentration of a mighty traffic on so small a point was found, in later times, to afford unbounded facility. But the colonial trade was too limited in its extent, under Ferdinand and Isabella, to involve such consequences. It was chiefly confined to a few wealthy seaports of Andalusia, from the vicinity of which the first adventurers had sallied forth on their career of discovery. It was no inconvenience to them to have a common port of entry, so central and accessible as Seville; which, moreover, by this arrangement became a great mart for European trade, thus affording a convenient market to the country for effecting its commercial exchanges with every quarter of Christendom.(2) It was only when laws, adapted to the incipient stages of commerce, were perpetuated to a period when that commerce had swelled to such gigantic dimensions as to embrace every quarter of the empire, that their gross impolicy became manifest.

It would not be giving a fair view of the great objects proposed by the Spanish sovereigns in their schemes of discovery, to omit one which was paramount to all the rest, with the queen at least,—the propagation of Christianity among the heathen. The conversion and civilisation of this simple people form, as has been already said, the burden of most of her official communications from the earliest period.(3) She neglected no means for the furtherance of this good work, through the agency of missionaries exclusively devoted to it, who were to establish their residence among the natives, and win them to the true faith by their instructions, and the edifying example

(1) Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 5, sec. 32, 33.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 11, 12.—Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 86.

(2) The historian of Seville mentions that it was the resort especially of the merchants of Flanders, with whom a more intimate intercourse had been opened by the intermarriages of the royal family with the house of Burgundy.—See Zuniga, *Annales de Sevilla*, p. 415.

(3) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 45, et loc. cit.—Las Casas, amidst his unsparing condemnation of the guilty, does ample justice to the pure and generous, though, alas! unavailing efforts of the queen.—See *Ceuvres*, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. pp. 21, 307, 395, et alibi.



of their own lives. It was with the design of ameliorating the condition of the natives, that she sanctioned the introduction into the colonies of negro slaves born in Spain (1501). This she did on the representation, that the physical constitution of the African was much better fitted than that of the Indian to endure severe toil under a tropical climate. To this false principle of economising human suffering we are indebted for that foul stain on the New World, which has grown deeper and darker with the lapse of years.(1)

Isabella, however, was destined to have her benevolent designs in regard to the natives defeated by her own subjects. The popular doctrine of the absolute rights of the Christian over the heathen seemed to warrant the exaction of labour from these unhappy beings to any degree, which avarice on the one hand could demand, or human endurance concede on the other. The device of the *repartimientos* systematised and completed the whole scheme of oppression. The queen, it is true, abolished them under Ovando's administration, and declared the Indians "as free as her own subjects." (2) But his representation, that the Indians, when no longer compelled to work, withdrew from all intercourse with the Christians, thus annihilating at once all hopes of their conversion, subsequently induced her to consent that they should be required to labour moderately and for a reasonable compensation.(3) This was construed with their usual latitude by the Spaniards. They soon revived the old system of distribution, on so terrific a scale, that a letter of Columbus, written shortly after Isabella's death, represents more than six-sevenths of the whole population of Hispaniola to have melted away under it!(4) The queen was too far removed to enforce the execution of her own beneficent mea-

(1) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 12. A good account of the introduction of negro slavery into the New World, comprehending the material facts, and some little known, may be found in the fifth chapter of Bancroft's "History of the United States;" a work in which the author has shown singular address in creating a unity of interest out of a subject which, in its early stages, would seem to want every other unity. It is the deficiency of this, probably, which has prevented Mr. Grahame's valuable History from attaining the popularity to which its solid merits justly entitle it. Should the remaining volumes of Mr. Bancroft's work be conducted with the same spirit, scholarship, and impartiality as the volume before us, it cannot fail to take a permanent rank in American literature.

(2) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 4, cap. 11.

(3) Dec. 20th, 1503.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 5, cap. 11. See the Instructions to Ovando in Navarrete (*Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. No. 153). "Pay them regular wages," says the ordinance, "for their labour;"—"como personas libres como lo son, y no como siervos." Las Casas, who analyses these instructions, which Llorente, by the bye, has misdated, exposes the atrocious manner in which they were violated, in every particular, by Ovando and his successors.—*Œuvres*, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. pp. 309 et seq.

(4) *Ibid.* ubi supra.—Las Casas, *Hist. Ind.* lib. 2, cap. 36, MS. apud Irving, vol. iii. p. 412. The venerable bishop confirms this frightful picture of desolation in its full extent, in his various memorials prepared for the council of the Indies.—*Œuvres*, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. *passim*.

snres; nor is it probable that she ever imagined the extent of their violation, for there was no intrepid philanthropist in that day, like Las Casas, to proclaim to the world the wrongs and sorrows of the Tudian.(1) A conviction, however, of the unworthy treatment of the natives seems to have pressed heavily on her heart; for in a codicil to her testament, dated a few days only before her death, she invokes the kind offices of her successor in their behalf in such strong and affectionate language, as plainly indicates how intently her thoughts were occupied with their condition down to the last hour of her existence.(2)

The moral grandeur of the maritime discoveries under this reign must not so far dazzle us as to lead to a very high estimate of their immediate results in an economical view. Most of those articles which have since formed the great staples of South American commerce, as cocoa, indigo, cochineal, tobacco, &c., were either not known in Isabella's time, or not cultivated for exportation. Small quantities of cotton had been brought to Spain, but it was doubted whether the profit would compensate the expense of raising it. The sugar-cane had been transplanted into Hispaniola, and thrived luxuriantly in its genial soil; but it required time to grow it to any considerable amount as an article of commerce; and this was still further delayed by the distractions as well as avarice of the colony, which grasped at nothing less substantial than gold itself. The only vegetable product extensively used in trade was the brazil-wood, whose beautiful dyo and application to various ornamental purposes made it, from the first, one of the most important monopolies of the crown.

The accounts are too vague to afford any probable estimate of the precious metals obtained from the new territories previous to Ovando's mission. Before the discovery of the mines of Hayna, it was certainly very inconsiderable. The size of some of the specimens of ore found there would suggest magnificent ideas of their opulence. One piece of gold is reported by the contemporary historians to have weighed three thousand two hundred castellanos, and to have been so large that the Spaniards served up a roasted pig on it, boasting that no potentate in Europe could dine off so costly a dish.(3) The admiral's own statement, that the miners obtained from six gold castel-

(1) Las Casas made his first voyage to the Indies, it is true, in 1493, or at latest 1502; but there is no trace of his taking an active part in denouncing the oppressions of the Spaniards earlier than 1510, when he combined his efforts with those of the Dominican missionaries lately arrived in St. Domingo in the same good work. It was not until some years later, 1515, that he returned to Spain, and pleaded the cause of the injured natives before the throne.—Llorente, *Œuvres de Las Casas*, tom. i. pp. 1–23.—Nic. Antonio, *Bibliotheca Nova*, tom. i. pp. 191, 192.

(2) See the will, apud Dormer, *Discursos Varios*, p. 381.

(3) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 5, cap. 1.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 84.—Oviedo, *Relacion Sumaria de la Historia Natural de las Indias*, cap. 84, apud Barcia, *Historiadores Primitivos*, tom. i.

lanos to one hundred or even two hundred and fifty in a day, allows a latitude too great to lead to any definite conclusion. (1) More tangible evidence of the riches of the island is afforded by the fact, that two hundred thousand castellanos of gold went down in the ships with Bobadilla. But this, it must be remembered, was the fruit of gigantic efforts, continued, under a system of unexampled oppression, for more than two years. To this testimony might be added that of the well-informed historian of Seville, who infers, from several royal ordinances, that the influx of the precious metals had been such, before the close of the fifteenth century, as to affect the value of the currency, and the regular prices of commodities. (2) These large estimates, however, are scarcely reconcilable with the popular discontent at the meagreness of the returns obtained from the New World, or with the assertion of Bernaldez, of the same date with Zuñiga's reference, that "so little gold had been brought home, as to raise a general belief that there was scarcely any in the island." (3) This is still further confirmed by the frequent representations of contemporary writers, that the expenses of the colonies considerably exceeded the profits; and may account for the very limited scale on which the Spanish government, at no time blind to its own interests, pursued its schemes of discovery, as compared with its Portuguese neighbours, who followed up theirs with a magnificent apparatus of fleets and armies, that could have been supported only by the teeming treasures of the Indies. (4)

(1) *Tercer Viage de Colon*, apud Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viajes*, tom. i. p. 274.

(2) Zuñiga, *Annales de Sevilla*, p. 415. The alteration was in the gold currency, which continued to rise in value till 1497, when it gradually sunk, in consequence of the importation from the mines of Hispaniola. Clemencia has given its relative value as compared with silver, for several different years; and the year he assigns for the commencement of its depreciation is precisely the same with that indicated by Zuñiga.—(*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. *ilust.* 29.) The value of silver was not materially affected till the discovery of the great mines of Potosi and Zacatecas.

(3) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 131.

(4) The estimates in the text, it will be noticed, apply only to the period antecedent to Ovando's administration, in 1502. The operations under him were conducted on a far more extensive and efficient plan. The system of *repartimientos* being revived, the whole physical force of the island, aided by the best mechanical apparatus, was employed in extorting from the soil all its hidden stores of wealth. The success was such, that in 1506, within two years after Isabella's death, the four foundries established in the island yielded an annual amount, according to Herrera, of 450,000 ounces of gold. It must be remarked, however, that one-fifth only of the gross sum obtained from the mines was at that time paid to the crown. It is a proof how far these returns exceeded the expectations at the time of Ovando's appointment, that the person then sent out as marker of the gold was to receive, as a reasonable compensation, one per cent. of all the gold assayed. The perquisite, however, was found to be so excessive, that the functionary was recalled, and a new arrangement made with his successor.—(See Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 6, cap. 18.)—When Navagiero visited Seville, in 1520, the royal fifth of the gold which passed through the mints amounted to about 100,000 ducats annually.—*Viaggio*, fol. 15.

While the colonial commerce failed to produce immediately the splendid returns which were expected, it was generally believed to have introduced a physical evil into Europe, which, in the language of an eminent writer, "more than counter-balanced all the benefits that resulted from the discovery of the New World." I allude to the loathsome disease which Heaven has sent as the severest scourge of licentious intercourse between the sexes; and which broke out with all the virulence of an epidemic in almost every quarter of Europe, in a very short time after the discovery of America. The coincidence of these two events led to the popular belief of their connection with each other, though it derived little support from any other circumstance. The expedition of Charles the Eighth, against Naples, which brought the Spaniards, soon after, in immediate contact with the various nations of Christendom, suggested a plausible medium for the rapid communication of the disorder; and this theory of its origin and transmission gaining credit with time, which made it more difficult to be refuted, has passed with little examination from the mouth of one historian to another to the present day.

The extremely brief interval which elapsed between the return of Columbus and the simultaneous appearance of the disorder at the most distant points of Europe, long since suggested a reasonable distrust of the correctness of the hypothesis; and an American, naturally desirous of relieving his own country from so melancholy a reproach, may feel satisfaction that the more searching and judicious criticism of our own day has at length established beyond a doubt that the disease, far from originating in the New World, was never known there till introduced by Europeans. (1)

(1) The curious reader is particularly referred to a late work, entitled *Lettere sulla Storia de' Mali Venereli, di Domenico Thiene, Venezia, 1833*; for the knowledge and loan of which I am indebted to my friend Dr. Walter Channing. In this work the author has assembled all the early notices of the disease of any authority, and discussed their import with great integrity and judgment. The following positions may be considered as established by his researches. 1. That neither Columbus nor his son, in their copious narratives and correspondence, allude in any way to the existence of such a disease in the New World. I must add, that an examination of the original documents published by Navarrete since the date of Dr. Thiene's work, fully confirms this statement. 2. That among the frequent notices of the disease, during the twenty-five years immediately following the discovery of America, there is not a single intimation of its having been brought from that country; but, on the contrary, a uniform derivation of it from some other source, generally France. 3. That the disorder was known and circumstantially described previous to the expedition of Charles VIII., and of course could not have been introduced by the Spaniards in that way, as vulgarly supposed. 4. That various contemporary authors trace its existence in a variety of countries, as far back as 1493, and the beginning of 1494, showing a rapidity and extent of diffusion perfectly irreconcilable with its importation by Columbus in 1493. 5. Lastly, that it was not till after the close of Ferdinand and Isabella's reigns that the first work appeared affecting to trace the origin of the disease to America; and this, published in 1517, was the production not of a Spaniard, but a foreigner.

Whatever be the amount of physical good or evil immediately resulting to Spain from her new discoveries, their moral consequences were incalculable. The ancient limits of human thought and action were overleaped; the veil which had covered the secrets of the deep for so many centuries was removed; another hemisphere was thrown open; and a boundless expansion promised to science, from the infinite varieties in which nature was exhibited in these unexplored regions. The success of the Spaniards kindled a generous emulation in their Portuguese rivals, who soon after accomplished their long-sought passage into the Indian seas, and thus completed the great circle of maritime discovery. (1) It would seem as if Providence had postponed this grand event until the possession of America, with its stores of precious metals, might supply such materials for a commerce with the East as should bind together the most distant quarters of the globe. The impression made on the

A letter of Peter Martyr to the learned Portuguese Arias Barbosa, professor of Greek at Salamanca, noticing the symptoms of the disease in the most unequivocal manner, will settle at once this much-vexed question, if we can rely on the genuineness of the date, the 5th of April, 1493, about five years before the return of Columbus. Dr. Thiene, however, rejects the date as apocryphal, on the ground,—1. That the name of "*morbus Gallicus*," given to the disease by Martyr, was not in use till after the French invasion, in 1494. 2. That the superscription of Greek professor at Salamanca was premature, as no such professorship existed there till 1503. As to the first of these objections, it may be remarked, that there is but one author prior to the French invasion who notices the disease at all. \*He derives it from Gaul, though not giving it the technical appellation of *morbus Gallicus*; and Martyr, it may be observed, far from confining himself to this, alludes to one or two other names, showing that its title was then quite undetermined. In regard to the second objection, Dr. Thiene does not cite his authority for limiting the introduction of Greek at Salamanca to 1503. He may have found a plausible one in the account of that university compiled by one of its officers, Pedro Chacon, in 1569, inserted in the eighteenth volume of the *Semanario Erudito* (Madrid, 1789). The accuracy of the writer's chronology, however, may well be doubted, from a gross anachronism on the same page with the date referred to, where he speaks of Queen Joanna as inheriting the crown in 1512. (*Hist. de la Universidad de Salamanca*, p. 55.) Waving this, however, the fact of Barbosa being Greek professor at Salamanca in 1493 is directly intimated by his pupil, the celebrated Andrew Rescendi. "*Arius Lusitanus*," says he, "*quadraginta, et eo plus annos, Salmanticæ tum Latinas litteras, tum Græcas, magnâ cum laude professus est.*" (*Responsio ad Quevedum*, apud Barbosa, *Bibliotheca Lusitana*, tom. i. p. 77.) Now, as Barbosa, by general consent, passed several years in his native country, Portugal, before his death in 1530, this assertion of Rescendi necessarily places him at Salamanca in the situation of Greek instructor some time before the date of Martyr's letter. It may be added, indeed, that Nic. Antonio, than whom a more competent critic could not be found, so far from suspecting the date of the letter, cites it as settling the period when Barbosa filled the Greek chair at Salamanca. (See *Bibliotheca Nova*, tom. i. p. 170.) Martyr's epistle, if we admit the genuineness of the date, must dispose at once of the whole question of the American origin of the venereal disease. But as this question is determined quite as conclusively, though not so summarily, by the accumulated evidence from other sources, the reader will probably think the matter not worth so much discussion.

(1) This event occurred in 1497; Vasco da Gama doubling the Cape of Good Hope, November 20th, in that year, and reaching Calicut in the following May, 1498.—*La Clède*, *Hist. de Portugal*, tom. iii. pp. 104—109.

enlightened minds of that day is evinced by the tone of gratitude and exultation in which they indulge at being permitted to witness the consummation of these glorious events, which their fathers had so long, but in vain, desired to see. (1)

The discoveries of Columbus occurred most opportunely for the Spanish nation, at the moment when it was released from the tumultuous struggle in which it had been engaged for so many years with the Moslems. The severe schooling of those wars had prepared it for entering on a bolder theatre of action, whose stirring and romantic perils raised still higher the chivalrous spirit of the people. The operation of this spirit was shown in the alacrity with which private adventurers embarked in expeditions to the New World, under cover of the general license, during the last two years of this century. Their efforts, combined with those of Columbus, extended the range of discovery from its original limits, twenty-four degrees of north latitude, to probably more than fifteen south, comprehending some of the most important territories in the western hemisphere. Before the end of 1500, the principal groups of the West Indian islands had been visited, and the whole extent of the southern continent coasted, from the Bay of Honduras to Cape St. Augustine. One adventurous mariner, indeed, named Lepc, penetrated several degrees south of this, to a point not reached by any other voyager for ten or twelve years after. A great part of the kingdom of Brazil was embraced in this extent, and two successive Castilian navigators landed, and took formal possession of it for the crown of Castile, previous to its reputed discovery by the Portuguese Cabral; (2) although the claims to it were subsequently relinquished by the Spanish government, conformably to the famous line of demarcation established by the treaty of Tordesillas. (3)

(1) See, among others, Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 181.

(2) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. iii. pp. 18—26.—Cabral's pretensions to the discovery of Brazil appear not to have been doubted until recently. They are sanctioned both by Robertson and Raynal.

(3) The Portuguese court formed, probably, no very accurate idea of the geographical position of Brazil. King Emanuel, in a letter to the Spanish sovereigns, acquainting them with Cabral's voyage, speaks of the newly-discovered region as not only convenient, but *necessary*, for the navigation to India.—(See the letter apud Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. iii. No. 13.) The oldest maps of this country, whether from ignorance or design, bring it twenty-two degrees east of its proper longitude; so that the whole of the vast tract now comprehended under the name of Brazil, would fall on the Portuguese side of the partition-line agreed on by the two governments, which, it will be remembered, was removed to 370 leagues west of the Cape de Verd Islands. The Spanish court made some show at first of resisting the pretensions of the Portuguese, by preparations for establishing a colony on the northern extremity of the Brazilian territory.—(Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. iii. p. 39.) It is not easy to understand how it came finally to admit these pretensions. Any correct admeasurement with the Castilian league would only have included the fringe, as it were, of the north-eastern promontory of Brazil. The Portuguese league, allowing seventeen to a degree, may have been adopted, which would embrace nearly the whole

While the colonial empire of Spain was thus every day enlarging, the man to whom it was all due was never permitted to know the extent or the value of it. He died in the conviction in which he lived, that the land he had reached was the long-sought Indies. But it was a country far richer than the Indies; and had he, on quitting Cuba, struck into a westerly instead of a southerly direction, it would have carried him into the very depths of the golden regions whose existence he had so long and vainly predicted. As it was, he "only opened the gates," to use his own language, for others more fortunate than himself; and, before he quitted Hispaniola for the last time, the young adventurer arrived there, who was destined by the conquest of Mexico to realise all the magnificent visions, which had been derided as only visions, in the lifetime of Columbus.

The discovery of the New World was fortunately reserved for a period when the human race was sufficiently enlightened to form some conception of its importance. Public attention was promptly and eagerly directed to this momentous event, so that few facts worthy of note, during the whole progress of discovery from its earliest epoch, escaped contemporary record. Many of these notices have, indeed, perished through neglect, in the various repositories in which they were scattered. The researches of Navarrete have rescued many, and will, it is to be hoped, many more from their progress to oblivion. The first two volumes of his compilation, containing the journals and letters of Columbus, the correspondence of the sovereigns with him, and a vast quantity of public and private documents, form, as I have elsewhere remarked, the most authentic basis for a history of that great man. Next to these in importance is the "History of the Admiral," by his son Ferdinand, whose own experience and opportunities, combined with uncommon literary attainments, eminently qualified him for recording his father's extraordinary life. It must be allowed, that he has done this with a candour and good faith seldom warped by any overweening, though natural, partiality for his subject. His work met with a whimsical fate. The original was early lost, but happily not before it had been translated into the Italian, from which a Spanish version was afterwards made; and from this latter, thus reproduced in the same tongue in which it originally appeared, are derived the various translations of it into the other languages of Europe. The Spanish version, which is incorporated into Barcia's collection, is executed in a slovenly manner, and is replete with chronological inaccuracies; a circumstance not very wonderful, considering the curious transmission it has undergone.

Another contemporary author of great value is Peter Martyr, who took so deep an interest in the nautical enterprise of his day, as to make it, independently of the abundant notices scattered through his correspondence, the subject of a separate work. His History, "*De Rebus Oceanicis et Novo Orbe*," has all the value which extensive learning, a reflecting, philosophical mind, and intimate familiarity with the principal actors in the scenes he describes, can give. Indeed, that no source of information might be wanting to him, the sovereigns authorised him to be present at the Council of the Indies, whenever any communication was made to that body respecting the progress of dis-

territory which passed under the name of Brazil in the best ancient maps, extending from Para on the north, to the great river of San Pedro on the south.—(See Malte Brun, *Univers. Geography*; Boston, 1824-9; book 91.) Mariana seems willing to help the Portuguese, by running the partition-line one hundred leagues farther west than they claimed themselves.—*Hist. do España*, tom. ii. p. 607.

covery. The principal defects of his work arise from the precipitate manner in which the greater part of it was put together, and the consequently imperfect and occasionally contradictory statements which appear in it. But the honest intentions of the author, who seems to have been fully sensible of his own imperfections, and his liberal spirit, are so apparent, as to disarm criticism in respect to comparatively venial errors.

But the writer who has furnished the greatest supply of materials for the modern historian is Antonio de Herrera. He did not flourish, indeed, until near a century after the discovery of America; but the post which he occupied of historiographer of the Indies gave him free access to the most authentic and reserved sources of information. He has availed himself of these with great freedom; transferring whole chapters from the unpublished narratives of his predecessors, especially of the good bishop Las Casas, whose great work, "*Crónica de las Indias Occidentales*," contained too much that was offensive to national feeling to be allowed the honours of the press. The apostle of the Indians, however, lives in the pages of Herrera, who, while he has omitted the tumid and overheated declamation of the original, is allowed by the Castilian critics to have retained whatever is of most value, and exhibited it in a dress far superior to that of his predecessor. It must not be omitted, however, that he is also accused of occasional inadvertence in stating as fact what Las Casas only adduced as tradition or conjecture. His "*Historia General de las Indias Occidentales*," bringing down the narrative to 1554, was published in four volumes, at Madrid, in 1601. Herrera left several other histories of the different states of Europe, and closed his learned labours in 1625, at the age of seventy-five.

No Spanish historian had since arisen to contest the palm with Herrera on his own ground, until, at the close of the last century, Don Juan Bautista Muñoz was commissioned by the government to prepare a history of the New World. The talents and liberal acquisitions of this scholar, the free admission opened to him in every place of public and private deposit, and the immense mass of materials collected by his indefatigable researches, authorised the most favourable auguries of his success. These were justified by the character of the first volume, which brought the narrative of early discovery to the period of Bobadilla's mission, written in a perspicuous and agreeable style, with such a discriminating selection of incident and skilful arrangement, as convey the most distinct impression to the mind of the reader. Unfortunately, the untimely death of the author crushed his labours in the bud. Their fruits were not wholly lost, however. Señor Navarrete availing himself of them, in connection with those derived from his own extensive investigations, is pursuing in part the plan of Muñoz, by the publication of original documents; and Mr. Irving has completed this design in regard to the early history of Spanish discovery, by the use which he has made of these materials in constructing out of them the noblest monument to the memory of Columbus.



## CHAPTER X.

### ITALIAN WARS.—PARTITION OF NAPLES.—GONSALVO OVERRUNS CALABRIA.

1498—1502.

*Louis XII.'s Designs on Italy—Alarm of the Spanish Court—Bold Conduct of its Minister at Rome—Celebrated Partition of Naples—Gonsalvo sails against the Turks—Success and Cruelties of the French—Gonsalvo invades Calabria—He punishes a Mutiny—His munificent Spirit—He captures Tarento—Seizes the Duke of Calabria.*

DURING the last four years of our narrative, in which the unsettled state of the kingdom and the progress of foreign discovery appeared to demand the whole attention of the sovereigns, a most important revolution was going forward in the affairs of Italy. The death of Charles the Eighth would seem to have dissolved the relations recently arisen between that country and the rest of Europe, and to have restored it to its ancient independence. It might naturally have been expected that France, under her new monarch, who had reached a mature age, rendered still more mature by the lessons he had imbibed in the school of adversity, would feel the folly of reviving ambitious schemes, which had cost so dear and ended so disastrously. Italy, too, it might have been presumed, lacerated and still bleeding at every pore, would have learned the fatal consequence of invoking foreign aid in her domestic quarrels, and of throwing open the gates to a torrent, sure to sweep down friend and foe indiscriminately in its progress. But experience, alas! did not bring wisdom, and passion triumphed as usual.

Louis the Twelfth, on ascending the throne, assumed the titles of duke of Milan and king of Naples, thus unequivocally announcing his intention of asserting his claims, derived through the Visconti family, to the former, and through the Angevin dynasty, to the latter state. His aspiring temper was stimulated rather than satisfied by the martial renown he had acquired in the Italian wars; and he was urged on by the great body of the French chivalry, who, disgusted with a life of inaction, longed for a field where they might win new laurels, and indulge in the joyous license of military adventure.

Unhappily the court of France found ready instruments for its purpose in the profligate politicians of Italy. The Roman pontiff, in particular, Alexander the Sixth, whose criminal

ambition assumes something respectable by contrast with the low vices in which he was habitually steeped, willingly lent himself to a monarch who could so effectually serve his selfish schemes of building up the fortunes of his family. The ancient republic of Venice, departing from her usual sagacious policy, and yielding to her hatred of Ludovico Sforza, and to the lust of territorial acquisition, consented to unite her arms with those of France against Milan, in consideration of a share (not the lion's share) of the spoils of victory. Florence, and many other inferior powers, whether from fear or weakness, or the short-sighted hope of assistance in their petty international feuds, consented either to throw their weight into the same scale, or to remain neutral.(1)

Having thus secured himself from molestation in Italy, Louis the Twelfth entered into negotiations with such other European powers as were most likely to interfere with his designs. The emperor Maximilian, whose relations with Milan would most naturally have demanded his interposition, was deeply entangled in a war with the Swiss. The neutrality of Spain was secured by the treaty of Marcoussis, August 5th, 1498, which settled all the existing differences with that country; and a treaty with Savoy in the following year guaranteed a free passage through her mountain-passes to the French army in Italy.(2)

Having completed these arrangements, Louis lost no time in mustering his forces, which, descending like a torrent on the fair plains of Lombardy, effected the conquest of the entire duchy in little more than a fortnight; and although the prize was snatched for a moment from his grasp, yet French valour and Swiss perfidy soon restored it. The miserable Sforza, the dupe of arts which he had so long practised, was transported into France, where he lingered out the remainder of his days in doleful captivity. He had first called the *barbarians* into Italy, and it was a righteous retribution which made him their earliest victim.(3)

By the conquest of Milan, France now took her place among the Italian powers. A preponderating weight was thus thrown into the scale, which disturbed the ancient political balance, and which, if the projects on Naples should be realised, would wholly annihilate it. These consequences, to which the Italian states seemed strangely insensible, had long been foreseen by the sagacious eye of Ferdinand the Catholic, who watched the movements of his powerful neighbour with the deepest anxiety.

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 4, p. 214, ed. 1645.—Flassan, *Diplomatie Française*, tom. i. pp. 275, 277.

(2) Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iii. pp. 397—400.—Flassan, *Diplomatie Française*, tom. i. p. 279.

(3) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 4, pp. 250—252.—Mémoires de la Trémouille, chap. 19, apud Petitot, *Collection de Mémoires*, tom. xiv.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario de' Successi più importanti* (Firenze, 1583), pp. 26—29.

He had endeavoured, before the invasion of Milan, to awaken the different governments in Italy to a sense of their danger, and to stir them up to some efficient combination against it. (1) Both he and the queen had beheld with disquietude the increasing corruptions of the papal court, and that shameless cupidity and lust of power which made it the convenient tool of the French monarch.

By their orders, Garcilasso de la Vega, the Spanish ambassador, read a letter from his sovereigns in the presence of his holiness, commenting on his scandalous immorality, his invasion of ecclesiastical rights appertaining to the Spanish crown, his schemes of selfish aggrandisement, and especially his avowed purpose of transferring his son, Caesar Borgia, from a sacred to a secular dignity; a circumstance that must necessarily make him, from the manner in which it was to be conducted, the instrument of Louis the Twelfth. (2)

This unsavoury rebuke, which probably lost nothing of its pungency from the tone in which it was delivered, so incensed the pope, that he attempted to seize the paper and tear it in pieces, giving vent at the same time to the most indecent reproaches against the minister and his sovereigns. Garcilasso coolly waited till the storm had subsided, and then replied undauntedly, "That he had uttered no more than became a loyal subject of Castile; that he should never shrink from declaring freely what his sovereigns commanded, or what he conceived to be for the good of Christendom; and, if his holiness were displeased with it, he could dismiss him from his court, where he was convinced, indeed, his residence could be no longer useful." (3)

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 31. Martyr, in a letter written soon after Sforza's recovery of his capital, says that the Spanish sovereigns "could not conceal their joy at the event, such was their jealousy of France."—(*Opus Epist. epist.* 213.) The same sagacious writer, the distance of whose residence from Italy removed him from those political factions and prejudices which clouded the optics of his countrymen, saw with deep regret their coalition with France, the fatal consequences of which he predicted in a letter to a friend in Venice, the former minister at the Spanish court. "The king of France," says he, "after he has dined with the duke of Milan, will come and sup with you."—(*Epist.* 207.) Daru, on the authority of Burchard, refers this remarkable prediction, which time so fully verified, to Sforza, on his quitting his capital.—(*Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. p. 326, 2nd ed.) Martyr's letter, however, is dated some months previously to that event.

(2) Louis XII., for the good offices of the pope in the affair of his divorce from the unfortunate Jeanne of France, promised the uncardinalled Caesar Borgia the duchy of Valence, in Dauphiny, with a rent of 20,000 livres, and a considerable force to support him in his flagitious enterprises against the princes of Romagna.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 4, p. 207.—Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. p. 275. In a letter, written not long after, by the Spanish minister to his sovereigns, he freely comments on the selfish and fickle character of the pope, veiling himself "como suela en las yperisias. Yo no lo puedo sufrir."—*Carta de Garcilasso de la Vega: Roma*, 8 de Nov. 1499, MS.

(3) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 33. Garcilasso de la Vega seems to have possessed little of the courtly and politic address of a

Ferdinand had no better fortune at Venice, where his negotiations were conducted by Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega, an adroit diplomatist, brother of Garcilasso.(1) These negotiations were resumed after the occupation of Milan by the French, when the minister availed himself of the jealousy occasioned by that event to excite a determined resistance to the proposed aggression on Naples. But the republic was too sorely pressed by the Turkish war,—which Sforza, in the hope of creating a diversion in his own favour, had brought on his country,—to allow leisure for other operations. Nor did the Spanish court succeed any better at this crisis with the emperor Maximilian, whose magnificent pretensions were ridiculously contrasted with his limited authority, and still more limited revenues, so scanty, indeed, as to gain him the contemptuous epithet among the Italians of *pochi denari*, or “the Moneyless.” He had conceived himself, indeed, greatly injured, both on the score of his imperial rights, and his connection with Sforza, by the conquest of Milan; but, with the levity and cupidity essential to his character, he suffered himself, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Spanish court, to be bribed into a truce with King Louis, which gave the latter full scope for his meditated enterprise on Naples.(2)

Thus disembarassed of the most formidable means of annoyance, the French monarch went briskly forward with his preparations, the object of which he did not affect to conceal. Frederic, the unfortunate king of Naples, saw himself with dismay now menaced with the loss of empire, before he had time to taste the sweets of it. He knew not where to turn for refuge, in his desolate condition, from the impending storm. His treasury was drained, and his kingdom wasted, by the late war. His subjects, although attached to his person, were too familiar with revolutions to stake their lives or fortunes on the cast. His countrymen, the Italians, were in the interest of his enemy; and his nearest neighbour, the pope, had drawn from personal pique motives for the most deadly hostility.(3) He

diplomatist. In a subsequent audience which the pope gave him together with a special embassy from Castile, his blunt expostulation so much exasperated his holiness, that the latter hinted it would not cost him much to have him thrown into the Tiber. The bold bearing of the Castilian, however, appears to have had its effect; since we find the pope soon after revoking an offensive ecclesiastical provision he had made in Spain, taking occasion at the same time to eulogise the character of the Catholic sovereigns in full consistency.—*Ibid.* lib. 3, cap. 33, 35.

(1) Ovidio has made this cavalier the subject of one of his dialogues.—*Quincagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 44.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 38, 39.—Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. pp. 336, 339, 347.—Muratori, *Annali d'Italia* (Milano, 1820), tom. xiv. pp. 9, 10.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 260.

(3) Alexander VI. had requested the hand of Carlotta, daughter of King Frederic, for his son Cæsar Borgia; but this was a sacrifice at which pride and parental affection alike revolted. The slight was not to be forgiven by the implacable Borgias. Comp. Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3.—

had as little reliance on the king of Spain, his natural ally and kinsman, who, he well knew, had always regarded the crown of Naples as his own rightful inheritance. He resolved, therefore, to apply at once to the French monarch; and he endeavoured to propitiate him by the most humiliating concessions,—the offer of an annual tribute, and the surrender into his hands of some of the principal fortresses in the kingdom. Finding these advances coldly received, he invoked, in the extremity of his distress, the aid of the Turkish sultan, Bajazet, the terror of Christendom, requesting such supplies of troops as should enable him to make head against their common foe. This desperate step produced no other result than that of furnishing the enemies of the unhappy prince with a plausible ground of accusation against him, of which they did not fail to make good use.(1)

The Spanish government in the mean time made the most vivid remonstrances through its resident minister, or agents expressly accredited for the purpose, against the proposed expedition of Louis the Twelfth. It even went so far as to guarantee the faithful discharge of the tribute proffered by the king of Naples.(2) But the reckless ambition of the French monarch, overleaping the barriers of prudence, and indeed of common sense, disdained the fruits of conquest without the name.

Ferdinand now found himself apparently reduced to the alternative of abandoning the prize at once to the French king, or of making battle with him in defence of his royal kinsman. The first of these measures, which would bring a restless and powerful rival on the borders of his Sicilian dominions, was not to be thought of for a moment. The latter, which pledged him a second time to the support of pretensions hostile to his own, was scarcely more palatable. A third expedient suggested itself; the partition of the kingdom, as hinted in the negotiations with Charles the Eighth, by which means the Spanish government, if it could not rescue the whole prize from the grasp of Louis, would at least divide it with him.(3)

Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 4, p. 223. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 22.

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 5, pp. 265, 266. — Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 40. — Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 229. — Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. p. 338.

(2) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* lib. 14, epist. 218.

(3) See Part II. Chapter 3, of this History. Ferdinand, it seems, entertained the thought of visiting Italy in person. This appears from a letter, or rather an elaborate memorial of Garcilasso de la Vega, urging various considerations to dissuade his master from this step. In the course of it he lays open the policy and relative strength of the Italian states, half of whom, at least, he regards as in the interests of France. At the same time he advises the king to carry the war across his own borders into the French territory, and thus, by compelling Louis to withdraw his forces, in part, from Italy, cripple his operations in that country. The letter is full of the suggestions of a shrewd

Instructions were accordingly given to Gralla, the minister at the court of Paris, to sound the government on this head, bringing it forward as his own private suggestion. Care was taken at the same time to secure a party in the French councils to the interests of Ferdinand.(1) The suggestions of the Spanish envoy received additional weight from the report of a considerable armament then equipping in the port of Malaga. Its ostensible purpose was to co-operate with the Venetians in the defence of their possessions in the Levant. Its main object, however, was to cover the coasts of Sicily in any event from the French, and to afford means for prompt action on any point where circumstances might require it. The fleet consisted of about sixty sail, large and small, and carried forces amounting to six hundred horse and four thousand foot, picked men, many of them drawn from the hardy regions of the north, which had been taxed least severely in the Moorish wars.(2)

The command of the whole was intrusted to the Great Captain, Gonsalvo of Cordova, who, since his return home, had fully sustained the high reputation which his brilliant military talents had acquired for him abroad. Numerous volunteers, comprehending the noblest of the young chivalry of Spain, pressed forward to serve under the banner of this accomplished and popular chieftain. Among them may be particularly noticed Diego de Mendoza, son of the grand cardinal, Pedro de la Paz,(3) Gonzalo Pizarro, father of the celebrated adventurer of Peru, and Diego de Paredes, whose personal prowess and feats of extravagant daring furnished many an incredible legend for chronicle and romance. With this gallant armament the Great Captain weighed anchor in the port of Malaga, in May, 1500, designing to touch at Sicily before proceeding against the Turks.(4)

policy, but shows that the writer knew much more of Italian politics than of what was then passing in the cabinets of Paris and Madrid.—Carta de Garcilasso de la Vega: Toledo, 25 de Agosto, 1500, MS.

(1) According to Zurita, Ferdinand secured the services of Guillaume de Poitiers, lord of Clérieux and governor of Paris, by the promise of the city of Cotiers, mortgaged to him in Italy.—(Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 40.) Comines calls the same nobleman "a good sort of a man, qui aisément croit, et pour especial *tels personnages*," meaning King Ferdinand.—Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.

(2) Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. iii. lib. 5, p. 324.—Ulloa, Vita et Fatti dell' Invittissimo Imperatore Carlo V. (Venetia, 1606), fol. 2.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 7.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 225.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 11.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 10, sec. 13.

(3) This cavalier, one of the most valiant captains in the army, was so diminutive in size, that, when mounted, he seemed almost lost in the high demipeak war-saddle then in vogue; which led a wag, according to Brantome, when asked if he had seen Don Pedro de Paz pass that way, to answer, that "he had seen his horse and saddle, but no rider."—Œuvres, tom. i. disc. 9.

(4) Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 217.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 161.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 9.

Meanwhile, the negotiations between France and Spain, respecting Naples, were brought to a close, by a treaty for the equal partition of that kingdom between the two powers, ratified at Granada, November 11th, 1500. This extraordinary document, after enlarging on the unmixed evils flowing from war, and the obligation on all Christians to preserve inviolate the blessed peace bequeathed them by the Saviour, proceeds to state that no other prince, save the kings of France and Aragon, can pretend to a title to the throne of Naples; and as King Frederic, its present occupant, has seen fit to endanger the safety of all Christendom by bringing on it its bitterest enemy the Turks, the contracting parties, in order to rescue it from this imminent peril, and preserve inviolate the bond of peace, agree to take possession of his kingdom and divide it between them. It is then provided, that the northern portion, comprehending the Terra di Lavoro and Abruzzo, be assigned to France, with the title of king of Naples and Jerusalem; and the southern, consisting of Apulia and Calabria, with the title of duke of those provinces, to Spain. The *dogana*, an important duty levied on the flocks of the Capitanate, was to be collected by the officers of the Spanish government, and divided equally with France. Lastly, any inequality between the respective territories was to be so adjusted, that the revenues accruing to each of the parties should be precisely equal. The treaty was to be kept profoundly secret until preparations were completed for the simultaneous occupation of the devoted territory by the combined powers. (1)

Such were the terms of this celebrated compact, by which two European potentates coolly carved out and divided between them the entire dominions of a third, who had given no cause for umbrage, and with whom they were both at that time in perfect peace and amity. Similar instances of political robbery (to call it by the coarse name it merits) have occurred in later times; but never one founded on more flimsy prettexts, or veiled under a more detestable mask of hypocrisy. The principal odium of the transaction has attached to Ferdinand, as the kinsman of the unfortunate king of Naples. His conduct, however, admits of some palliatory considerations that cannot be claimed for Louis.

The Aragonese nation always regarded the bequest of Ferdinand's uncle, Alfonso the Fifth, in favour of his natural offspring, as an unwarrantable and illegal act. The kingdom of Naples had been won by their own good swords, and, as such, was the rightful inheritance of their own princes. Nothing but the domestic troubles of his dominions had prevented John the Second of Aragon, on the decease of his brother, from asserting his claim by arms. His son, Ferdinand the Catholic, had

(1) See the original treaty, apud Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446.

hitherto acquiesced in the usurpation of the bastard branch of his house only from similar causes. On the accession of the present monarch, he had made some demonstrations of vindicating his pretensions to Naples, which, however, the intelligence he received from that kingdom induced him to defer to a more convenient season.(1) But it was deferring, not relinquishing his purpose. In the mean time, he carefully avoided entering into such engagements as should compel him to a different policy by connecting his own interests with those of Frederic; and with this view, no doubt, rejected the alliance, strongly solicited by the latter, of the duke of Calabria, heir apparent to the Neapolitan crown, with his third daughter, the Infanta Maria. Indeed, this disposition of Ferdinand, so far from being dissembled, was well understood by the court of Naples, as is acknowledged by its own historians.(2)

It may be thought that the undisturbed succession of four princes to the throne of Naples, each of whom had received the solemn recognition of the people, might have healed any defects in their original title, however glaring. But it may be remarked, in extenuation of both the French and Spanish claims, that the principles of monarchical succession were but imperfectly settled in that day; that oaths of allegiance were tendered too lightly by the Neapolitans, to carry the same weight as in other nations; and that the prescriptive right derived from possession, necessarily indeterminate, was greatly weakened in this case by the comparatively few years, not more than forty, during which the bastard line of Aragon had occupied the throne,—a period much shorter than that, after which the house of York had in England, a few years before, successfully contested the validity of the Lancastrian title. It should be added, that Ferdinand's views appear to have perfectly corresponded with those of the Spanish nation at large; not one writer of the time, whom I have met with, intimating the slightest doubt of his title to Naples, while not a few insist on it with unnecessary emphasis.(3) It is but fair to state, however, that foreigners, who contemplated the transaction with a more impartial eye, condemned it as inflicting a deep stain on the characters of both potentates. Indeed, something like an apprehension of this, in the parties themselves, may be inferred from their solicitude to deprecate public censure by masking their designs under a pretended zeal for religion.

Before the conferences respecting the treaty were brought to a close, the Spanish armada under Gonsalvo, after a detention

(1) See Part II. Chapter 3, of this History.

(2) Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. 1, lib. 3, cap. 32.

(3) See, in particular, the Doctor Salazar de Mendoza, who exhausts the subject,—and the reader's patience,—in discussing the multifarious grounds of the incontrovertible title of the house of Aragon to Naples.—*Monarquia*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 12—15.



of two months in Sicily, where it was reinforced by two thousand recruits, who had been serving as mercenaries in Italy, held its course for the Morea. (September 21st, 1500.) The Turkish squadron, lying before Napoli di Romania, without waiting Gonsalvo's approach, raised the siege, and retreated precipitately to Constantinople. The Spanish general, then uniting his forces with the Venetians, stationed at Corfu, proceeded at once against the fortified place of St. George, in Cephalonia, which the Turks had lately wrested from the republic.(1)

The town stood high on a rock, in an impregnable position, and was garrisoned by four hundred Turks, all veteran soldiers, prepared to die in its defence. We have not room for the details of this siege, in which both parties displayed unbounded courage and resources, and which was protracted nearly two months under all the privations of famine, and the inclemencies of a cold and stormy winter.(2)

At length, weary with this fatal procrastination, Gonsalvo and the Venetian admiral, Pesaro, resolved on a simultaneous attack on separate quarters of the town. The ramparts had been already shaken by the mining operations of Pedro Navarro, who, in the Italian wars, acquired such terrible celebrity in this department, till then little understood. The Venetian cannon, larger and better served than that of the Spaniards, had opened a practicable breach in the works, which the besieged repaired with such temporary defences as they could. The signal being given at the appointed hour, the two armies made a desperate assault on different quarters of the town, under cover of a murderous fire of artillery. The Turks sustained the attack with dauntless resolution, stopping up the breach with the bodies of their dead and dying comrades, and pouring down volleys of shot, arrows, burning oil and sulphur, and missiles of every kind, on the heads of the assailants. But the desperate energy, as well as the numbers of the latter, proved too strong for them. Some forced the breach, others scaled the ramparts; and, after a short and deadly struggle within the walls, the brave garrison, four-fifths of whom with their commander had fallen, were overpowered, and the victorious banners of St. Jago and St. Mark were planted side by side triumphantly on the towers.(3)

(1) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, tom. i. p. 226.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 9.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 19. Gonsalvo was detained most unexpectedly in Messina, which he had reached July 19, by various embarrassments, enumerated in his correspondence with the sovereigns. The difficulty of obtaining supplies for the troops was among the most prominent. The people of the island showed no good will to the cause. Obstacles multiplied, until it seemed as if they came from the devil himself; *parecen obstaculos del diablo*. Among others, he indicates the coldness of the viceroy. Part of these letters, as usual, is in cipher.—*Cartas á los Reyes Catól. fñas en Messina á 15 y 21 de Setiembre de 1501*, MS.

(2) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, ubi supra.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 14.

(3) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, ubi supra.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*,

The capture of this place, although accomplished at considerable loss, and after a most gallant resistance, by a mere handful of men, was of great service to the Venetian cause; since it was the first check given to the arms of Bajazet, who had filched one place after another from the republic, menacing its whole colonial territory in the Levant. The promptness and efficiency of King Ferdinand's succour to the Venetians gained him high reputation throughout Europe, and precisely of the kind which he most coveted, that of being the zealous defender of the faith; while it formed a favourable contrast to the cold supineness of the other powers of Christendom.

The capture of St. George restored to Venice the possession of Cephalonia; and the Great Captain, having accomplished this important object, returned in the beginning of the following year, 1501, to Sicily. Soon after his arrival there, an embassy waited on him, from the Venetian senate, to express their grateful sense of his services, which they testified by enrolling his name on the golden book as a nobleman of Venice, and by a magnificent present of plate, curious silks and velvets, and a stud of beautiful Turkish horses. Gonsalvo courteously accepted the proffered honours, but distributed the whole of the costly largess, with the exception of a few pieces of plate, among his friends and soldiers.(1)

In the mean while, Louis the Twelfth having completed his preparations for the invasion of Naples, an army consisting of one thousand lances and ten thousand Swiss and Gascon foot, crossed the Alps, and directed its march towards the south (June 1st, 1501). At the same time a powerful armament, under Philip de Ravenstein, with six thousand five hundred additional troops on board, quitted Genoa for the Neapolitan capital. The command of the land forces was given to the Sire d'Aubigny, the same brave and experienced officer who had formerly coped with Gonsalvo in the campaigns of Calabria.(2)

No sooner had D'Aubigny crossed the papal borders, than the French and Spanish ambassadors announced to Alexander the Sixth and the college of cardinals the existence of the treaty for the partition of the kingdom between the sovereigns their masters, requesting his holiness to confirm it, and grant them the investiture of their respective shares. In this very reasonable petition, his holiness, well drilled in the part he was to play, acquiesced without difficulty; declaring himself moved thereto solely by his consideration of the pious intentions of the

cap. 10.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 25.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 167.

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 167.—Quintana, Españoles Célebres, tom. i. p. 246.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 228.—Ullon, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 4.

(2) Jean d'Anton, Histoire de Louys XII. (Paris, 1622), part 1, chap. 44, 47, 48.—Guccicardini, Istoria, tom. i. p. 265.—Saint Gelais, Histoire de Louys XII. (Paris, 1622), p. 163.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 46.

parties, and the unworthiness of King Frederic, whose treachery to the Christian commonwealth had forfeited all right (if he ever possessed any) to the crown of Naples.(1)

From the moment that the French forces had descended into Lombardy, the eyes of all Italy were turned with breathless expectation on Gonsalvo, and his army in Sicily. The bustling preparations of the French monarch had diffused the knowledge of his designs throughout Europe. Those of the king of Spain, on the contrary, remained enveloped in profound secrecy. Few doubted that Ferdinand would step forward to shield his kinsman from the invasion which menaced him, and, it might be, his own dominions in Sicily; and they looked to the immediate junction of Gonsalvo with King Frederic, in order that their combined strength might overpower the enemy before he had gained a footing in the kingdom. Great was their astonishment when the scales dropped from their eyes, and they beheld the movements of Spain in perfect accordance with those of France, and directed to crush their common victim between them. They could scarcely credit, says Guicciardini, that Louis the Twelfth could be so blind as to reject the proffered vassalage and substantial sovereignty of Naples, in order to share it with so artful and dangerous a rival as Ferdinand.(2)

The unfortunate Frederic, who had been advised for some time past of the unfriendly dispositions of the Spanish government,(3) saw no refuge from the dark tempest mustering against him on the opposite quarters of his kingdom. He collected such troops as he could, however, in order to make battle with the nearest enemy before he should cross the threshold. On the 28th of June the French army resumed its march. Before quitting Rome, a brawl arose between some French soldiers and the Spaniards resident in the capital; each party asserting the paramount right of its own sovereign to the crown of Naples. From words they soon came to blows, and many lives were lost before the fray could be quelled; a melancholy augury for the permanence of the concord so unrighteously established between the two governments.(4)

On the 8th of July, the French crossed the Neapolitan frontier. Frederic, who had taken post at St. Germano, found himself so weak that he was compelled to give way on its approach, and

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 43.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 14.

(2) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 266.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 8.

(3) In the month of April the king of Naples received letters from his envoys in Spain, written by command of King Ferdinand, informing him that he had nothing to expect from that monarch in case of an invasion of his territories by France. Frederic bitterly complained of the late hour at which this intelligence was given, which effectually prevented an accommodation he might otherwise have made with King Louis.—Lanuza, *Historias*, lib. i. cap. 14.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 37.

(4) D'Anton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part i. chap. 43.

retreat on his capital. The invaders went forward, occupying one place after another with little resistance, till they came before Capua, where they received a temporary check. During a parley for the surrender of that place, they burst into the town, and giving free scope to their fiendish passions, butchered seven thousand citizens in the streets, and perpetrated outrages worse than death on their defenceless wives and daughters. It was on this occasion that Alexander the Sixth's son, the infamous Cæsar Borgia, selected forty of the most beautiful from the principal ladies of the place, and sent them back to Rome, to swell the complement of his seraglio. The dreadful doom of Capua intimidated further resistance, but inspired such detestation of the French throughout the country, as proved of infinite prejudice to their cause in their subsequent struggle with the Spaniards.(1)

King Frederic, shocked at bringing such calamities on his subjects, resigned his capital without a blow in its defence, and, retreating to the isle of Ischia, soon after embraced the counsel of the French admiral Ravenstein, to accept a safe-conduct into France, and throw himself on the generosity of Louis. (Oct. 1501.) The latter received him courteously, and assigned him the duchy of Anjou with an ample revenue for his maintenance, which, to the credit of the French king, was continued after he had lost all hope of recovering the crown of Naples.(2) With this show of magnanimity, however, he kept a jealous eye on his royal guest; under pretence of paying him the greatest respect, he placed a guard over his person, and thus detained him in a sort of honourable captivity to the day of his death, which occurred soon after, in 1504.

Frederic was the last of the illegitimate branch of Aragon who held the Neapolitan sceptre; a line of princes who, whatever might be their characters in other respects, accorded that munificent patronage to letters which sheds a ray of glory over the roughest and most turbulent reign. It might have been expected that an amiable and accomplished prince, like Frederic, would have done still more towards the moral development of his people, by healing the animosities which had so long festered in their bosoms. His gentle character, however, was ill suited to the evil times on which he had fallen; and it is not improbable that he found greater contentment in the calm and cultivated retirement of his latter years, sweetened by the sympathies of friendship which adversity had proved,(3) than when placed

(1) Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 4.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 1, chap. 51—54.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 8.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, pp. 268, 269.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 41.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3.

(2) St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 153.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 1, chap. 56.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. p. 541.

(3) The reader will readily call to mind the Neapolitan poet Sannazaro, whose fidelity to his royal master forms so beautiful a contrast with the con-

on the dazzling heights which attract the admiration and envy of mankind.(1)

Early in March, Gonsalvo of Cordova had received his first official intelligence of the partition treaty, and of his own appointment to the post of lieutenant-general of Calabria and Apulia. He felt natural regret at being called to act against a prince whose character he esteemed, and with whom he had once been placed in the most intimate and friendly relations. In the true spirit of chivalry, he returned to Frederic, before taking up arms against him, the duchy of St. Angelo, and the other large domains with which that monarch had requited his services in the late war, requesting at the same time to be released from his obligations of homage and fealty. The generous monarch readily complied with the latter part of his request, but insisted on his retaining the grant, which he declared an inadequate compensation, after all, for the benefits the Great Captain had once rendered him.(2)

The levies assembled at Messina amounted to three hundred heavy-armed, three hundred light horse, and three thousand eight hundred infantry, together with a small body of Spanish veterans, which the Castilian ambassador had collected in Italy. The number of the forces was inconsiderable; but they were in excellent condition, well disciplined, and seasoned to all the toils and difficulties of war. On the fifth of July, the Great Captain landed at Tropea, and commenced the conquest of Calabria, ordering the fleet to keep along the coast, in order to furnish whatever supplies he might need. The ground was familiar to him, and his progress was facilitated by the old relations he had formed there, as well as by the important posts which the Spanish government had retained in its hands as an indemnification for the expenses of the late war. Notwithstanding the opposition or coldness of the great Angevin lords who resided in this quarter, the entire occupation of the two Calabrias, with the exception of Tarento, was effected in less than a month.(3)

This city, remarkable in ancient times for its defence against Hannibal, was of the last importance. King Frederic had duct of Pontano, and indeed of too many of his tribe, whose gratitude is of that sort that will only rise above zero in the sunshine of a court. His various poetical effusions afford a noble testimony to the virtues of his unfortunate sovereign, the more unassuming as many of them were produced in the days of his adversity.

(1) "Neque mala vel bona," says the philosophic Roman, "quæ vulgus putet; multos, qui condituri adversis videantur, beatos; ac plerosque, quamquam magnas per opes, miserrimos; si illi gravem fortunam constantè tolerant, hi prospera inconsultè utantur."—Tacitus, *Annales*, lib. 6, sect. 22.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 35.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 236.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 21.—Ianuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 14.

(3) Abarca, *Reyes de Aragón*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 11, sec. 8.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 44.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 9.

sent thither his eldest son, the duke of Calabria, a youth about fourteen years of age, under the care of Juan de Guayara, count of Potenza, with a strong body of troops, considering it the place of greatest security in his dominions. Independently of the strength of its works, it was rendered nearly inaccessible by its natural position; having no communication with the mainland except by two bridges, at opposite quarters of the town, commanded by strong towers, while its exposure to the sea made it easily open to supplies from abroad.

Gonsalvo saw that the only method of reducing the place must be by blockade. Disagreeable as the delay was, he prepared to lay regular siege to it, ordering the fleet to sail round the southern point of Calabria, and blockado the port of Tarento, while he throw up works on the land side, which commanded the passes to the town, and cut off its communications with the neighbouring country. The place, however, was well victualled, and the garrison prepared to maintain it to the last.(1)

Nothing tries more severely the patience and discipline of the soldier than a life of sluggish inaction, unenlivened, as in the present instance, by any of the rencontres, or feats of arms, which keep up military excitement, and gratify the cupidity or ambition of the warrior. The Spanish troops, cooped up within their intrenchments, and disgusted with the languid monotony of their life, cast many a wistful glance to the stirring scenes of war in the centre of Italy, where Cæsar Borgia held out magnificent promises of pay and plunder to all who embarked in his adventurous enterprises. He courted the aid, in particular, of the Spanish veterans, whose worth he well understood, for they had often served under his banner in his feuds with the Italian princes. In consequence of these inducements, some of Gonsalvo's men were found to desert every day; while those who remained were becoming hourly more discontented, from the large arrears due from the government; for Ferdinand, as already remarked, conducted his operations with a stinted economy, very different from the prompt and liberal expenditure of the queen, always competent to his object.(2)

A trivial incident, at this time, swelled the popular discon-

(1) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 231.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 9.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3.—*Chronica del Gran Capitán*, cap. 31.

(2) Carta de Gonzalo á los Reyes, Tarento, 10 de Mayo, 1502, MS. Don Juan Manuel, the Spanish minister at Vienna, seems to have been fully sensible of this trait of his master. He told the emperor Maximilian, who had requested the loan of 300,000 ducats from Spain, that it was as much money as would suffice King Ferdinand for the conquest, not merely of Italy, but Africa into the bargain.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 42.

tent into mutiny. The French fleet, after the capture of Naples, was ordered to the Levant to assist the Venetians against the Turks. Ravenstein, ambitious of eclipsing the exploits of the Great Captain, turned his arms against Mitilene, with the design of recovering it for the republic. He totally failed in the attack, and his fleet was soon after scattered by a tempest, and his own ship wrecked on the isle of Cerigo. He subsequently found his way, with several of his principal officers, to the shores of Calabria, where he landed in the most forlorn and desperate plight. Gonsalvo, touched with his misfortunes, no sooner learned his necessities, than he sent him abundant supplies of provisions, adding a service of plate, and a variety of elegant apparel for himself and followers; consulting his own munificent spirit in this, much more than the limited state of his finances.(1)

This excessive liberality was very inopportune. The soldiers loudly complained that their general found treasures to squander on foreigners, while his own troops were defrauded of their pay. The Biscayans, a people of whom Gonsalvo used to say, "he had rather be a lion-keeper than undertake to govern them," took the lead in the tumult. It soon swelled into open insurrection; and the men, forming themselves into regular companies, marched to the general's quarters and demanded payment of their arrears. One fellow, more insolent than the rest, levelled a pike at his breast with the most angry and menacing looks. Gonsalvo, however, retaining his self-possession, gently put it aside, saying, with a good-natured smile, "Higher, you careless knave, lift your lance higher, or you will run me through in your jesting." As he was reiterating his assurances of the want of funds, and his confident expectation of speedily obtaining them, a Biscayan captain called out, "Send your daughter to the brothel, and that will soon put you in funds!" This was a favourite daughter named Elvira, whom Gonsalvo loved so tenderly, that he would not part with her, even in his campaigns. Although stung to the heart by this audacious taunt, he made no reply; but without changing a muscle of his countenance, continued, in the same tone as before, to expostulate with the insurgents, who at length were prevailed on to draw off, and disperse to their quarters. The next morning the appalling spectacle of the lifeless body of the Biscayan, hanging by the neck from a window of the house in which he had been quartered, admonished the army that there were limits to the general's forbearance it was not prudent to overstep.(2)

(1) Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. iii. lib. 6, p. 368.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 232.—D'Auton, part 1, chap. 71, 72.

(2) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 34.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 252, 253.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 232. The turbulent character of the Biscayans is noticed by the Great Captain in a letter, of somewhat earlier date, to the secretary Almazan.—Carta, 16 de Abril, 1501. MS.

An unexpected event, which took place at this juncture, contributed even more than this monitory lesson to restore subordination to the army. This was the capture of a Genoese galleon with a valuable freight, chiefly iron, bound to some Turkish port, as it was said, in the Levant; which Gonsalvo, moved no doubt by his zeal for the Christian cause, ordered to be seized by the Spanish cruisers; and the cargo to be disposed of for the satisfaction of his troops. Giovio charitably excuses this act of hostility against a friendly power with the remark, that "when the Great Captain did anything contrary to law, he was wont to say, 'A general must secure the victory at all hazards, right or wrong: and when he has done this, he can compensate those whom he has injured with tenfold benefits.'"(1)

The unexpected length of the siege of Tarento determined Gonsalvo at length to adopt bolder measures for quickening its termination. The city, whose insulated position has been noticed, was bounded on the north by a lake, or rather arm of the sea, forming an excellent interior harbour, about eighteen miles in circumference. The inhabitants, trusting to the natural defences of this quarter, had omitted to protect it by fortifications, and the houses rose abruptly from the margin of the basin. Into this reservoir the Spanish commander resolved to transport such of his vessels then riding in the outer bay, as from their size could be conveyed across the narrow isthmus which divided it from the inner.

After incredible toil, twenty of the smallest craft were moved on huge cars and rollers across the intervening land, and safely launched on the bosom of the lake. The whole operation was performed amid the exciting accompaniments of discharges of ordnance, strains of martial music, and loud acclamations of the soldiery. The inhabitants of Tarento saw with consternation the fleet so lately floating in the open ocean under their impregnable walls, now quitting its native element, and moving, as it were by magic, across the land, to assault them on the quarter where they were the least defended.(2)

The Neapolitan commander perceived it would be impossible to hold out longer, without compromising the personal safety of the young prince under his care. He accordingly entered into negotiations for a truce with the Great Captain, during which articles of capitulation were arranged, guaranteeing to the duke of Calabria and his followers the right of evacuating the place and going wherever they listed. The Spanish general,

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 243.

(2) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, ubi supra.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 33. Gonsalvo took the hint for this, doubtless, from Hannibal's similar expedient.—(See Polybius, lib. 8.) Cæsar notices a similar manœuvre, executed by him in his wars in Spain. The vessels which he caused to be transported, however, across twenty miles of land, were much inferior in size to those of Gonsalvo.—*De Bello Civili*, lib. 1, cap. 54.



in order to give greater solemnity to these engagements, bound himself to observe them by an oath on the sacrament.(1)

On the 1st of March, 1502, the Spanish army took possession, according to agreement, of the city of Tarento; and the duke of Calabria with his suite was permitted to leave it, in order to rejoin his father in France. In the mean time, advices were received from Ferdinand the Catholic, instructing Gonsalvo on no account to suffer the young prince to escape from his hands, as he was a pledge of too great importance for the Spanish government to relinquish. The general in consequence sent after the duke, who had proceeded in company with the count of Potenza as far as Bitonto, on his way to the north, and commanded him to be arrested and brought back to Tarento. Not long after, he caused him to be conveyed on board one of the men-of-war in the harbour, and, in contempt of his solemn engagements, sent a prisoner to Spain.(2)

The national writers have made many awkward attempts to varnish over this atrocious act of perfidy in their favourite hero. Zurita vindicates it by a letter from the Neapolitan prince to Gonsalvo, requesting the latter to take this step, since he preferred a residence in Spain to one in France, but could not with decency appear to act in opposition to his father's wishes on the subject. If such a letter, however, were really obtained from the prince, his tender years would entitle it to little weight, and of course it would afford no substantial ground for justification. Another explanation is offered by Paolo Giovio, who states that the Great Captain, undetermined what course to adopt, took the opinion of certain learned jurists. This sage body decided "that Gonsalvo was not bound by his oath, since it was repugnant to his paramount obligations to his master; and that the latter was not bound by it, since it was made without his privity!"(3) The man who trusts

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 52, 53.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 270.—Giamonte, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*, tom. xiv. p. 14. The various authorities differ more irreconcilably than usual in the details of the siege. I have followed Paolo Giovio, a contemporary, and personally acquainted with the principal actors. All agree in the only fact in which one would willingly see some discrepancy, Gonsalvo's breach of faith to the young duke of Calabria.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 56.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 11, sec. 10—12.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 9.—Lanuza, *Historias*, lib. 1, cap. 14.—Martyr, who was present on the young prince's arrival at court, where he experienced the most honourable reception, speaks of him in the highest terms: "Adolescens namque est et regno et regio sanguine dignus, miræ indolis, formæ egregius."—(See *Opus Epist.* epist. 252.) He survived to the year 1550, but without ever quitting Spain, contrary to the fond prediction of his friend Sannazaro:

"Nam mihi, nam tempus veniet, cum reddita sceptræ  
Parthenopes, fractosque tuâ sub cuspidè reges,  
Ipse canani."—*Opera Latina*, *Ecloga* 4.

(3) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 4, cap. 58.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust.*

his honour to the tampering of casuists, has parted with it already.(1)

The only palliation of the act must be sought in the prevalent laxity and corruption of the period, which is rife with examples of the most flagrant violation of both public and private faith. Had this been the act of a Sforza indeed, or a Borgia, it could not reasonably have excited surprise. But coming from one of a noble, magnanimous nature, like Gonsalvo, exemplary in private life, and unstained with any of the grosser vices of the age, it excited general astonishment and reprobation, even among his contemporaries. It has left a reproach on his name, which the historian may regret, but cannot wipe away.

Virorum, lib. i. p. 234. — Mariana coolly disposes of Gonsalvo's treachery with the remark, "No parece se le guardo lo que tenian asentado. En la guerra quien hay que de todo punto lo guarde?"—(Hist. de España, tom. ii. p. 675.)

"Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?"

(1) In Gonsalvo's correspondence is a letter to the sovereigns, written soon after the occupation of Tarento, in which he mentions his efforts to secure the duke of Calabria in the Spanish interests. He speaks with confidence of his own ascendancy over the young man's mind, and assures the sovereigns that the latter will be content to continue with him till he shall receive instructions from Spain, how to dispose of him. At the same time the Great Captain took care to maintain a *surveillance* over the duke, by means of the attendants on his person. We find no allusion to any promises under oath. The communication is too brief to clear up the difficulties in this dark transaction. As coming from Gonsalvo himself, the document has great interest, and I will give it to the reader in the original: "A vuestras altezas he dado aviso de la entrada de las vanderas e gente de vuestras altezas por la gracia de nuestro Señor en Tarento el primero día de Marzo, e así en la plática que estava con el duque Don Ferrando de ponerse al servicio y amparo de vuestras altezas syn otro partido ny ofrecimiento demas de certificarle que en todo tiempo sería libre para yr donde quisiere sy vuestras altezas bien no le tratasen, y que vuestras altezas le ternian el respeto que a tal persona como el se deve. El conde de Potencia e algunos de los que estan ceerca del han trabajado por apartarle de este proposito e llevarle a Isrila así yo por muchos modos he procurado de Reducirle al servicio de vuestras altezas, y tengole en tal termino que puedo certificar a vuestras altezas que este mozo no les saldra de la mano con consenso suyo del servicio de vuestras altezas, as fa tanto que vuestras altezas me enhen a mandar como del he de disponer e de lo que con el se ha de facer, y por los contrastes que en esto han cntrevenido no ha salido de Taranto porque así ha convenido. El viernes que sera once de Marzo saldra a Castellaneta que es quince millas de aqui con algunos destos suyos que le quieren seguir con alguna buena parte de compañía destos criados de vuestras altezas para acompañarle, y este mismo día viernes entrar así las vanderas e gente de vuestras altezas en el castillo de Taranto con ayuda de nuestro Señor."

## CHAPTER XI.

ITALIAN WARS.—RUPTURE WITH FRANCE.—GONSALVO  
 BESIEGED IN BARLETTA.

1502—1503.

Rupture between the French and Spaniards—Gonsalvo retires to Barletta—Chivalrous Character of the War—Tourney near Trani—Duel between Bayard and Sotomayor—Distress of Barletta—Constancy of the Spaniards—Gonsalvo storms and takes Ruvo—Prepares to leave Barletta.

It was hardly to be expected that the partition treaty between France and Spain, made so manifestly in contempt of all good faith, would be maintained any longer than suited the convenience of the respective parties. The French monarch, indeed, seems to have prepared, from the first, to dispense with it so soon as he had secured his own moiety of the kingdom; (1) and sagacious men at the Spanish court inferred that King Ferdinand would do as much, when he should be in a situation to assert his claims with success. (2)

It was altogether improbable, whatever might be the good faith of the parties, that an arrangement could long subsist, which so rudely rent asunder the members of this ancient monarchy; or that a thousand points of collision should not arise between rival hosts, lying as it were on their arms within bowshot of each other, and in view of the rich spoil which each regarded as its own. Such grounds for rupture did occur, sooner probably than either party had foreseen, and certainly before the king of Aragon was prepared to meet it.

The immediate cause was the extremely loose language of the partition treaty, which assumed such a geographical division of the kingdom into four provinces as did not correspond

(1) Peter Martyr, in a letter written from Venice, while detained there on his way to Alexandria, speaks of the efforts made by the French emissaries to induce the republic to break with Spain, and to support their master in his designs on Naples. "*Adsunt namque a Ludovico rege Gallorum oratores, qui omni nixu conantur a vobis Venetorum animos avertere. Fremere dentibus aiunt oratorem primarium Gallum, quia nequeat per Venetorum suffragia consequi, ut aperte vobis hostilitatem edicant, utque velint Gallis regno Parthenopeo contra vestra præsidia ferre suppetias.*" The letter is dated October 1st, 1501.—*Opus Epist. epist. 231.*

(2) Martyr, after noticing the grounds of the partition treaty, comments with his usual shrewdness on the politic views of the Spanish sovereigns: "*Facilius namque se sperant, eam partem, quam sibi Galli sortiti sunt, habituros aliquando, quam si universum regnum occuparint.*"—*Opus Epist. epist. 218.*

with any ancient division, and still less with the modern, by which the number was multiplied to twelve.(1) The central portion, comprehending the Capitanate, the Basilicate, and the Principality, became debatable ground between the parties, each of whom insisted on these as forming an integral part of its own moiety. The French had no ground whatever for contesting the possession of the Capitanate, the first of these provinces, and by far the most important, on account of the tolls paid by the numerous flocks which descended every winter into its sheltered valleys from the snow-covered mountains of Abruzzo.(2) There was more uncertainty to which of the parties the two other provinces were meant to be assigned. It is scarcely possible that language so loose, in a matter requiring mathematical precision, should have been unintentional.

Before Gonsalvo de Cordova had completed the conquest of the southern moiety of the kingdom, and while lying before Tarento, he received intelligence of the occupation by the French of several places, both in the Capitanate and Basilicate. He detached a body of troops for the protection of these countries, and, after the surrender of Tarento, marched towards the north to cover them with his whole army. As he was not in a condition for immediate hostilities, however, he entered into negotiations, which, if attended with no other advantage, would at least gain him time.(3)

The pretensions of the two parties, as might have been expected, were too irreconcilable to admit of compromise; and a personal conference between the respective commanders-in-chief (April 1st, 1502) led to no better arrangement, than that each should retain his present acquisitions till explicit instructions could be received from their respective courts.

But neither of the two monarchs had further instructions to give; and the Catholic king contented himself with admonishing his general to postpone an open rupture as long as possible.

(1) The Italian historians, who have investigated the subject with some parade of erudition, treat it so vaguely as to leave it, after all, nearly as perplexed as they found it. Giovio includes the Capitanate in Apulia, according to the ancient division; Guicciardini according to the modern; and the Spanish historian Mariana, according to both. The last writer, it may be observed, discusses the matter with equal learning and candour, and more perspicuity than either of the preceding. He admits reasonable grounds for doubt to which moiety of the kingdom the Basilicate and Principalities should be assigned.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. p. 670.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 5, pp. 274, 275.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 234, 235.

(2) The provision of the partition treaty, that the Spaniards should collect the tolls paid by the flocks on their descent from the French district of Abruzzo into the Capitanate, is conclusive evidence of the intention of the contracting parties to assign the latter to Spain. See the treaty apud Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446.

(3) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 52.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 12.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 10.—Gonsalvo, in his account of these transactions to the sovereigns, notices "the intemperate language and bearing" both of the viceroy and Alègre. This part of the letter is in cipher.—Carta de Tarento, 10 de Marzo, 1502. MS.

that the government might have time to provide more effectually for his support, and strengthen itself by alliance with other European powers. But, however pacific may have been the disposition of the generals, they had no power to control the passions of their soldiers, who, thus brought into immediate contact, glared on each other with the ferocity of bloodhounds, ready to slip the leash which held them in temporary check. Hostilities soon broke out along the lines of the two armies, the blame of which each nation charged on its opponent. There seems good ground, however, for imputing it to the French; since they were altogether better prepared for war than the Spaniards; and entered into it so heartily as not only to assail places in the debatable ground, but in Apulia, which had been unequivocally assigned to their rivals.(1)

In the mean while, the Spanish court fruitlessly endeavoured to interest the other powers of Europe in its cause. The emperor Maximilian, although dissatisfied with the occupation of Milan by the French, appeared wholly engrossed with the frivolous ambition of a Roman coronation. The pontiff and his son, Caesar Borgia, were closely bound to King Louis by the assistance which he had rendered them in their marauding enterprises against the neighbouring chiefs of Romagna. The other Italian princes, although deeply incensed and disgusted by this infamous alliance, stood too much in awe of the colossal power which had planted its foot so firmly on their territory, to offer any resistance. Venice alone, surveying from her distant watch-tower, to borrow the words of Peter Martyr, the whole extent of the political horizon, appeared to hesitate. The French ambassadors loudly called on her to fulfil the terms of her late treaty with their master, and support him in his approaching quarrel; but that wily republic saw with distrust the encroaching ambition of her powerful neighbour, and secretly wished that a counterpoise might be found in the success of Aragon. Martyr, who stopped at Venice on his return from Egypt, appeared before the senate (October, 1501), and employed all his eloquence in supporting his master's cause in opposition to the French envoys; but his pressing entreaties to the Spanish sovereigns to send thither some competent person, as a resident minister, show his own conviction of the critical position in which their affairs stood.(2)

(1) D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, part 2, chap. 3—7.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 60, 62, 64, 65.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, tom. i. p. 236.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4. Bernaldez states, that the Great Captain, finding his conference with the French general ineffectual, proposed to the latter to decide the quarrel between their respective nations by single combat. (*Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 167.) We should require some other authority, however, than that of the good Curate to vouch for this romantic flight, so entirely out of keeping with the Spanish general's character, in which prudence was probably the most conspicuous attribute.

(2) Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. p. 345.—Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. i. lib. 6.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 238, 240, 252. This may appear

The letters of the same intelligent individual, during his journey through the Milanese,(1) are filled with the most gloomy forebodings of the termination of a contest for which the Spaniards were so indifferently provided; while the whole north of Italy was alive with the bustling preparations of the French, who loudly vaunted their intentions of driving their enemy not merely out of Naples, but Sicily itself.(2)

Louis the Twelfth superintended these preparations in person; and, to be near the theatre of operations, crossed the Alps, and took up his quarters at Asti. (July 1602.) At length, all being in readiness, he brought things to an immediate issue, by commanding his general to proclaim war at once against the Spaniards, unless they abandoned the Capitanate in four-and-twenty hours.(3)

The French forces in Naples amounted, according to their own statements, to one thousand men-at-arms, three thousand five hundred French and Lombard; and three thousand Swiss infantry, in addition to the Neapolitan levies raised by the Angevin lords throughout the kingdom. The command was intrusted to the duke of Nemours, a brave and chivalrous young nobleman of the ancient house of Armagnac, whose family connections more than talents had raised to the perilous post of viceroy, over the head of the veteran D'Aubigny. The latter would have thrown up his commission in disgust, but for the remonstrances of his sovereign, who prevailed on him to remain where his counsels were more than ever necessary to supply the inexperience of the young commander. The jealousy

strange, considering that Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega was there, a person of whom Gonzalo de Oviedo writes, "Fué gentil caballero, é sabio, é de gran prudencia; \* \* \* \* muy entendido é de mucho reposo é honesto é afable é de linda conversacion;" and again, more explicitly, "Embaxador á Venecia, en el qual oficio sirvio muy bien, é como prudente varon." (Quinagencas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 44.) Martyr admits his prudence, but objects his ignorance of Latin; a deficiency, however heinous in the worthy tutor's eyes, probably of no rare occurrence among the elder Castilian nobles.

(1) Many of Martyr's letters were addressed to both Ferdinand and Isabella. The former, however, was ignorant of the Latin language, in which they were written. Martyr playfully alludes to this in one of his epistles, reminding the queen of her promise to interpret them faithfully to her husband. The unconstrained and familiar tone of his correspondence affords a pleasing example of the personal intimacy to which the sovereigns, so contrary to the usual stiffness of Spanish etiquette, admitted men of learning and probity at their court, without distinction of rank.—Opus Epist. epist. 230.

(2) "Galli," says Martyr, in a letter more remarkable for strength of expression, than elegance of Latinity, "furunt, sæviunt, interneclonem nostris miuantur, putantque id sibi fore facillimum. Regem eorum esse in itinere, inquietum, ut ipse eum duplicato exercitu Alpes trajiciat in Italiam. Vestro nomini insurgunt. Cristas erigunt in vos superbissimè. Provinciam hanc, veluti rem humilem, parvique momenti, se aggressuros præconantur. Nihil esse negotii eradicare exterminareque vestra præsidia ex utrâque Sicilia blacterant. Insolenter nimis expuendo insultant."—Opus Epist. epist. 241.

(3) D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII. part 2, chap. 8.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, pp. 274, 275.—Buonaeorsii, Diario, p. 61.

and wilfulness of the latter, however, defeated these intentions; and the misunderstanding of the chiefs, extending to their followers, led to a fatal want of concert in their movements.

With these officers were united some of the best and bravest of the French chivalry; among whom may be noticed Jacques de Chabannes, more commonly known as the Sire de la Palice, a favourite of Louis the Twelfth, and well entitled to be so by his deserts; Louis d'Ars; Ives d'Alègre, brother of the Précy who gained so much renown in the wars of Charles the Eighth; and Pierre de Bayard, the knight "sans peur en sans reproche," who was then entering on the honourable career in which he seemed to realise all the imaginary perfections of chivalry. (1)

Notwithstanding the small numbers of the French force, the Great Captain was in no condition to cope with them. He had received no reinforcement from home since he first landed in Calabria. His little corps of veterans was destitute of proper clothing and equipments, and the large arrears due to them made the tenure of their obedience extremely precarious. (2) Since affairs began to assume their present menacing aspect, he had been busily occupied with drawing together the detachments posted in various parts of Calabria, and concentrating them on the town of Atella, in the Basilicate, where he had established his own quarters. He had also opened a correspondence with the barons of the Aragonese faction, who were most numerous as well as most powerful in the northern section of the kingdom, which had been assigned to the French. He was particularly fortunate in gaining over the two Colonnas, whose authority, powerful connections, and large military experience, proved of inestimable value to him. (3)

With all the resources he could command, however, Gonsalvo found himself, as before noticed, unequal to the contest, though it was impossible to defer it, after the peremptory summons of the French viceroy to surrender the Capitanate. To this he unhe-

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, p. 265.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 1, chap. 57.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. pp. 221—223.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 169. Brantôme has introduced sketches of most of the French captains mentioned in the text into his admirable gallery of national portraits.—See *Vies des Hommes Illustres*, *Œuvres*, tom. ii. and iii.

(2) Martyr's epistles at this crisis are filled with expostulation, argument, and entreaties to the sovereigns, begging them to rouse from their apathy, and take measures to secure the wavering affections of Venice, as well as to send more effectual aid to their Italian troops. Ferdinand listened to the first of these suggestions, but showed a strange insensibility to the last.

(3) Carta de Gonzalo á los Reyes, Tarento, 10 de Marzo, 1502, MS.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 4, cap. 62, 65.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 230. Prospero Colonna, in particular, was distinguished not only for his military science, but his fondness for letters and the arts, of which he is commemorated by Tiraboschi as a munificent patron.—(*Letteratura Italiana*, tom. viii. p. 77.) Paolo Giovio has introduced his portrait among the effigies of illustrious men, who, it must be confessed, are more indebted in his work to the hand of the historian than the artist.—*Elogia Virorum bellicâ Virtute Illustrium* (Basilæ, 1578), lib. 5.

sitatingly answered, that "the Capitanate belonged of right to his own master; and that, with the blessing of God, he would make good its defence against the French king, or any other who should invade it."

Notwithstanding the bold front put on his affairs, however, he did not choose to abide the assault of the French in his present position. He instantly drew off with the greater part of his force to Barletta, a fortified seaport on the confines of Apulia, on the Adriatic, the situation of which would enable him either to receive supplies from abroad, or to effect a retreat, if necessary, on board the Spanish fleet, which still kept the coast of Calabria. The remainder of his army he distributed in Bari, Andria, Canosa, and other adjacent towns; where he confidently hoped to maintain himself till the arrival of reinforcements, which he solicited in the most pressing manner from Spain and Sicily, should enable him to take the field on more equal terms against his adversary. (1) ^

The French officers, in the mean time, were divided in opinion as to the best mode of conducting the war. Some were for besieging Bari, held by the illustrious and unfortunate Isabella of Aragon; (2) others, in a more chivalrous spirit, opposed the attack of a place defended by a female, and advised an immediate assault on Barletta itself, whose old and dilapidated works might easily be forced, if it did not at once surrender. The duke of Nemours, deciding on a middle course, determined to invest the last-mentioned town; and, cutting off all communication with the surrounding country, to reduce it by regular blockade. This plan was unquestionably the least eligible of all, as it would allow time for the enthusiasm of the French, the *furia Francese*, as it was called in Italy, which carried them victorious over so many obstacles, to evaporate, while it brought into play the stern resolve, the calm, unflinching endurance, which distinguished the Spanish soldier. (3)

One of the first operations of the French viceroy was the siege of Canosa (July 2, 1502), a strongly-fortified place west of Barletta, garrisoned by six hundred picked men under the engineer Pedro Navarro. The defence of the place justified the reputation of this gallant soldier. He beat off two successive assaults of the enemy, led on by Bayard, La Palioe, and

(1) D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, chap. 8.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 10.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 42.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. p. 541.

(2) This beautiful and high-spirited lady, whose fate has led Boccacini, in his whimsical satire of the "Ragguagli di Parnasso," to call her the most unfortunate female on record, had seen her father, Alfonso II., and her husband, Galeazzo Sforza, driven from their thrones by the French, while her son still remained in captivity in their hands. No wonder they revolted from accumulating new woes on her devoted head.

(3) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 237.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, pp. 282, 283.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 14.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 249.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 168.



the flower of their chivalry. He had prepared to sustain a third, resolved to bury himself under the ruins of the town rather than surrender. But Gonsalvo, unable to relieve it, commanded him to make the best terms he could, saying, "the place was of far less value than the lives of the brave men who defended it." Navarro found no difficulty in obtaining an honourable capitulation; and the little garrison, dwindled to one-third of its original number, marched out through the enemy's camp, with colours flying and music playing, as if in derision of the powerful force it had so nobly kept at bay.<sup>(1)</sup>

After the capture of Canosa, D'Aubigny, whose misunderstanding with Nemours still continued, was dispatched with a small force into the south, to overrun the two Calabrias. The viceroy, in the mean while, having fruitlessly attempted the reduction of several strong places held by the Spaniards in the neighbourhood of Barletta, endeavoured to straiten the garrison there by desolating the surrounding country, and sweeping off the flocks and herds which grazed in its fertile pastures. The Spaniards, however, did not remain idle within their defences, but, sallying out in small detachments, occasionally retrieved the spoil from the hands of the enemy, or annoyed him with desultory attacks, ambuscades, and other irregular movements of *guerilla* warfare, in which the French were comparatively unpractised.<sup>(2)</sup>

The war now began to assume many of the romantic features of that of Granada. The knights on both sides, not content with the usual military rencontres, defied one another to jousts and tourneys, eager to establish their prowess in the noble exercises of chivalry. One of the most remarkable of these meetings took place between eleven Spanish and as many French knights, in consequence of some disparaging remarks of the latter on the cavalry of their enemies, which they affirmed inferior to their own. The Venetians gave the parties a fair field of combat in the neutral territory under their own walls of Trani. A gallant array of well-armed knights of both nations guarded the lists, and maintained the order of the fight. On the appointed day (Sept. 20, 1502), the champions appeared in the field, armed at all points, with horses richly caparisoned, and barbed or covered with steel panoply like their masters. The roofs and battlements of Trani were covered with specta-

(1) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 47.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. 1. lib. 4, cap. 69.—Giovio, *Vitæ illust. Virorum*, tom. 1. p. 241.—D'Auton, part 2, chap. 11.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 247. Martyr says, that the Spaniards marched through the enemy's camp, shouting "España, España, viva España!" (ubi supra). Their gallantry in the defence of Canosa elicits a hearty eulogium from Jean d'Auton, the loyal historiographer of Louis XII. "Je ne veux donc par ma Chronique mettre les biensfaits des Espagnols en vau, mais dire que pour vertueuse defence, doibuent avoir louange honorable."—*Hist. de Louys XII.* chap. 11.

(2) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 169.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 10.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 66.

tors, while the lists were thronged with the French and Spanish chivalry, each staking in some degree the national honour on the issue of the contest. Among the Castilians were Diego de Paredes and Diego de Vera, while the good knight Bayard was most conspicuous on the other side.

As the trumpets sounded the appointed signal, the hostile parties rushed to the encounter. Three Spaniards were borne from their saddles by the rudeness of the shock, and four of their antagonists' horses slain. The fight, which began at ten in the morning, was not to be protracted beyond sunset. Long before that hour all the French, save two, one of them the chevalier Bayard, had been dismounted, and their horses, at which the Spaniards had aimed more than at the riders, disabled or slain. The Spaniards, seven of whom were still on horseback, pressed hard on their adversaries, leaving little doubt of the fortune of the day. The latter, however, intrenching themselves behind the carcases of their dead horses, made good their defence against the Spaniards, who in vain tried to spur their terrified steeds over the barrier. In this way the fight was protracted till sunset; and, as both parties continued to keep possession of the field, the palm of victory was adjudged to neither, while both were pronounced to have demeaned themselves like good and valiant knights.(1)

The tourney being ended, the combatants met in the centre of the lists, and embraced each other in the true companionship of chivalry, "making good cheer together," says an old chronicler, before they separated. The Great Captain was not satisfied with the issue of the fight. "We have at least," said one of his champions, "disproved the taunt of the Frenchmen, and shown ourselves as good horsemen as they." "I sent you for better," coldly retorted Gonsalvo.(2)

A more tragic termination befel a combat à l'outrance between the chevalier Bayard and a Spanish cavalier, named Alonso de Sotomayor, who had accused the former of uncourteous treatment of him while his prisoner. Bayard denied the charge, and defied the Spaniard to prove it in single fight, on horse or on foot, as he best liked. Sotomayor, aware of his antagonist's uncommon horsemanship, preferred the latter alternative.

(1) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 53.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, chap. 26.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 238, 239.—*Mémoires de Bayard par le Loyal Serviteur*, chap. 23, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xv.—Brantôme, *Œuvres*, tom. iii. disc. 77. This celebrated tourney, its causes, and all the details of the action, are told in as many different ways as there are narrators; and this, notwithstanding it was fought in the presence of a crowd of witnesses, who had nothing to do but look on, and note what passed before their eyes. The only facts in which all agree, are, that there was such a tournament, and that neither party gained the advantage. So much for history!

(2) D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* ubi supra.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. ii. p. 263.

At the day and hour appointed (Feb. 2, 1503), the two knights entered the lists, armed with sword and dagger, and sheathed in complete harness; although with a degree of temerity unusual in these combats, they wore their visors up. Both combatants knelt down in silent prayer for a few moments, and then rising and crossing themselves, advanced straight against each other; "the good knight Bayard," says Brantôme, "moving as light of step, as if he were going to lead some fair lady down the dance."

The Spaniard was of a large and powerful frame, and endeavoured to crush his enemy by weight of blows, or to close with him and bring him to the ground. The latter, naturally inferior in strength, was rendered still weaker by a fever, from which he had not entirely recovered. He was more light and agile than his adversary, however; and superior dexterity enabled him not only to parry his enemy's strokes, but to deal him occasionally one of his own, while he sorely distressed him by the rapidity of his movements. At length, as the Spaniard was somewhat thrown off his balance by an ill-directed blow, Bayard struck him so sharply on the gorget that it gave way, and the sword entered his throat. Furious with the agony of the wound, Sotomayor collected all his strength for a last struggle, and, grasping his antagonist in his arms, they both rolled in the dust together. Before either could extricate himself, the quick-eyed Bayard, who had retained his poniard in his left hand during the whole combat, while the Spaniard's had remained in his belt, drove the steel with such convulsive strength under his enemy's eye, that it pierced quite through the brain. After the judges had awarded the honours of the day to Bayard, the minstrels as usual began to pour forth triumphant strains in praise of the victor; but the good knight commanded them to desist, and, having first prostrated himself on his knees in gratitude for his victory, walked slowly out of the lists, expressing a wish that the combat had had a different termination, so that his honour had been saved.<sup>(1)</sup>

In these jousts and tourneys, described with sufficient proximity, but in a truly heart-stirring tone, by the chroniclers of the day, we may discern the last gleams of the light of chivalry which illumined the darkness of the middle ages; and, although rough in comparison with the pastimes of more polished times, they called forth such displays of magnificence, courtesy, and knightly honour, as throw something like the grace of civilisation over the ferocious features of the age.

While the Spaniards, cooped up within the old town of Barletta, sought to vary the monotony of their existence by these

(1) Brantôme, *Cœuvres*, tom. vi. *Discours sur les Duels*.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, chap. 27.—Ulhoa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 11.—*Mémoires de Bayard*, chap. 22, apud *Collection des Mémoires*.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 240.

French and Scottish gendarmerie, rode over from one extremity to the other without opposition. (1)

The prospect now grew darker and darker around the little garrison of Barletta. The discomfiture of Benavides excluded hopes of relief in that direction. The gradual occupation of most of the strong places in Apulia by the duke of Nemours cut off all communication with the neighbouring country; and a French fleet cruising in the Adriatic rendered the arrival of further stores and reinforcements extremely precarious. Gonsalvo, however, maintained the same unruffled cheerfulness as before, and endeavoured to infuse it into the hearts of others. He perfectly understood the character of his countrymen, knew all their resources, and tried to rouse every latent principle of honour, loyalty, pride, and national feeling; and such was the authority which he acquired over their minds, and so deep the affection which he inspired, by the amenity of his manners and the generosity of his disposition, that not a murmur or symptom of insubordination escaped them during the whole of this long and painful siege. But neither the excellence of his troops, nor the resources of his own genius, would have been sufficient to extricate Gonsalvo from the difficulties of his situation without the most flagrant errors on the part of his opponent. The Spanish general, who understood the character of the French commander perfectly well, lay patiently awaiting his opportunity, like a skilful fencer, ready to make a decisive thrust at the first vulnerable point that should be presented. Such an occasion at length offered itself early in the following year (Jan. 1503). (2)

The French, no less weary than their adversaries of their long inaction, sallied out from Canosa, where the viceroy had established his head-quarters, and crossing the Ofanto, marched up directly under the walls of Barletta, with the intention of drawing out the garrison from the "old den," as they called it, and deciding the quarrel in a pitched battle. The duke of Nemours, accordingly, having taken up his position, sent a trumpet into the place, to defy the Great Captain to the encounter; but the latter returned for answer, that "he was accustomed to choose his own place and time for fighting, and would thank the French general to wait till his men found time to shoe their horses, and burnish up their arms." At length Nemours, after remaining some days, and finding there was no chance of decoying his wily foe from his defences, broke up his camp and retired, satisfied with the empty honours of his gaseonade.

No sooner had he fairly turned his back, than Gonsalvo,

(1) Ibid. lib. 5, p. 294.—D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII. part 2, chap. 22.—Crónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 63.

(2) Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 11.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 247.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 9.

whose soldiers had been restrained with difficulty from sallying out on their insolent foe, ordered the whole strength of his cavalry, under the command of Diego de Mendoza, flanked by two corps of infantry, to issue forth and pursue the French. Mendoza executed these orders so promptly, that he brought up his horse, which was somewhat in advance of the foot, on the rear guard of the French, before it had got many miles from Barletta. The latter instantly halted to receive the charge of the Spaniards, and, after a lively skirmish of no great duration, Mendoza retreated, followed by the incautious enemy, who, in consequence of their irregular and straggling march, were detached from the main body of their army. In the mean time, the advancing columns of the Spanish infantry, which had now come up with the retreating horse, unexpectedly closing on the enemy's flanks, threw them into some disorder, which became complete when the flying cavalry of the Spaniards, suddenly wheeling round in the rapid style of the Moorish tactics, charged them boldly in front. All was now confusion. Some made resistance, but most sought only to escape; a few effected it, but the greater part of those who did not fall on the field were carried prisoners to Barletta, where Mendoza found the Great Captain with his whole army drawn up under the walls in order of battle, ready to support him in person, if necessary. The whole affair passed so expeditiously, that the viceroy, who, as has been said, conducted his retreat in a most disorderly manner, and, in fact, had already dispersed several battalions of his infantry to the different towns from which he had drawn them, knew nothing of the rencontre till his men were securely lodged within the walls of Barletta. (1)

The arrival of a Venetian trader at this time, with a cargo of grain, brought temporary relief to the pressing necessities of the garrison. (2) This was followed by the welcome intelligence of the total discomfiture of the French fleet under M. de Préjan by the Spanish admiral Lezcano, in an action off Otranto, which consequently left the seas open for the supplies daily

(1) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 243, 244.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 11, 12. A dispute arose, soon after this affair, between a French officer and some Italian gentlemen at Gonsalvo's table, in consequence of certain injurious reflections made by the former on the bravery of the Italian nation. The quarrel was settled by a combat *à l'outrance* between thirteen knights on each side, fought under the protection of the Great Captain, who took a lively interest in the success of his allies. It terminated in the discomfiture and capture of all the French. The tourney covers more pages in the Italian historians than the longest battle, and is told with pride and a swell of exultation, which show that this insult of the French cut more deeply than all the injuries inflicted by them.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 244—247.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, pp. 296—298.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. pp. 542—552; et al.

(2) This supply was owing to the avarice of the French general Alègre, who, having got possession of a magazine of corn in Foggia, sold it to the Venetian merchant; instead of reserving it, where it was most needed, for his own army.

expected from Sicily. Fortune seemed now in the giving vein; for in a few days a convoy of seven transports from that island, laden with grain, meat, and other stores, came safe into Barletta, and supplied abundant means for recruiting the health and spirits of its famished inmates.(1)

Thus restored, the Spaniards began to look forward with eager confidence to the achievement of some new enterprise. The temerity of the viceroy soon afforded an opportunity. The people of Castellaneta, a town near Tarento, were driven by the insolent and licentious behaviour of the French garrison to betray the place into the hands of the Spaniards. The duke of Nemours, enraged at this defection, prepared to march at once with his whole force and take signal vengeance on the devoted little town; and this, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his officers against a step which must inevitably expose the unprotected garrisons in the neighbourhood to the assault of their vigilant enemy in Barletta. The event justified these apprehensions.(2)

No sooner had Gonsalvo learned the departure of Nemours on a distant expedition, than he resolved at once to make an attack on the town of Ruvo, about twelve miles distant, and defended by the brave La Palice, with a corps of three hundred French lanees and as many foot. With his usual promptness, the Spanish general quitted the walls of Barletta the same night on which he received the news (Feb. 22nd, 1503), taking with him his whole effective force, amounting to about three thousand infantry, and one thousand light and heavy armed horse. So few, indeed, remained to guard the city, that he thought it prudent to take some of the principal inhabitants as hostages to insure its fidelity in his absence.

At break of day the little army arrived before Ruvo. Gonsalvo immediately opened a lively cannonade on the old ramparts, which in less than four hours effected a considerable breach. He then led his men to the assault, taking charge himself of those who were to storm the breach, while another division, armed with ladders for scaling the walls, was intrusted to the adventurous cavalier Diego de Paredes.

The assailants experienced more resolute resistance than they had anticipated from the inconsiderable number of the garrison. La Palice, throwing himself into the breach with his iron band of dismounted gendarmes, drove back the Spaniards as often as they attempted to set foot on the broken ramparts; while the Gascon archery showered down volleys of arrows thick as hail, from the battlements, on the exposed persons of the assailants. The latter, however, soon rallied under the eye of their general,

(1) D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 1, chap. 72.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 254.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illustr. Virorum*, p. 242.

(2) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, p. 296.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, chap. 31.

and returned with fresh fury to the charge, until the overwhelming tide of numbers bore down all opposition, and they poured in through the breach and over the walls with irresistible fury. The brave little garrison were driven before them; still, however, occasionally making fight in the streets and houses. Their intrepid young commander, La Palice, retreated, facing the enemy, who pressed thick and close upon him, till, his further progress being arrested by a wall, he placed his back against it, and kept them at bay, making a wide circle around him with the deadly sweep of his battle-axe. But the odds were too much for him; and at length, after repeated wounds, having been brought to the ground by a deep cut in the head, he was made prisoner; not, however, before he had flung his sword far over the heads of the assailants, disdaining, in the true spirit of a knight-errant, to yield it to the rabble around him.(1)

All resistance was now at an end. The women of the place had fled like so many frightened deer to one of the principal churches; and Gonsalvo, with more humanity than was usual in these barbarous wars, placed a guard over their persons, which effectually secured them from the insults of the soldiery. After a short time spent in gathering up the booty and securing his prisoners, the Spanish general, having achieved the object of his expedition, set out on his homeward march, and arrived without interruption at Barletta.

The duke of Nemours had scarcely appeared before Castellaneta, before he received tidings of the attack on Ruvo. He put himself, without losing a moment, at the head of his gendarmes, supported by the Swiss pikemen, hoping to reach the beleaguered town in time to raise the siege. Great was his astonishment, therefore, on arriving before it, to find no trace of an enemy, except the ensigns of Spain unfurled from the deserted battlements. Mortified and dejected, he made no further attempt to recover Castellaneta, but silently drew off to hide his chagrin in the walls of Canosa.(2)

Among the prisoners were several persons of distinguished rank. Gonsalvo treated them with his usual courtesy, and especially La Palice, whom he provided with his own surgeon

(1) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 248, 249.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, p. 296.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 175.—D'Anton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, chap. 31.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 72. The gallant behaviour of La Palice, and indeed the whole siege of Ruvo, is told by Jean d'Anton in a truly heart-stirring tone, quite worthy of the chivalrous pen of old Froissart. There is an inexpressible charm imparted to the French memoirs and chronicles of this ancient date, not only from the picturesque character of the details, but from a gentle tinge of romance shed over them, which calls to mind the doughty feats of

“prowest knights,  
Both Paynim and the peers of Charlemagne.”

(2) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. ubi supra.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 16.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 72.

and all the appliances for rendering his situation as comfortable as possible. For the common file, however, he showed no such sympathy; but condemned them all to serve in the Spanish admiral's galleys, where they continued to the close of the campaign. An unfortunate misunderstanding had long subsisted between the French and Spanish commanders respecting the ransom and exchange of prisoners; and Gonsalvo was probably led to this severe measure, so different from his usual clemency, by an unwillingness to encumber himself with a superfluous population in the besieged city.(1) But, in truth, such a proceeding, however offensive to humanity, was not at all repugnant to the haughty spirit of chivalry, which reserving its courtesies exclusively for those of gentle blood and high degree, cared little for the inferior orders, whether soldier or peasant, whom it abandoned without remorse to all the caprices and cruelties of military license.

The capture of Ruvo, was attended with important consequences to the Spaniards. Besides a valuable booty of clothes, jewels, and money, they brought back with them nearly a thousand horses, which furnished Gonsalvo with the means of augmenting his cavalry, the small number of which had hitherto materially crippled his operations. He accordingly selected seven hundred of his best troops, and mounted them on the French horses; thus providing himself with a corps burning with zeal to approve itself worthy of the distinguished honour conferred on it.(2)

A few weeks after, the general received an important accession of strength from the arrival of two thousand German mercenaries, which Don Juan Manuel, the Spanish minister at the Austrian court, had been permitted to raise in the emperor's dominions. This event determined the Great Captain on a step which he had been some time meditating. The new levies placed him in a condition for assuming the offensive. His stock of provisions, moreover, already much reduced, would be obviously insufficient long to maintain his increased numbers. He resolved, therefore, to sally out of the old walls of Barletta, and, availing himself of the high spirits in which the late successes had put his troops, to bring the enemy at once to battle.(3)

(1) D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII. ubi supra.*—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 249.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. ii. p. 270.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 14.

(2) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 249.

(3) Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 16.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 17.



## CHAPTER XII.

ITALIAN WARS.—NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.—VICTORY OF CERIGNOLA.—SURRENDER OF NAPLES

1503.

Birth of Charles V.—Philip and Joanna visit Spain—Treaty of Lyons—The Great Captain refuses to comply with it—Encamps before Cerignola—Battle, and Rout of the French—Triumphant Entry of Gonsalvo into Naples.

BEFORE accompanying the Great Captain further in his warlike operations, it will be necessary to take a rapid glance at what was passing in the French and Spanish courts, where negotiations were in train for putting a stop to them altogether.

The reader has been made acquainted in a preceding chapter with the marriage of the infanta Joanna, second daughter of the Catholic sovereigns, with the archduke Philip, son of the emperor Maximilian, and sovereign, in right of his mother, of the Low Countries. The first fruit of this marriage was the celebrated Charles the Fifth, born at Ghent, February 24th, 1500, whose birth was no sooner announced to Queen Isabella, than she predicted that to this infant would one day descend the rich inheritance of the Spanish monarchy.(1) The premature death of the heir apparent, Prince Miguel, not long after, prepared the way for this event by devolving the succession on Joanna, Charles's mother. From that moment the sovereigns were pressing in their entreaties that the archduke and his wife would visit Spain, that they might receive the customary oaths of allegiance, and that the former might become acquainted with the character and institutions of his future subjects. The giddy young prince, however, thought too much of present pleasure to heed the call of ambition or duty, and suffered more than a year to glide away before he complied with the summons of his royal parents.(2)

(1) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1500.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 2. The queen expressed herself in the language of Scripture, "Sors cecidit super Matthan," in allusion to the circumstance of Charles being born on that saint's day; a day which, if we are to believe Garibay, was fortunate to him through the whole course of his life.—Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 9.

(2) A letter from Joanna, in the collection of Señor de Gayangos, shows much eagerness to vindicate herself and her husband, as far as may be, from

In the latter part of 1501, Philip and Joanna, attended by a numerous suite of Flemish courtiers, set out on their journey, proposing to take their way through France. They were entertained with profuse magnificence and hospitality at the French court, where the politic attentions of Louis the Twelfth. not only effaced the recollection of ancient injuries to the house of Burgundy, (1) but left impressions of the most agreeable character on the mind of the young prince. (2) After some weeks passed in a succession of splendid *fêtes* and amusements at Blois, where the archduke confirmed the treaty of Trent recently made between his father, the emperor, and the French king, stipulating the marriage of Louis's eldest daughter, the princess Claude, with Philip's son Charles, the royal pair resumed their journey towards Spain, which they entered by the way of Fontarabia, January 29th, 1502. (3)

Magnificent preparations had been made for their reception. The grand constable of Castile, the duke of Naxara, and many other of the principal *grandees*, waited on the borders to receive them. Brilliant *fêtes* and illuminations, and all the usual marks of public rejoicing, greeted their progress through the principal cities of the north; and a *pragmática* relaxing the simplicity, or rather severity, of the sumptuary laws of the period, so far as to allow the use of silks and various coloured apparel, shows the attention of the sovereigns to every circumstance, however trifling, which could affect the minds of

any suspicious of unwillingness to visit Spain, caused by their delay. "Io no se que ninguno de mi casa diga que pueden retardar nuestra yda alla, y si lo dixese seria tambien castigado quanto nunca fue persona, y deseo tanto la yda alla que todos los impedimientos que se ysieren trabajare que quitarlos con todas mis fuerças."—Carta al Secretario Almazan, Bruselas, Novembre 4, 1500, MS.

(1) Charles VIII., Louis's predecessor, had contrived to secure the hand of Anne of Bretagne, notwithstanding she was already married by proxy to Philip's father, the emperor Maximilian; and this, too, in contempt of his own engagements to Margaret, the emperor's daughter, to whom he had been affianced from her infancy. This twofold insult, which sunk deep into the heart of Maximilian, seems to have made no impression on the volatile spirits of his son.

(2) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, lib. 27, cap. 11.—St. Gelais describes the cordial reception of Philip and Joanna by the court at Blois, where he was probably present himself. The historian shows his own opinion of the effect produced on their young minds by these flattering attentions, by remarking: "Le roy leur monstra si très grand semblant d'amour, que par noblesse et honesteté de cœur il les obligeoit envers luy de leur en souvenir toute leur vie."—*Hist. de Louys XII.* pp. 164, 165. In passing through Paris, Philip took his seat in the parliament as peer of France, and subsequently did homage to Louis XII. as his suzerain for his estates in Flanders; an acknowledgment of inferiority not at all palatable to the Spanish historians, who insist with much satisfaction on the haughty refusal of his wife, the archduchess, to take part in the ceremony.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 55.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1502.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 1.—Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part 1, p. 17.

(3) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1502.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 5.

the young princes agreeably, and diffuse an air of cheerfulness over the scene.(1)

Ferdinand and Isabella, who were occupied with the affairs of Andalusia at this period, no sooner heard of the arrival of Philip and Joanna, than they hastened to the north. They reached Toledo towards the end of April; and in a few days, the queen, who paid the usual penalties of royalty, in seeing her children, one after another, removed far from her into distant lands, had the satisfaction of again folding her beloved daughter in her arms.

On the 22nd of the ensuing month, the archduke and his wife received the usual oaths of fealty from the cortes duly convoked for the purpose at Toledo.(2) King Ferdinand, not long after, made a journey into Aragon, in which the queen's feeble health would not permit her to accompany him, in order to prepare the way for a similar recognition by the estates of that realm. We are not informed what arguments the sagacious monarch made use of to dispel the scruples formerly entertained by that independent body, on a similar application in behalf of his daughter, the late queen of Portugal.(3) They were completely successful, however; and Philip and Joanna, having ascertained the favourable disposition of cortes, made their entrance in great state into the ancient city of Saragossa in the month of October. On the 27th, having first made oath before the Justices, to observe the laws and liberties of the realm, Joanna as future queen proprietor, and Philip as her husband, were solemnly recognised by the four arms of Aragon as successors to the crown, in default of male issue of King Ferdinand. The cir-

(1) Zurita, 'Anales, tom. v. lib. 4, cap. 55.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 220. This extreme simplicity of attire, in which Zurita discerns "the modesty of the times," was enforced by laws, the policy of which, whatever be thought of their moral import, may well be doubted in an economical view. I shall have occasion to draw the reader's attention to them hereafter.

(2) The writ is dated at Llerena, March 8. It was extracted by Marina from the archives of Toledo.—Teoría, tom. ii. p. 15.

(3) It is remarkable that the Aragonese writers, generally so inquisitive on all points touching the constitutional history of their country, should have omitted to notice the grounds on which the cortes thought proper to reverse its former decision in the analogous case of the infanta Isabella. There seems to have been even less reason for departing from ancient usage in the present instance, since Joanna had a son, to whom the cortes might lawfully have tendered its oath of recognition; for a female, although excluded from the throne in her own person, was regarded as competent to transmit the title unimpaired to her male heirs. Blancas suggests no explanation of the affair (Coronaciones, lib. 3, cap. 20, and Comentarios, pp. 274, 511), and Zurita quietly dismisses it with the remark, that "there was some opposition raised, but *the king had managed it so discreetly beforehand*, that there was not the same difficulty as formerly."—(Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. I. lib. 5, cap. 5.) It is curious to see with what effrontery the prothonotary of the cortes, in the desire to varnish over the departure from constitutional precedent, declares, in the opening address, "the Princess Joanna true and lawful heir to the crown, to whom, in default of male heirs, the usage and law of the land require the oath of allegiance."—Coronaciones, ubi supra.

cumstance is memorable, as affording the first example of the parliamentary recognition of a female heir apparent in Aragonese history.(1)

Amidst all the honours so liberally lavished on Philip, his bosom secretly swelled with discontent, fomented still further by his followers, who pressed him to hasten his return to Flanders, where the free and social manners of the people were much more congenial to their tastes than the reserve and stately ceremonial of the Spanish court. The young prince shared in these feelings, to which, indeed, the love of pleasure, and an instinctive aversion to anything like serious occupation, naturally disposed him. Ferdinand and Isabella saw with regret the frivolous disposition of their son-in-law, who, in the indulgence of selfish and effeminate ease, was willing to repose on others all the important duties of government. They beheld with mortification his indifference to Joanna, who could boast few personal attractions,(2) and who cooled the affections of her husband by alternations of excessive fondness and irritable jealousy, for which last the levity of his conduct gave her too much occasion.

Shortly after the ceremony at Saragossa, the archduke announced his intention of an immediate return to the Netherlands, by the way of France. The sovereigns, astonished at this abrupt determination, used every argument to dissuade him from it. They represented the ill effect it might occasion the princess Joanna, then too far advanced in a state of pregnancy to accompany him. They pointed out the impropriety, as well as danger, of committing himself to the hands of the French king, with whom they were now at open war; and they finally insisted on the importance of Philip's remaining long enough in the kingdom to become familiar with the usages, and establish himself in the affections of the people over whom he would one day be called to reign.

All these arguments were ineffectual; the inflexible prince, turning a deaf ear alike to the entreaties of his unhappy wife, and the remonstrances of the Aragonese cortes still in session, set out from Madrid, with the whole of his Flemish suite, in the month of December. He left Ferdinand and Isabella disgusted with the levity of his conduct; and the queen, in par-

(1) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1500.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 12, sec. 6.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, p. 126.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 14.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 5.—Petronilla, the only female who ever sat, in her own right, on the throne of Aragon, never received the homage of cortes as heir apparent; the custom not having been established at that time, the middle of the twelfth century.—(Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 5.) Blancas has described the ceremony of Joanna's recognition with quite as much circumstantiality as the novelty of the case could warrant.—Coronaciones, lib. 3, cap. 20.

(2) "Simplex est femina," says Martyr, speaking of Joanna, "licet a tantâ muliere progenita."—Opus Epist. epist. 250.

ticular, filled with mournful solicitude for the welfare of the daughter with whom his destinies were united. (1)

Before his departure for France, Philip, anxious to re-establish harmony between that country and Spain, offered his services to his father-in-law in negotiating with Louis the Twelfth, if possible, a settlement of the differences respecting Naples. Ferdinand showed some reluctance at intrusting so delicate a commission to an envoy in whose discretion he placed small reliance, which was not augmented by the known partiality which Philip entertained for the French monarch. (2) Before the archduke had crossed the frontier, however, he was overtaken by a Spanish ecclesiastic named Bernaldo Boyl, abbot of St. Miguel de Cuxa, who brought full powers to Philip from the king for concluding a treaty with France, accompanied at the same time with private instructions of the most strict and limited nature. He was enjoined moreover, to take no step without the advice of his reverend coadjutor, and to inform the Spanish court at once, if different propositions were submitted from those contemplated by his instructions. (3)

Thus fortified, the archduke Philip made his appearance at the French court in Lyons, where he was received by Louis with the same lively expressions of regard as before. With these amiable dispositions, the negotiations were not long in resulting in a definitive treaty, arranged to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, though in violation of the private instructions of the archduke. In the progress of the discussions, Ferdinand, according to the Spanish historians, received advices from his envoy, the abate Boyl, that Philip was transcending his commission; in consequence of which the king sent an express to France, urging his son-in-law to adhere to the strict letter of his instructions. Before the messenger reached Lyons, however, the treaty was executed. Such is the Spanish account of this blind transaction. (4)

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* ubi supra.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 10.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 44.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1502.

(2) Such manifest partiality for the French court and manners was shown by Philip and his Flemish followers, that the Spaniards very generally believed the latter were in the pay of Louis XII. See Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 44.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 23.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 253.—Lanuza, *Historias*, cap. 16.

(3) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 10.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 2.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 1, chap. 32.

(4) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 23.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* pp. 170, 171.—Claude de Seyssel, *Histoire de Louys XII.* (Paris, 1615), p. 108.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. pp. 690, 691.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. cap. 16. Some of the French historians speak of two agents besides Philip, employed in the negotiations. Father Boyl is the only one named by the Spanish writers as regularly commissioned for the purpose, although it is not improbable that Gralla, the resident minister at Louis's court, took part in the discussions.

The treaty, which was signed at Lyons (April 5th, 1503), was arranged on the basis of the marriage of Charles, the infant son of Philip, and Claude princess of France; a marriage which, settled by three several treaties, was destined never to take place. The royal infants were immediately to assume the titles of King and Queen of Naples, and Duke and Duchess of Calabria. Until the consummation of the marriage, the French division of the kingdom was to be placed under the administration of some suitable person named by Louis the Twelfth, and the Spanish under that of the Archduke Philip, or some other deputy, appointed by Ferdinand. All places unlawfully seized by either party were to be restored; and lastly, it was settled, with regard to the disputed province of the Capitanate, that the portion held by the French should be governed by an agent of King Louis, and the Spanish by the Archduke Philip on behalf of Ferdinand.(1)

Such in substance was the treaty of Lyons; a treaty which, while it seemed to consult the interests of Ferdinand, by securing the throne of Naples eventually to his posterity, was, in fact, far more accommodated to those of Louis, by placing the immediate control of the Spanish moiety under a prince over whom that monarch held entire influence. It is impossible that so shrewd a statesman as Ferdinand could, from the mere consideration of advantages so remote to himself, and dependent on so precarious a contingency as the marriage of two infants then in their cradles, have seriously contemplated an arrangement which surrendered all the actual power into the hands of his rival; and that, too, at the moment when his large armament, so long preparing for Calabria, had reached that country, and when the Great Captain, on the other quarter, had received such accessions of strength as enabled him to assume the offensive on at least equal terms with the enemy.

No misgivings on this head, however, appear to have entered the minds of the signers of the treaty, which was celebrated by the court at Lyons with every show of public rejoicing, and particularly with tourneys and tilts of reeds, in imitation of the Spanish chivalry. At the same time, the French king countermanded the embarkation of fresh troops on board a fleet equipping at the port of Genoa for Naples, and sent orders to his generals in Italy to desist from further operations. The archduke forwarded similar instructions to Gonsalvo, accompanied with a copy of the powers intrusted to him by Ferdinand. That prudent officer, however, whether in obedience to previous directions from the king, as Spanish writers affirm, or on his own responsibility, from a very natural sense of duty, refused to comply with the ambassador's orders; declaring, "he knew no authority but that of his own sovereigns, and that he

(1) See the treaty, apud Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. pp. 27—29.

felt bound to prosecute the war with all his ability till he received their commands to the contrary.”(1)

Indeed, the archduke's despatches arrived at the very time when the Spanish general, having strengthened himself by a reinforcement from the neighbouring garrison of Tarento under Pedro Navarro, was prepared to sally forth and try his fortune in battle with the enemy. Without further delay, he put his purpose into execution, and on Friday, the 28th of April, 1503, marched out with his whole army from the ancient walls of Barletta; a spot ever memorable in history, as the scene of the extraordinary sufferings and indomitable constancy of the Spanish soldier.

The road lay across the field of Cannæ, where, seventeen centuries before, the pride of Rome had been humbled by the victorious arms of Hannibal,(2) in a battle which, though fought with far greater numbers, was not so decisive in its consequences as that which the same scenes were to witness in

(1) Abarea, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 171.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 75.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, chap. 32. According to the Aragonese historians, Ferdinand, on the archduke's departure, informed Gonsalvo of the intended negotiations with France, cautioning the general at the same time not to heed any instructions of the archduke till confirmed by him. This circumstance the French writers regard as unequivocal proof of the king's insincerity in entering into the negotiation. It wears this aspect at first, certainly; but on a nearer view, admits of a very different construction. Ferdinand had no confidence in the discretion of his envoy, whom, if we are to believe the Spanish writers, he employed in the affair more from accident than choice; and notwithstanding the full powers intrusted to him, he did not consider himself bound to recognise the validity of any treaty which the other should sign, until first ratified by himself. With these views, founded on principles now universally recognised in European diplomacy, it was natural to caution his general against any unauthorised interference on the part of his envoy, which the rash and presumptuous character of the latter, acting, moreover, under an undue influence of the French monarch, gave him good reason to fear. As to the Great Captain, who has borne a liberal share of censure on this occasion, it is not easy to see how he could have acted otherwise than he did, even in the event of no special instructions from Ferdinand. For he would scarcely have been justified in abandoning a sure prospect of advantage, on the authority of one, the validity of whose powers he could not determine, and which, in fact, do not appear to have warranted such interference. The only authority he knew, was that from which he held his commission, and to which he was responsible for the faithful discharge of it.

(2) Neither Polybius (lib. 3, sec. 24, et seq.), nor Livy (*Hist.* lib. 23, cap. 43—50), who give the most circumstantial narratives of the battle, are precise enough to enable us to ascertain the exact spot in which it was fought. Strabo, in his topographical notices of this part of Italy, briefly alludes to “the affair of Cannæ” (τὰ περὶ Κάννας) without any description of the scene of action.—(Geog. lib. 6, p. 285.) Cluverius fixes the site of the ancient Cannæ on the right bank of the Aufidus, the modern Ofanto, between three and four miles below Canusium; and notices the modern hamlet of nearly the same name, Cannò, where common tradition recognises the ruins of the ancient town.—(Italia Antiqua, lib. 4, cap. 12, sec. 8.)—D'Anville makes no difficulty in identifying these two (*Géographie Ancienne*, abrégée, tom. i. p. 208), having laid down the ancient town in his maps in the direct line, and about midway between Barletta and Cerignola.

a few hours. The coincidence is certainly singular; and one might almost fancy that the actors in these fearful tragedies, unwilling to deface the fair haunts of civilisation, had purposely sought a more fitting theatre in this obscure and sequestered region.

The weather, although only at the latter end of April, was extremely sultry; the troops, notwithstanding Gonsalvo's orders on crossing the river Ofanto, the ancient Aufidus, had failed to supply themselves with sufficient water for the march; parched with heat and dust, they were soon distressed by excessive thirst; and as the burning rays of the noontide sun beat fiercely on their heads, many of them, especially those cased in heavy armour, sunk down on the road, fainting with exhaustion and fatigue. Gonsalvo was seen in every quarter, administering to the necessities of his men, and striving to reanimate their drooping spirits. At length, to relieve them, he commanded that each trooper should take one of the infantry on his crupper, setting the example himself by mounting a German ensign behind him on his own horse.

In this way the whole army arrived, early in the afternoon, before Cerignola, a small town on an eminence about sixteen miles from Barletta, where the nature of the ground afforded the Spanish general a favourable position for his camp. The sloping sides of the hill were covered with vineyards, and its base was protected by a ditch of considerable depth. Gonsalvo saw at once the advantages of the ground. His men were jaded by the march; but there was no time to lose, as the French, who, on his departure from Barletta, had been drawn up under the walls of Canosa, were now rapidly advancing. All hands were put in requisition, therefore, for widening the trench, in which they planted sharp-pointed stakes; while the earth which they excavated enabled them to throw up a parapet of considerable height on the side next the town. On this rampart he mounted his little train of artillery, consisting of thirteen guns, and behind it drew up his forces in order of battle.(1)

Before these movements were completed in the Spanish camp, the bright arms and banners of the French were seen glistening in the distance, amid the tall fennel and cane-brakes with which the country was thickly covered. As soon as they had come in view of the Spanish encampment, they were

(1) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 253—255.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, p. 303.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 75, 76.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 27.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 256.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 16, 17. Giovio says that he had heard Fabrizio Colonna remark more than once, in allusion to the intrenchments at the base of the hill, "that the victory was owing, not to the skill of the commander, nor the valour of the troops, but to a mound and a ditch." This ancient mode of securing a position, which had fallen into disuse, was revived after this, according to the same author, and came into general practice among the best captains of the age.—*Ubi supra*.



brought to a halt, while a council of war was called, to determine the expediency of giving battle that evening. The duke of Nemours would have deferred it till the following morning, as the day was already far spent, and allowed no time for reconnoitring the position of his enemy. But Ives d'Alègre, Chandieu, the commander of the Swiss, and some other officers, were for immediate action, representing the importance of not balking the impatience of the soldiers, who were all hot for the assault. In the course of the debate, Alègre was so much heated as to throw out some rash taunts on the courage of the viceroy, which the latter would have avenged on the spot, had not his arm been arrested by Louis d'Ars. He had the weakness, however, to suffer them to change his cooler purpose, exclaiming, "We will fight to-night, then; perhaps those who vaunt the loudest will be found to trust more to their spurs than their swords;" a prediction bitterly justified by the event.(1)

While this dispute was going on, Gonsalvo gained time for making the necessary disposition of his troops. In the centre he placed his German auxiliaries, armed with their long pikes, and on each wing the Spanish infantry, under the command of Pedro Navarro, Diego de Paredes, Pizarro, and other illustrious captains. The defence of the artillery was committed to the left wing. A considerable body of men-at-arms, including those recently equipped from the spoils of Ruvo, was drawn up within the intrenchments, in a quarter affording a convenient opening for a sally, and placed under the orders of Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, whose brother Prospero, and Pedro de la Paz, took charge of the light cavalry, which was posted without the lines to annoy the advance of the enemy, and act on any point as occasion might require. Having completed his preparations, the Spanish general coolly awaited the assault of the French.

The duke of Nemours had marshalled his forces in a very different order. He distributed them into three battles or divisions, stationing his heavy horse, composing altogether, as Gonsalvo declared, "the finest body of cavalry seen for many years in Italy," under the command of Louis d'Ars, on the right: the second and centre division, formed somewhat in the rear of the right, was made up of the Swiss and Gascon infantry, headed by the brave Chandieu; and his left, consisting chiefly of his light cavalry, and drawn up, like the last, somewhat in the rear of the preceding, was intrusted to Alègre.(2)

It was within half an hour of sunset when the duke de

(1) Brantôme, *Cœuvres*, tom. ii. disc. 8.—Garnier, *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1783-8), tom. v. pp. 395, 396.—Gallard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 244.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 171.

(2) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 76.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 253-255.—Tillot, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 17.

Nemours gave orders for the attack, and, putting himself at the head of the gendarmerie on the right, spurred at full gallop against the Spanish left. The hostile armies were nearly equal, amounting to between six and seven thousand men each. The French were superior in the number and condition of their cavalry, rising to a third of their whole force; while Gonsalvo's strength lay chiefly in his infantry, which had acquired a lesson of tactics under him, that raised it to a level with the best in Europe.

As the French advanced, the guns on the Spanish left poured a lively fire into their ranks, when a spark accidentally communicating with the magazine of powder, the whole blew up with a tremendous explosion. The Spaniards were filled with consternation; but Gonsalvo, converting the misfortune into a lucky omen, called out, "Courage, soldiers; these are the beacon-lights of victory! We have no need of our guns at close quarters."

In the mean time the French van under Nemours, advancing rapidly under the dark clouds of smoke, which rolled heavily over the field, were unexpectedly brought up by the deep trench, of whose existence they were unapprised. Some of the horse were precipitated into it, and all received a sudden check, until Nemours, finding it impossible to force the works in this quarter, rode along their front in search of some practicable passage. In doing this, he necessarily exposed his flank to the fatal aim of the Spanish arquebusiers. A shot from one of them took effect on the unfortunate young nobleman, and he fell mortally wounded from his saddle.

At this juncture, the Swiss and Gascon infantry, briskly moving up to second the attack of the now disordered horse, arrived before the intrenchments. Undismayed by this formidable barrier, their commander, Chandieu, made the most desperate attempts to force a passage; but the loose earth freshly turned up, afforded no hold to the feet, and his men were compelled to recoil from the dense array of German pikes which bristled over the summit of the breastwork. Chandieu, their leader, made every effort to rally and bring them back to the charge; but, in the act of doing this, was hit by a ball, which stretched him lifeless in the ditch; his burnished arms, and the snow-white plumes above his helmet, making him a conspicuous mark for the enemy.

All was now confusion. The Spanish arquebusiers, screened by their defences, poured a galling fire into the dense masses of the enemy who were mingled together indiscriminately, horse and foot, while, the leaders being down, no one seemed capable of bringing them to order. At this critical moment, Gonsalvo, whose eagle eye took in the whole operations of the field, ordered a general charge along the line; and the Spaniards, leaping their intrenchments, descended with the fury of an

avalanche on their foes, whose wavering columns, completely broken by the violence of the shock, were seized with a panic, and fled, scarcely offering any resistance. Louis d'Ars, at the head of such of the men-at-arms as could follow him, went off in one direction, and Ives d'Alègre, with his light cavalry, which had hardly come into action, in another; thus fully verifying the ominous prediction of his commander. The slaughter fell most heavily on the Swiss and Gascon foot, whom the cavalry under Mendoza and Pedro de la Paz rode down and cut to pieces without sparing, till the shades of evening shielded them at length from their pitiless pursuers. (1)

Prospero Colonna pushed on to the French encampment, where he found the tables in the duke's tent spread for his evening repast; of which the Italian general and his followers did not fail to make good account. A trifling incident that well illustrates the sudden reverses of war.

The Great Captain passed the night on the field of battle, which on the following morning presented a ghastly spectacle of the dying and the dead. More than three thousand French are computed by the best accounts to have fallen. The loss of the Spaniards, covered as they were by their defences, was inconsiderable. (2) All the enemy's artillery, consisting of thirteen pieces, his baggage, and most of his colours, fell into their hands. Never was there a more complete victory, achieved too within the space of little more than an hour. The body of the unfortunate Nemours, which was recognised by one of his pages from the rings on the fingers, was found under a heap of slain, much disfigured. It appeared that he had received three several wounds, disproving, if need were, by his honourable death, the injurious taunts of Alègre. Gonsalvo was affected even to tears at beholding the mutilated remains of his young and gallant adversary, who, whatever judgment may be formed of his capacity as a leader, was allowed to have all the qualities

(1) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 75.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 396, 397.—*Fleurange, Mémoires*, chap. 5, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xvi.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, ubi sup.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. pp. 303, 304.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* pp. 171, 172.—Brantôme, *Œuvres*, tom. ii. disc. 8.

(2) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 180.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. cpist.* 256.—*Fleurange, Mémoires*, chap. 5. No account, that I know of, places the French loss so low as 3,000; Garibay raises it to 4,500, and the French *maréchal de Fleurange* rates that of the Swiss alone at 5,000; a round exaggeration, not readily accounted for, as he had undoubted access to the best means of information. The Spaniards were too well screened to sustain much injury, and no estimate makes it more than a hundred killed, and some considerably less. The odds are indeed startling, but not impossible; as the Spaniards were not much exposed by personal collision with the enemy, until the latter were thrown into too much disorder to think of anything but escape. The more than usual confusion and discrepancy in the various statements of the particulars of this action may probably be attributed to the lateness of the hour, and consequently imperfect light, in which it was fought.

which belonged to a true knight. With him perished the last scion of the illustrious house of Armagnac. Gonsalvo ordered his remains to be conveyed to Barletta, where they were laid in the cemetery of the convent of St. Francis, with all the honours due to his high station. (1)

The Spanish commander lost no time in following up his blow, well aware that it is quite as difficult to improve a victory as to win one. The French had rushed into battle with too much precipitation to agree on any plan of operations, or any point on which to rally in case of defeat. They accordingly scattered in different directions, and Pedro de la Paz was dispatched in pursuit of Louis d'Ars, who threw himself into Venosa, (2) where he kept the enemy at bay for many months longer. Paredes kept close on the scent of Alègre, who, finding the gates shut against him, wherever he passed, at length took shelter in Gaeta, on the extreme point of the Neapolitan territory. There he endeavoured to rally the scattered relics of the field of Cerignola, and to establish a strong position, from which the French, when strengthened by fresh supplies from home, might recommence operations for the recovery of the kingdom.

The day after the battle of Cerignola the Spaniards received tidings of another victory, scarcely less important, gained over the French in Calabria, the preceding week. (3) The army sent out under Portocarrero had reached that coast early in March; but, soon after its arrival, its gallant commander fell ill and died. (4) The dying general named Don Fernando de Andrada as his successor; and this officer, combining his forces with those before in the country under Cardona and Benavides, encountered the French commander D'Aubigny in a pitched battle, not far from Seminara, on Friday, the 21st of April. It was near the same spot on which the latter had twice beaten

(1) Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 277.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255.—Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. pp. 248, 249.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 17.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 181.

(2) It was to this same city of Venosium that the rash and unfortunate Varro made his retreat, some seventeen centuries before, from the bloody field of Cannæ.—Liv. *Hist. lib.* 22, cap. 49.

(3) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 256.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 80. Friday, says Guicciardini, alluding no doubt to Columbus's discoveries, as well as these two victories, was observed to be a lucky day to the Spaniards; according to Gaillard, it was regarded from this time by the French with more superstitious dread than ever.—Istoria, tom. i. p. 304.—Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 348.

(4) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 8, 24.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 250. The reader may, perhaps, recollect the distinguished part played in the Moorish war by Luis Portocarrero, lord of Palma. He was of noble Italian origin, being descended from the ancient Genoese house of Bocanegra. The Great Captain and he had married sisters; and this connection probably recommended him, as much as his military talents, to the Calabrian command, which it was highly important should be intrusted to one who would maintain a good understanding with the commander-in-chief; a thing not easy to secure among the haughty nobility of Castile.

the Spaniards. But the star of France was on the wane; and the gallant old officer had the mortification to see his little corps of veterans completely routed after a sharp engagement of less than an hour, while he himself was retrieved with difficulty from the hands of the enemy by the valour of his Scottish guard.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Great Captain and his army, highly elated with the news of this fortunate event, which annihilated the French power in Calabria, began their march on Naples; Fabrizio Colonna having been first detached into the Abruzzi to receive the submission of the people in that quarter. The tidings of the victory had spread far and wide; and, as Gonsalvo's army advanced, they beheld the ensigns of Aragon floating from the battlements of the towns upon their route, while the inhabitants came forth to greet the conqueror, eager to testify their devotion to the Spanish cause. The army halted at Benevento; and the general sent his summons to the city of Naples, inviting it in the most courteous terms to resume its ancient allegiance to the legitimate branch of Aragon. It was hardly to be expected that the allegiance of a people, who had so long seen their country set up as a mere stake for political gamblers, should sit very closely upon them, or that they should care to peril their lives on the transfer of a crown which had shifted on the heads of half a dozen proprietors in as many successive years.<sup>(2)</sup> With the same ductile enthusiasm, therefore, with which they greeted the accession of Charles the Eighth or Louis the Twelfth, they now welcomed the restoration of the ancient dynasty of Aragon; and deputies from the principal nobility and citizens waited on the Great Captain at Acerra, where they tendered him the keys of the city, and requested the confirmation of their rights and privileges.

Gonsalvo, having promised this in the name of his royal master, on the following morning, the 14th of May, 1503, made his entrance in great state into the capital, leaving his army without the walls. He was escorted by the military of the city under a royal canopy borne by the deputies. The streets were strewn with flowers, the edifices decorated with appropriate emblems and devices, and wreathed with banners emblazoned with the united arms of Aragon and Naples. As he passed along, the city wrung with the acclamations of countless

(1) *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 256.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, cap. 80.—Varillas, *Histoire de Louis XII.* (Paris, 1688, tom. i. pp. 289—292). See the account of D'Aubigny's victories at Seminara, in Part II. chap. 13, vol. i. and chap. 11, vol. ii. of this History.

(2) Since 1494, the sceptre of Naples had passed into the hands of no less than seven princes,—Ferdinand I., Alfonso II., Ferdinand II., Charles VIII., Frederic III., Louis XII., Ferdinand the Catholic. No private estate in the kingdom in the same time had probably changed masters half so often. Gonsalvo notices this revolutionary spirit of the Neapolitans in this emphatic language,—“*regno tan tremoloso que la paz que al mundo sosiega a el lo altera.*”—*Carta al rey Catholico, de Nápoles, á 31 de Octubre, 1503*, MS.

multitudes, who thronged the streets; while every window and housetop was filled with spectators, eager to behold the man who, with scarcely any other resources than those of his own genius, had so long defied, and at length completely foiled, the power of France.

On the following day a deputation of the nobility and people waited on the Great Captain at his quarters, and tendered him the usual oaths of allegiance for his master, King Ferdinand, whose accession finally closed the series of revolutions which had so long agitated this unhappy country.(1)

The city of Naples was commanded by two strong fortresses still held by the French, which, being well victualled and supplied with ammunition, showed no disposition to surrender. The Great Captain determined, therefore, to reserve a small corps for their reduction, while he sent forward the main body of his army to besiege Gaeta. But the Spanish infantry refused to march until the heavy arrears, suffered to accumulate through the negligence of the government, were discharged; and Gonsalvo, afraid of awakening the mutinous spirit which he had once found it so difficult to quell, was obliged to content himself with sending forward his cavalry and German levies, and to permit the infantry to take up its quarters in the capital, under strict orders to respect the persons and property of the citizens.

He now lost no time in pressing the siege of the French fortresses, whose impregnable situation might have decided the efforts of the most formidable enemy in the ancient state of military science. But the reduction of these places was intrusted to Pedro Navarro, the celebrated engineer, whose improvements in the art of mining have gained him the popular reputation of being its inventor, and who displayed such unprecedented skill on this occasion, as makes it a memorable epoch in the annals of war.(2)

Under his directions, the small tower of St. Vincenzo having been first carried by a furious cannonade, a mine was run under the outward defences of the great fortress called Castel Nuovo. On the 21st of May, the mine was sprung; a passage was opened over the prostrate ramparts, and the assailants, rushing in with Gonsalvo and Navarro at their head, before the garrison had time to secure the drawbridge, applied their ladders to the walls of the castle, and succeeded in carrying the place by

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. p. 304.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4.—Ferreraz, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. p. 230.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. pp. 552, 553.—Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*, tom. xiv. p. 40.—*Chronica del Gran Capitano*, cap. 81.—Ulton, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 18.

(2) The Italians, in their admiration of Pedro Navarro, caused medals to be struck, on which the invention of mines was ascribed to him. (Marini, *apud Daru*, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. p. 351.) Although not actually the inventor, his glory was scarcely less, since he was the first who discovered the extensive and formidable uses to which they might be applied to the science of destruction.—See vol. i. p. 308, note, of this History.

escalade, after a desperate struggle, in which the greater part of the French were slaughtered. An immense booty was found in the castle. The Angevin party had made it a place of deposit for their most valuable effects, gold, jewels, plate, and other treasures, which, together with its well-stored magazines of grain and ammunition, became the indiscriminate spoil of the victors. As some of these, however, complained of not getting their share of the plunder, Gonsalvo, giving full scope in the exultation of the moment to military license, called out gaily, "Make amends for it, then, by what you can find in my quarters!" The words were not uttered to deaf ears. The mob of soldiery rushed to the splendid palace of the Angevin prince of Salerno, then occupied by the Great Captain, and in a moment its sumptuous furniture, paintings, and other costly decorations, together with the contents of its generous cellar, were seized and appropriated without ceremony by the invaders, who thus indemnified themselves at their general's expense for the remissness of government.

After some weeks of protracted operations, the remaining fortress, Castel d'Uovo, as it was called, opened its gates to Navarro; and a French fleet, coming into the harbour, had the mortification to find itself fired on from the walls of the place it was intended to relieve. Before this event, Gonsalvo, having obtained funds from Spain for paying off his men, quitted the capital and directed his march on Gaeta. The important results of his victories were now fully disclosed. D'Aubigny, with the wreck of the forces escaped from Seminara, had surrendered. The two Abruzzi, the Capitanate, all the Basilicate, except Venosa, still held by Louis d'Ars, and indeed every considerable place in the kingdom, had tendered its submission, with the exception of Gaeta. Summoning, therefore, to his aid Andrada, Navarro, and his other officers, the Great Captain resolved to concentrate all his strength on this point, designing to press the siege, and thus exterminate at a blow the feeble remains of the French power in Italy. The enterprise was attended with more difficulty than he had anticipated. (1)

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 30, 31, 34, 35.—Giovio, *Vite Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255—257.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 183.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 307—309.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 18, 19.—Ammirato, *Istorie Fiorentine*, tom. iii. p. 271.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. p. 551.—*Chronica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 81, 86, 87, 93, 95.—Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. pp. 40—109.

## CHAPTER XIII.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.—UNSUCCESSFUL INVASION OF  
SPAIN.—TRUCE.

1503.

Ferdinand's Policy examined—First Symptoms of Joanna's Insanity—Isabella's Distress and Fortitude—Efforts of France—Siege of Salas—Isabella's Levees—Ferdinand's Successes—Reflections on the Campaign.

THE events noticed in the preceding chapter glided away as rapidly as the flitting phantoms of a dream. Scarcely had Louis the Twelfth received the unwelcome intelligence of Gonsalvo de Cordova's refusal to obey the mandate of the Archduke Philip, before he was astounded with the tidings of the victory of Cerignola, the march on Naples, and the surrender of that capital, as well as of the greater part of the kingdom, following one another in breathless succession. It seemed as if the very means on which the French king had so confidently relied for calming the tempest had been the signal for awakening all its fury, and bringing it on his devoted head. Mortified and incensed at being made the dupe of what he deemed a perfidious policy, he demanded an explanation of the archduke, who was still in France. The latter, vehemently protesting his own innocence, felt, or affected to feel, so sensibly the ridiculous, and, as it appeared, dishonourable part played by him in the transaction, that he was thrown into a severe illness, which confined him to his bed for several days.<sup>(1)</sup> Without delay, he wrote to the Spanish court in terms of bitter expostulation, urging the immediate ratification of the treaty made pursuant to its orders, and an indemnification to France for its subsequent violation. Such is the account given by the French historians.

The Spanish writers, on the other hand, say that, before the news of Gonsalvo's successes reached Spain, King Ferdinand refused to confirm the treaty sent him by his son-in-law, until it had undergone certain material modifications. If the Spanish monarch hesitated to approve the treaty in the doubtful pos-

(1) St. Gelais seems willing to accept Philip's statement, and to consider the whole affair of the negotiation as "one of Ferdinand's old tricks," "*l'ancienne cautele de celuy qui en scavoit bien faire d'autres.*"—Hist. de Louys XII. p. 172.



ture of his affairs, he was little likely to do so when he had the game entirely in his own hands.(1)

He postponed an answer to Philip's application, willing probably to gain time for the Great Captain to strengthen himself firmly in his recent acquisitions. At length, after a considerable interval, he dispatched an embassy to France announcing his final determination never to ratify a treaty made in contempt of his orders, and so clearly detrimental to his interests. He endeavoured, however, to gain further time by spinning out the negotiation, holding up for this purpose the prospect of an ultimate accommodation, and suggesting the re-establishment of his kinsman, the unfortunate Frederic, on the Neapolitan throne, as the best means of effecting it. The artifice, however, was too gross even for the credulous Louis; who peremptorily demanded of the ambassadors the instant and absolute ratification of the treaty, and, on their declaring it was beyond their powers, ordered them at once to leave his court. "I had rather," said he, "suffer the loss of a kingdom, which may perhaps be retrieved, than the loss of honour, which never can." A noble sentiment, but falling with no particular grace from the lips of Louis the Twelfth.(2)

The whole of this blind transaction is stated in so irreconcilable a manner by the historians of the different nations, that it is extremely difficult to draw anything like a probable narrative out of them. The Spanish writers assert that the public commission of the archduke was controlled by strict private instructions;(3) while the French, on the other hand, are either silent as to the latter, or represent them to have been as broad and unlimited as his credentials.(4) If this be true, the negotiation must be admitted to exhibit, on the part of Ferdinand, as gross an example of political jugglery and falsehood as ever disgraced the annals of diplomacy.(5)

(1) *Idem*, ubi supra.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. p. 410.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. pp. 238, 239.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 23.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.—Ferrerías, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. p. 233.

(2) Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. p. 398.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. p. 300, ed. 1645.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 9. It is amusing to see with what industry certain French writers, as Gaillard and Varillas, are perpetually contrasting the *bonne foi* of Louis XII. with the *méchanceté* of Ferdinand, whose secret intentions, even, are quoted in evidence of his hypocrisy, while the most objectionable acts of his rival seem to be abundantly compensated by some fine sentiment like that in the text.

(3) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 10.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 2.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. pp. 690, 691.—*Et al.*

(4) Seyssel, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 61.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 171.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 239.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. p. 387.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, chap. 32.

(5) Varillas regards Philip's mission to France as a *coup de maître* on the part of Ferdinand, who thereby rid himself of a dangerous rival at home, likely to contest his succession to Castile on Isabella's death, while he em-

But it is altogether improbable, as I have before remarked, that a monarch so astute and habitually cautious should have intrusted unlimited authority, in so delicate a business, to a person whose discretion, independent of his known partiality for the French monarch, he held so lightly. It is much more likely that he limited, as is often done, the full powers committed to him in public, by private instructions of the most explicit character; and that the archduke was betrayed by his own vanity, and perhaps ambition (for the treaty threw the immediate power into his own hands), into arrangements unwarranted by the tenor of these instructions.(1)

If this were the case, the propriety of Ferdinand's conduct in refusing the ratification depends on the question how far a sovereign is bound by the acts of a plenipotentiary who departs from his private instructions. Formerly, the question would seem to have been unsettled. Indeed, some of the most respectable writers on public law in the beginning of the seventeenth century maintain that such a departure would not justify the prince in withholding his ratification; deciding thus, no doubt, on principles of natural equity, which appear to require that a principal should be held responsible for the acts of an agent, coming within the scope of his powers, though at variance with his secret orders, with which the other contracting party can have no acquaintance or concern.(2)

The inconvenience, however, arising from adopting a principle in political negotiations which must necessarily place the destinies of a whole nation in the hands of a single individual, rash or incompetent it may be, without the power of interference or supervision on the part of a government, has led

played that rival in outwitting Louis XII. by a treaty which he meant to disavow.—(*Politique de Ferdinand*, liv. 1, pp. 146—150.) The first of these imputations is sufficiently disproved by the fact that Philip quitted Spain in opposition to the pressing remonstrances of the king, queen, and cortes, and to the general disgust of the whole nation, as is repeatedly stated by Gomez, Martyr, and other contemporaries. The second will be difficult to refute, and still harder to prove, as it rests on a man's secret intentions, known only to himself. Such are the flimsy cobwebs of which this political dreamer's theories are made. Truly *châteaux en Espagne*.

(1) Martyr, whose copious correspondence furnishes the most valuable commentary, unquestionably, on the proceedings of this reign, is provokingly reserved in regard to this interesting matter. He contents himself with remarking, in one of his letters, that "the Spaniards derided Philip's negotiations as of no consequence, and indeed altogether preposterous, considering the attitude assumed by the nation at that very time for maintaining its claims by the sword;" and he dismisses the subject with a reflection that seems to rest the merits of the case more on might than right: "Exitus, qui iudex est rerum æternus, loquatur. Nostri regio potantur majori ex parte."—(*Opus Epist. epist.* 237.) This reserve of Martyr might be construed unfavourably for Ferdinand, were it not for the freedom with which he usually criticises whatever appears really objectionable to him in the measures of the government.

(2) Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. 2, cap. 11, sec. 12; lib. 3, cap. 22, sec. 4.—Gentilis, *De Jure Belli*, lib. 3, cap. 14, apud Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Juris Publici*, lib. 2, cap. 7.

to a different conclusion in practice; and it is now generally admitted by European writers, not merely that the exchange of ratifications is essential to the validity of a treaty, but that a government is not bound to ratify the doings of a minister who has transcended his private instructions.(1)

But whatever be thought of Ferdinand's good faith in the early stages of this business, there is no doubt that, at a later period, when his position was changed by the success of his arms in Italy, he sought only to amuse the French court with a show of negotiation, in order, as we have already intimated, to paralyse its operations and gain time for securing his conquests. The French writers inveigh loudly against this crafty and treacherous policy; and Louis the Twelfth gave vent to his own indignation in no very measured terms. But, however we may now regard it, it was in perfect accordance with the trickish spirit of the age; and the French king resigned all right of rebuking his antagonist on this score, when he condescended to become a party with him to the infamous partition treaty, and still more when he so grossly violated it. He had voluntarily engaged with his Spanish rival in the game, and it afforded no good ground of complaint that he was the least adroit of the two.

While Ferdinand was thus triumphant in his schemes of foreign policy and conquest, his domestic life was clouded with the deepest anxiety, in consequence of the declining health of the queen, and the eccentric conduct of his daughter, the infanta Joanna. We have already seen the extravagant fondness with which that princess, notwithstanding her occasional sallies of jealousy, doted on her young and handsome husband.(2) From the hour of his departure she had been plunged in the deepest dejection, sitting day and night with her eyes fixed on the ground in uninterrupted silence, or broken only by occasional expressions of petulant discontent. She refused all consolation, thinking only of rejoining her absent lord, and "equally regardless," says Martyr, who was then at the court, "of herself, her future subjects, and her afflicted parents." (3)

On the 10th of March, 1503, she was delivered of her second son, who received the baptismal name of Ferdinand, in compliment to his grandfather.(4) No change, however, took place

(1) Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Juris Publici*, lib. 2, cap. 7.—Mably, *Droit Public*, chap. 1.—Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. 2, chap. 12.—Martens, *Law of Nations*, trans. book 2, chap. 1. Bynkershoek, the earliest of these writers, has discussed the question with an amplitude, perspicuity, and fairness, unsurpassed by any who have followed him.

(2) Philip is known in history by the title of "the handsome," implying that he was, at least, quite as remarkable for his personal qualities as his mental.

(3) *Opus Epist.* epist. 258.—Ferreraz, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. pp. 235—238.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 44.

(4) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1503.—Gomez, *de Rebus Gestis*, fol. 45, 46. He was born at Alcalá de Henares. Ximenes availed himself of this circum-

in the mind of the unfortunate mother, who from this time was wholly occupied with the project of returning to Flanders. An invitation to that effect, which she received from her husband in the month of November, determined her to undertake the journey, at all hazards, notwithstanding the affectionate remonstrances of the queen, who represented the impracticability of traversing France, agitated, as it then was, with all the bustle of warlike preparation, or of venturing by sea at this inclement and stormy season.

One evening, while her mother was absent at Segovia, Joanna, whose residence was at Medina del Campo, left her apartment in the castle, and sallied out, though in dishabille, without announcing her purpose to any of her attendants. They followed, however, and used every argument and entreaty to prevail on her to return, at least for the night, but without effect; until the bishop of Burgos, who had charge of her household, finding every other means ineffectual, was compelled to close the castle gates, in order to prevent her departure.

The princess, thus thwarted in her purpose, gave way to the most violent indignation. She menaced the attendants with her utmost vengeance for their disobedience, and, taking her station on the barrier, she obstinately refused to re-enter the castle, or even to put on any additional clothing, but remained cold and shivering on the spot till the following morning. The good bishop, sorely embarrassed by the dilemma to which he found himself reduced, of offending the queen by complying with the mad humour of the princess, or the latter still more by resisting it, dispatched an express in all haste to Isabella, acquainting her with the affair, and begging instructions how to proceed.

The queen, who was staying, as has been said, at Segovia, about forty miles distant, alarmed at the intelligence, sent the king's cousin, the admiral Henriquez, together with the archbishop of Toledo, at once to Medina, and prepared to follow as fast as the feeble state of her health would permit. The efforts of these eminent persons, however, were not much more successful than those of the bishop. All they could obtain from Joanna was, that she would retire to a miserable kitchen in the neighbourhood during the night; while she persisted in taking her station on the barrier as soon as it was light, and continued there, immovable as a statue, the whole day. In this deplorable state she was found by the queen on her arrival; and it was not without great difficulty that the latter, with all the deference habitually paid her by her daughter, suc-

stance to obtain from Isabella a permanent exemption from taxes for his favourite city, which his princely patronage was fast raising up to contest the palm of literary precedence with Salamanca, the ancient "Athens of Spain." The citizens of the place long preserved, and still preserve, for aught I know, the cradle of the royal infant, in token of their gratitude.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, p. 127.

ceeded in persuading her to return to her own apartments in the castle. These were the first unequivocal symptoms of that hereditary taint of insanity which had clouded the latter days of Isabella's mother, and which, with a few brief intervals, was to shed a deeper gloom over the long-protracted existence of her unfortunate daughter.(1)

The conviction of this sad infirmity of the princess gave a shock to the unhappy mother scarcely less than that which she had formerly been called to endure in the death of her children. The sorrows, over which time had had so little power, were opened afresh by a calamity which naturally filled her with the most gloomy forebodings for the fate of her people, whose welfare was to be committed to such incompetent hands. These domestic griefs were still further swelled at this time by the death of two of her ancient friends and counsellors, Juan Chacon, adelantado of Murcia,(2) and Gutierre de Cardenas, grand commander of Leon.(3) They had attached themselves to Isabella in the early part of her life, when her fortunes were still under a cloud; and they afterwards reaped the requital of their services in such ample honours and emoluments as royal gratitudo could bestow, and in the full enjoyment of her confidence, to which their steady devotion to her interests well entitled them.(4)

But neither the domestic troubles which pressed so heavily on Isabella's heart, nor the rapidly declining state of her own health, had power to blunt the energies of her mind, or lessen the vigilance with which she watched over the interests of her people. A remarkable proof of this was given in the autumn of the present year, 1503, when the country was menaced with an invasion from France.

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 268.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 56.—Gomez, *de Rebus Gestis*, fol. 46.

(2) "Espejo de bondad," mirror of virtue, as Oviedo styles this cavalier. He was always much regarded by the sovereigns, and the lucrative post of *contador mayor*, which he filled for many years, enabled him to acquire an immense estate, 50,000 ducats a year, without imputation on his honesty.—Quincuagenas, *MS.* bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 2.

(3) The name of this cavalier, as well as that of his cousin Alonso de Cardenas, grand master of St. James, have become familiar to us in the Granadine war. If Don Gutierre made a less brilliant figure than the latter, he acquired, by means of his intimacy with the sovereigns, and his personal qualities, as great weight in the royal councils as any subject in the kingdom. "Nothing of any importance," says Oviedo, "was done without his advice." He was raised to the important posts of *comendador de Leon*, and *contador mayor*, which last, in the words of the same author, "made its possessor a second king over the public treasury." He left large estates, and more than five thousand vassals. His eldest son was created duke of Maqueda.—Quincuagenas, *MS.* bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 1.—Col. de Céd. tom. v. No. 182.

(4) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 255.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 45.—For some further account of these individuals, see the note in p. 321 of vol. i. Martyr thus panegyricises the queen's fortitude under her accumulated sorrows. "Sentit, licet constantissima sit, et suavia feminam prudens, has alas fortune servientis regina, ita concussa fluctibus undique, veluti vasta rupes, maris in medio."—*Opus Epist. loc. cit.*

The whole French nation had shared the indignation of Louis the Twelfth at the mortifying result of his enterprise against Naples; and it answered his call for supplies so promptly and liberally, that, in a few months after the defeat of Cerignola, he was able to resume operations on a more formidable scale than France had witnessed for centuries. Three large armies were raised; one to retrieve affairs in Italy; a second to penetrate into Spain by the way of Fontarabia; and a third to cross into Roussillon, and get possession of the strong post of Salsas, the key of the mountain-passes in that quarter. Two fleets were also equipped in the ports of Genoa and Marseilles, the latter of which was to support the invasion of Roussillon by a descent on the coast of Catalonia. These various corps were intended to act in concert, and thus, by one grand simultaneous movement, Spain was to be assailed on three several points of her territory. The results did not correspond with the magnificence of the apparatus. (1)

The army destined to march on Fontarabia was placed under the command of Alan d'Albret, father of the king of Navarre, along the frontiers of whose dominions its route necessarily lay. Ferdinand had assured himself of the favourable dispositions of this prince, the situation of whose kingdom, more than its strength, made his friendship important; and the lord d'Albret, whether from a direct understanding with the Spanish monarch, or fearful of the consequences which might result to his son from the hostility of the latter, detained the forces intrusted to him so long among the bleak and barren fastnesses of the mountains, that at length, exhausted by fatigue and want of food, the army melted away without even reaching the enemy's borders. (2)

The force directed against Roussillon was of a more formidable character. It was commanded by the *maréchal de Rieux*, a brave and experienced officer, though much broken by age and bodily infirmities. It amounted to more than twenty thousand men. Its strength, however, lay chiefly in its numbers. It was, with the exception of a few thousand lansquenets under William de la Marek, (3) made up of the *arrièr-ban*

(1) Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 405, 406.—Ferrerias, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. pp. 235—238.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. pp. 300, 301.—*Mémoires de La Trémouille*, chap. 19, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xiv.

(2) Alcon, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. pp. 110—112. The king of Navarre promised to oppose the passage of the French, if attempted, through his dominions; and, in order to obviate any distrust on the part of Ferdinand, sent his daughter Margaret to reside at the court of Castile, as a pledge for his fidelity.—Ferrerias, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. p. 235.

(3) Younger brother of Robert, third duke of Bouillon (D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 2, pp. 103, 186). The reader will not confound him with his namesake, the famous "bear of Ardenne,"—more familiar to us now in the pages of romance than history,—who perished ignominiously some twenty years before this period, in 1484, not in fight, but by the hands of the common executioner at Utrecht.—Duclos, *Hist. de Louis XI.* tom. ii. p. 379.

of the kingdom, and the undisciplined militia from the great towns of Languedoc. With this numerous array the French marshal entered Roussillon without opposition, and sat down before Salsas on the 16th of September, 1503.

The old castle of Salsas, which had been carried without much difficulty by the French in the preceding war, had been put in a defensible condition at the commencement of the present, under the superintendence of Pedro Navarro, although the repairs were not yet wholly completed. Ferdinand, on the approach of the enemy, had thrown a thousand picked men into the place, which was well victualled and provided for a siege; while a corps of six thousand was placed under his cousin, Don Frederic de Toledo, duke of Alva, with orders to take up a position in the neighbourhood, where he might watch the movements of the enemy, and annoy him as far as possible by cutting off his supplies. (1)

Ferdinand, in the mean while, lost no time in enforcing levies throughout the kingdom, with which he might advance to the relief of the beleaguered fortress. While thus occupied, he received such accounts of the queen's indisposition as induced him to quit Aragon, where he then was, and hasten by rapid journeys to Castile. The accounts were probably exaggerated, he found no cause for immediate alarm on his arrival; and Isabella, ever ready to sacrifice her own inclinations to the public weal, persuaded him to return to the scene of operations, where his presence at this juncture was so important. Forgetting her illness, she made the most unwearied efforts for assembling troops without delay to support her husband. The grand constable of Castile was commissioned to raise levies through every part of the kingdom, and the principal nobility flocked in with their retainers from the farthest provinces, all eager to obey the call of their beloved mistress. Thus strengthened, Ferdinand, whose head-quarters were established at Girona, saw himself in less than a month in possession of a force which, including the supplies of Aragon, amounted to ten or twelve thousand horse, and three or four times that number of foot. He no longer delayed his march, and about the middle of October put his army in motion, proposing to effect a junction with the duke of Alva, then lying before Perpignan, at a few leagues' distance from Salsas. (2)

(1) Gonzalo Ayora, Capitan de la Guardia Real, *Cartas al Rey Don Fernando* (Madrid, 1794), carta 9.—Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. pp. 112, 113.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. p. 407.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 51.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 11.

(2) Gonzalo Ayora, *Cartas*, cap. 9.—Zurita, *Anales*, ubi supra.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 197, 198.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1503.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 8.—Col. de Cédulas, tom. i. No. 97. The most authentic account of the siege of Salsas is to be found in the correspondence of Gonzalo Ayora, dated in the Spanish camp. This individual, equally eminent in letters and arms, filled the dissimilar posts of captain of the royal guard and historiographer of the crown. He served in the army at this

Isabella, who was at Segovia, was made acquainted by regular expresses with every movement of the army. She no sooner learned its departure from Girona than she was filled with disquietude at the prospect of a speedy encounter with the enemy, whose defeat, whatever glory it might reflect on her own arms, could be purchased only at the expense of Christian blood. She wrote in earnest terms to her husband, requesting him not to drive his enemies to despair by closing up their retreat to their own land, but to leave vengeance to Him to whom alone it belonged. She passed her days, together with her whole household, in fasting and continual prayer; and, in the fervour of her pious zeal, personally visited the several religious houses of the city, distributing alms among their holy inmates, and imploring them humbly to supplicate the Almighty to avert the impending calamity.(1)

The prayers of the devout queen and her court found favour with Heaven.(2) King Ferdinand reached Perpignan on the 19th of October; and on that same night the French marshal, finding himself unequal to the rencounter with the combined forces of Spain, broke up his camp, and, setting fire to his tents, began his retreat towards the frontier, having consumed nearly six weeks since first opening trenches. Ferdinand pressed close on his flying enemy, whose rear sustained some annoyance from the Spanish *ginetes*, in its passage through the defiles of the sierras. The retreat, however, was conducted in too good order to allow any material loss to be inflicted on the French, who succeeded at length in sheltering themselves under the cannon of Narbonne, up to which place they were pursued by their victorious foe. Several places on the frontier, as Leocate, Palme, Sigean, Roquefort, and others, were abandoned to the Spaniards, who pillaged them of whatever was worth carrying off; without any violence, however, to the persons of the inhabitants, whom, as a Christian population, if we are to believe Martyr, Ferdinand refused even to make prisoners.(3)

time, and was present at all its operations.—*Pres. ad Cartas de Ayora*; and *Nic. Antonio, Bibl. Nov. tom. i. p. 551.*

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist. 253.* The loyal captain Ayora shows little of this Christian vein. He concludes one of his letters with praying, no doubt most sincerely, "that the Almighty would be pleased to infuse less benevolence into the hearts of the sovereigns, and incite them to chastise and humble the proud French, and strip them of their ill-gotten possessions, which, however repugnant to their own godly inclinations, would tend greatly to replenish their coffers, as well as those of their faithful and loving subjects."—See this graceless petition in his *Cartas, carta 9, p. 66.*

(2) "Exaudivit igitur sanctæ reginæ religiosorumque ac virginum preces summus Altitonans." (Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist. 263.*) The learned Theban borrows an epithet more familiar to Greek and Roman, than to Christian ears.

(3) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 54.*—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 80, cap. 13, sec. 11.*—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist. 264.*—Carbajal, *Anales, MS. año 1503.*—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 198.*—Garnier, *Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 408, 409.*—Gonzalo Ayora, *Cartas, carta*



The Spanish monarch made no attempt to retain these acquisitions; but, having dismantled some of the towns which offered most resistance, returned loaded with the spoils of victory to his own dominions. "Had he been as good a general as he was a statesman," says a Spanish historian, "he might have penetrated to the centre of France." (1) Ferdinand, however, was too prudent to attempt conquests which could only be maintained, if maintained at all, at an infinite expense of blood and treasure. He had sufficiently vindicated his honour by meeting his foe so promptly, and driving him triumphantly over the border; and he preferred, like a cautious prince, not to risk all he had gained by attempting more, but to employ his present successes as a vantage-ground for entering on negotiation, in which at all times he placed more reliance than on the sword.

In this, his good star still further favoured him. The armada, equipped at so much cost by the French king at Marseilles, had no sooner put to sea, than it was assailed by furious tempests, and so far crippled, that it was obliged to return to port without even effecting a descent on the Spanish coast.

These accumulated disasters so disheartened Louis the Twelfth, that he consented to enter into negotiations for a suspension of hostilities; and an armistice was finally arranged, through the mediation of his pensioner Frederic, ex-king of Naples, between the hostile monarchs. It extended only to their hereditary dominions; Italy and the circumjacent seas being still left open as a common arena, on which the rival parties might meet, and settle their respective titles by the sword. This truce, first concluded for five months, was subsequently prolonged to three years. It gave Ferdinand what he most needed, leisure, and means to provide for the security of his Italian possessions, on which the dark storm of war was soon to burst with tenfold fury. (2)

11.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. dial. de Deza. Peter Martyr seems to have shared none of Isabella's scruples in regard to bringing the enemy to battle. On the contrary, he indulges in a most querulous strain of sarcasm against the Catholic king for his remissness in this particular. "Quare efflucescente die moniti nostri de Gallorum discessu ad eos, at sero, concurrarunt. Itex Perpiniani agebat, ad millia passuum sex non brevia, uti nostri. Propterea vero id actum, venit concitato cursu, at sero. Ad hostes itur, at sero. Cernunt hostium acies, at sero, at a longe. Distabant jam miliaria circiter duo. Ergo sero Phryges sapuerunt. Cujus hæc culpa, tu scrutator alunde; mea est, si nescis. Maximam dedit ea dies, quæ est, si nescis, calendarum Novembriam sextam, Hispanis ignominiam, et aliquando jacturam illis pariet collachrymandam."—Letter to the cardinal of Santa Cruz, epist. 262.

(1) Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. p. 113. Oviedo, who was present in this campaign, seems to have been of the same opinion. At least he says, "If the king had pursued vigorously, not a Frenchman would have lived to carry back the tidings of defeat to his own land." If we are to believe him, Ferdinand desisted from the pursuit at the earnest entreaty of Bishop Deza, his confessor.—*Quincuagenas*, MS.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 55.—Abarea, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 12, sec. 11.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 264.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. cap. 17.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Machia-

The unfortunate Frederic, who had been drawn from his obscurity to take part in these negotiations, died in the following year. It is singular that the last act of his political life should have been to mediate a peace between the dominions of two monarchs who had united to strip him of his own.

The results of this campaign were as honourable to Spain as they were disastrous and humiliating to Louis the Twelfth, who had seen his arms baffled on every point, and all his mighty apparatus of fleets and armies dissolved, as if by enchantment, in less time than it had been preparing. The immediate success of Spain may no doubt be ascribed, in a considerable degree, to the improved organisation and thorough discipline introduced by the sovereigns into the national militia at the close of the Moorish war, without which it would have been scarcely possible to concentrate so promptly on a distant point such large masses of men, all well equipped and trained for active service. So soon was the nation called to feel the effect of these wise provisions.

But the results of the campaign are, after all, less worthy of notice as indicating the resources of the country, than as evidence of a pervading patriotic feeling, which could alone make these resources available. Instead of the narrow local jealousies which had so long estranged the people of the separate provinces, and more especially those of the rival states of Aragon and Castile, from one another, there had been gradually raised up a common national sentiment, like that knitting together the constituent parts of one great commonwealth. At the first alarm of invasion on the frontier of Aragon, the whole extent of the sister kingdom, from the green valleys of the Guadalquivir up to the rocky fastnesses of the Asturias, responded to the call, as to that of a common country, sending forth, as we have seen, its swarms of warriors to repel the foe, and roll back the tide of war upon his own land. What a contrast did all this present to the cold and parsimonious hand with which the nation, thirty years before, dealt out its supplies to King John the Second. Ferdinand's father, when he was left to cope single-handed with the whole power of France in this very quarter of Roussillon. Such was the consequence of the glorious *union*, which brought together the petty and hitherto discordant tribes of the Peninsula under the same rule; and, by creating common interests and an harmonious principle of action, was silently preparing them for constituting one great nation—one and indivisible, as intended by nature.

velli, Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 27. Mons. Varillas notices as the weak side of Louis XII. "une démanœuvre de faire la paix à contre temps, dont il fut travaillé durant toute sa vie." (*Politique de Ferdinand*, liv. 1, p. 118.) A statesman shrewder than Varillas, De Retz, furnishes, perhaps, the best key to this policy, in the remark, "Les gens foibles ne plient jamais quand ils le doivent."

Those who have not themselves had occasion to pursue historical inquiries, will scarcely imagine on what loose grounds the greater part of the narrative is to be built. With the exception of a few leading outlines, there is such a mass of inconsistency and contradiction in the details, even of contemporaries, that it seems almost as hopeless to seize the true aspect of any particular age as it would be to transfer to the canvas a faithful likeness of an individual from a description simply of his prominent features.

Much of the difficulty might seem to be removed, now that we are on the luminous and beaten track of Italian history; but, in fact, the vision is rather dazzled than assisted by the numerous cross lights thrown over the path, and the infinitely various points of view from which every object is contemplated. Besides the local and party prejudices which we had to encounter in the contemporary Spanish historians, we have now a host of national prejudices, not less unfavourable to truth; while the remoteness of the scene of action necessarily begets a thousand additional inaccuracies in the gossiping and credulous chroniclers of France and Spain.

The mode in which public negotiations were conducted at this period interposes still further embarrassments in our search after truth. They were regarded as the personal concerns of the sovereign, in which the nation at large had no right to interfere. They were settled, like the rest of his private affairs, under his own eye, without the participation of any other branch of the government. They were shrouded, therefore, under an impenetrable secrecy, which permitted such results only to emerge into light as suited the monarch. Even these results cannot be relied on as furnishing the true key to the intentions of the parties. The science of the cabinet, as then practised, authorised such a system of artifice and shameless duplicity as greatly impaired the credit of those official documents which we are accustomed to regard as the surest foundations of history.

The only records which we can receive with full confidence are the private correspondence of contemporaries, which, from its very nature, is exempt from most of the restraints and affectations incident more or less to every work destined for the public eye. Such communications, indeed, come like the voice of departed years; and when, as in Martyr's case, they proceed from one whose acuteness is combined with singular opportunities for observation, they are of inestimable value. Instead of exposing to us only the results, they lay open the interior workings of the machinery, and we enter into all the shifting doubts, passions, and purposes which agitate the minds of the actors. Unfortunately, the chain of correspondence here, as in similar cases, when not originally designed for historical uses, necessarily suffers from occasional breaks and interruptions. The scattered gleams which are thrown over the most prominent points, however, shed so strong a light, as materially to aid us in groping our way through the darker and more perplexed passages of the story.

The obscurity which hangs over the period has not been dispelled by those modern writers, who, like Varillas in his well-known work, "*Politique de Ferdinand le Catholique*," affect to treat the subject philosophically, paying less attention to facts than to their causes and consequences. These ingenious persons, seldom willing to take things as they find them, seem to think that truth is only to be reached by delving deep below the surface. In this search after more profound causes of action, they reject whatever is natural and obvious. They are inexhaustible in conjectures and fine-spun conclusions, inferring quite as much from what is not said or done, as from what is. In short, they put the reader as completely in possession of their hero's thoughts, on all occasions, as any professed romance writer would venture to do. All this may be very agreeable, and to persons of easy faith very satisfactory; but it is not history, and may well remind us of the astonishment somewhere expressed by Cardinal de Retz, at the assurance of those who, at a distance from the scene of action, pretended to lay open all the secret springs of policy, of which he himself, though a principal party, was ignorant.

No prince, on the whole, has suffered more from these unwarrantable liberties than Ferdinand the Catholic. His reputation for shrewd policy suggests a ready key to whatever is mysterious and otherwise inexplicable in his government; while it puts writers like Gaillard and Varillas constantly on the scent after the most secret and subtle sources of action, as if there were always

something more to be detected than readily meets the eye. Instead of judging him by the general rules of human conduct, everything is referred to deep-laid stratagem; no allowance is made for the ordinary disturbing forces, the passions and casualties of life; every action proceeds with the same wary calculation that regulates the moves upon a chess-board; and thus a character of consummate artifice is built up, not only unsupported by historical evidence, but in manifest contradiction to the principles of our nature. The part of our subject embraced in the present chapter has long been debatable ground between the French and Spanish historians; and the obscurity which hangs over it has furnished an ample range for speculation to the class of writers above alluded to, which they have not failed to improve.

## CHAPTER XIV.

ITALIAN WARS.—CONDITION OF ITALY.—FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES, ON THE GARIGLIANO.

1503.

Melancholy State of Italy—Great Preparations of Louis—Gonsalvo repulsed before Gaeta—Armies on the Garigliano—Bloody Passage of the Bridge—Anxious Expectation of Italy—Critical Situation of the Spaniards—Gonsalvo's Resolution—Heroism of Paredes and Bayard.

WE must now turn our eyes towards Italy, where the sounds of war, which had lately died away, were again heard in wilder dissonance than ever. Our attention, hitherto, has been too exclusively directed to mere military manœuvres, to allow us to dwell much on the condition of this unhappy land. The dreary progress of our story, over fields of blood and battle, might naturally dispose the imagination to lay the scene of action in some rude and savage age; an age at best, of feudal heroism, when the energies of the soul could be roused only by the fierce din of war.

Far otherwise, however; the tents of the hostile armies were now pitched in the bosom of the most lovely and cultivated regions of the globe, inhabited by a people who had carried the various arts of policy and social life to a degree of excellence elsewhere unknown; whose natural resources had been augmented by all the appliances of ingenuity and industry; whose cities were crowded with magnificent and costly works of public utility; into whose ports every wind that blew wafted the rich freights of distant climes; whose thousand hills were covered to their very tops with the golden labours of the husbandman; and whose intellectual development showed itself not only in a liberal scholarship far outstripping that of their contemporaries, but in works of imagination, and of elegant art more particularly, which rivalled the best days of antiquity. The period before us, indeed, the commencement of

the sixteenth century, was that of their meridian splendour when Italian genius, breaking through the cloud which had temporarily obscured its early dawn, shone out in full effulgence; for we are now touching on the age of Machiavelli, Ariosto, and Michael Angelo,—the golden age of Leo the Tenth.

It is impossible, even at this distance of time, to contemplate without feelings of sadness the fate of such a country, thus suddenly converted into an arena for the bloody exhibitions of the gladiators of Europe; to behold her trodden underfoot by the very nations on whom she had freely poured the light of civilisation; to see the fierce soldiery of Europe, from the Danube to the Tagus, sweeping like an army of locusts over her fields, defiling her pleasant places, and raising the shout of battle, or of brutal triumph, under the shadow of those monuments of genius which have been the delight and despair of succeeding ages. It was the old story of the Goths and Vandals acted over again. Those more refined arts of the cabinet on which the Italians were accustomed to rely, much more than on the sword, in their disputes with one another, were of no avail against these rude invaders, whose strong arm easily broke through the subtle webs of policy which entangled the movements of less formidable adversaries. It was the triumph of brute force over civilisation,—one of the most humiliating lessons by which Providence has seen fit to rebuke the pride of human intellect. (1)

The fate of Italy inculcates a most important lesson. With all this outward show of prosperity, her political institutions had gradually lost the vital principle which could alone give them stability or real value. The forms of freedom, indeed, in most instances, had sunk under the usurpation of some aspiring chief. Everywhere patriotism was lost in the most intense selfishness. Moral principle was at as low an ebb in private as in public life. The hands, which shed their liberal patronage over genius and learning, were too often red with blood. The courtly precincts, which seemed the favourite haunt of the

- (1) "O pria sì cara al ciel del mondo parte,  
Che l'acqua cigne, e 'l sasso orrido serra;  
O lieta sopra ogn' altra e dolce terra,  
Che 'l superbo Appennin segna e diparte:  
Che val omai, se 'l buon popol di Marte  
Ti lasciò del mar donna e de la terra?  
Le genti a te già serve, or ti fan guerra,  
E pongon man ne le tue treccie sparte.  
Lasso! nè manca de' tuoi figli ancora,  
Chi le più strane a te chiamando insieme  
La spada sua nel tuo bel corpo adopre.  
Or son queste simili a l' antich' opre?  
O pur così pietate e Dio s'onora?  
Ahi secol duro, ahi tralignato seme."

Bembo, Rime, Son. 108.

This exquisite little lyric, inferior to none other which had appeared on the same subject since the "*Italia mia*," of Petrarch, was composed by Bembo at the period of which we are treating.

Muses, were too often the Epiœnean sty of brutish sensuality; while the head of the church itself, whose station, exalted over that of every worldly potentate, should have raised him at least above their grosser vices, was sunk in the foulest corruptions that debase poor human nature. Was it surprising then, that the tree, thus cankered at heart, with all the goodly show of blossoms on its branches, should have fallen before the blast, which now descended in such pitiless fury from the mountains?

Had there been an invigorating national feeling, any common principle of coalition among the Italian states; had they, in short, been true to themselves, they possessed abundant resources in their wealth, talent, and superior science, to have shielded their soil from violation. Unfortunately, while the other European states had been augmenting their strength incalculably by the consolidation of their scattered fragments into one whole, those of Italy, in the absence of some great central point round which to rally, had grown more and more confirmed in their original disunion. Thus, without concert in action, and destitute of the vivifying impulse of patriotic sentiment, they were delivered up to be the spoil and mockery of nations, whom in their proud language they still despised as barbarians; an impressive example of the impotence of human genius, and of the instability of human institutions, however excellent in themselves, when unsustained by public and private virtue.(1)

The great powers who had now entered the lists, created entirely new interests in Italy, which broke up the old political combinations. The conquest of Milan enabled France to assume a decided control over the affairs of the country. Her recent reverses in Naples, however, had greatly loosened this authority; although Florence and other neighbouring states which lay under her colossal shadow, still remained true to her. Venice, with her usual crafty policy, kept aloof, maintaining a position of neutrality between the belligerents, each of whom made the most pressing efforts to secure so formidable an ally. She had, however, long since entertained a deep distrust of her French neighbour; and although she would enter into no public engagements, she gave the Spanish minister every assurance of her friendly disposition towards his government.(2) She intimated

(1) The philosophic Machiavelli discerned the true causes of the calamities, in the corruptions of his country; which he has exposed, with more than his usual boldness and bitterness of sarcasm, in the seventh book of his "Arte della Guerra."

(2) Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega filled the post of minister at the republic during the whole of the war. His long continuance in the office at so critical a period, under so vigilant a sovereign as Ferdinand, is sufficient warrant for his ability. Peter Martyr, while he admits his talents, makes some objections to his appointment, on the ground of his want of scholarship. "Nec placet quod hunc elegeritis hac tempestate. Maluisssem namque virum, qui Latinam calleret, vel saltem intelligeret, linguam; hic tantum suam patriam verna-

this still more unequivocally by the supplies she had allowed her citizens to carry into Barletta during the late campaign, and by other indirect aid of a similar nature during the present; for all which she was one day to be called to a heavy reckoning by her enemies.

The disposition of the papal court towards the French monarch was still less favourable; and it took no pains to conceal this after his reverses in Naples. Soon after the defeat of Cerignola, it entered into correspondence with Gonsalvo de Cordova; and although Alexander the Sixth refused to break openly with France, and sign a treaty with the Spanish sovereigns, he pledged himself to do so on the reduction of Gaeta. In the mean time, he freely allowed the Great Captain to raise such levies as he could in Rome, before the very eyes of the French ambassador. So little had the immense concessions of Louis, including those of principle and honour, availed to secure the fidelity of this treacherous ally. (1)

With the emperor Maximilian, notwithstanding repeated treaties, he was scarcely on better terms. That prince was connected with Spain by the matrimonial alliances of his family, and no less averse to France from personal feeling, which, with the majority of minds, operates more powerfully than motives of state policy. He had, moreover, always regarded the occupation of Milan by the latter as an infringement, in some measure, of his imperial rights. The Spanish government, availing itself of these feelings, endeavoured through its minister, Don Juan Manuel, to stimulate Maximilian to the invasion of Lombardy. As the emperor, however, demanded, as usual, a liberal subsidy for carrying on the war, King Ferdinand, who was seldom incommoded by a superfluity of funds, preferred reserving them for his own enterprises, to hazarding them on the Quixotic schemes of his ally. But, although the negotiations were attended with no result, the amicable dispositions of the Austrian government were evinced by the permission given to its subjects to serve under the banners of Gonsalvo, where, indeed, as we have already seen, they formed some of his best troops. (2)

culam novit; prudentem esse alias, atque inter ignaros literarum satis esse gnarum, Rex ipse mihi testatus est. Cupissem tamen ego, quæ dixi." (See the letter to the Catholic queen, *Opus Epist. epist.* 246.) The objections have weight undoubtedly, the Latin being the common medium of diplomatic intercourse at that time. Martyr, who on his return through Venice from his Egyptian mission, took charge for the time of the interests of Spain, might probably have been prevailed on to assume the difficulties of a diplomatic station there himself. See also the note in page 170 of the present volume.

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 38, 38.—Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. iii. lib. 6.—Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. p. 347.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 311, ed. 1645.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, pp. 77, 81.

(2) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 55.—Coxe, *History of the House of Austria* (London, 1807), vol. i. chap. 23.

But while Louis the Twelfth drew so little assistance from abroad, the heartiness with which the whole French people entered into his feelings at this crisis made him nearly independent of it, and in an incredibly short space of time placed him in a condition for resuming operations on a far more formidable scale than before. The preceding failures in Italy he attributed in a great degree to an over-weening confidence in the superiority of his own troops, and his neglect to support them with the necessary reinforcements and supplies. He now provided against this by remitting large sums to Rome, and establishing ample magazines of grain and military stores there, under the directions of commissaries, for the maintenance of the army. He equipped without loss of time a large armament at Genoa, under the marquis of Saluzzo, for the relief of Gaeta, still blockaded by the Spaniards. He obtained a small supply of men from his Italian allies, and subsidised a corps of eight thousand Swiss, the strength of his infantry; while the remainder of his army, comprehending a fine body of cavalry, and the most complete train of artillery probably in Europe, was drawn from his own dominions. Volunteers of the highest rank pressed forward to serve in an expedition to which they confidently looked for the vindication of the national honour. The command was intrusted to the *maréchal de la Tremouille*, esteemed the best general in France; and the whole amount of force, exclusive of that employed permanently in the fleet, is variously computed from twenty to thirty thousand men.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the month of July, the army was on its march across the broad plains of Lombardy, but, on reaching Parma, the appointed place of rendezvous for the Swiss and Italian mercenaries, was brought to a halt by tidings of an unlooked-for event, the death of Pope Alexander the Sixth. He expired on the 18th of August, 1503, at the age of seventy-two, the victim, there is very little doubt, of poison he had prepared for others; thus closing an infamous life by a death equally infamous. He was a man of undoubted talent, and uncommon energy of character. But his powers were perverted to the worst purposes, and his gross vices were unredeemed, if we are to credit the report of his most respectable contemporaries, by a single virtue. In him the papacy reached its lowest degradation. His pontificate, however, was not without its use; since that Providence, which still educes good from evil, made the scandal which it

(1) Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 78.—*St. Gelais*, *Hist. de Louys XII.* pp. 173, 174.—*Varillas*, *Hist. de Louis XII.* tom. i. pp. 386, 387.—*Mémoires de la Trémouille*, chap. 19, apud *Petitot*, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xiv.—*Muratori*, *Annali d'Italia*, tom. xiv. anno 1503. Historians, as usual, differ widely in their estimates of the French numbers. Guicciardini, whose moderate computation of 20,000 men is usually followed, does not take the trouble to reconcile his sum total with the various estimates given him in detail, which considerably exceed that amount.—*Istoria*, pp. 308, 309, 312.



occasioned to the Christian world a principal spring of the glorious reformation.(1)

The death of this pontiff occasioned no particular disquietude at the Spanish court, where his immoral life had been viewed with undisguised reprobation, and made the subject of more than one pressing remonstrance, as we have already seen. His public course had been as little to its satisfaction; since, although a Spaniard by birth, being a native of Valencia, he had placed himself almost wholly at the disposal of Louis the Twelfth, in return for the countenance afforded by that monarch to the iniquitous schemes of his son, Cæsar Borgia.

The pope's death was attended with important consequences on the movements of the French. Louis' favourite minister, cardinal d'Amboise, had long looked to this event as opening to him the succession to the tiara. He now hastened to Italy, therefore, with his master's approbation, proposing to enforce his pretensions by the presence of the French army, placed, as it would seem, with this view, at his disposal.

The army, accordingly, was ordered to advance towards Rome, and halt within a few miles of its gates. The conclave of cardinals, then convened to supply the vacancy in the pontificate, were filled with indignation at this attempt to overawe their election; and the citizens beheld with anxiety the encampment of this formidable force under their walls, anticipating some counteracting movement on the part of the Great Captain, which might involve their capital, already in a state of anarchy, in all the horrors of war. Gonzalvo, indeed, had sent forward a detachment of between two and three thousand men, under Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, who posted themselves in the neighbourhood of the city, where they could observe the movements of the enemy.(2)

At length cardinal d'Amboise, yielding to public feeling, and the representations of pretended friends, consented to the removal of the French forces from the neighbourhood, and

(1) Carta de Gonzalo, Del Real, Gaeta, 8 de Agosto, 1503, MS.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 81.—Bembo, Istoria Vniuersale, lib. 6. The little ceremony with which Alexander's remains were treated while yet scarcely cold, is the best commentary on the general detestation in which he was held. "Lorsque Alexandre," says the pope's *maître des cérémonies*, "rendit le dernier soupir, il n'y avoit dans sa chambre que l'évêque de Rieti, le dataire et quelques palefreniers. Cette chambre fut aussitôt pillée. La face du cadavre devint noire; la langue s'enfila au point qu'elle remplissoit la bouche qui resta ouverte. La bière dans laquelle il fallait mettre le corps se trouva trop petite; on l'y enfouit à coups de poings. Les restes du pape insultés par ses domestiques furent portés dans l'église de St. Pierre, sans être accompagnés de prêtres ni de torches, et on les plaça en dedans de la grille du chœur pour les dérober aux outrages de la populace."—Notice de Burchard, apud Brequigny, Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi (Paris, 1787—1818), tom. i, p. 120.

(2) Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 82.—Machiavelli, Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 1, 3, et al.—Bembo, Istoria Vniuersale, tom. iii. lib. 6.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 28.—Zurita, Annales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 47.

trusted for success to his personal influence. He over-estimated its weight. It is foreign to our purpose to detail the proceedings of the reverend body thus convened to supply the chair of St. Peter. They are displayed at full length by the Italian writers, and must be allowed to form a most edifying chapter in ecclesiastical history.(1) It is enough to state, that, on the departure of the French, the suffrages of the conclave fell on an Italian (Sept. 22), who assumed the name of Pius the Third, and who justified the policy of the choice by dying in less time than his best friends had anticipated,—within a month after his elevation.(2)

The new vacancy was at once supplied by the election of Julius the Second (Oct. 31), the belligerent pontiff who made his tiara a helmet, and his crosier a sword. It is remarkable, that while his fierce, inexorable temper left him with scarcely a personal friend, he came to the throne by the united suffrages of each of the rival factions of France, Spain, and, above all, Venice, whose ruin in return, he made the great business of his restless pontificate.(3)

No sooner had the game, into which cardinal d'Amboise had entered with such prospects of success, been snatched from his grasp by the superior address of his Italian rivals, and the election of Pius the Third been publicly announced, than the French army was permitted to resume its march on Naples, after the loss—an irreparable loss, of more than a month. A still greater misfortune had befallen it, in the mean time, in the illness of Trémouille, its chief; which compelled him to resign the command into the hands of the marquis of Mantua, an Italian nobleman, who held the second station in the army. He was a man of some military experience, having fought in the Venetian service, and led the allied forces, with doubtful credit indeed, against Charles the Eighth at the battle of Fornovo. His elevation was more acceptable to his own countrymen than to the French; and in truth, however competent to ordinary exigencies, he was altogether unequal to the present, in which he was compelled to measure his genius with that of the greatest captain of the age.(4)

The Spanish commander, in the mean while, was detained

(1) Guicciardini, in particular, has related them with a circumstantiality which could scarcely have been exceeded by one of the conclave itself.—*Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 316—318.

(2) Bembo, *Istoria Veneziana*, lib. 6.—Ammirato, *Istorie Fiorentine*, tom. iii. lib. 28. The election of Pius was extremely grateful to Queen Isabella, who caused Te Deums and thanksgivings to be celebrated in the churches, for the appointment of “so worthy a pastor over the Christian fold.”—See Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 265.

(3) Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, lct. 6.—Bembo, *Istoria Veneziana*, lib. 7.

(4) Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 433—438.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 316.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 83.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII* p. 173.

before the strong post of Gaeta, into which Ives d'Alègre had thrown himself, as already noticed, with the fugitives from the field of Cerignola, where he had been subsequently reinforced by four thousand additional troops under the marquis of Saluzzo. From these circumstances, as well as the great strength of the place, Gonsalvo experienced an opposition, to which of late he had been wholly unaccustomed. His exposed situation in the plains, under the guns of the city, occasioned the loss of many of his best men, and, among others, that of his friend Don Hugo de Cardona, one of the late victors at Seminara, who was shot down at his side while conversing with him. At length, after a desperate but ineffectual attempt to extricate himself from his perilous position, by forcing the neighbouring eminence of Mount Orlando, he was compelled to retire to a greater distance, and draw off his army to the adjacent village of Castellone, which may call up more agreeable associations in the reader's mind as the site of the Villa Formiana of Cicero.<sup>(1)</sup> At this place he was still occupied with the blockade of Gaeta, when he received intelligence that the French had crossed the Tiber, and were in full march against him.<sup>(2)</sup>

While Gonsalvo lay before Gaeta, he had been intent on collecting such reinforcements as he could from every quarter. The Neapolitan division under Navarro had already joined him, as well as the victorious legions of Andrada from Calabria. His strength was further augmented by the arrival of between two and three thousand troops, Spanish, German, and Italian, which the Castilian minister, Francisco de Roxas, had levied in Rome; and he was in daily hopes of a more important accession from the same quarter, through the good offices of the Venetian ambassador. Lastly, he had obtained some additional recruits, and a remittance of a considerable sum of money, in a fleet of Catalan ships lately arrived from Spain. With all this, however, a heavy amount of arrears remained due to his troops. In point of numbers, he was still far inferior to the enemy; no computation swelling them higher than three thousand horse, two of them light cavalry, and nine thousand foot. The strength of his army lay in his Spanish infantry, on whose thorough discipline, steady nerve, and strong attachment to his person, he felt he might confidently rely. In cavalry, and still more in artillery, he was far below the French; which, together with his great numerical inferiority, made it impossible for him to keep the open country. His only resource was to get posses-

(1) Cicero's country seat stood midway between Gaeta and Mola, the ancient Formiæ, about two miles and a half from each. — (Cluverius, *Ital. Antig.* lib. 9, cap. 6.) The remains of his mansion and of his mausoleum may still be discerned, on the borders of the old Appian Way, by the classical and credulous tourist.

(2) *Giovio, Vita Illustr. Virorum*, fol. 258, 259. — *Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 2, cap. 95. — *Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 19. — *Peter Martyr, Opus Epist.* epist. 261

sion of some pass or strong position which lay in their route, where he might detain them till the arrival of further reinforcements should enable him to face them on more equal terms. The deep stream of the Garigliano presented such a line of defence as he wanted.(1)

On the 6th of October, therefore, the Great Captain broke up his camp at Castellone, and, abandoning the whole region north of the Garigliano to the enemy, struck into the interior of the country, and took post at San Germano, a strong place on the other side of the river, covered by the two fortresses of Monte Casino(2) and Rocca Secca. Into this last he threw a body of determined men under Villalba, and waited calmly the approach of the enemy.

It was not long before the columns of the latter were descried in full march on Ponto Corvo, at a few miles' distance only, on the opposite side of the Garigliano. After a brief halt there, they traversed the bridge before that place, and advanced confidently forward in the expectation of encountering little resistance from a foe so much their inferior. In this they were much mistaken; the garrison of Rocca Secca, against which they directed their arms, handled them so roughly, that, after in vain endeavouring to carry the place in two desperate assaults, the marquis of Mantua resolved to abandon the attempt altogether, and, recrossing the river, to seek a more practicable point for his purpose lower down.(3)

Keeping along the right bank, therefore, to the south-east of the mountains of Fondi, he descended nearly to the mouth of the Garigliano, the site, as commonly supposed, of the ancient Minturnæ.(4) The place was covered by a fortress called the Tower of the Garigliano, occupied by a small Spanish garrison, who made some resistance, but surrendered on being permitted to march out with the honours of war. On rejoining their countrymen under Gonsalvo, the latter were so much incensed

(1) Carta del Gran Capitan, Del Real, Gaceta, 8 de Agosto, 1503, MS.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 33, 43, 44, 49, 57.—Giovio, Vita Illustr. Virorum, fol. 238, 239.—Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. p. 417.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Ferrerías, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 252—257.—Mariana, Hist. d'Espanña, lib. 26, cap. 5. The Castilian writers do not state the sum total of the Spanish force, which is to be inferred only from the scattered estimates, careless and contradictory as usual, of the various detachments which joined it.

(2) The Spaniards carried Monte Casino by storm, and with sacrilegious violence plundered the Benedictine monastery of all its costly plate. They were compelled, however, to respect the bones of the martyrs, and other saintly relics; a division of spoil probably not entirely satisfactory to its reverend inmates.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 262.

(3) Crónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 102.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 21.—Gucciccardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 6, pp. 326, 327.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 267.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 188.

(4) The remains of this city, which stood about four miles above the mouth of the Liris, are still to be seen on the right of the road. In ancient days it was of sufficient magnitude to cover both sides of the river. See Strabo, Géographie, lib. 5, p. 233 (Paris, 1629, with Casaubon's notes), p. 110.

that the garrison should have yielded on any terms, instead of dying on their posts, that, falling on them with their pikes, they massacred them all to a man. Gonsalvo did not think proper to punish this outrage, which, however shocking to his own feelings, indicated a desperate tone of resolution, which he felt he should have occasion to tax to the utmost in the present exigency.(1)

The ground now occupied by the armies was low and swampy, a character which it possessed in ancient times; the marshes on the southern side being supposed to be the same in which Marius concealed himself from his enemies during his proscription.(2) Its natural humidity was greatly increased, at this time, by the excessive rains, which began earlier, and with much more violence than usual. The French position was neither so low, nor so wet, as that of the Spaniards. It had the advantage, moreover, of being supported by a well-peopled and friendly country in the rear, where lay the large towns of Fondi, Itri, and Gaeta; while their fleet, under the admiral Préjan, which rode at anchor in the mouth of the Garigliano, might be of essential service in the passage of the river.

In order to effect this, the marquis of Mantua prepared to throw a bridge across, at a point not far from Trajetto. He succeeded in it, notwithstanding the swollen and troubled condition of the waters,(3) in a few days, under cover of the artillery, which he had planted on the bank of the river, and which, from its greater elevation, entirely commanded the opposite shore.

The bridge was constructed of boats belonging to the fleet,

(1) *Chronica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap. 167.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, fol. 263.

(2) The marshes of Minturnæ lay between the city and the mouth of the Liris.—(Cluverius, *Ital. Antiq.* lib. 3, cap. 16, sec. 9.) The Spanish army encamped, says Guicciardini, "in a place called by Livy, from its vicinity to Sessa, *Aqua Sinuessana*, being perhaps the marshes in which Marius hid himself."—(Istoria, lib. 6.) The historian makes two blunders in a breath. 1st. *Aqua Sinuessana* was a name derived not from Sessa, the ancient *Baessa Aurunca*, but from the adjacent *Sinuessæ*, a town about ten miles south-east of Minturnæ.—(Comp. Livy, lib. 22, cap. 14; and Strabo, lib. 5, p. 223.) 2nd. The name did not indicate marshes, but natural hot springs, particularly noted for their salubrity: "*Salubritate harum aquarum*," says Tacitus, in allusion to them (Annals, lib. 12); and Pliny notices their medicinal properties more explicitly.—*Hist. Naturalis*, lib. 31, cap. 2.

(3) This does not accord with Horace's character of the Garigliano, the ancient Liris, as the "*taciturnus amnis*" (*Carm.* lib. i. 30), and still less with that of *Silius Italicus*:—

"Liris . . . qui fonte quieto  
Dissimulat cursum, et nulla mutabilis inbre  
Perstringit tactas gemmant gurgite ripas."

Punica, lib. 4.

Indeed, the stream exhibits at the present day the same soft and tranquil aspect celebrated by the Roman poets. Its natural character, however, was entirely changed at the period before us, in consequence of the unexampled heaviness and duration of the autumnal rains.

strongly secured together, and covered with planks. The work being completed, on the 6th of November the army advanced upon the bridge, supported by such a lively cannonade from the batteries along the shore, as made all resistance on the part of the Spaniards ineffectual. The impetuosity with which the French rushed forward was such as to drive back the advanced guard of their enemy, which, giving way in disorder, retreated on the main body. Before the confusion could extend further, Gonsalvo mounted *à la ginetta*, in the manner of the light cavalry, rode through the broken ranks, and, rallying the fugitives, quickly brought them to order. Navarro and Andrada at the same time led up the Spanish infantry, and the whole column charging furiously against the French, compelled them to falter, and at length to fall back on the bridge.

The struggle now became desperate; officers and soldiers, horse and foot, mingling together, and fighting hand to hand, with all the ferocity kindled by close personal combat. Some were trodden under the feet of the cavalry, many more were forced from the bridge, and the waters of the Garigliano were covered with men and horses, borne down by the current, and struggling in vain to gain the shore. It was a contest of mere bodily strength and courage, in which skill and superior tactics were of little avail. Among those who most distinguished themselves, the name of the noble Italian Fabrizio Colonna is particularly mentioned. An heroic action is recorded, also, of a person of inferior rank, a Spanish *alferez*, or standard-bearer, named Illescas. The right hand of this man was shot away by a cannon-ball. As a comrade was raising up the fallen colours, the gallant ensign resolutely grasped them, exclaiming that "he had one hand still left." At the same time, muffling a scarf round the bleeding stump, he took his place in the ranks as before. This brave deed did not go unrewarded, and a liberal pension was settled on him at Gonsalvo's instance.

During the heat of the *mêlée*, the guns on the French shore had been entirely silent, since they could not be worked without doing as much mischief to their own men as to the Spaniards, with whom they were closely mingled. But, as the French gradually recoiled from their impetuous adversaries, fresh bodies of the latter rushing forward to support their advance, necessarily exposed a considerable length of column to the range of the French guns, which opened a galling fire on the further extremity of the bridge. The Spaniards, notwithstanding "they threw themselves into the face of the cannon," as the marquis of Mantua exclaimed, "with as much unconcern as if their bodies had been made of air, instead of flesh and blood," found themselves so much distressed by this terrible fire, that they were compelled to fall back; and the van, thus left without

support, at length retreated in turn, abandoning the bridge to the enemy.(1)

This action was one of the severest which occurred in these wars. Don Hugo de Moncada, the veteran of many a fight by land and sea, told Paolo Giovio, that "he had never felt himself in such imminent peril in any of his battles as in this." (2) The French, notwithstanding they remained masters of the contested bridge, had met with a resistance which greatly discouraged them; and, instead of attempting to push their success further, retired that same evening to their quarters on the other side of the river. The tempestuous weather, which continued with unabated fury, had now broken up the roads, and converted the soil into a morass, nearly impracticable for the movements of horse, and quite so for those of artillery, on which the French chiefly relied; while it interposed comparatively slight obstacles to the manœuvres of infantry, which constituted the strength of the Spaniards. From a consideration of these circumstances, the French commander resolved not to resume active operations till a change of weather, by restoring the roads, should enable him to do so with advantage. Meanwhile, he constructed a redoubt on the Spanish extremity of the bridge, and threw a body of troops into it, in order to command the pass, whenever he should be disposed to use it.(3)

While the hostile armies thus lay facing each other, the eyes of all Italy were turned to them, in anxious expectation of a battle which should finally decide the fate of Naples. Expresses were daily despatched from the French camp to Rome, whence the ministers of the different European powers transmitted the tidings to their respective governments. Machiavelli represented at that time the Florentine republic at the papal court, and his correspondence teems with as many floating rumours and speculations as a modern gazette. There were many French residents in the city, with whom the minister was personally acquainted. He frequently notices their opinions on the progress of the war, which they regarded with the most sanguine confidence, as sure to result in the triumph of their own arms, when once fairly brought into collision with the enemy. The calmer and more penetrating eye of the Florentine discerns symptoms in the condition of the two armies of quite a different tendency.(4)

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 188.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 14.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 10.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 269.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 262.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 22.—Machiavelli, Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 11, Nov. 10; let. 16, Nov. 13; let. 17.—Crónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 106.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 440, 441.

(2) Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 264.

(3) Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 327, 328.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 262.—Machiavelli, Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 29.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 443—445.

(4) Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 9, 10, 19.—The French showed the same

It seemed now obvious that victory must declare for that party which could best endure the hardships and privations of its present situation. The local position of the Spaniards was far more unfavourable than that of the enemy. The Great Captain, soon after the affair of the bridge, had drawn off his forces to a rising ground about a mile from the river, which was crowned by the little hamlet of Cintura, and commanded the route to Naples. In front of his camp he sunk a deep trench, which, in the saturated soil, speedily filled with water; and he garnished it at each extremity with a strong redoubt. Thus securely intrenched, he resolved patiently to await the movements of the enemy.

The situation of the army, in the mean time, was indeed deplorable. Those who occupied the lower level were up to their knees in mud and water; for the excessive rains, and the inundation of the Garigliano, had converted the whole country into a mere quagmire, or rather standing pool. The only way in which the men could secure themselves was by covering the earth as far as possible with boughs and bundles of twigs; and it was altogether uncertain how long even this expedient would serve against the encroaching element. Those on the higher grounds were scarcely in better plight. The driving storms of sleet and rain, which had continued for several weeks without intermission, found their way into every crevice of the flimsy tents and crazy hovels, thatched only with branches of trees, which afforded a temporary shelter to the troops. In addition to these evils, the soldiers were badly fed, from the difficulty of finding resources in the waste and depopulated regions in which they were quartered; (1) and badly paid, from the negligence, or perhaps poverty, of King Ferdinand, whose inadequate remittances to his general exposed him, among many other embarrassments, to the imminent hazard of disaffection among the soldiery, especially the foreign mercenaries, which nothing, indeed, but the most delicate and judicious conduct on his part could have averted. (2)

confidence from the beginning of hostilities. One of that nation having told Suarez, the Castilian minister at Venice, that the marshal de la Trémouille said, "he would give 20,000 ducats if he could meet Gonsalvo de Cordova in the plains of Viterbo;" the Spaniard smartly replied, "Nemours would have given twice as much not to have met him at Cerignola."—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 36.

(1) This barren tract of uninhabited country must have been of very limited extent; for it lay in the Campania Felix, in the neighbourhood of the cultivated plains of Sessa, the Massican mountain, and Falerian fields,—names which call up associations that must live while good poetry and good wine shall be held in honour.

(2) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 23, cap. 5.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 323.—Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, let. 34.—Ulrica, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 22.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 107, 108. The Neapolitan conquests, it will be remembered, were undertaken exclusively for the crown of Aragon, the revenues of which were far more limited than those of Castile.



In this difficult crisis, Gonsalvo de Cordova retained all his usual equanimity, and even the cheerfulness so indispensable in a leader who would infuse heart into his followers. He entered freely into the distresses and personal feelings of his men, and, instead of assuming any exemption from fatigue or suffering on the score of his rank, took his turn in the humblest tour of duty with the meanest of them, mounting guard himself, it is said, on more than one occasion. Above all, he displayed that inflexible constancy which enables the strong mind in the hour of darkness and peril to buoy up the sinking spirits around it. A remarkable instance of this fixedness of purpose occurred at this time.

The forlorn condition of the army, and the indefinite prospect of its continuance, raised a natural apprehension in many of the officers, that if it did not provoke some open act of mutiny, it would in all probability break down the spirits and constitution of the soldiers. Several of them, therefore,—among the rest, Mendoza and the two Colonna,—waited on the commander-in-chief, and, after stating their fears without reserve, besought him to remove the camp to Capua, where the troops might find healthy and commodious quarters, at least until the severity of the season was mitigated; before which, they insisted, there was no reason to anticipate any movement on the part of the French. But Gonsalvo felt too deeply the importance of grappling with the enemy before they should gain the open country, to be willing to trust to any such precarious contingency. Besides, he distrusted the effect of such a retrograde movement on the spirits of his own troops. He had decided on his course after the most mature deliberation; and, having patiently heard his officers to the end, replied in these few but memorable words: "It is indispensable to the public service to maintain our present position; and, be assured, I would sooner march forward two steps, though it should bring me to my grave, than fall back one, to gain a hundred years." The decided tone of the reply relieved him from further importunity.<sup>(1)</sup>

There is no act of Gonsalvo's life, which on the whole displays more strikingly the strength of his character. When thus witnessing his faithful followers drooping and dying around him, with the consciousness that a word could relieve them from all their distresses, he yet refrained from uttering it, in stern obedience to what he regarded as the call of duty; and this, too, on his own responsibility, in opposition to the remonstrances of those on whose judgment he most relied.

Gonsalvo confided in the prudence, sobriety, and excellent

(1) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 188.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 3, cap. 108.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 328.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 58.

constitution of the Spaniards, for resisting the bad effects of the climate. He relied, too, on their tried discipline, and their devotion to himself, for carrying them through any sacrifice he should demand of them. His experience at Barletta led him to anticipate results of a very opposite character with the French troops. The event justified his conclusions in both respects.

The French, as already noticed, occupied higher and more healthy ground, on the other side of the Garigliano, than their rivals. They were fortunate enough also to find more effectual protection from the weather in the remains of a spacious amphitheatre, and some other edifices, which still covered the site of Minturnæ. With all this, however, they suffered more severely from the inclement season than their robust adversaries. Numbers daily sickened and died. They were much straitened, moreover, from want of provisions, through the knavish peculations of the commissaries who had charge of the magazines in Rome. Thus situated, the fiery spirits of the French soldiery, eager for prompt and decisive action, and impatient of delay, gradually sunk under the protracted miseries of a war where the elements were the principal enemy, and where they saw themselves melting away like slaves in a prison-ship, without even the chance of winning an honourable death on the field of battle.(1)

The discontent occasioned by these circumstances was further swelled by the imperfect success which had attended their efforts when allowed to measure weapons with the enemy.

At length the latent mass of disaffection found an object on which to vent itself, in the person of their commander-in-chief, the marquis of Mantua, never popular with the French soldiers. They now loudly taxed him with imbecility, accused him of a secret understanding with the enemy, and loaded him with the opprobrious epithets with which Transalpine insolence was accustomed to stigmatise the Italians. In all this they were secretly supported by Ives d'Alègre, Sandricourt, and other French officers, who had always regarded with dissatisfaction the elevation of the Italian general; till at length the latter, finding that he had influence with neither officers nor soldiers, and unwilling to retain command where he had lost authority, availed himself of a temporary illness, under which he was labouring, to throw up his commission, and withdrew abruptly to his own estates.

He was succeeded by the marquis of Saluzzo, an Italian indeed by birth, being a native of Piedmont, but who had long served under the French banners, where he had been intrusted

(1) Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 205.—Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 445.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 59.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, fol. 85.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 22.—Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII. tom. i. pp. 401, 402.

by Louis the Twelfth with very important commands. He was not deficient in energy of character or military science; but it required powers of a higher order than his to bring the army under subordination, and renew its confidence under present circumstances. The Italians, disgusted with the treatment of their former chief, deserted in great numbers. The great body of the French chivalry, impatient of their present unhealthy position, dispersed among the adjacent cities of Fondi, Itri, and Gaeta, leaving the low country around the Tower of the Garigliano to the care of the Swiss and German infantry. Thus, while the whole Spanish army lay within a mile of the river, under the immediate eye of their commander, prepared for instant service, the French were scattered over a country more than ten miles in extent, where, without regard to military discipline, they sought to relieve the dreary monotony of a camp by all the relaxations which such comfortable quarters could afford.(1)

It must not be supposed that the repose of the two armies was never broken by the sounds of war. More than one rencontre, on the contrary, with various fortune, took place, and more than one display of personal prowess by the knights of the two nations, as formerly at the siege of Barletta. The Spaniards made two unsuccessful efforts to burn the enemy's bridge; but they succeeded, on the other hand, in carrying the strong fortress of Rocca Guglielma, garrisoned by the French. Among the feats of individual heroism, the Castilian writers expatiate most complacently on that of their favourite cavalier, Diego de Paredes, who descended alone on the bridge against a body of French knights, all armed in proof, with a desperate hardihood worthy of Don Quixote; and would most probably have shared the usual fate of that renowned personage on such occasions, had he not been rescued by a sally of his own countrymen. The French find a counterpart to this adventure in that of the preux chevalier Bayard, who with his single arm maintained the barriers of the bridge against two hundred Spaniards for an hour or more.(2)

Such feats, indeed, are more easily achieved with the pen, than with the sword. It would be injustice, however, to the honest chronicler of the day to suppose that he did not himself fully

“ Believe the magic wonders that he sung.”

Every heart confessed the influence of a romantic age,—the

(1) Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 440—443.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 264, 265.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 329.—Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, let. 44.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* pp. 173, 174.

(2) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap. 106.—*Mémoires de Bayard*, chap. 25, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xv.—Varillas, *Hist. de Louis XII.* tom. i. p. 417.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 288—290.—Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, let. 39, 44.

dying age, indeed, of chivalry,—but when, with superior refinement, it had lost nothing of the enthusiasm and exaltation of its prime. A shadowy twilight of romance enveloped every object. Every day gave birth to such extravagances, not merely of sentiment, but of action, as made it difficult to discern the precise boundaries of fact and fiction. The chronicler might innocently encroach sometimes on the province of the poet, and the poet occasionally draw the theme of his visions from the pages of the chronicler. Such, in fact, was the case; and the romantic Muse of Italy, then coming forth in her glory, did little more than give a brighter flush of colour to the chimeras of real life. The characters of living heroes, a Bayard, a Paredes, and a La Pulice, readily supplied her with the elements of those ideal combinations in which she has so gracefully embodied the perfections of chivalry.(1)

## CHAPTER XV.

ITALIAN WARS.—ROUT OF THE GARIGLIANO.—TREATY WITH FRANCE.—GONSALVO'S MILITARY CONDUCT.

1503—1504.

Gonsalvo crosses the River—Consternation of the French—Action near Gaeta—Hotly contested—The French defeated—Gaeta surrenders—Public Enthusiasm—Treaty with France—Review of Gonsalvo's Military Conduct—Results of the Campaign.

SEVEN weeks had now elapsed since the two armies had lain in sight of each other without any decided movement on either side. During this time the Great Captain had made repeated efforts to strengthen himself, through the intervention of the Spanish ambassador, Francisco de Rojas,(2) by reinforcements from Rome. His negotiations were chiefly directed to secure the alliance of the Orsini, a powerful family, long involved in a bitter feud with the Colonnas, then in the Spanish service. A reconciliation between these noble houses was at length happily

(1) Compare the prose romances of D'Auton, of the "loyal serviteur" of Bayard, and the no less loyal biographer of the Great Captain, with the poetic ones of Ariosto, Berni, and the like:

"Magnanima menzogna! or quando è il vero  
Sì bello, che si possa a te preporre?"

(2) He succeeded Garcilasso de la Vega at the court of Rome. Oviedo says, in reference to the illustrious house of Rojas, "En todas las historias de España no se hallan tantos caballeros de un linage y nombre notados por valerosos caballeros y valientes milites como deste nombre de Rojas."—Quincenagenas, MS. bat. I, quinc. 2, did. 8.

effected; and Bartolomeo d'Alviano, the head of the Orsini, agreed to enlist under the Spanish commander with three thousand men. This arrangement was finally brought about through the good offices of the Venetian minister at Rome, who even advanced a considerable sum of money towards the payment of the new levies. (1)

The appearance of this corps, with one of the most able and valiant of the Italian captains at its head, revived the drooping spirits of the camp. Soon after his arrival, Alviano strongly urged Gonsalvo to abandon his original plan of operations, and avail himself of his augmented strength to attack the enemy in his own quarters. The Spanish commander had intended to confine himself wholly to the defensive, and, too unequal in force to meet the French in the open field, as before noticed, had intrenched himself in his present strong position with the fixed purpose of awaiting the enemy there. Circumstances had now greatly changed. The original inequality was diminished by the arrival of the Italian levies, and still further compensated by the present disorderly state of the French army. He knew, moreover, that in the most perilous enterprises, the assailing party gathers an enthusiasm and an impetus in its career which counterbalances large numerical odds; while the party taken by surprise is proportionably disconcerted, and prepared, as it were, for defeat before a blow is struck. From these considerations, the cautious general acquiesced in Alviano's project to cross the Garigliano, by establishing a bridge at a point opposite Suzio, a small place garrisoned by the French, on the right bank, about four miles above their head-quarters. The time for the attack was fixed as soon as possible after the approaching Christmas, when the French, occupied with the festivities of the season, might be thrown off their guard. (2)

This day of general rejoicing to the Christian world at length arrived. It brought little joy to the Spaniards, buried in the depths of these dreary morasses, destitute of most of the necessities of life, and with scarcely any other means of resisting the climate than those afforded by their iron constitutions and invincible courage. They celebrated the day, however, with all the devotional feeling and the imposing solemnities with which it is commemorated by the Roman Catholic church; and the exercises of religion, rendered more impressive by

(1) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 5.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 319, 320.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 48, 57.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragón*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 14, sec. 4, 5.—Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. pp. 364, 365.

(2) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 267, 268.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 23.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, pp. 329, 330.—Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, let. 36. Caesar, at the battle of Pharsalia, acted on the principle mentioned in the text, in becoming the assailing party; and he severely censures Pompey for allowing the ardour of his troops to escape in inaction, as they coldly waited to receive his attack.—*De Bello Civili*, lib. 3, cap. 92.

their situation, served to exalt still higher the heroic constancy which had sustained them under such unparalleled sufferings.

In the mean while, the materials for the bridge were collected, and the work went forward with such dispatch, that on the 28th of December all was in readiness for carrying the plan of attack into execution. The task of laying the bridge across the river was intrusted to Alviano, who had charge of the van. The central and main division of the army, under Gonsalvo, was to cross at the same point; while Andrada, at the head of the rear-guard, was to force a passage at the old bridge, lower down the stream, opposite to the Tower of the Garigliano.(1)

The night was dark and stormy. Alviano performed the duty intrusted to him with such silence and celerity, that the work was completed without attracting the enemy's notice. He then crossed over with the van-guard, consisting chiefly of cavalry, supported by Navarro, Paredes, and Pizarro; and, falling on the sleeping garrison of Suzio, cut to pieces all who offered resistance.

The report of the Spaniards having passed the river spread far and wide, and soon reached the head-quarters of the marquis of Saluzzo, near the Tower of the Garigliano. The French commander-in-chief, who believed that the Spaniards were lying on the other side of the river, as torpid as the snakes in their own marshes, was as much astounded by the event as if a thunderbolt had burst over his head from a cloudless sky. He lost no time, however, in rallying such of his scattered forces as he could assemble, and in the mean while dispatched Ives d'Alègre with a body of horse to hold the enemy in check till he could make good his own retreat on Gaeta. His first step was to demolish the bridge near his own quarters, cutting the moorings of the boats, and turning them adrift down the river. He abandoned his tents and baggage, together with nine of his heaviest cannon; leaving even the sick and wounded to the mercy of the enemy, rather than encumber himself with anything that should retard his march. The remainder of the artillery he sent forward in the van; the infantry followed next; and the rear, in which Saluzzo took his own station, was brought up by the men-at-arms, to cover the retreat.

Before Alègre could reach Suzio, the whole Spanish army had passed the Garigliano, and formed on the right bank. Unable to face such superior numbers, he fell back with precipitation, and joined himself to the main body of the French, now in full retreat on Gaeta.(2)

(1) *Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 2, cap. 110.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. 189.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 3, fol. 256.—Zurita, *Historia del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 6, cap. 69.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 270.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 84.

(2) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 189.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 22, 23.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, p. 336.—Gandier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v.

Gonsalvo, afraid the French might escape him, sent forward Prospero Colonna, with a corps of light horse, to annoy and retard their march until he could come up. Keeping the right bank of the river with the main body, he marched rapidly through the deserted camp of the enemy, leaving little leisure for his men to glean the rich spoil which lay tempting them on every side. It was not long before he came up with the French, whose movements were greatly retarded by the difficulty of dragging their guns over the ground completely saturated with rain. The retreat was conducted, however, in excellent order; they were eminently favoured by the narrowness of the road, which, allowing but a comparatively small body of troops on either side to come into action, made success chiefly depend on the relative merits of those. The French rear, as already stated, was made up of their men-at-arms, including Bayard, Sandricourt, La Fayette, and others of their bravest chivalry, who, armed at all points, found no great difficulty in beating off the light troops which formed the advance of the Spaniards. At every bridge, stream, and narrow pass, which afforded a favourable position, the French cavalry closed their ranks, and made a resolute stand to gain time for the columns in advance.

In this way, alternately halting and retreating, with perpetual skirmishes, though without much loss on either side, they reached the bridge before Mola di Gaeta. Here, some of the gun-carriages breaking down or being overturned, occasioned considerable delay and confusion. The infantry, pressing on, became entangled with the artillery. The marquis of Saluzzo endeavoured to avail himself of the strong position afforded by the bridge to restore order. A desperate struggle ensued. The French knights dashed boldly into the Spanish ranks, driving back for a time the tide of pursuit. The chevalier Bayard, who was seen, as usual, in the front of danger, had three horses killed under him; and at length, carried forward by his ardour into the thickest of the enemy, was retrieved with difficulty from their hands by a desperate charge of his friend Sandricourt. (1)

The Spaniards, shaken by the violence of the assault, seemed for a moment to hesitate; but Gonsalvo had now time to bring up his men-at-arms, who sustained the faltering columns, and renewed the combat on more equal terms. He himself was in the hottest of the *mêlée*; and at one time was exposed to im-

pp. 448, 449.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap. 110.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 14, sec. 6.—Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 60.—Senarega, apud Muratori, *Rerum Ital. Script.* tom. xxiv, p. 579.

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 330, 331.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 449—451.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, ubi supra.—Varillas, *Hist. de Louis XII.* tom. i. pp. 416—418.—Ammirato, *Istorie Fiorentine*, tom. iii. lib. 28, p. 273.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii, p. 555.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, pp. 84, 85.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, fol. 268.

minent hazard by his horse's losing his footing on the slippery soil, and coming with him to the ground. The general fortunately experienced no injury, and quickly recovering himself, continued to animate his followers by his voice and intrepid bearing, as before.

The fight had now lasted two hours. The Spaniards, although still in excellent heart, were faint with fatigue and want of food, having travelled six leagues without breaking their fast since the preceding evening. It was, therefore, with no little anxiety that Gonsalvo looked for the coming up of his rear-guard, left, as the reader will remember, under Andrada, at the lower bridge, to decide the fortune of the day.

The welcome spectacle at length presented itself. The dark columns of the Spaniards were seen, at first faint in the distance, by degrees growing more and more distinct to the eye. Andrada had easily carried the French redoubt on his side of the Garigliano; but it was not without difficulty and delay that he recovered the scattered boats which the French had sent adrift down the stream, and finally succeeded in re-establishing his communications with the opposite bank. Having accomplished this, he rapidly advanced by a more direct road to the east of that lately traversed by Gonsalvo, along the seaside, in pursuit of the French. The latter beheld with dismay the arrival of a fresh body of troops, who seemed to have dropped from the clouds on the field of battle. They scarcely waited for the shock before they broke and gave way in all directions. The disabled carriages of the artillery, which clogged up the avenues in the rear, increased the confusion among the fugitives; and the foot were trampled down without mercy under the heels of their own cavalry, in the eagerness of the latter to extricate themselves from their perilous situation. The Spanish light horse followed up their advantage with the alacrity of vengeance long delayed, inflicting bloody retribution for all they had so long suffered in the marshes of Sessa.

At no great distance from the bridge the road takes two directions; the one towards Itri, the other to Gaeta. The bewildered fugitives here separated, by far the greater part keeping the latter route. Gonsalvo sent forward a body of horse under Navarro and Pedro de la Paz, by a short cut across the country, to intercept their flight. A large number fell into his hands in consequence of this manœuvre; but the greater part of those who escaped the sword succeeded in throwing themselves into Gaeta.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Great Captain took up his quarters that night in the

(1) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 190.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 452, 453.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 23.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 331.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, ubi supra.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, pp. 84, 85.—Ammirato, *Istorie Fiorentine*, ubi supra.—Varillas, *Hist. de Louis XII.* tom. i. pp. 416—418



neighbouring village of Castellone. His brave followers had great need of refreshment, having fasted and fought through the whole day, and that under a driving storm of rain which had not ceased for a moment. Thus terminated the battle, or rout as it is commonly called, of the Garigliano, the most important in its results of all Gonsalvo's victories, and furnishing a suitable close to his brilliant military career. (1) The loss of the French is computed at from three to four thousand men left dead on the field, together with all their baggage, colours, and splendid train of artillery. The Spaniards must have suffered severely during the sharp conflict on the bridge; but no estimate of their loss is to be met with in any native or foreign writer. (2) It was observed that the 29th of December, on which this battle was won, came on Friday, the same ominous day of the week which had so often proved auspicious to the Spaniards under the present reign. (3)

The disparity of the forces actually engaged was probably not great, since the extent of country over which the French were quartered prevented many of them from coming up in time for action. Several corps who succeeded in reaching the field at the close of the fight, were seized with such a panic as to throw down their arms without attempting resistance. (4) The admirable artillery, on which the French placed chief reliance, was not only of no service, but of infinite mischief to them, as

(1) Soon after the rout of the Garigliano, Bembo produced the following sonnet, which most critics agree was intended, although no name appears in it, for Gonsalvo de Cordova:—

"Ben devria farvi onor d'eterno esempio  
Napoli vostra, o 'n mezzo al suo bel monte  
Scolpirvi in lieta e coronata fronte,  
Gir trionfando, e dar i voti al tempio:  
Poi che l' avete all' orgoglioso ed empio  
Stuolo ritolta, e parreggiate l' onte;  
Or ch' avea più la voglia e le man pronte  
A far d' Italia tutta acerbo scempio.  
Torcestei voi, Signor, dal corso ardito,  
E foste tal, ch' ancora esser vorebbe  
A por di qua dall' Alpe nostra il piede.  
L' onda Tirrena del suo sangue crebbe,  
E di tronchi restò coperto il lito,  
E gli augelli ne fer secure prede."—Opere, tom. ii. p. 57.

(2) The curate of Los Palacios sums up the loss of the French, from the time of Gonsalvo's occupation of Barletta to the surrender of Gaeta in the following manner:—5,000 prisoners, 14,000 killed in battle, a still greater number by exposure and fatigue, besides a considerable body cut off by the peasantry. To balance this bloody roll, he computes the Spanish loss at two hundred slain in the field!—*Reyes Católicos*, MS, cap. 191.

(3) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. ii. cap. 110.—Zurita, *Anales*, ubi supra.—Garibay, *Compendio*, lib. 19, cap. 16.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 296, 297. Guicciardini, who has been followed in this by the French writers, fixes the date of the rout at the 28th of December. If, however, it occurred on Friday, as he, and every authority, indeed, asserts, it must have been on the 29th, as stated by the Spanish historians.—*Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 330.

(4) *Giovio*, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, fol. 268.

we have seen. The brunt of the battle fell on their chivalry, which bore itself throughout the day with the spirit and gallantry worthy of its ancient renown; never flinching till the arrival of the Spanish rear-guard fresh in the field, at so critical a juncture, turned the scale in their adversaries' favour.

Early on the following morning, Gonsalvo made preparations for storming the heights of Mount Orlando, which overlooked the city of Gaeta. Such was the despondency of its garrison, however, that this strong position, which bade defiance a few months before to the most desperate efforts of Spanish valour, was now surrendered without a struggle. The same feeling of despondency had communicated itself to the garrison of Gaeta; and, before Navarro could bring the batteries of Mount Orlando to bear upon the city, a flag of truce arrived from the marquis of Saluzzo with proposals for capitulation.

This was more than the Great Captain could have ventured to promise himself. The French were in great force; the fortifications of the place in excellent repair; it was well provided with artillery and ammunition, and with provisions for ten days at least; while their fleet, riding in the harbour, afforded the means of obtaining supplies from Leghorn, Genoa, and other friendly ports. But the French had lost all heart; they were sorely wasted by disease; their buoyant self-confidence was gone, and their spirits broken by the series of reverses which had followed without interruption from the first hour of the campaign to the last disastrous affair of the Garigliano. The very elements seemed to have leagued against them. Further efforts they deemed a fruitless struggle against destiny; and they now looked with melancholy longing to their native land, eager only to quit these ill-omened shores for ever.

The Great Captain made no difficulty in granting such terms as, while they had a show of liberality, secured him the most important fruits of victory. This suited his cautious temper far better than pressing a desperate foe to extremity. He was, moreover, with all his successes, in no condition to do so; he was without funds, and, as usual, deeply in arrears to his army; while there was scarcely a ration of bread, says an Italian historian, in his whole camp.(1)

It was agreed by the terms of capitulation, January 1st, 1504, that the French should evacuate Gaeta at once, and deliver it up to the Spaniards, with its artillery, munitions, and military stores of every description. The prisoners on both sides, including those taken in the preceding campaign,—an arrangement greatly to the advantage of the enemy,—were to

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, fol. 268, 269.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap. 111.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 370.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 331.—Zurita, *Angles*, tom. v. lib. 8, cap. 61.—Garnier, *Hist. de France* tom. v. pp. 454, 455.—Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. cap. 29.

be restored; and the army in Gaeta was to be allowed a free passage, by land or sea, as they should prefer, to their own country.<sup>(1)</sup>

From the moment hostilities were brought to a close, Gonsalvo displayed such generous sympathy for his late enemies, and such humanity in relieving them, as to reflect more honour on his character than all his victories. He scrupulously enforced the faithful performance of the treaty, and severely punished any violence offered to the French by his own men. His benign and courteous demeanour towards the vanquished, so remote from the images of terror with which he had been hitherto associated in their minds, excited unqualified admiration; and they testified their sense of his amiable qualities by speaking of him as the "gentil capitaine et gentil cavalier."<sup>(2)</sup>

The news of the rout of the Garigliano and the surrender of Gaeta diffused general gloom and consternation over France. There was scarce a family of rank, says a writer of that country, that had not some one of its members involved in these sad disasters.<sup>(3)</sup> The court went into mourning. The king, mortified at the discomfiture of all his lofty schemes by the foe whom he despised, shut himself up in his palace, refusing access to every one, until the agitation of his spirits threw him into an illness which had well-nigh proved fatal.

(1) Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 61.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 454, 455.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 190.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4. No particular mention was made of the Italian allies in the capitulation. It so happened that several of the great Angevin lords, who had been taken in the preceding campaigns of Calabria, were found in arms in the place.—(Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, fol. 252, 253, 269.) Gonsalvo, in consequence of this manifest breach of faith, refusing to regard them as comprehended in the treaty, sent them all prisoners of state to the dungeons of Castel Nuovo in Naples. This action has brought upon him much unmerited obloquy with the French writers. Indeed, before the treaty was signed, if we are to credit the Italian historians, Gonsalvo peremptorily refused to include the Neapolitan lords within it. Thus much is certain; that, after having been taken and released, they were now found under the French hammers a second time. It seems not improbable, therefore, that the French, however naturally desirous they may have been of protection for their allies, finding themselves unable to enforce it, acquiesced in such an equivocal silence with respect to them, as, without apparently compromising their own honour, left the whole affair to the discretion of the Great Captain. With regard to the sweeping charge made by certain modern French historians against the Spanish general, of a similar severity to the other Italians indiscriminately, found in the place, there is not the slightest foundation for it in any contemporary authority.—See Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 254.—Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. p. 456.—Varillas, *Hist. de Louis XII.* tom. i. pp. 419, 420.

(2) Fleurange, *Mémoires*, chap. 5, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xvi.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 190.—Giovio, *Vita Illust. Virorum*, fol. 269, 270.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, cap. 111.

(3) Brantôme, who visited the banks of the Garigliano some fifty years after this, beheld them in imagination thronged with the shades of the illustrious dead, whose bones lay buried in its dreary and pestilential marshes. There is a sombre colouring in the vision of the old chronicler not unpoetical.—*Vies des Hommes Illustres*, disc. 6.

Meanwhile his exasperated feelings found an object on which to vent themselves in the unfortunate garrison of Gaeta, who so pusillanimously abandoned their post to return to their own country. He commanded them to winter in Italy, and not to recross the Alps without further orders. He sentenced Sandricourt and Alègre to banishment for insubordination to their commander-in-chief,—the latter, for his conduct, more particularly, before the battle of Cerignola; and he hanged up the commissaries of the armies, whose infamous peculations had been a principal cause of its ruin.(1)

But the impotent wrath of their monarch was not needed to fill the bitter cup which the French soldiers were now draining to the dregs. A large number of those who embarked for Genoa died of the maladies contracted during their long bivouac in the marshes of Minturnæ. The rest recrossed the Alps into France, too desperate to heed their master's prohibition. Those who took their way by land suffered still more severely from the Italian peasantry, who retaliated in full measure the barbarities they had so long endured from the French. They were seen wandering like spectres along the high roads and principal cities on the route, pining with cold and famine; and all the hospitals in Rome, as well as the stables, sheds, and every other place, however mean, affording shelter, were filled with the wretched vagabonds, eager only to find some obscure retreat to die in.

The chiefs of the expedition fared little better. Among others the marquis of Saluzzo, soon after reaching Genoa, was carried off by a fever caused by his distress of mind. Sandricourt, too haughty to endure disgrace, laid violent hands on himself. Alègre, more culpable, but more courageous, survived to be reconciled to his sovereign, and to die a soldier's death on the field of battle.(2)

Such are the dismal colours in which the French historians depict the last struggle made by their monarch for the recovery of Naples. Few military expeditions have commenced under more brilliant and imposing auspices; few have been conducted in so ill-advised a manner through their whole progress; and none attended in their close with more indiscriminate and overwhelming ruin.

On the 3rd of January, 1504, Gonsalvo made his entry into Gaeta; and the thunders of his ordnance, now for the first time heard from its battlements, announced that this strong key to the dominions of Naples had passed into the hands of Aragon. After a short delay for the refreshment of his troops, he set out

(1) Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 456—458.—Giovio, *Vite Illust. Virorum*, fol. 269, 270.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, pp. 332, 337.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louis XII.* p. 173.

(2) Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 86.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 23.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 190.—Giovio, *Vite Illust. Virorum*, ubi supra.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. pp. 254—256.

for the capital. But, amidst the general jubilee which greeted his return, he was seized with a fever, brought on by the incessant fatigue and high mental excitement in which he had been kept for the last four months. The attack was severe, and the event for some time doubtful. During this state of suspense, the public mind was in the deepest agitation. The popular manners of Gonsalvo had won the hearts of the giddy people of Naples, who transferred their affections, indeed, as readily as their allegiance; and prayers and vows for his restoration were offered up in all the churches and monasteries of the city. His excellent constitution at length got the better of his disease. As soon as this favourable result was ascertained, the whole population, rushing to the other extreme, abandoned itself to a delirium of joy; and, when he was sufficiently recovered to give them audience, men of all ranks thronged to Castel Nuovo to tender their congratulations, and obtain a sight of the hero, who now returned to their capital, for the third time, with the laurel of victory on his brow. Every tongue, says his enthusiastic biographer, was eloquent in his praise: some dwelling on his noble port, and the beauty of his countenance; others on the elegance and amenity of his manners; and all dazzled by a spirit of munificence which would have become royalty itself.(1)

The tide of panegyric was swelled by more than one bard, who sought, though with indifferent success, to catch inspiration from so glorious a theme; trusting, doubtless, that his liberal hand would not stint the recompense to the precise measure of desert. Amid this general burst of adulation, the muso of Sannazaro, worth all his tribe, was alone silent; for the trophies of the conqueror were raised on the ruins of that royal house under which the bard had been so long sheltered: and this silence, so rare in his tuneful brethren, must be admitted to reflect more credit on his name than the best he ever sung.(2)

The first business of Gonsalvo was to call together the different orders of the state, and receive their oaths of allegiance to King Ferdinand. He next occupied himself with the necessary arrangements for the re-organisation of the government, and for reforming various abuses which had crept into the administration of justice more particularly. In these attempts to introduce order, he was not a little thwarted, however, by the insubordination of his own soldiery. They loudly clamoured for the discharge of the arrears, still shamefully protracted, till, their discontents swelling to open mutiny, they forcibly seized on two of the principal places in the kingdom as secu-

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, fol. 270, 271.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 298.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 1.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 359.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 190, 191.

(2) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, f. 271.

city for the payment. Gonsalvo chastised their insolence by disbanding several of the most refractory companies, and sending them home for punishment. He endeavoured to relieve them in part by raising contributions from the Neapolitans. But the soldiers took the matter into their own hands, oppressing the unfortunate people on whom they were quartered, in a manner which rendered their condition scarcely more tolerable than when exposed to the horrors of actual war.(1) This was the introduction, according to Guicciardini, of those systematic military exactions in time of peace, which became so common afterwards in Italy, adding an inconceivable amount to the long catalogue of woes which afflicted that unhappy land.(2)

Amidst his manifold duties, Gonsalvo did not forget the gallant officers who had borne with him the burdens of the war; and he requited their services in a princely style, better suited to his feelings than his interests, as subsequently appeared. Among them were Navarro, Mendoza, Andrada, Benavides, Leyva, the Italians Alviano and the two Colonnas, most of whom lived to display the lessons of tactics which they learned under this great commander, on a still wider theatre of glory, in the reign of Charles the Fifth. He made them grants of cities, fortresses, and extensive lands, according to their various claims, to be held as fiefs of the crown. All this was done with the previous sanction of his royal master, Ferdinand the Catholic. They did some violence, however, to his more economical spirit; and he was heard somewhat peevishly to exclaim, "It boots little for Gonsalvo de Cordova to have won a kingdom for me, if he lavishes it all away before it comes into my hands." It began to be perceived at court that the Great Captain was too powerful for a subject.(3)

Meanwhile, Louis the Twelfth was filled with serious apprehensions for the fate of his possessions in the north of Italy. His former allies, the emperor Maximilian and the republic of Venice,—the latter more especially,—had shown many indications, not merely of coldness to himself, but of a secret understanding with his rival, the king of Spain. The restless pope, Julius the Second, had schemes of his own, wholly independent of France. The republics of Pisa and Genoa, the latter one of her avowed dependencies, had entered into correspondence with the Great Captain, and invited him to assume their protection;

(1) "Servire per sempre, vincitrice o vinta." The Italians began at this early period to feel the pressure of those woes, which a century and a half later wrung out of Eliecaja the beautiful lament, which has lost something of its touching graces, even under the hand of Lord Byron.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 64.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 310, 311.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, ubi supra. See also Gonsalvo's letter to the sovereigns, in which he states that all Italy this year was wasted by a terrible famine, brought on by the neglect of husbandry, as well as by the unprecedented rains.—*Carta de Napoles*, 25 de Agosto, 1503, MS.

(3) Giovio, *Vite Illust. Virorum*, fol. 270, 271.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 1.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 24.

while several of the disaffected party in Milan had assured him of their active support, in case he would march with a sufficient force to overturn the existing government. Indeed, not only France, but Europe in general, expected that the Spanish commander would avail himself of the present crisis to push his victorious arms into upper Italy, revolutionise Tuscany in his way, and, wresting Milan from the French, drive them, crippled and disheartened by their late reverses, beyond the Alps.(1)

But Gonsalvo had occupation enough on his hands in settling the disordered state of Naples. King Ferdinand, his sovereign, notwithstanding the ambition of universal conquest absurdly imputed to him by the French writers, had no design to extend his acquisitions beyond what he could permanently maintain. His treasury, never overflowing, was too deeply drained by the late heavy demands on it, for him so soon to embark on another perilous enterprise, that must arouse anew the swarms of enemies who seemed willing to rest in quiet after their long and exhausting struggle; nor is there any reason to suppose he sincerely contemplated such a movement for a moment.(2)

The apprehension of it, however, answered Ferdinand's purpose, by preparing the French monarch to arrange his differences with his rival, as the latter now earnestly desired, by negotiation. Indeed, two Spanish ministers had resided during the greater part of the war at the French court, with the view of improving the first opening that should occur for accomplishing this object; and by their agency a treaty was concluded, to continue for three years, which guaranteed to Aragon the undisturbed possession of her conquests during that period. The chief articles provided for the immediate cessation of hostilities between the belligerents, and the complete re-establishment of their commercial relations and intercourse, with the exception of Naples, from which the French were to be excluded. The Spanish crown was to have full power to reduce all refractory places in that kingdom; and the contracting parties solemnly pledged themselves, each to render no assistance, secretly or openly, to the enemies of the other. The treaty, which was to run from the 25th of February, 1504, was signed by the French king and the Spanish plenipotentiaries at Lyons on the 11th of that month, and ratified by Ferdinand and Isabella, at the con-

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 338.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 64.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, rey 30, cap. 14.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, pp. 85, 86.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 66. The campaign against Louis XII. had cost the Spanish crown 331 *cuentos* or millions of maravedis, equivalent to 9,268,000 dollars of the present time. A moderate charge enough for the conquest of a kingdom; and made still lighter to the Spaniards by one-fifth of the whole being drawn from Naples itself.—See Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. 359.

vent of Santa Maria de la Mejorada, the 31st of March following.(1)

There was still a small spot in the heart of Naples, comprehending Venosa and several adjoining towns, where Louis d'Ars and his brave associates yet held out against the Spanish arms. Although cut off by the operation of this treaty from the hope of further support from home, the French knight disdained to surrender; but sallied out at the head of his little troop of gallant veterans, and thus, armed at all points, says Brantôme, with lance in rest, took his way through Naples and the centre of Italy. He marched in battle array, levying contributions for his support on the places through which he passed. In this manner he entered France, and presented himself before the court at Blois. The king and queen, delighted with his prowess, came forward to welcome him, and made good cheer, says the old chronicler, for himself and his companions, whom they recompensed with liberal largesses, proffering at the same time any boon to the brave knight which he should demand for himself. The latter, in return, simply requested that his old comrade, Ives d'Alègre, should be recalled from exile. This trait of magnanimity, when contrasted with the general ferocity of the times, has something in it inexpressibly pleasing. It shows, like others recorded of the French gentlemen of that period, that the age of chivalry—the chivalry of romance, indeed—had not wholly passed away.(2)

The pacification of Lyons sealed the fate of Naples; and, while it terminated the wars in that kindom, closed the military career of Gonsalvo de Cordova. It is impossible to contemplate the magnitude of the results achieved with such slender resources, and in the face of such overwhelming odds, without deep admiration for the genius of the man by whom they were accomplished.

His success, it is true, is imputable in part to the signal errors of his adversaries. The magnificent expedition of Charles the Eighth failed to produce any permanent impression, chiefly in consequence of the precipitation with which it had been entered into, without sufficient concert with the Italian states, who became a formidable enemy when united in his rear. He did not even avail himself of his temporary acquisition of Naples to gather support from the attachment of his new subjects. Far from incorporating with them, he was regarded as a foreigner and an enemy, and, as such, expelled by the joint

(1) The treaty is to be found in Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. No. 26, pp. 51–53.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 64.—Machiavelli, *Legazione Seconda a Francia*, let. 9, Feb. 11.

(2) Brantôme, *Œuvres*, tom. ii. disc. 11.—Fleurbaey, *Mémoires*, chap. 5, and Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xvi.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 85.—Gallard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. pp. 253–256.—See also *Mémoires de Bayard*, chap. 25; the good knight, “sans peur et sans reproche,” made one of this intrepid little band, having joined Louis d'Ars after the capitulation of Gaeta.



action of all Italy from its bosom, as soon as it had recovered sufficient strength to rally.

Louis the Twelfth profited by the errors of his predecessor. His acquisitions in the Milanese formed a basis for future operations; and, by negotiation and otherwise, he secured the alliance and the interests of the various Italian governments on his side. These preliminary arrangements were followed by preparations every way commensurate with his object. He failed in the first campaign, however, by intrusting the command to incompetent hands, consulting birth rather than talent or experience.

In the succeeding campaigns, his failure, though partly chargeable on himself, was less so than on circumstances beyond his control. The first of these was the long detention of the army before Rome by Cardinal d'Amboise, and its consequent exposure to the unexampled severity of the ensuing winter. A second was the fraudulent conduct of the commissaries, implying, no doubt, some degree of negligence in the person who appointed them; and lastly, the want of a suitable commander-in-chief of the army. La Trémouille being ill, and D'Aubigny a prisoner in the hands of the enemy, there appeared no one among the French qualified to cope with the Spanish general. The marquis of Mantua, independently of the disadvantage of being a foreigner, was too timid in council and dilatory in conduct, to be any way competent to this difficult task.

If his enemies, however, committed great errors, it is altogether owing to Gonsalvo that he was in a situation to take advantage of them. Nothing could be more unpromising than his position on first entering Calabria. Military operations had been conducted in Spain on principles totally different from those which prevailed in the rest of Europe. This was the case, especially in the late Moorish wars, where the old tactics and the character of the ground brought light cavalry chiefly into use. This, indeed, constituted his principal strength at this period; for his infantry, though accustomed to irregular service, was indifferently armed and disciplined. An important revolution, however, had occurred in the other parts of Europe. The infantry had there regained the superiority which it had maintained in the days of the Greeks and Romans. The experiment had been made on more than one bloody field; and it was found that the solid columns of Swiss and German pikes not only bore down all opposition in their onward march, but presented an impregnable barrier, not to be shaken by the most desperate charges of the best heavy-armed cavalry. It was against those dreaded battalions that Gonsalvo was called to measure for the first time the bold, but rudely armed and comparatively raw, recruits from Galicia and the Asturias.

He lost his first battle, into which it should be remembered he was precipitated against his will. He proceeded afterwards

with the greatest caution, gradually familiarising his men with the aspect and usages of the enemy whom they held in such awe, before bringing them again to a direct encounter. He put himself to school during this whole campaign, carefully acquainting himself with the tactics, discipline, and novel arms of his adversaries, and borrowing just so much as he could incorporate into the ancient system of the Spaniards, without discarding the latter altogether. Thus, while he retained the short sword and buckler of his countrymen, he fortified his battalions with a large number of spearmen, after the German fashion. The arrangement is highly commended by the sagacious Machiavelli, who considers it as combining the advantages of both systems; since, while the long spear served all the purposes of resistance, or even of attack on level ground, the short swords and targets enabled their wearers, as already noticed, to cut in under the dense array of hostile pikes, and bring the enemy to close quarters, where his formidable weapon was of no avail.(1)

While Gonsalvo made this innovation in the arms and tactics, he paid equal attention to the formation of a suitable character in his soldiery. The circumstances in which he was placed at Barletta, and on the Garigliano, imperatively demanded this. Without food, clothes, or pay, without the chance even of retrieving his desperate condition by venturing a blow at the enemy, the Spanish soldier was required to remain passive. To do this he demanded patience, abstinence, strict subordination, and a degree of resolution far higher than that required to combat obstacles, however formidable in themselves, where active exertion, which tasks the utmost energies of the soldier, renews his spirits, and raises them to a contempt of danger. It was calling on him, in short, to begin with achieving that most difficult of all victories, the victory over himself.

All this the Spanish commander effected. He infused into his men a portion of his own invincible energy. He inspired a love of his person, which led them to emulate his example; and a confidence in his genius and resources, which supported them under all their privations by a firm reliance on a fortunate issue. His manners were distinguished by a graceful courtesy, less encumbered with etiquette than was usual with persons of his high rank in Castile. He knew well the proud and independent feelings of the Spanish soldier; and, far from annoying him by unnecessary restraints, showed the most liberal indul-

(1) Machiavelli, *Arte della Guerra*, lib. 2. Machiavelli considers the victory over D'Aubigny at Seminara as imputable in a great degree to the peculiar arms of the Spaniards, who, with their short swords and shields, gliding in among the deep ranks of the Swiss spearmen, brought them to close combat, where the former had the whole advantage. Another instance of the kind occurred at the memorable battle of Ravenna some years later.—*Ubi supra*.

gence at all times. But his kindness was tempered with severity, which displayed itself on such occasions as required interposition, in a manner that rarely failed to repress everything like insubordination. The reader will readily recall an example of this in the mutiny before Tarento; and it was doubtless by the assertion of similar power that he was so long able to keep in check his German mercenaries, distinguished above the troops of every other nation by their habitual license and contempt of authority.

While Gonsalvo relied so freely on the hardy constitution and patient habits of the Spaniards, he trusted no less to the deficiency of these qualities in the French, who, possessing little of the artificial character formed under the stern training of later times, resembled their Gaulish ancestors in the facility with which they were discouraged by unexpected obstacles, and the difficulty with which they could be brought to rally.(1) In this he did not miscalculate. The French infantry, drawn from the militia of the country, hastily collected and soon to be disbanded, and the independent nobility and gentry who composed the cavalry service, were alike difficult to be brought within the strict curb of military rule. The severe trials, which steeled the souls and gave sinewy strength to the constitutions of the Spanish soldiers, impaired those of their enemies, introduced divisions into their councils, and relaxed the whole tone of discipline. Gonsalvo watched the operation of all this, and, coolly waiting the moment when his weary and disheartened adversary should be thrown off his guard, collected all his strength for a decisive blow, by which to terminate the action. Such was the history of those memorable campaigns, which closed with the brilliant victories of Cerignola and the Garigliano.

In a review of his military conduct, we must not overlook his politic deportment towards the Italians, altogether the reverse of the careless and insolent bearing of the French. He availed himself liberally of their superior science, showing great deference, and confiding the most important trusts, to their officers.(2) Far from the reserve usually shown to foreigners, he appeared insensible to national distinctions, and ardently embraced them as companions in arms, embarked in a common cause with himself. In their tourney with the French before Barletta, to which the whole nation attached such importance as a vindication of national honour, they were entirely supported

(1) "Prima," says Livy pithily, speaking of the Gauls in the time of the Republic, "*eorum prœlia plus quam virorum, postrema minus quam faminarum.*"—Lib. 10, cap. 25.

(2) Two of the most distinguished of these were the Colonnas, Prospero and Fabrizio, of whom frequent mention has been made in our narrative. The best commentary on the military reputation of the latter, is the fact, that he is selected by Machiavelli as the principal interlocutor in his *Dialogues on the Art of War*.

by Gonsalvo, who furnished them with arms, secured a fair field of fight, and shared the triumph of the victors as that of his own countrymen,—paying those delicate attentions, which cost far less indeed, but to an honourable mind are of greater value, than more substantial benefits. He conciliated the good will of the Italian states by various important services; of the Venetians, by his gallant defence of their possessions in the Levant; of the people of Rome, by delivering them from the pirates of Ostia; while he succeeded, notwithstanding the excesses of his soldiery, in captivating the giddy Neapolitans to such a degree, by his affable manners and splendid style of life, as seemed to efface from their minds every recollection of the last and most popular of their monarchs, the unfortunate Frederic.

The distance of Gonsalvo's theatre of operations from his own country, apparently most discouraging, proved extremely favourable to his purposes. The troops, cut off from retreat by a wide sea and an impassable mountain barrier, had no alternative but to conquer or to die. Their long continuance in the field without disbanding gave them all the stern inflexible qualities of a standing army; and, as they served through so many successive campaigns under the banner of the same leader, they were drilled in a system of tactics far steadier and more uniform than could be acquired under a variety of commanders, however able. Under these circumstances, which so well fitted them for receiving impressions, the Spanish army was gradually moulded into the form determined by the will of its great chief.

When we look at the amount of forces at the disposal of Gonsalvo, it appears so paltry, especially compared with the gigantic apparatus of later wars, that it may well suggest disparaging ideas of the whole contest. To judge correctly, we must direct our eyes to the result. With this insignificant force we shall then see the kingdom of Naples conquered, and the best generals and armies of France annihilated; an important innovation effected in military science; the art of mining, if not invented, carried to unprecedented perfection; a thorough reform introduced in the arms and discipline of the Spanish soldier; and the organisation completed of that valiant infantry, which is honestly eulogised by a French writer as irresistible in attack, and impossible to rout; (1) and which carried the banners of Spain victorious for more than a century over the most distant parts of Europe.

(1) See Dubos, *Ligue de Cambray*, dissert. prélim. p. 60.—This French writer has shown himself superior to national distinctions, in the liberal testimony which he bears to the character of these brave troops. See a similar strain of panegyric from the chivalrous pen of old Brantôme.—*Œuvres*, tom. i. disc. 27.

The brilliant qualities and achievements of Gonsalvo de Cordova have naturally made him a popular theme both for history and romance. Various biographies of him have appeared in the different European languages, though none, I believe, hitherto in English. The authority of principal reference in these pages is the Life which Paolo Giovio has incorporated in his great work, "*Vita Illustrum Virorum*," which I have elsewhere noticed. The Life of Gonsalvo is not exempt from the prejudices, nor from the minor inaccuracies, which may be charged on most of this author's productions; but these are abundantly compensated by the stores of novel and interesting details which Giovio's familiarity with the principal actors of the time enabled him to throw into his work, and by the skillful arrangement of his narrative, so disposed as, without studied effort, to bring into light the prominent qualities of his hero. Every page bears the mark of that "golden pen" which the polite Italian reserved for his favourites; and while this obvious partiality may put the reader somewhat on his guard, it gives an interest to the work inferior to none other of his agreeable compositions.

The most imposing of the Spanish memoirs of Gonsalvo, in bulk at least, is the "*Crónica del Gran Capitán*," Alcalá de Hénarez, 1584. Nic. Antonio doubts whether the author were Pulgar, who wrote the "*History of the Catholic Kings*," of such frequent reference in the Granadine wars; or another Pulgar del Salar, as he is called, who received the honours of knighthood from King Ferdinand for his valorous exploits against the Moors. (See *Bibliotheca Nova*, tom. i. p. 387.) With regard to the first Pulgar, there is no reason to suppose that he lived into the sixteenth century; and as to the second, the work composed by him, so far from being the one in question, was a compendium, bearing the title of "*Sumario de los Hechos del Gran Capitán*," printed as early as 1527, at Seville. (See the editor's prologue to Pulgar's "*Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*," ed. Valencia, 1780.) Its author, therefore, remains in obscurity. He sustains no great damage on the score of reputation, however, from this circumstance, as his work is but an indifferent specimen of the rich old Spanish Chronicle, exhibiting most of its characteristic blemishes, with a very small admixture of its beauties. The long and prosy narrative is overloaded with the most frivolous details, trumpeted forth in a strain of glorification which sometimes disfigures more meritorious compositions in the Castilian. Nothing like discrimination of character, of course, is to be looked for in the unvarying swell of panegyric, which claims for its subject all the extravagant flights of a hero of romance. With these deductions, however, and a liberal allowance, consequently, for the nationality of the work, it has considerable value as a record of events too recent in their occurrence to be seriously defaced by those deeper stains of error which are so apt to settle on the weather-beaten monuments of antiquity. It has accordingly formed a principal source of the "*Vida del Gran Capitán*," introduced by Quintana in the first volume of his "*Españoles Célèbres*," printed at Madrid in 1807. This memoir, in which the incidents are selected with discernment, displays the usual freedom and vivacity of its poetic author. It does not bring the general politics of the period under review, but will not be found deficient in particulars having immediate connection with the personal history of its subject; and, on the whole, exhibits in an agreeable and compendious form whatever is of most interest or importance to the general reader.

The French have also a "*Histoire de Gonsalvo de Cordoue*," composed by Father Duponcet, a Jesuit, in two vols. 12mo, Paris, 1714. Though an ambitious, it is a bungling performance, most unskillfully put together, and contains quite as much of what its hero did not do, as of what he did. The prolixity of the narrative is not even relieved by that piquancy of style which forms something like a substitute for thought in many of the lower order of French historians. It is less to history, however, than to romance, that the French public is indebted for its conceptions of the character of Gonsalvo de Cordova, as depicted by the gaudy pencil of Florian, in that highly poetic colouring, which is more attractive to the majority of readers than the cold and sober delineations of truth.

The contemporary French accounts of the Neapolitan wars of Louis XII. are extremely meagre, and few in number. The most striking, on the whole, is

D'Auton's chronicle, composed in the true chivalrous vein of old Froissart, but unfortunately terminating before the close of the first campaign. St. Gelais and Claude Seyssel touch very lightly on this part of their subject. History becomes in their hands, moreover, little better than fulsome panegyric, carried to such a height, indeed, by the latter writer, as brought on him the most severe strictures from his contemporaries: so that he was compelled to take up the pen more than once in his own vindication. The "*Mémoires de Bayard*," Meurange, and *La Trémouille*, so diffuse in most military details, are nearly silent in regard to those of the Neapolitan war. The truth is, the subject was too ungrateful in itself, and presented too unbroken a series of calamities and defeats, to invite the attention of the French historians, who willingly turned to those brilliant passages in this reign more soothing to national vanity.

The blank has been filled up, or rather attempted to be so, by the assiduity of their later writers. Among these, occasionally consulted by me, are Varillas, whose "*Histoire de Louis XII.*," loose as it is, rests on a somewhat more solid basis than his metaphysical reveries, assuming the title of "*Politique de Ferdinand*," already repeatedly noticed; Garnier, whose perspicuous narrative, if inferior to that of Gaillard in acuteness and epigrammatic point, makes a much nearer approach to truth; and, lastly, Sismondi, who, if he may be charged, in his "*Histoire des Français*," with some of the defects incident to indiscreet rapidity of composition, succeeds by a few brief and animated touches in opening deeper views into character and conduct than can be got from volumes of ordinary writers.

The want of authentic materials for a perfect acquaintance with the reign of Louis XII. is a subject of complaint with French writers themselves. The memoirs of the period, occupied with the more dazzling military transactions, make no attempt to instruct us in the interior organisation or policy of the government. One might imagine that their authors lived a century before Philippe de Comines, instead of coming after him, so inferior are they, in all the great properties of historic composition, to this eminent statesman. The French *sanans* have made slender contributions to the stock of original documents, collected more than two centuries ago by Godefroy for the illustration of this reign. It can scarcely be supposed, however, that the labours of this early antiquary exhausted the department in which the French are rich beyond all others, and that those who work the same mine hereafter should not find valuable materials for a broader foundation of this interesting portion of their history.

It is fortunate that the reserve of the French in regard to their relations with Italy at this time, has been abundantly compensated by the labours of the most eminent contemporary writers of the latter country, as Bembo, Machiavelli, Glorio, and the philosophic Guicciardini; whose situation as Italians enabled them to maintain the balance of historic truth undisturbed, at least by undue partiality for either of the two great rival powers; whose high public stations introduced them to the principal characters of the day, and to springs of action hidden from vulgar eyes; and whose superior science, as well as genius, qualified them for rising above the humble level of garrulous chronicle and memoir to the classic dignity of history. It is with regret that we must now strike into a track unilluminated by the labours of these great masters of their art in modern times.

Since the publication of this History, the Spanish minister at Washington, Don Angel Calderon de la Barea, did me the favour to send me a copy of the biography above noticed as the "*Sumario de los Hechos del Gran Capitan*." It is a recent reprint from the ancient edition of 1527, of which the industrious editor, Don F. Martinez de la Rosa, was able to find but one copy in Spain. In its new form it covers about a hundred duodecimo pages. It has positive value as a contemporary document, and as such I gladly avail myself of it. But the greater part is devoted to the early history of Gonsalvo, over which my limits have compelled me to pass lightly; and for the rest, I am happy to find, on the perusal of it, nothing of moment which conflicts with the statements drawn from other sources. The able editor has also combined an interesting notice of its author, Pulgar, *El de las Hazañas*, one of those heroes whose doughty feats shed the illusions of knight-errantry over the war of Granada.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## ILLNESS AND DEATH OF ISABELLA,—HER CHARACTER.

1504.

Decline of the Queen's Health—Alarm of the Nation—Her Testament—and Codicil—Her Resignation and Death—Her Remains transported to Granada—Isabella's Person—Her Manners—Her Character—Parallel with Queen Elizabeth.

THE acquisition of an important kingdom in the heart of Europe, and of the New World beyond the waters, which promised to pour into her lap all the fabled treasures of the Indies, was rapidly raising Spain to the first rank of European powers. But, in this noontide of her success, she was to experience a fatal shock in the loss of that illustrious personage who had so long and so gloriously presided over her destinies. We have had occasion to notice more than once the declining state of the queen's health during the last few years. Her constitution had been greatly impaired by incessant personal fatigue and exposure, and by the unremitting activity of her mind. It had suffered far more severely, however, from a series of heavy domestic calamities, which had fallen on her with little intermission since the death of her mother in 1496. The next year, she followed to the grave the remains of her only son, the heir and hope of the monarchy, just entering on his prime; and, in the succeeding, was called on to render the same sad offices to the best-beloved of her daughters, the amiable queen of Portugal.

The severe illness occasioned by this last blow, terminated in a dejection of spirits, from which she never entirely recovered. Her surviving children were removed far from her into distant lands; with the occasional exception, indeed, of Joanna, who caused a still deeper pang to her mother's affectionate heart, by exhibiting infirmities which justified the most melancholy presages for the future.

Far from abandoning herself to weak and useless repining, however, Isabella sought consolation, where it was best to be found, in the exercises of piety, and in the earnest discharge of the duties attached to her exalted station. Accordingly, we find her attentive as ever to the minutest interests of her subjects; supporting her great minister Ximenes in his schemes of reform, quickening the zeal for discovery in the west, and, at the close of the year 1503, on the alarm of the French invasion.

rousing her dying energies to kindle a spirit of resistance in her people. These strong mental exertions, however, only accelerated the decay of her bodily strength, which was gradually sinking under that sickness of the heart which admits of no cure, and scarcely of consolation.

In the beginning of that very year she had declined so visibly, that the cortes of Castile, much alarmed, petitioned her to provide for the government of the kingdom after her decease, in case of the absence or incapacity of Joanna. (1) She seems to have rallied in some measure after this; but it was only to relapse into a state of greater debility, as her spirits sunk under the conviction, which now forced itself on her, of her daughter's settled insanity.

Early in the spring of the following year (1504), that unfortunate lady embarked for Flanders, where, soon after her arrival, the inconstancy of her husband, and her own ungovernable sensibilities, occasioned the most scandalous scenes. Philip became openly enamoured of one of the ladies of her suite; and his injured wife, in a paroxysm of jealousy, personally assaulted her fair rival in the palace, and caused the beautiful looks which had excited the admiration of her fickle husband to be shorn from her head. This outrage so affected Philip, that he vented his indignation against Joanna in the coarsest and most unmanly terms, and finally refused to have any further intercourse with her. (2)

The account of this disgraceful scene reached Castile in the month of June. It occasioned the deepest chagrin and mortification to the unhappy parents. Ferdinand soon after fell ill of a fever, and the queen was seized with the same disorder, accompanied by more alarming symptoms. Her illness was exasperated by anxiety for her husband, and she refused to credit the favourable reports of his physicians while he was detained from her presence. His vigorous constitution, however, threw off the malady, while hers gradually failed under it. Her tender heart was more keenly sensible than his to the unhappy condition of their child, and to the gloomy prospects which awaited her beloved Castile. (3)

Her faithful follower Martyr was with the court at this time in Medina del Campo. In a letter to the count of Tendilla, dated October 7th, he states that the most serious apprehensions were entertained by the physicians for the queen's fate. "Her whole system," he says, "is pervaded by a consuming fever. She loathes food of every kind, and is tormented with incessant

(1) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 11.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 84.

(2) Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 271, 272.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 46.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1504.

(3) Gomez, *de Rebus Gestis*, fol. 46, 47.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 273.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1504.



thirst, while the disorder has all the appearance of terminating in a dropsy." (1)

In the mean while, Isabella lost nothing of her solicitude for the welfare of her people, and the great concerns of government. While reclining, as she was obliged to do great part of the day, on her couch, she listened to the recital or reading of whatever occurred of interest, at home or abroad. She gave audience to distinguished foreigners, especially such Italians as could acquaint her with the particulars of the late war, and above all in regard to Gonsalvo do Cordova, in whose fortunes she had always taken the liveliest concern. (2) She received with pleasure, too, such intelligent travellers as her renown had attracted to the Castilian court. She drew forth their stores of various information, and dismissed them, says a writer of the age, penetrated with the deepest admiration of that masculine strength of mind which sustained her so nobly under the weight of a mortal malady. (3)

This malady was now rapidly gaining ground. On the 15th of October we have another epistle of Martyr, of the following melancholy tenor:—"You ask me respecting the state of the queen's health. We sit sorrowful in the palace all day long, tremblingly waiting the hour when religion and virtue shall quit the earth with her. Let us pray that we may be permitted to follow hereafter where she is soon to go. She so far transcends all human excellence, that there is scarcely anything of mortality about her. She can hardly be said to die, but to pass into a nobler existence; which should rather excite our envy than our sorrow. She leaves the world filled with her renown, and she goes to enjoy life eternal with her God in heaven. I write this," he concludes, "between hope and fear, while the breath is still fluttering within her." (4)

The deepest gloom now overspread the nation. Even Isabella's long illness had failed to prepare the minds of her faithful people for the sad catastrophe. They recalled several ominous circumstances which had before escaped their attention. In the preceding spring, an earthquake, accompanied by a tre-

(1) Opus Epist. epist. 274.

(2) A short time before her death she received a visit from the distinguished officer Prospero Colonna. The Italian noble, on being presented to King Ferdinand, told him that "he had come to Castile to behold the woman, who from her sick-bed ruled the world," "ver una señora que desde la cama mandava al mundo."—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 8.—Carta de Gonzalo á los Reyes, en Nápoles, 25 de Agosto, 1503, MS.

(3) Gomez, de Rebus Gestis, fol. 47. Among the foreigners introduced to the queen at this time, was a celebrated Venetian traveller, named Vianelli, who presented her with a cross of pure gold set with precious stones, among which was a carbuncle of inestimable value. The liberal Italian met with rather an uncourteous rebuke from Ximenes, who told him, on leaving the presence, that "he had rather have the money his diamonds cost, to spend in the service of the church, than all the gems of the Indies."—Ibid.

(4) Opus Epist. epist. 276.

mendous hurricane, such as the oldest men did not remember, had visited Andalusia, and especially Carmona, a place belonging to the queen, and occasioned a frightful desolation there. The superstitious Spaniards now read in these portents the prophetic signs by which Heaven announces some great calamity. Prayers were put up in every temple; processions and pilgrimages made in every part of the country for the recovery of their beloved sovereign,—but in vain. (1)

Isabella, in the mean time, was deluded with no false hopes. She felt too surely the decay of her bodily strength, and she resolved to perform what temporal duties yet remained for her, while her faculties were still unclouded.

On the 12th of October she executed that celebrated testament which reflects so clearly the peculiar qualities of her mind and character. She begins with prescribing the arrangements for her burial. She orders her remains to be transported to Granada, the Franciscan monastery of Santa Isabella in the Alhambra, and there deposited in a low and humble sepulchre, without other memorial than a plain inscription on it. "But," she continues, "should the king my lord prefer a sepulchre in some other place, then my will is, that my body be there transported, and laid by his side; that the union we have enjoyed in this world, and, through the mercy of God, may hope again for our souls in heaven, may be represented by our bodies in the earth." Then, desirous of correcting by her example, in this last act of her life, the wasteful pomp of funeral obsequies to which the Castilians were addicted, she commands that her own should be performed in the plainest and most unostentatious manner, and that the sum saved by this economy should be distributed in alms among the poor.

She next provides for several charities, assigning, among others, marriage portions for poor maidens, and a considerable sum for the redemption of Christian captives in Barbary. She enjoins the punctual discharge of all her personal debts within a year; she retronches superfluous offices in the royal household, and revokes all such grants, whether in the forms of lands or annuities, as she conceives to have been made without sufficient warrant. She inculcates on her successors the importance of maintaining the integrity of the royal domains, and, above all, of never divesting themselves of their title to the important fortress of Gibraltar.

After this she comes to the succession of the crown, which she settles on the infanta Joanna as "queen proprietor," and the archduke Philip as her husband. She gives them much good counsel respecting their future administration; enjoining them, as they would secure the love and obedience of their subjects,

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 200, 201.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1504.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.—Zuñiga, Anales de Sevilla, pp. 423, 424.

to conform in all respects to the laws and usages of the realm, to appoint no foreigner to office, — an error into which Philip's connexions, she saw, would be very likely to betray them, and to make no laws or ordinances "which necessarily require the consent of cortes," during their absence from the kingdom.<sup>(1)</sup> She recommends to them the same conjugal harmony which had ever subsisted between her and her husband; she beseeches them to show the latter all the deference and filial affection "due to him beyond every other parent, for his eminent virtues;" and finally inculcates on them the most tender regard for the liberties and welfare of their subjects.

She next comes to the great question proposed by the cortes of 1503, respecting the government of the realm in the absence or incapacity of Joanna. She declares that, after mature deliberation, and with the advice of many of the prelates and nobles of the kingdom, she appoints King Ferdinand her husband to be the sole regent of Castile, in that exigency, until the majority of her grandson Charles; being led to this, she adds, "by the consideration of the magnanimity and illustrious qualities of the king my lord, as well as his large experience, and the great profit which will redound to the state from his wise and beneficial rule." She expresses her sincere conviction that his past conduct affords a sufficient guarantee for his faithful administration, but, in compliance with established usage, requires the customary oath from him on entering on the duties of the office.

She then makes a specific provision for her husband's personal maintenance, which, "although less than she could wish, and far less than he deserves, considering the eminent services he had rendered the state," she settles at one half of all the net proceeds and profits accruing from the newly discovered countries in the west; together with ten million maravedis annually, assigned on the *alcavalas* of the grandmasterships of the military orders.

After some additional regulations respecting the descent of the crown on failure of Joanna's lineal heirs, she recommends in the kindest and most emphatic terms to her successors the various members of her household, and her personal friends, among whom we find the names of the marquis and marchioness of Moya (Beatrice de Bobadilla, the companion of her youth), and Garcilasso de la Vega, the accomplished minister at the papal court.

And lastly, concluding in the same beautiful strain of conjugal tenderness in which she began, she says, "I beseech the king my lord that he will accept all my jewels, or such as he

(1) "Ni fagan fuera de los dichos mis Reynos e Señoríos, Leyes e Premáticas, ni las otras cosas que en Cortes se deven hazer segund las Leyes de ellos" (Testamento, apud Dormer, *Discursos Varios*, p. 343); an honourable testimony to the legislative rights of the cortes which contrasts strongly with the despotic assumption of preceding and succeeding princes.

shall select, so that, seeing them, he may be reminded of the singular love I always bore him while living, and that I am now waiting for him in a better world; by which remembrance he may be encouraged to live the more justly and holily in this."

Six executors were named to the will. The two principal were the king and the primate Ximenes, who had full powers to act in conjunction with any one of the others.(1)

I have dwelt the more minutely on the details of Isabella's testament, from the evidence it affords of her constancy in her dying hour to the principles which had governed her through life; of her expansive and sagacious policy; her prophetic insight into the evils to result from her death,—evils, alas! which no forecast could avert; her scrupulous attention to all her personal obligations; and that warm attachment to her friends which could never falter while a pulse beat in her bosom.

After performing this duty, she daily grew weaker, the powers of her mind seeming to brighten as those of her body declined. The concerns of her government still occupied her thoughts; and several public measures, which she had postponed through urgency of other business, or growing infirmities, pressed so heavily on her heart, that she made them the subject of a codicil to her former will. It was executed November 23rd, 1504, only three days before her death.

Three of the provisions contained in it are too remarkable to pass unnoticed. The first concerns the codification of the laws. For this purpose the queen appoints a commission to make a new digest of the statutes and *pragmáticas*, the contradictory tenor of which still occasioned much embarrassment in Castilian jurisprudence. This was a subject she always had much at heart; but no nearer approach had been made to it than the valuable though insufficient work of Montalvo, in the early part of her reign; and, notwithstanding her precautions, none more effectual was destined to take place till the reign of Philip the Second.(2)

The second item had reference to the natives of the New World. Gross abuses had arisen there since the partial revival of the *repartimientos*, although Las Casas says, "intelligence of this was carefully kept from the ears of the queen."(3)

(1) I have before me three copies of Isabella's testament; one in MS. apud Carbajal, Anales, año 1504; a second, printed in the beautiful Valencia edition of Mariana, tom. ix. apend. No. 1; and a third, published in Dormer's Discursos Varios de Historia, pp. 314—388. I am not aware that it has been printed elsewhere.

(2) The "Ordenanças Reales de Castilla," published in 1484, and the "Pragmáticas del Reyno," first printed in 1503, comprehend the general legislation of this reign; a particular account of which the reader may find in Part I. Chapter 6, and Part II. Chapter 26, vol. II. of this History.

(3) Las Casas, who will not be suspected of sycophancy, remarks, in his narrative of the destruction of the Indies, "Les plus grandes horreurs de ces-

Some vague apprehension of the truth, however, appears to have forced itself on her; and she enjoins her successors, in the most earnest manner, to quicken the good work of converting and civilising the poor Indians, to treat them with the greatest gentleness, and redress any wrongs they may have suffered in their persons or property.

Lastly, she expresses her doubts as to the legality of the revenue drawn from the *alcavalas*, constituting the principal income of the crown. She directs a commission to ascertain whether it were originally intended to be perpetual, and if this were done with the free consent of the people; enjoining her heirs, in that event to collect the tax so that it should press least heavily on her subjects. Should it be found otherwise, however, she directs that the legislature be summoned to devise proper measures for supplying the wants of the crown,—“measures depending for their validity on the good pleasure of the subjects of the realm.” (1)

Such were the dying words of this admirable woman, displaying the same respect for the rights and liberties of the nation which she had shown through life, and striving to secure the blessings of her benign administration to the most distant and barbarous regions under her sway. These two documents were a precious legacy bequeathed to her people, to guide them when the light of her personal example should be withdrawn for ever.

The queen's signature to the codicil, which still exists among the manuscripts of the Royal Library at Madrid, shows, by its irregular and scarcely legible characters, the feeble state to which she was then reduced. (2) She had now adjusted all her worldly concerns; and she prepared to devote herself, during the brief space which remained, to those of a higher nature. It was but the last act of a life of preparation. She had the misfortune, common to persons of her rank, to be separated in her last moments from those whose filial tenderness might have done so much to soften the bitterness of death. But she had the good fortune, most rare, to have secured for this trying hour the solace of disinterested friendship; for she beheld

guerres et de cette boucherie commencèrent aussitôt qu'on sut en Amérique que la reine Isabelle venait de mourir; car jusqu'alors il ne s'était pas commis autant de crimes dans l'île Espagnole, et l'on avait même eu soin de les cacher à cette princesse, parcequ'elle ne cessait de recommander de traiter les Indiens avec douceur, et de ne rien négliger pour les rendre heureux: j'ai vu, ainsi que beaucoup d'Espagnols, les lettres qu'elle écrivait à ce sujet, et les ordres, qu'elle envoyait; ce qui prouve que cette admirable reine aurait mis fin à tant de cruautés, si elle avait pu les connaître.”—Œuvres, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 21.

(1) The original codicil is still preserved among the manuscripts of the Royal Library at Madrid. It is appended to the queen's testament in the works before noticed.

(2) Clemensin has given a fac-simile of this last signature of the queen, in the Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Hist. 21.

around her the friends of her childhood, formed and proved in the dark season of adversity.

As she saw them bathed in tears around her bed, she calmly said, "Do not weep for me, nor waste your time in fruitless prayers for my recovery, but pray rather for the salvation of my soul." (1) On receiving the extreme unction, she refused to have her feet exposed, as was usual on that occasion; a circumstance which, occurring at a time when there can be no suspicion of affectation, is often noticed by Spanish writers as a proof of that sensitive delicacy and decorum which distinguished her through life. (2) At length, having received the sacraments, and performed all the offices of a sincere and devout Christian, she gently expired, a little before noon, on Wednesday, November 26th, 1504, in the fifty-fourth year of her age, and thirtieth of her reign. (3)

"My hand," says Peter Martyr, in a letter written on the same day to the archbishop of Granada, "falls powerless by my side for very sorrow. The world has lost its noblest ornament; a loss to be deplored not only by Spain, which she has so long carried forward in the career of glory, but by every nation in Christendom; for she was the mirror of every virtue, the shield of the innocent, and an avenging sword to the wicked. I know none of her sex, in ancient or modern times, who in my judgment is at all worthy to be named with this incomparable woman." (4)

No time was lost in making preparations for transporting the queen's body, unembalmed, to Granada, in strict conformity to her orders. It was escorted by a numerous *cortège* of cavaliers and ecclesiastics, among whom was the faithful Martyr. The procession began its mournful march the day following her death, taking the route through Arevalo, Toledo, and Jaen. Scarcely had it left Medina del Campo, when a tremendous tempest set in, which continued with little interruption during the whole journey. The roads were rendered nearly impassable; the bridges swept away, the small streams swollen to the size of the Tagus, and the level country buried under a deluge of water. Neither sun nor stars were seen during their whole progress. The horses and mules were borne down by the torrents, and the riders in several instances perished with them. "Never," exclaims Martyr, "did I encounter such perils in the whole of my hazardous pilgrimage to Egypt." (5)

(1) L. Marineo, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 157.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16.

(2) Arevalo, *Historia Palentina*, MS. apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. p. 572.—L. Marineo, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 187.—Garibay, *Compendio*, ubi supra.

(3) Isabella was born April 22nd, 1451, and ascended the throne December 11th, 1474.

(4) *Opus Epist.* epist. 279.

(5) *Opus Epist.* epist. 280.—The text does not exaggerate the language of the epistle.

At length, on the 18th of December, the melancholy and way-worn cavalcade reached the place of its destination; and, amidst the wild strife of the elements, the peaceful remains of Isabella were laid, with simple solemnities, in the Franciscan monastery of the Alhambra. Here, under the shadow of those venerable Moslem towers, and in the heart of the capital which her noble constancy had recovered for her country, they continued to repose till after the death of Ferdinand, when they were removed to be laid by his side, in the stately mansoleum of the cathedral church of Granada. (1)

I shall defer the review of Queen Isabella's administration until it can be done in conjunction with that of Ferdinand; and shall confine myself at present to such considerations on the prominent traits of her character as have been suggested by the preceding history of her life.

Her person, as mentioned in the early part of the narrative, was of the middle height, and well proportioned. She had a clear, fresh complexion, with light blue eyes and auburn hair, — a style of beauty exceedingly rare in Spain. Her features were regular, and universally allowed to be uncommonly handsome. (2) The illusion which attaches to rank, more especially when united with engaging manners, might lead us to suspect some exaggeration in the eulogiums so liberally lavished on her. But they would seem to be in a great measure justified by the portraits that remain of her, which combine a faultless symmetry of features, with singular sweetness and intelligence of expression.

Her manners were most gracious and pleasing. They were marked by natural dignity and modest reserve, tempered by an affability which flowed from the kindness of her disposition. She was the last person to be approached with undue familiarity; yet the respect which she imposed was mingled with the strongest feelings of devotion and love. She showed great tact in accommodating herself to the peculiar situation and character of those around her. She appeared in arms at the head of her troops, and shrunk from none of the hardships of war. During the reforms introduced into the religious

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 201. — Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1504. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16. — Zurita, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 84. — Navagiero, Viaggio, fol. 23.

(2) The curate of Los Palacios remarks of her, "Fue muger hermosa, de muy gentil cuerpo, e gesto, e composicion." — (Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 201.) Pulgar, another contemporary, eulogises "el mirar muy gracioso, y honesto, las facciones del rostro bien puestas, la cara toda muy hermosa." — (Reyes Católicos, part 1, cap. 4.) L. Marinero says, "Todo lo que avia en el rey de dignidad, se hallava en la reyna de graciosa hermosura, y en entrambos se mostrava una majestad venerable, aunque a juyzio de muchos la reyna era de mayor hermosura." — (Cosas Memorables, fol. 182.) And Oviedo, who had likewise frequent opportunities of personal observation, does not hesitate to declare, "En hermosura puestas delante de S.A. todas las mugeres que yo he visto, ninguna vi tan graciosa, ni tanto de ver como su persona." — Quinquagenas, MS.

houses, she visited the nunneries in person, taking her needle-work with her, and passing the day in the society of the inmates. When travelling in Galicia, she attired herself in the costume of the country, borrowing for that purpose the jewels and other ornaments of the ladies there, and returning them with liberal additions.(1) By this condescending and captivating deportment, as well as by her higher qualities, she gained an ascendancy over her turbulent subjects which no king of Spain could ever boast.

She spoke the Castilian with much elegance and correctness. She had an easy fluency of discourse, which, though generally of a serious complexion, was occasionally seasoned with agreeable sallies, some of which have passed into proverbs.(2) She was temperate even to abstemiousness in her diet, seldom or never tasting wine;(3) and so frugal in her table, that the daily expenses for herself and family did not exceed the moderate sum of forty ducats.(4) She was equally simple and economical in her apparel. On all public occasions, indeed, she displayed a royal magnificence;(5) but she had no relish for it in private, and she freely gave away her clothes(6) and jewels,(7) as presents to her friends. Naturally of a sedate, though cheerful temper,(8) she had little taste for the frivolous amusements which make up so much of a court life; and, if she encouraged the presence of minstrels and musicians in her palace, it was to wean her young nobility from the coarser and less intellectual pleasures to which they were addicted.(9)

Among her moral qualities, the most conspicuous, perhaps, was her magnanimity. She betrayed nothing little or selfish, in thought or action. Her schemes were vast, and executed in the same noble spirit in which they were conceived. She never

(1) Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 8.

(2) Mem. de la Acad. ubi supra.

(3) L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, fol. 182.—Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, part 1, cap. 4.

(4) Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. p. 329.

(5) Such occasions have rare charms, of course, for the gossiping chroniclers of the period. See, among others, the gorgeous ceremonial of the baptism and presentation of Prince John at Seville, 1478, as related by the good curate of Los Palacios.—(Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 32, 33.) "Isabella was surrounded and served," says Pulgar, "by grandees and lords of the highest rank, so that it was said she maintained too great pomp; *pompa demasiada*."—Reyes Católicos, part 1, cap. 4.

(6) Florez quotes a passage from an original letter of the queen, written soon after one of her progresses into Galicia, showing her habitual liberality in this way: "Decid a doña Luisa, que porque vengo de Galicia desecha de vestidos, no le envío para su hermana; que *no tengo agora cosa buena*; mas yo ge los enviare presto buenos."—Reynas Cathólicas, tom. ii, p. 339.

(7) See the magnificent inventory presented to her daughter-in-law, Margaret of Austria, and to her daughter Maria, queen of Portugal, apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 12.

(8) "Alegre," says the author of the "Carro de las Doñas," "de una alegría honesta y muy mesurada."—Ibid. p. 558.

(9) Among the retainers of the court, Bernaldez notices "la multitud de poetas, de trovadores, e músicos de todas partes."—Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 201.



employed doubtful agents or sinister measures, but the most direct and open policy. (1) She scorned to avail herself of advantages offered by the perfidy of others. (2) Where she had once given her confidence, she gave her hearty and steady support; and she was scrupulous to redeem any pledge she had made to those who ventured in her cause, however unpopular. She sustained Ximenes in all his obnoxious but salutary reforms. She seconded Columbus in the prosecution of his arduous enterprise, and shielded him from the calumny of his enemies. She did the same good service to her favourite Gonsalvo de Cordova; and the day of her death was felt, and, as it proved, truly felt by both, as the last of their good fortune. (3) Artifice and duplicity were so abhorrent to her character, and soaverse from her domestic policy, that when they appear in the foreign relations of Spain, it is certainly not imputable to her. She was incapable of harbouring any petty distrust or latent malice; and, although stern in the execution and exaction of public justice, she made the most generous allowance, and even sometimes advances to those who had personally injured her. (4)

But the principle which gave a peculiar colouring to every feature of Isabella's mind was piety. It shone forth from the very depths of her soul with a heavenly radiance, which illuminated her whole character. Fortunately her earliest years had been passed in the rugged school of adversity, under the eye of a mother who implanted in her serious mind such strong principles of religion as nothing in after-life had power to shake. At an early age, in the flower of youth and beauty, she was introduced to her brother's court; but its blandishments, so dazzling to a young imagination, had no power over hers; for she was surrounded by a moral atmosphere of purity,

*"Driving far off each thing of sin and guilt." (5)*

(1) "*Quería que sus cartas é mandamientos fuesen cumplidos con diligencia.*"—Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, part 1, cap. 4.

(2) See a remarkable instance of this in her treatment of the faithless Juan de Corral, noticed in Part I. Chapter 10, of this History.

(3) The melancholy tone of Columbus's correspondence after the queen's death, shows too well the colour of his fortunes and feelings.—(Navarrete, Colección de Viages, tom. i. pp. 341 et seq.) The sentiments of the Great Captain were still more unequivocally expressed, according to Giovio. "*Nec multis inde diebus regina fato concessit, incredibili eum dolore atque jactura Consalvi; nam ab eâ tanquam alumnus, ac in ejus regiâ educatus, cuncta quæ exoptari possent virtutis et dignitatis incrementa adeptum fuisse fatebatur, rege ipso quanquam minus benigno parumque liberali nunquam reginæ voluntati reluctari auso. Id vero præclare tanquam verissimum apparuit elatâ reginâ.*"—Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 275.

(4) The reader may recall a striking example of this in the early part of her reign, in her great tenderness and forbearance towards the humours of Carillo, archbishop of Toledo, her quondam friend, but then her most implacable foe.

(5) Isabella at her brother's court might well have sat for the whole of Milton's beautiful portraiture:

*"So dear to Heaven is saintly chastity,  
That, when a soul is found sincerely so,*

Such was the decorum of her manners, that, though encompassed by false friends and open enemies, not the slightest reproach was breathed on her fair name in this corrupt and calumnious court.

She gave a liberal portion of her time to private devotions, as well as to the public exercises of religion.(1) She expended large sums in useful charities, especially in the erection of hospitals and churches, and the more doubtful endowments of monasteries.(2) Her piety was strikingly exhibited in that unfeigned humility which, although the very essence of our faith, is so rarely found; and most rarely in those whose great powers and exalted stations seem to raise them above the level of ordinary mortals. A remarkable illustration of this is afforded in the queen's correspondence with Talavera, in which her meek and docile spirit is strikingly contrasted with the puritanical intolerance of her confessor.(3) Yet Talavera, as we have seen, was sincere and benevolent at heart. Unfortunately, the royal conscience was at times committed to very different keeping; and that humility which, as we have repeatedly had occasion to notice, made her defer so reverentially to her ghostly advisers, led, under the fanatic Torquemada,

A thousand liveried angels lackey her,  
Driving far off each thing of sin and guilt,  
And, in clear dream and solemn vision,  
Tell her of things that no gross ear can hear,  
Till oft converse with heavenly habitants  
Begin to cast a beam on the outward shape,  
The unpolluted temple of the mind,  
And turns it by degrees to the soul's essence,  
Till all be made immortal."

(1) "Era tanto," says L. Marineo, "el ardor y diligencia que tenia cerca el culto divino, que aunque de día y de noche estava muy ocupada en grandes y arduos negocios de la governacion de muchos reynos y señorios, parecia que su vida era mas contemplativa que activa. Porque siempre se hallava presente a los divinos oficios y a la palabra de Dios. Era tanta su atencion que si alguno de los que celebravan o cantavan los psalmos, o otras cosas de la yglesia errava alguna dición o syllaba, lo sintia y lo notava, y despues como maestro a discípulo se lo enmendava y corregia. Acostumbrava cada dia dezir todas las horas canónicas demas de otras muchas votivas y extraordinarias devociones que tenia."—Cosas Memorables, fol. 163.

(2) Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, part 1, cap. 4.—L. Marineo enumerates many of these splendid charities.—(Cosas Memorables, fol. 165.) See also the notices scattered over the Itinerary (Viaggio in Spagno) of Navagiero, who travelled through the country a few years after.

(3) The archbishop's letters are little better than a homily on the sins of dancing, feasting, dressing, and the like, garnished with scriptural allusions, and conveyed in a tone of sour rebuke that would have done credit to the most canting Roundhead in Oliver Cromwell's court. The queen, far from taking exception at it, vindicates herself from the grave imputations with a degree of earnestness and simplicity which may provoke a smile in the reader. "I am aware," she concludes, "that custom cannot make an action, bad in itself, good; but I wish your opinion whether, under all the circumstances, these can be considered bad; that, if so, they may be discontinued in future."—See this curious correspondence in Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 13.

the confessor of her early youth, to those deep blemishes on her administration, the establishment of the Inquisition, and the exile of the Jews.

But although blemishes of the deepest dye on her administration, they are certainly not to be regarded as such on her moral character. It will be difficult to condemn her, indeed, without condemning the age; for these very acts are not only excused, but extolled by her contemporaries, as constituting her strongest claims to renown, and to the gratitude of her country.(1) They proceeded from the principle, openly avowed by the court of Rome, that zeal for the purity of the faith could atone for every crime. This immoral maxim, flowing from the head of the church, was cohoed in a thousand different forms by the subordinate clergy, and greedily received by a superstitious people.(2) It was not to be expected that a solitary woman, filled with natural diffidence of her own capacity on such subjects, should array herself against those venerated counsellors whom she had been taught from her cradle to look to as the guides and guardians of her conscience.

However mischievous the operations of the Inquisition may have been in Spain, its establishment in point of principle, was not worse than many other measures which have passed with far less censure, though in a much more advanced and civilised age.(3) Where, indeed, during the sixteenth, and the greater part of the seventeenth century, was the principle of persecution abandoned by the dominant party, whether Catholic or Protestant? And where that of toleration asserted, except by the weaker? It is true, to borrow Isabella's own expression, in her letter to Talavera, the prevalence of a bad custom cannot constitute its apology. But it should serve much to mitigate our condemnation of the queen, that she fell into no greater error, in the imperfect light in which she lived, than

(1) Such encomiums become still more striking in writers of sound and expansive views like Zurita and Blancas, who, although flourishing in a better-instructed age, do not scruple to pronounce the Inquisition "the greatest evidence of her prudence and piety; whose uncommon utility, not only Spain, but all Christendom, freely acknowledged!"—Blancas, *Commentarii*, p. 263.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 1, cap. 6.

(2) Sismondi displays the mischievous influence of these theological dogmas in Italy, as well as Spain, under the pontificate of Alexander VI. and his immediate predecessors, in the 90th chapter of his eloquent and philosophical "*Histoire des Républiques Italiques*."

(3) I borrow almost the words of Mr. Hallam, who, noticing the penal statutes against Catholics under Elizabeth, says, "They established a persecution which fell not at all short in principle of that for which the Inquisition had become so odious."—(*Constitutional History of England*; Paris, 1827; vol. i. chap. 3.) Even Lord Burleigh, commenting on the mode of examination adopted in certain cases by the High Commission Court, does not hesitate to say, the interrogatories were so curiously penned, so full of branches and circumstance, as he thought the inquisitors of Spain used not so many questions to comprehend and to trap their preys.—*Ibid.* chap. 4.

was common to the greatest minds in a later and far riper period.(1)

Isabella's actions, indeed, were habitually based on principle. Whatever errors of judgment be imputed to her, she most anxiously sought in all situations to discern and discharge her duty. Faithful in the dispensation of justice, no bribe was large enough to ward off the execution of the law.(2) No motive, not even conjugal affection, could induce her to make an unsuitable appointment to public office.(3) No reverence for the ministers of religion could lead her to wink at their misconduct;(4) nor could the deference she entertained for the head of the church allow her to tolerate his encroachments on the rights of her crown.(5) She seemed to consider herself especially bound to preserve entire the peculiar claims and privileges of Castile, after its union under the same sovereign with Aragon.(6) And although, "while her own will was law," says Peter Martyr, "she governed in such a manner that it might appear the joint action of both Ferdinand and herself," yet she was careful never to surrender into his hands one of those prerogatives which belonged to her as queen proprietor of the kingdom.(7)

Isabella's measures were characterised by that practical good sense, without which the most brilliant parts may work more to the woe than to the weal of mankind. Though engaged all her life in reforms, she had none of the failings so common

(1) Even Milton, in his essay on the "Liberty of Unlicensed Printing," the most splendid argument, perhaps, the world had then witnessed in behalf of intellectual liberty, would exclude Popery from the benefits of toleration, as a religion which the public good required at all events to be extirpated. Such were the crude views of the rights of conscience entertained in the latter half of the seventeenth century, by one of those gifted minds, whose extraordinary elevation enabled it to catch and reflect back the coming light of knowledge, long before it had fallen on the rest of mankind.

(2) The most remarkable example of this, perhaps, occurred in the case of the wealthy Galician knight Yáñez de Lugo, who endeavoured to purchase a pardon of the queen by the enormous bribe of 40,000 doblas of gold. The attempt failed, though warmly supported by some of the royal counsellors. The story is well vouched.—Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, part 2, cap. 97.—L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, fol. 180.

(3) The reader may recollect a pertinent illustration of this, on the occasion of Ximenes's appointment to the primacy.—See Part II. Chapter 5, of this History.

(4) See among other instances, her exemplary chastisement of the ecclesiastics of Traxillo. Part I. Chapter 12, vol. i. of this History.

(5) Ibid. Part I. Chapter 6; Part II. Chapter 10, vol. ii.; et alibi. Indeed, this independent attitude was shown, as I have more than once had occasion to notice, not merely in shielding the rights of her own crown, but in the boldest remonstrances against the corrupt practices and personal immorality of those who filled the chair of St. Peter at this period.

(6) The public acts of this reign afforded repeated evidence of the pertinacity with which Isabella insisted on reserving the benefits of the Moorish conquests and the American discoveries for her own subjects of Castile, by whom and for whom they had been mainly achieved. The same thing is reiterated in the most emphatic manner in her testament.

(7) Opus Epist. epist. 31.

in reformers. Her plans, though vast, were never visionary. The best proof of this is, that she lived to see most of them realised.

She was quick to discern objects of real utility. She saw the importance of the new discovery of printing, and liberally patronised it from the first moment it appeared.(1) She had none of the exclusive local prejudices too common with her countrymen. She drew talent from the most remote quarters to her dominions by munificent rewards. She imported foreign artisans for her manufactures; foreign engineers and officers for the discipline of her army; and foreign scholars to imbue her martial subjects with more cultivated tastes. She consulted the useful in all her subordinate regulations; in her sumptuary laws, for instance, directed against the fashionable extravagances of dress, and the ruinous ostentation so much affected by the Castilians in their weddings and funerals.(2) Lastly, she showed the same perspicacity in the selection of her agents; well knowing that the best measures become bad in incompetent hands.

But, although the skilful selection of her agents was an obvious cause of Isabella's success, yet another, even more important, is to be found in her own vigilance and untiring exertions. During the first busy and bustling years of her reign, these exertions were of incredible magnitude. She was almost always in the saddle, for she made all her journeys on horseback; and she travelled with a rapidity which made her always present on the spot where her presence was needed. She was never intimidated by the weather, or the state of her own health; and this reckless exposure undoubtedly contributed much to impair her excellent constitution.(3)

She was equally indefatigable in her mental application. After assiduous attention to business through the day, she was often known to sit up all night dictating despatches to her

(1) Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. p. 49.

(2) The preamble of one of her *pragmáticas*, against this lavish expenditure at funerals, contains some reflections worth quoting, for the evidence they afford of her practical good sense: "Nos deseando proveer e remediar al tal gasto sin provecho, e considerando que esto no redunde en sufragio e alivio de las animas de los defuntos," &c. "Pero los Católicos Christianos que creemos que hai otra vida despues desta, donde las animas esperan folgoanza e vida perdurable, desta habemos de curar e procurar de la ganar porobras meritorias, e no por cosas transitorias e vanas como son los lutos e gastos excesivos."—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. p. 318.

(3) Her exposure in this way on one occasion brought on a misarrriage. According to Gomez, indeed, she finally died of a painful internal disorder, occasioned by her long and laborious journeys.—(De Rebus Gestis, fol. 47.) Giovinio adopts the same account.—(Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 278.) The authorities are good, certainly; but Martyr, who was in the palace, with every opportunity of correct information, and with no reason for concealment of the truth, in his private correspondence with Tendilla and Talavera, makes no allusion whatever to such a complaint, in his circumstantial account of the queen's illness.

secretaries.(1) In the midst of these overwhelming cares, she found time to supply the defects of early education by learning Latin, so as to understand it without difficulty, whether written or spoken; and, indeed, in the opinion of a competent judge, to attain a critical accuracy in it.(2) As she had little turn for light amusements, she sought relief from graver cares by some useful occupation appropriate to her sex; and she left ample evidence of her skill in this way, in the rich specimens of embroidery, wrought with her own fair hands, with which she decorated the churches. She was careful to instruct her daughters in these more humble departments of domestic duty; for she thought nothing too humble to learn which was useful.(3)

With all her high qualifications, Isabella would have been still unequal to the achievement of her grand designs without possessing a degree of fortitude rare in either sex; not the courage which implies contempt of personal danger,—though of this she had a larger share than falls to most men;(4) nor that which supports its possessor under the extremities of bodily pain,—though of this she gave ample evidence, since she endured the greatest suffering her sex is called to bear without a groan;(5) but that moral courage which sustains the spirit in the dark hour of adversity, and, gathering light from within to dispel the darkness, imparts its own cheering influence to all around. This was shown remarkably in the stormy season which ushered in her accession, as well as through the whole of the Moorish war. It was her voice that decided never to abandon Alhama.(6) Her remonstrances compelled the king and nobles to return to the field, when they had quitted it. after an ineffectual campaign. As dangers and difficulties multiplied, she multiplied resources to meet them; and when

(1) Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. vii. p. 411.—*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. p. 29.

(2) L. Maríneo, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 182.—“Pronunciabo con primor el Latin, y era tan habil en la prosodia, que si erraban algun acento, luego le corregia.”—*Idem*, apud Florez, *Reynas Cathólicas*, tom. ii. p. 834.

(3) If we are to believe Florez, the king wore no shirt but of the queen's making: “Preciabase de no haverse puesto su marido camisa que elle no huviesse hilado y cosido.”—(*Reynas Cathólicas*, tom. ii. p. 832.). If this be taken literally, his wardrobe, considering the multitude of her avocations, must have been indifferently furnished.

(4) Among many evidences of this, what other need be given than her conduct at the famous riot at Segovia? Part I. Chapter 6, of this History.

(5) Pulgar, *Reyes Católicos*, part 1, cap. 4.—“No fue la Reyna,” says L. Maríneo, “de animo menos fuerte para sufrir los dolores corporales. Porque como yo fuy informado de las dueñas que le servian en la camara, ni en los dolores que padescia de sus enfermedades, ni en los del parto (que es cosa de grande admiracion) nunca la vieron quejarse; antes con increyble y maravillosa fortaleza los sufría y dissimulava.”—(*Cosas Memorables*, fol. 186.) To the same effect writes the anonymous author of the “*Carro de las Doñas*,” apud *Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. p. 559.

(6) “Era firme en sus propósitos, de los quales se retrala con gran dificultad.”—Pulgar, *Reyes Católicos*, part 1, cap. 4.

her soldiers lay drooping under the evils of some protracted siege, she appeared in the midst, mounted on her war-horse, with her delicate limbs eased in knightly mail; (1) and, riding through their ranks, breathed new courage into their hearts by her own intrepid bearing. To her personal efforts indeed, as well as counsels, the success of this glorious war may be mainly imputed; and the unsuspecting testimony of the Venetian minister Navagiero, a few years later, shows that the nation so considered it. "Queen Isabel," says he, "by a singular genius, masculine strength of mind, and other virtues most unusual in our own sex, as well as hers, was not merely of great assistance in, but the chief cause of, the conquest of Granada. She was, indeed, a most rare and virtuous lady; one of whom the Spaniards talk far more than of the king, sagacious as he was, and uncommon for his time." (2)

Happily these masculine qualities in Isabella did not extinguish the softer ones which constitute the charm of her sex. Her heart overflowed with affectionate sensibility to her family and friends. She watched over the declining days of her aged mother, and ministered to her sad infirmities with all the delicacy of filial tenderness. (3) We have seen abundant proofs how fondly and faithfully she loved her husband to the last; (4) though this love was not always as faithfully requited. (5) For

(1) The reader may refresh his recollection of Tasso's graceful sketch of Erminia in similar warlike panoply:

"Col durissimo acciaio preme ed offende  
Il delicato collo e l'aurea chioma;  
E la tenera man lo scudo prende  
Per troppo grave e insupportabil soma.  
Così tutta di ferro intorno splende,  
E in atto militar se stessa dona."

Gerusalemme Liberata, canto 6, stanza 92.

(2) Viaggio, fol. 27.

(3) We find one of the first articles in the marriage treaty with Ferdinand enjoining him to cherish and treat her mother with all reverence, and to provide suitably for her royal maintenance. (Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Append. No. 1.) The author of the "Carro de las Noñas" thus notices her tender devotedness to her parent at a later period: "Y esto me dijo quien lo vido por sus propios ojos, que la Reyna Doña Isabel, nuestra señora, cuando estaba allí en Arevalo visitando a su madre, ella misma por su persona servía a su misma madre. E aquí tomen ejemplo los hijos como han de servir a sus padres, pues una Reina tan poderosa y en negocios tan arduos puesta, todos los mas de los años (puesto todo aparte y pospuesto) iba a visitar a su madre y la servía humildemente."—Viaggio, p. 357.

(4) Among other little tokens of mutual affection, it may be mentioned that not only the public coin, but their furniture, books, and other articles of personal property, were stamped with their initials, F. & I., or emblazoned with their devices, his being a yoke, and hers a sheaf of arrows. (Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quine. 2, dial. 3.) It was common, says Oviedo, for each party to take a device whose initial corresponded with that of the name of the other; as was the case here with *jugo* and *flechas*.

(5) Marino thus speaks of the queen's discreet and most amiable conduct in these delicate matters: "Amava en tanta manera al Rey su marido, que andava sobre aviso con celos a ver si el amava a otras. Y si sentia que mirava a alguna dama o donzella de su casa con señal de amores, con mucha pru-

her children she lived more than for herself; and for them too she died, for it was their loss and their afflictions which froze the current of her blood before age had time to chill it. Her exalted state did not remove her above the sympathies of friendship.(1) With her friends she forgot the usual distinctions of rank, sharing in their joys, visiting and consoling them in sorrow and sickness, and condescending in more than one instance to assume the office of excentric on their disease.(2) Her heart, indeed, was filled with benevolence to all mankind. In the most fiery heat of war, she was engaged in devising means for mitigating its horrors. She is said to have been the first to introduce the benevolent institution of camp hospitals; and we have seen, more than once, her lively solicitude to spare the effusion of blood even of her enemies. But it is needless to multiply examples of this beautiful but familiar trait in her character.(3)

It is in these more variable qualities of her sex, that Isabella's superiority becomes most apparent over her illustrious namesake, Elizabeth of England,(4) whose history presents some features parallel to her own. Both were disciplined in early life by the teachings of that stern nurse of wisdom, adversity. Both were made to experience the deepest humiliation at the hands of their nearest relative, who should have cherished and protected them. Both succeeded in establishing them-

denela buscava medios y maneras con que despedir aquella tal persona de su casa, con su mucha honrra y provecho." (Cosas Memorables, fol. 182.) There was unfortunately too much cause for this uneasiness. See Part II. Chapter 24, vol. II. of this History.

(1) The best beloved of her friends, probably, was the marchioness of Moya, who, seldom separated from her royal mistress through life, had the melancholy satisfaction of closing her eyes in death. Oviedo, who saw them frequently together says, that the queen never addressed this lady, even in later life, with any other than the endearing title of *hija marquesa*, "daughter marchioness."—Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 23.

(2) As was the case with Cardenas, the comendador mayor, and the grand cardinal Mendoza, to whom, as we have already seen, she paid the kindest attentions during their last illness. While in this way she indulged the natural dictates of her heart, she was careful to render every outward mark of respect to the memory of those whose rank or services entitled them to such consideration. "Quando," says the author so often quoted, "quiera que falleciera alguno de los grandes de su reyno, o algun principe Christiano, luego embiavan varones sabios y religiosos para consolar a sus herederos y deudos. Y demas desto se vestian de ropas de luto en testimonio del dolor y sentimiento que hazian."—L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, fol. 185.

(3) Her humanity was shown in her attempts to mitigate the ferocious character of those national amusements, the bull-fights, the popularity of which throughout the country was too great, as she intimates in one of her letters, to admit of her abolishing them altogether. She was so much moved at the sanguinary issue of one of these combats, which she witnessed at Arevalo, says a contemporary, that she devised a plan, by guarding the horns of the bulls, for preventing any serious injury to the men and horses; and she never would attend another of these spectacles until this precaution had been adopted.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.

(4) Isabel, the name of the Catholic queen, is correctly rendered into English by that of Elizabeth.



selves on the throne after the most precarious vicissitudes. Each conducted her kingdom, through a long and triumphant reign, to a height of glory which it had never before reached. Both lived to see the vanity of all earthly grandeur, and to fall the victims of an inconsolable melancholy; and both left behind an illustrious name, unrivalled in the subsequent annals of their country.

But with these few circumstances of their history the resemblance ceases. Their characters afford scarcely a point of contact. Elizabeth, inheriting a large share of the bold and bluff King Harry's temperament, was haughty, arrogant, coarse, and irascible; while with these fiercer qualities she mingled deep dissimulation and strange irresolution. Isabella, on the other hand, tempered the dignity of royal station with the most bland and courteous manners. Once resolved, she was constant in her purposes, and her conduct in public and private life was characterised by candour and integrity. Both may be said to have shown that magnanimity which is implied by the accomplishment of great objects in the face of great obstacles. But Elizabeth was desperately selfish; she was incapable of forgiving, not merely a real injury, but the slightest affront to her vanity; and she was merciless in exacting retribution. Isabella, on the other hand, lived only for others,—was ready at all times to sacrifice self to considerations of public duty; and, far from personal resentments, showed the greatest condescension and kindness to those who had most sensibly injured her; while her benevolent heart sought every means to mitigate the authorised severities of the law, even towards the guilty.(1)

Both possessed rare fortitude. Isabella, indeed, was placed in situations which demanded more frequent and higher displays of it than her rival; but no one will doubt a full measure of this quality in the daughter of Henry the Eighth. Elizabeth was better educated, and every way more highly accomplished than Isabella. But the latter knew enough to maintain her station with dignity; and she encouraged learning by a munificent patronage.(2) The masculine powers and passions of Elizabeth seemed to divorce her in a great measure from the peculiar attributes of her sex, at least from those which constitute its peculiar charm; for she had abundance of its foibles,—a coquetry and love of admiration which age could

(1) She gave evidence of this in the commutation of the sentence she obtained for the wretch who stabbed her husband, and whom her ferocious nobles would have put to death without the opportunity of confession and absolution, that "his soul might perish with his body!" (See her letter to Talavera.) She showed this merciful temper, so rare in that rough age, by dispensing altogether with the preliminary barbarities sometimes prescribed by the law in capital executions.—*Mém. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. Hist. 13.

(2) Hume admits, that, "unhappily for literature, at least for the learned of this age, Queen Elizabeth's vanity lay more in shining by her own learning, than in encouraging men of genius by her liberality."

not chill; a levity, most careless, if not criminal;(1) and a fondness for dress and tawdry magnificence of ornament which was ridiculous or disgusting, according to the different periods of life in which it was indulged.(2) Isabella, on the other hand, distinguished through life for decorum of manners, and purity beyond the breath of calumny, was content with the legitimate affection which she could inspire within the range of her domestic circle. Far from a frivolous affectation of ornament or dress, she was most simple in her own attire, and seemed to set no value on her jewels, but as they could serve the necessities of the state;(3) when they could be no longer useful in this way, she gave them away, as we have seen, to her friends.

Both were uncommonly sagacious in the selection of their ministers; though Elizabeth was drawn into some errors in this particular by her levity,(4) as was Isabella by religious feeling. It was this, combined with her excessive humility, which led to the only grave errors in the administration of the latter. Her rival fell into no such errors; and she was a stranger to the amiable qualities which led to them. Her conduct was certainly not controlled by religious principle; and though the bulwark of the Protestant faith, it might be difficult to say whether she were at heart most a Protestant or a Catholic. She viewed religion in its connection with the state, in other words, with herself; and she took measures for enforcing conformity to her own views, not a whit less despotic, and scarcely less sanguinary, than those countenanced for conscience sake by her more bigoted rival.(5)

(1) Which of the two, the reader of the records of these times may be somewhat puzzled to determine. If one need be convinced how many faces history can wear, and how difficult it is to get at the true one, he has only to compare Dr. Lingard's account of this reign with Mr. Turner's. Much obliquity was to be expected, indeed, from the avowed apologist of a persecuted party, like the former writer. But it attaches, I fear, to the latter in more than one instance,—as in the reign of Richard III., for example. Does it proceed from the desire of saying something new on a beaten topic, where the new cannot always be true? Or, as is most probable, from that confiding benevolence, which throws somewhat of its own light over the darkest shades of human character? The unprejudiced reader may perhaps agree, that the balance of this great queen's good and bad qualities is held with a more steady and impartial hand by Mr. Hallam than any preceding writer.

(2) The unsuspecting testimony of her godson, Harrington, places these foibles in the most ludicrous light. If the well-known story, repeated by historians, of the three thousand dresses left in her wardrobe at her decease, be true, or near truth, it affords a singular contrast with Isabella's taste in these matters.

(3) The reader will remember how effectually they answered this purpose in the Moorish war. See Part I. Chap. 14, vol. i. of this History.

(4) It is scarcely necessary to mention the names of Hatton and Leicester, both recommended to the first offices in the state chiefly by their personal attractions, and the latter of whom continued to maintain the highest place in his sovereign's favour for thirty years or more, in despite of his total destitution of moral worth.

(5) Queen Elizabeth, indeed, in a declaration to her people, proclaims, "We

This feature of bigotry, which has thrown a shade over Isabella's otherwise beautiful character, might lead to a disparagement of her intellectual power compared with that of the English queen. To estimate this aright, we must contemplate the results of their respective reigns. Elizabeth found all the materials of prosperity at hand, and availed herself of them most ably to build up a solid fabric of national grandeur. Isabella created these materials. She saw the faults of her people looked up in a deathlike lethargy, and she breathed into them the breath of life for those great and heroic enterprises which terminated in such glorious consequences to the monarchy. It is when viewed from the depressed position of her early days, that the achievements of her reign seem scarcely less than miraculous. The masculine genius of the English queen stands out relieved beyond its natural dimensions by its separation from the softer qualities of her sex; while her rival's, like some vast but symmetrical edifice, loses in appearance somewhat of its actual grandeur from the perfect harmony of its proportions.

The circumstances of their deaths, which were somewhat similar, displayed the great dissimilarity of their characters. Both pined amidst the royal state, a prey to incurable despondency, rather than any marked bodily distemper. In Elizabeth it sprung from wounded vanity, a sullen conviction that she had outlived the admiration on which she had so long fed,—and even the solace of friendship, and the attachment of her subjects. Nor did she seek consolation, where alone it was to be found, in that sad hour. Isabella, on the other hand, sunk under a too acute sensibility to the sufferings of others. But, amidst the gloom which gathered around her, she looked with the eye of faith to the brighter prospects which unfolded of the future; and, when she resigned her last breath, it was amidst the tears and universal lamentations of her people.

It is in this undying, unabated attachment of the nation, indeed, that we see the most unequivocal testimony to the virtues of Isabella. In the downward progress of things in Spain, some of the most ill-advised measures of her administration have found favour, and been perpetuated, while the more salutary have been forgotten. This may lead to a misconception of her real merits. In order to estimate these, we must listen to the voice of her contemporaries, the eye-witnesses of the

know not, nor have any meaning to allow, that any of our subjects should be molested, either by examination or inquisition, in any matter of faith, as long as they shall profess the Christian faith." (Turner's Elizabeth, vol. ii. p. 241, note.) One is reminded of Parson Thwackum's definition in "Tom Jones:" "When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England." It would be difficult to say which fared worst, Puritans or Catholics, under this system of toleration.

condition in which she found the state, and in which she left it. We shall then see but one judgment formed of her, whether by foreigners or natives. The French and Italian writers equally join in celebrating the triumphant glories of her reign, and her magnanimity, wisdom, and purity of character.(1) Her own subjects extol her as "the most brilliant exemplar of every virtue," and mourn over the day of her death as "the last of the prosperity and happiness of their country."(2) While those who had nearer access to her person are unbounded in their admiration of those amiable qualities, whose full power is revealed only in the unrestrained intimacies of domestic life.(3) The judgment of posterity has ratified the sentence of her own age. The most enlightened Spaniards of the present day, by no means insensible to the errors of her government, but more capable of appreciating its merits than those of a less-instructed age, bear honourable testimony to her deserts; and while they pass over the bloated magnificence of succeeding monarchs, who arrest the popular eye, dwell with enthusiasm on Isabella's character, as the most truly great in their line of princes.(4)

(1) "Quum generosi," says Paolo Giovio, speaking of her, "prudensque animi magnitudine, tum pudicitie et pietatis laude antiquis heroidibus comparanda."—(Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 265.) Guicciardini eulogises her as "Donna di onestissimi costumi, e in concetto grandissimo nel regni suoi di magnanimità e prudenza."—(istoria, lib. 6.) The *loyal serviteur* notices her death in the following chivalrous strain: "L'an 1506, une des plus triumpantes et glorieuses dames qui puis mille ans ait esté sur terre alla de vie a trespas; ce fut la royne Ysabel de Castille, qui ayda, le bras armé, à conquister le royaume de Grenade sur les Mores. Je veux bien asseurer aux lecteurs de ceste present hystoire, que sa vie a esté telle, qu'elle a bien mérité couronne de laurier après sa mort."—Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 26. See also Comines, Mémoires, chap. 23.—Navagiero, Viaggio, fol. 27;—et al. auct.

(2) I borrow the words of one contemporary: "Quo quidem die omnis Hispaniæ felicitas, omne decus, omnium virtutum pulcherrimum specimen, interit" (L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, lib. 21); and the sentiments of all.

(3) If the reader needs further testimony of this, he will find abundance collected by the indefatigable Clemencin, in the 21st Illust. of the Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi.

(4) It would be easy to cite the authority over and over again of such writers as Marina, Sempere, Llorente, Navarrete, Quintana, and others, who have done such honour to the literature of Spain in the present century. It will be sufficient, however, to advert to the remarkable tribute paid to Isabella's character by the Royal Spanish Academy of History, who in 1805 appointed their late secretary, Clemencin, to deliver a eulogy on that illustrious theme; and who raised a still nobler monument to her memory, by the publication, in 1821, of the various documents compiled by him for the illustration of her reign, as a separate volume of their valuable Mémoires.

## CHAPTER XVII.

FERDINAND REGENT.—HIS SECOND MARRIAGE.—DISSENSIONS  
WITH PHILLIP.—RESIGNATION OF THE REGENCY.

1504—1506.

Ferdinand Regent—Philip's Pretensions—Ferdinand's Perplexities—Impolitic Treaty with France—The King's Second Marriage—Landing of Philip and Joanna—Unpopularity of Ferdinand—His Interview with his Son-in-law—He resigns the Regency.

THE death of Isabella gives a new complexion to our history, a principal object of which has been the illustration of her personal character and public administration. The latter part of the narrative, it is true, has been chiefly occupied with the foreign relations of Spain, in which her interference has been less obvious than in the domestic. But still we have been made conscious of her presence and parental supervision, by the maintenance of order, and the general prosperity of the nation. Her death will make us more sensible of this influence, since it was the signal for disorders which even the genius and authority of Ferdinand were unable to suppress.

While the queen's remains were yet scarcely cold, King Ferdinand took the usual measures for announcing the succession. He resigned the crown of Castile, which he had worn with so much glory for thirty years. From a platform raised in the great square of Toledo, the heralds proclaimed, with sound of trumpet, the accession of Philip and Joanna to the Castilian throne, and the royal standard was unfurled by the duke of Alva in honour of the illustrious pair. The king of Aragon then publicly assumed the title of administrator or governor of Castile, as provided by the queen's testament, and received the obeisance of such of the nobles as were present, in his new capacity. These proceedings took place on the evening of the same day on which the queen expired. (1)

A circular letter was next addressed to the principal cities, requiring them, after the customary celebration of the obsequies of their late sovereign, to raise the royal banners in the name of

(1) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 52.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 279.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 20, cap. 1.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1504.—Sandoval, *Hist. del. Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 9. "Sapientie alii," says Martyr, in allusion to those prompt proceedings, "et summae bonitatis adscribunt; alii, rem novam admirati, regem incusant, remque arguunt non debuisset fieri."—Ubi supra.

Joanna; and writs were immediately issued in her name, without mention of Philip's, for the convocation of a cortes to ratify these proceedings.(1)

The assembly met at Toro, January 11th, 1505. The queen's will, or rather such clauses of it as related to the succession, were read aloud, and received the entire approbation of the commons, who, together with the *grandees* and *prelates* present, took the oaths of allegiance to Joanna as queen and lady proprietor, and to Philip as her husband. They then determined that the exigency contemplated in the testament, of Joanna's incapacity, actually existed,(2) and proceeded to tender their homage to King Ferdinand, as the lawful governor of the realm in her name. The latter in turn made the customary oath to respect the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the whole was terminated by an embassy from the cortes, with a written account of its proceedings, to their new sovereigns in Flanders.(3)

All seemed now done that was demanded for giving a constitutional sanction to Ferdinand's authority as regent. By the written law of the land, the sovereign was empowered to nominate a regency, in case of the minority or incapacity of the heir apparent.(4) This had been done in the present instance by Isabella, and at the earnest solicitation of the cortes, made two years previously to her death. It had received the cordial approbation of that body, which had undeniable authority to control such testamentary provisions.(5) Thus, from the first to the last stage of the proceeding, the whole had gone on with a scrupulous attention to constitutional forms. Yet the authority of the new regent was far from being firmly seated; and it was the conviction of this which had led him to accelerate measures.

Many of the nobles were extremely dissatisfied with the queen's settlement of the regency, which had taken air before her death; and they had even gone so far as to send to Flanders before that event, and invite Philip to assume the government

(1) Philip's name was omitted, as being a foreigner, until he should have taken the customary oath to respect the laws of the realm, and especially to confer office on none but native Castilians.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 84.

(2) The maternal tenderness and delicacy which had led Isabella to allude to her daughter's infirmity only in very general terms, are well remarked by the cortes. See the copy of the original act in Zurita, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 4.

(3) Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 15, sec. 2.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 3.—Marina, *Teoria*, part 2, cap. 4.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 12.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emper. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 9.

(4) *Siete Partidas*, part 2, tit. 15, ley 3. Guicciardini, with the ignorance of the Spanish constitution natural enough in a foreigner, disputes the queen's right to make any such settlement.—Istoria, lib. 7.

(5) See the whole subject of the powers of cortes in this particular, as discussed very fully and satisfactorily by Marina, *Teoria*, part 2, cap. 13.

himself, as the natural guardian of his wife.(1) These discontented lords, if they did not refuse to join in the public acts of acknowledgment to Ferdinand at Toro, at least were not reserved in intimating their dissatisfaction.(2) Among the most prominent were the marquis of Villena, who may be said to have been nursed to faction from the cradle, and the duke of Najara, both potent nobles, whose broad domains had been grievously clipped by the resumption of the crown lands so scrupulously enforced by the late government, and who looked forward to their speedy recovery under the careless rule of a young inexperienced prince like Philip.(3)

But the most efficient of his partisans was Don Juan Manuel, Ferdinand's ambassador at the court of Maximilian. This nobleman, descended from one of the most illustrious houses in Castile, was a person of uncommon parts; restless and intriguing, plausible in his address, bold in his plans, but exceedingly cautious, and even cunning, in the execution of them. He had formerly insinuated himself into Philip's confidence during his visit to Spain, and, on receiving news of the queen's death, hastened without delay to join him in the Netherlands.

Through his means, an extensive correspondence was soon opened with the discontented Castilian lords; and Philip was persuaded, not only to assert his pretensions to undivided supremacy in Castile, but to send a letter to his royal father-in-law, requiring him to resign the government at once, and retire into Aragon.(4) The demand was treated with some contempt

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 203.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 15, sec. 8.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. c. 274, 277.

(2) Zurita's assertion, that all the nobility present did homage to Ferdinand (Anales, tom. vi. cap. 3), would seem to be contradicted by a subsequent passage. Comp. cap. 4.

(3) Isabella in her will particularly enjoins on her successors never to alienate or to restore the crown lands recovered from the marquise of Villena.—Dormer, Discursos Varios, p. 331.

(4) "Nor was it sufficient," says Dr. Robertson, in allusion to Philip's pretensions to the government, "to oppose to these just rights, and to the inclination of the people of Castile, the authority of a testament, *the genuineness of which was perhaps doubtful*, and its contents to him appeared certainly to be iniquitous."—(History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V.; London, 1796; vol. ii. p. 7.) But who ever intimated a doubt of its genuineness, before Dr. Robertson? Certainly no one living at that time; for the will was produced before cortes, by the royal secretary, in the session immediately following the queen's death; and Zurita has preserved the address of that body, commenting on the part of its contents relating to the succession.—(Anales, tom. vi. cap. 4.) Dr. Carbajal, a member of the royal council, and who was present, as he expressly declares, at the approval of the testament, "a cuyo otorgamiento y aun ordenacion me hallé," has transcribed the whole of the document in his Anales, with the signatures of the notary and the seven distinguished persons who witnessed its execution. Dormer, the national historiographer of Aragon, has published the instrument, with the same minuteness, in his "Discursos Varios," "from authentic MSS. in his possession," "escrituras auténticas en mi poder." Where the original is now to be found, or whether it be in existence, I have no knowledge. The codicil, as we have seen, with the queen's signature, is still extant in the Royal Library at Madrid.

by Ferdinand, who admonished him of his incompetency to govern a nation like the Spaniards, whom he understood so little, but urged him at the same time to present himself before them with his wife as soon as possible.(1)

Ferdinand's situation, however, was far from comfortable. Philip's, or rather Manuel's, emissaries were busily stirring up the embers of disaffection. They dwelt on the advantages to be gained from the free and lavish disposition of Philip, which they contrasted with the parsimonious temper of the stern *old Catalan*, who had so long held them under his yoke.(2) Ferdinand, whose policy it had been to crush the overgrown power of the nobility, and who, as a foreigner, had none of the natural claims to loyalty enjoyed by his late queen, was extremely odious to that jealous and haughty body. The number of Philip's adherents increased in it every day, and soon comprehended the most considerable names in the kingdom.

The king, who watched these symptoms of disaffection with deep anxiety, said little, says Martyr, but coolly scrutinised the minds of those around him, dissembling as far as possible his own sentiments.(3) He received further and more unequivocal evidence, at this time, of the alienation of his son-in-law. An Aragonese gentleman, named Conchillos, whom he had placed near the person of his daughter, obtained a letter from her, in which she approved in the fullest manner of her father's retaining the administration of the kingdom. The letter was betrayed to Philip; the unfortunate secretary was seized and thrown into a dungeon, and Joanna was placed under a rigorous confinement, which much aggravated her malady.(4)

With this affront, the king received also the alarming intelligence that the emperor Maximilian and his son Philip were tampering with the fidelity of the Great Captain; endeavouring to secure Naples in any event to the archduke, who claimed it as the appurtenance of Castile, by whose armies its conquest, in fact, had been achieved. There were not wanting persons of high standing at Ferdinand's court to infuse suspicions, however unwarrantable, into the royal mind, of the loyalty of his viceroy, a Castilian by birth, and who owed his elevation exclusively to the queen.(5)

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 292.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 1.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 53.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 12.

(2) "Existimantes," says Giovio, "sub florentissimo juvene rege aliquanto Iberius atque licentius ipsorum potentia fructuros, quam sub austero et parum liberali, ut aiebant, *sene Catalano*."—*Vite Illust. Virorum*, p. 277.

(3) "Rex quæcumque versant atque ordiuntur, sentit, dissimulat et animos omnium tacitus scrutatur."—*Opus Epist. epist.* 299.

(4) Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 15, sec. 4.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 18.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 286.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 8.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 9.—Oviedo had the story from Conchillos's brother.

(5) Giovio, *Vite Illust. Virorum*, pp. 275—277.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6,



The king was still further annoyed by reports of the intimate relations subsisting between his old enemy, Louis the Twelfth, and Philip, whose children were affianced to each other. The French monarch, it was said, was prepared to support his ally in an invasion of Castile, for the recovery of his rights, by a diversion in his favour on the side of Roussillon, as well as of Naples.(1)

The Catholic king felt sorely perplexed by these multiplied embarrassments. During the brief period of his regency, he had endeavoured to recommend himself to the people by a strict and impartial administration of the laws, and the maintenance of public order. The people, indeed, appreciated the value of a government under which they had been protected from the oppressions of the aristocracy more effectually than at any former period. They had testified their good will by the alacrity with which they confirmed Isabella's testamentary dispositions at Toro. But all this served only to sharpen the aversion of the nobles. Some of Ferdinand's counsellors would have persuaded him to carry measures with a higher hand. They urged him to reassume the title of King of Castile, which he had so long possessed as husband of the late queen; (2) and others even advised him to assemble an armed force which should overawe all opposition to his authority at home, and secure the country from invasion. He had facilities for this in the disbanded levies lately returned from Italy, as well as in a considerable body drawn from his native dominions of Aragon, waiting his orders on the frontier.(3) Such violent measures, however, were repugnant to his habitual policy, temperate and cautious. He shrunk from a contest in which even success must bring unspeakable calamities on the country;(4) and, if he ever seriously entertained such views,(5) he abandoned them, cap. 5, 11.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 25.—Abareal, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 15, sec. 3.

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 290.—Buonaecorsi, *Diario*, p. 94.

(2) The vice-chancellor, Alonso de la Caballeria, prepared an elaborate argument in support of Ferdinand's pretensions to the regal authority and title, less as husband of the late queen, than as the lawful guardian and administrator of his daughter.—See Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. cap. 14.

(3) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 5, 15.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 18.

(4) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 291.

(5) Robertson speaks with confidence of Ferdinand's intention to "oppose Philip's landing by force of arms" (*History of Charles V.* vol. ii. p. 13), an imputation which has brought a heavy judgment on the historian's head from the clever author of the "*History of Spain and Portugal*."—(Lardner's *Cabinet Cyclopædia*.) "All this," says the latter, "is at variance with both truth and probability; nor does Ferreras, the only authority cited for this unjust declamation, afford the slightest ground for it."—(Vol. ii. p. 277, note.) Nevertheless, this is so stated by Ferreras (*Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. p. 282), who is supported by Mariana (*Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 16), and, in the most unequivocal manner by Zurita (*Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 21), a much higher authority than either. Martyr, it is true, whom Dr. Dunham does not appear to have consulted on this occasion, declares that the king had no design of resorting to force.—See *Opus Epist.* epist. 291, 305.

and employed his levies on another destination in Africa.<sup>(1)</sup> His situation, however, grew every hour more critical. Alarmed by rumours of Louis's military preparations, for which liberal supplies were voted by the states-general; trembling for the fate of his Italian possessions; deserted and betrayed by the great nobility at home; there seemed now no alternative left for him but to maintain his ground by force, or to resign at once, as required by Philip, and retire into Aragon. This latter course appears never to have been contemplated by him. He resolved at all hazards to keep the reins in his own grasp, influenced in part, probably, by the consciousness of his rights, as well as by his sense of duty, which forbade him to resign the trust he had voluntarily assumed into such incompetent hands as those of Philip and his counsellors; and partly, no doubt, by natural reluctance to relinquish the authority which he had enjoyed for so many years. To keep it, he had recourse to an expedient such as neither friend nor foe could have anticipated.

He saw the only chance of maintaining his present position lay in detaching France from the interests of Philip, and securing her to himself. The great obstacle to this was their conflicting claims on Naples. This he purposed to obviate by proposals of marriage to some member of the royal family, in whose favour these claims, with the consent of King Louis, might be resigned. He accordingly dispatched a confidential envoy privately into France, with ample instructions for arranging the preliminaries. This person was Juan de Enguera, a Catalan monk of much repute for his learning, and a member of the royal council.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 202.—Curbajal, Anales, MS. año 1505.

(2) Before venturing on this step, it was currently reported that Ferdinand had offered his hand, though unsuccessfully, to Joanna Beltraneja, Isabella's unfortunate competitor for the crown of Castile, who still survived in Portugal.—(Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 14.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 13;—et al.) The report originated, doubtless, in the malice of the Castilian nobles, who wished in this way to discredit the king still more with the people. It received, perhaps, some degree of credit from a silly story, in circulation, of a testament of Henry IV. having lately come into Ferdinand's possession, avowing Joanna to be his legitimate daughter. See Curbajal (Anales, MS. año 1474), the only authority for this last rumour. Robertson has given an incautious credence to the first story, which has brought Dr. Dunham's iron snail somewhat unmercifully on his shoulders again; yet his easy faith in the matter may find some palliation, at least sufficient to screen him from the charge of wilful misstatement, in the fact that Ciemenchin, a native historian, and a most patient and fair inquirer after truth, has come to the same conclusion.—(Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. llist. 19.) Both writers rely on the authority of Sandoval, an historian of the latter half of the sixteenth century, whose naked assertion cannot be permitted to counterbalance the strong testimony afforded by the silence of contemporaries and the general discredit of succeeding writers.—(Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 10.) Sismondi, not content with this first offer of King Ferdinand, makes him afterwards propose for a daughter of King Emanuel, or, in other words, his own grand-daughter!—Hist. des Français, tom. xv. chap. 30.

Louis the Twelfth had viewed with much satisfaction the growing misunderstanding betwixt Philip and his father-in-law, and had cunningly used his influence over the young prince to foment it. He felt the deepest disquietude at the prospect of the enormous inheritance which was to devolve on the former, comprehending Burgundy and Flanders, Austria, and probably the Empire, together with the united crowns of Spain and their rich dependencies. By the proposed marriage, a dismemberment might be made at least of the Spanish monarchy; and the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, passing under different sceptres, might serve, as they had formerly done, to neutralize each other. It was true, this would involve a rupture with Philip, to whose son his own daughter was promised in marriage. But this match, extremely distasteful to his subjects, gradually became so to Louis, as every way prejudicial to the interest of France.(1)

Without much delay, therefore, preliminaries were arranged with the Aragonese envoy; and immediately after, in the month of August, 1505, the count of Cifuentes, and Thomas Malferit, regent of the royal chancery, were publicly sent as plenipotentiaries on the part of King Ferdinand, to conclude and execute the treaty.

It was agreed, as the basis of the alliance, that the Catholic king should be married to Germaine, daughter of Jean de Foix, viscount of Narbonne, and one of the sisters of Louis the Twelfth, and grand-daughter to Leonora, queen of Navarre,—that guilty sister of King Ferdinand whose fate is recorded in the earlier part of our History. The princess Germaine, it will be seen, therefore, was nearly related to both the contracting parties. She was at this time eighteen years of age, and very beautiful.(2) She had been educated in the palace of her royal uncle, where she had imbibed the free and volatile manners of his gay, luxurious court. To this lady Louis the Twelfth consented to resign his claims on Naples, to be secured by way of dowry to her and her heirs, male or female, in perpetuity. In case of her decease without issue, the moiety of the kingdom recognised as his by the partition treaty with Spain was to revert to him. It was further agreed, that Ferdinand should reimburse Louis the Twelfth for the expenses of the Neapolitan war, by the payment of one million gold ducats, in ten yearly

(1) Fleurange, *Mémoires*, chap. 15.—Seyssel, *Hist. de Louys XII.* pp. 228—229.

(2) Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 7, sec. 4.—Gomez, de Rebus Gestis, fol. 58.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Monarquía*, tom. i. p. 410. "Laquelle," says Fleurange, who had doubtless often seen the princess, "étoit bonne et fort belle princesse, du moins elle n'avoit point perdu son embonpoint."—(*Mémoires*, chap. 19.) It would be strange if she had at the age of eighteen. Varillas gets over the discrepancy of age between the parties very well, by making Ferdinand's at this time only thirty-seven years!—*Hist. de Louis XII.* tom. i. p. 457.

instalments; and lastly, that a complete amnesty should be granted by him to the lords of the Angevin or French party in Naples, who should receive full restitution of their confiscated honours and estates. A mutual treaty of alliance and commerce was to subsist henceforth between France and Spain; and the two monarchs, holding one another, to quote the words of the instrument, "as two souls in one and the same body," pledged themselves to the maintenance and defence of their respective rights and kingdoms against every other power what ever. This treaty was signed by the French king at Blois, October 12th, 1505, and ratified by Ferdinand the Catholic at Segovia on the 16th of the same month. (1)

Such were the disgraceful and most impolitic terms of this compact, by which Ferdinand, in order to secure the brief possession of a barren authority, and perhaps to gratify some unworthy feelings of revenge, was content to barter away all those solid advantages, flowing from the union of the Spanish monarchies, which had been the great and wise object of his own and Isabella's policy; for, in the event of male issue,—and that he should have issue was by no means improbable, considering he was not yet fifty-four years of age,—Aragon and its dependencies must be totally severed from Castile. (2) In the other alternative, the splendid Italian conquests, which, after such cost of toil and treasure, he had finally secured to himself, must be shared with his unsuccessful competitor. In any event, he had pledged himself to such an indemnification of the Angevin faction in Naples as must create inextricable embarrassment, and inflict great injury on his loyal partisans, into whose hands their estates had already passed. And last, though not least, he dishonoured by this unsuitable and precipitate alliance his late illustrious queen, the memory of whose transcendent excellence, if it had faded in any degree from his own breast, was too deeply seated in those of her subjects to allow them to look on the present union otherwise than as a national indignity.

So, indeed, they did regard it; although the people of Aragon, in whom late events had rekindled their ancient jealousy of Castile, viewed the match with more complacency, as likely to restore them to that political importance, which had been somewhat impaired by the union with their more powerful neighbour. (3)

(1) Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. No. 40, pp. 72—74.

(2) These dependencies did not embrace, however, the half of Granada and the West Indies, as supposed by Mons. Gallard, who gravely assures us, that "Les états conquis par Ferdinand étoient conquêtes de communauté dont la moitié appartenoit au mari, et la moitié aux enfans."—(Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 306.) Such are the gross misconceptions of fact on which this writer's speculations rest!

(3) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 19.—Marianna, Hist. de Espana, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 16.

The European nations could not comprehend an arrangement so irreconcilable with the usual sagacious policy of the Catholic king. The petty Italian powers, who, since the introduction of France and Spain into their political system, were controlled by them more or less in all their movements, viewed this sinister conjunction as auspicious of no good to their interests or independence. As for the archduke Philip, he could scarcely credit the possibility of this desperate act, which struck off at a blow so rich a portion of his inheritance. He soon received confirmation, however, of its truth, by a prohibition from Louis the Twelfth to attempt a passage through his dominions into Spain, until he should come to some amicable understanding with his father-in-law. (1)

Philip, or rather Manuel, who exercised unbounded influence over his counsels, saw the necessity now of temporising. The correspondence was resumed with Ferdinand, and an arrangement was at length concluded between the parties, known as the concord of Salamanca, November 24th, 1505. The substance of it was, that Castile should be governed in the joint names of Ferdinand, Philip, and Joanna; but that the first should be entitled, as his share, to one half of the public revenue. This treaty, executed in good faith by the Catholic king, was only intended by Philip to hush the suspicions of the former until he could effect a landing in the kingdom, where, he confidently believed, nothing but his presence was wanting to insure success. He completed the perfidious proceeding by sending an epistle, well garnished with soft and honeyed phrase, to his royal father-in-law. These artifices had their effect, and completely imposed, not only on Louis, but on the more shrewd and suspicious Ferdinand. (2)

On the 8th of January, 1506, Philip and Joanna embarked on board a splendid and numerous armada, and set sail from a

(1) Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 15, sec. 8.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 21.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 7. He received much more unequivocal intimation in a letter from Ferdinand, curious as showing that the latter sensibly felt the nature and extent of the sacrifices he was making. "You," said he to Philip, "by lending yourself to be the easy dupe of France, have driven me most reluctantly into a second marriage; have stripped me of the fair fruits of my Neapolitan conquests," &c. He concludes with this appeal to him: "Sit satis, fili, pervagatum; redi in te, si filius, non hostis accesseris; his non obstantibus, mi filius, amplexabere. Magna est paternæ vis naturæ." Philip may have thought his father-in-law's late conduct an indifferent commentary on the "paternæ vis naturæ." See the king's letter quoted by Peter Martyr in his correspondence with the count of Tendilla.—Opus Epist. epist. 293.

(2) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1506.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 23.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 16.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 292. Zurita has transcribed the whole of this dutiful and most loving epistle.—Ubi supra. Guicciardini considers Philip as only practising the lessons he had learned in Spain, "le arti Spagnuole."—(Istoria, lib. 7.) The phrase would seem to have been proverbial with the Italians, like the "Punica fides," which their Roman ancestors fastened on the character of their African enemy; perhaps with equal justice.

port in Zealand. A furious tempest scattered the fleet soon after leaving the harbour: Philip's ship, which took fire in the storm, narrowly escaped foundering; and it was not without great difficulty that they succeeded in bringing her, a miserable wreck, into the English port of Weymouth.(1) King Henry the Seventh, on learning the misfortunes of Philip and his consort, was prompt to show every mark of respect and consideration for the royal pair thus thrown upon his island. They were escorted in magnificent style to Windsor, and detained with dubious hospitality for nearly three months. During this time, Henry the Seventh availed himself of the situation and inexperience of his young guest so far as to extort from him two treaties, not altogether reconcilable, as far as the latter was concerned, with sound policy or honour.(2). The respect which the English monarch entertained for Ferdinand the Catholic, as well as their family connection, led him to offer his services as a common mediator between the father and son. He would have persuaded the latter, says Lord Bacon, "to be ruled by the counsel of a prince so prudent, so experienced, and so fortunate as King Ferdinand;" to which the archduke replied, "If his father-in-law would let him govern Castile, he should govern him."(3)

At length Philip, having re-assembled his Flemish fleet at Weymouth, embarked with Joanna and his numerous suite of courtiers and military retainers; and reached Coruña, in the north-western corner of Galicia, after a prosperous voyage, on the 28th of April.

A short time previous to this event, the count of Cifuentes having passed into France for the purpose, the betrothed bride of King Ferdinand quitted that country under his escort, attended by a brilliant train of French and Neapolitan lords.(4) On the borders, at Fontarabia, she was received by the archbishop of Saragossa, Ferdinand's natural son, with a numerous retinue, composed chiefly of Aragonese and Catalan nobility, and was conducted with much solemnity to Dneñas, where she was joined by the king. In this place, where thirty years before he had been united to Isabella, he now, as if to embitter

(1) Joanna, according to Sandoval, displayed much composure in her alarming situation. When informed by Philip of their danger, she attired herself in her richest dress, securing a considerable sum of money to her person, that her body, if found, might be recognised, and receive the obsequies suited to her rank.—Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 10.

(2) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 204.—Carrbajal, Anales, MS. año 1506.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII. p. 166.—Bacon, Hist. of Henry VII. Works, vol. v. pp. 177—179.—Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 7.—Rymer, Fœdera, tom. xiii. pp. 129—132. One was a commercial treaty with Flanders, so disastrous as to be known in that country by the name of "malus intercurus;" the other involved the surrender of the unfortunate duke of Suffolk.

(3) Bacon, Hist. of Henry VII. Works, vol. v. p. 179.

(4) Oviedo, Quincuagena, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 36.—Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 26.

still further the recollections of the past, led to the altar her young and beautiful successor (March 18th, 1506). "It seemed hard," says Martyr, in his quiet way, "that these nuptials should take place so soon, and that too in Isabella's own kingdom of Castile, where she had lived without peer, and where her ashes are still held in as much veneration as she enjoyed while living." (1)

It was less than six weeks after this, that Philip and Joanna landed at Coruña. Ferdinand, who had expected them at some nearer northern port, prepared without loss of time to go forward and receive them. He sent on an express to arrange the place of meeting with Philip, and advanced himself as far as Leon. But Philip had no intention of such an interview at present. He had purposely landed in a remote corner of the country, in order to gain time for his partisans to come forward and declare themselves. Missives had been despatched to the principal nobles and cavaliers, and they were answered by great numbers of all ranks, who pressed forward to welcome and pay court to the young monarch. (2) Among them were the names of most of the considerable Castilian families; and several, as Villena and Najara, were accompanied by large well-appointed retinues of armed followers. The archduke brought over with him a body of three thousand German infantry, in complete order. He soon mustered an additional force of six thousand native Spaniards, which, with the chivalry who thronged to meet him, placed him in a condition to dictate terms to his father-in-law; and he now openly proclaimed that he had no intention of abiding by the concord of Salamanca, and that he would never consent to an arrangement prejudicing in any degree his, and his wife's, exclusive possession of the crown of Castile. (3)

It was in vain that Ferdinand endeavoured to gain Don Juan Manuel to his interests by the most liberal offers. He could offer nothing to compete with the absolute ascendancy which the favourite held over his young sovereign. It was in vain that Martyr, and afterwards Ximenes, were sent to the arch-

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 330.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 36.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1506.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 203. "Some affirmed," says Zurita, "that Isabella, before appointing her husband to the regency, exacted an oath from him that he would not marry a second time."—(*Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 84.) This improbable story, so inconsistent with the queen's character, has been transcribed with more or less qualification by succeeding historians, from Mariana to Quintana. Robertson repeats it without any qualification at all.—See *History of Charles V.* vol. ii. p. 6.

(2) "Quisque enim in spes suas pronus et expeditus, commodo servendum," says Giovio, borrowing the familiar metaphor, "et orientem solem potius quam occidentem adorandum esse dicebat."—*Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 278.

(3) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 29, 30.—Gomez, *de Rebus Gestis*, fol. 57.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 204.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 304, 305.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1506.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 10.

duke, to settle the grounds of accommodation, or at least the place of interview with the king. Philip listened to them with courtesy, but would abate not a jot of his pretensions; and Manuel did not care to expose his royal master to the influence of Ferdinand's superior address and sagacity in a personal interview.(1)

Martyr gives a picture, by no means unfavourable, of Philip at this time. He had an agreeable person, a generous disposition, free and open manners, with a certain nobleness of soul, although spurred on by a most craving ambition. But he was so ignorant of affairs, that he became the dupe of artful men, who played on him for their own purposes.(2)

Ferdinand at length finding that Philip, who had now left Coruña, was advancing by a circuitous route into the interior, on purpose to avoid him, and that all access to his daughter was absolutely refused, could no longer repress his indignation; and he prepared a circular letter to be sent to the different parts of the country, calling on it to rise and aid him in rescuing the queen, their sovereign, from her present shameful captivity.(3) It does not appear that he sent it. He probably found that the call would not be answered; for the French match had lost him even that degree of favour with which he had been regarded by the commons: so the very expedient on which he relied for perpetuating his authority in Castile, was the chief cause of his losing it altogether.

He was doomed to experience still more mortifying indignities. By the orders of the marquis of Astorga and the count of Benevente, he was actually refused admittance into those cities; while proclamation was made by the same arrogant lords, prohibiting any of their vassals from aiding or harbouring his Aragonese followers. "A sad spectacle, indeed," exclaims the loyal Martyr, "to behold a monarch, yesterday almost omnipotent, thus wandering a vagabond in his own kingdom, refused even the sight of his own child!"(4)

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 306, 308, 309.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 59.—Giovio, *Vitæ illust. Virorum*, p. 278.

(2) "Nil benignius Philippo in terris, nullus inter orbis principes animosior, inter juvenes pulchrior," &c.—(*Opus Epist. epist.* 285.) In a subsequent letter he thus describes the unhappy predicament of the young prince: "Nescit hic juvenis, nescit quo se vertat, hinc avaris, illinc ambitiosis, atque utrimque vaftris hominibus circumseptus alienigena, bonæ naturæ, apertique animi. Trahetur in diversa, perturbabitur ipse atque obtundetur. Omnia confunduntur. Utinam vana prædicem!"—*Epist.* 308.

(3) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 2.

(4) *Opus Epist. epist.* 308:—

"Ayer era Rey de España,  
oy no lo soy de una villa;  
ayer villas y castillos,  
oy ninguno poseya;  
ayer tenía criados," &c.

The lament of King Roderic, in this fine old ballad, would seem hardly too extravagant in the mouth of his royal descendant.



Of all the gay tribe of courtiers who fluttered around him in his prosperity, the only Castilians of note who now remained true were the duke of Alva and the count of Cifuentes; (1) for even his son-in-law, the constable of Castile, had deserted him. There were some, however, at a distance from the scene of operations, as the good Talavera for instance, and the count of Tendilla, who saw with much concern the prospect of changing the steady and well-tryed hand, which had held the helm for more than thirty years, for the capricious guidance of Philip and his favourites. (2)

An end was at length put to this scandalous exhibition; and Manuel, whether from increased confidence in his own resources, or the fear of bringing public odium on himself, consented to trust his royal charge to the peril of an interview. (3) The place selected was an open plain near Puebla de Sanabria, on the borders of Leon and Galicia (June 23rd). But, even then, the precautions taken were of a kind truly ludicrous, considering the forlorn condition of King Ferdinand. The whole military apparatus of the archduke was put in motion, as if he expected to win the crown by battle. First came the well-appointed German spearmen, all in fighting order; then the shining squadrons of the noble Castilian chivalry, and their armed retainers. Next followed the archduke, seated on his war-horse and encompassed by his body-guard; while the rear was closed by the long files of archers and light cavalry of the country. (4)

Ferdinand, on the other hand, came into the field attended by about two hundred nobles and gentlemen, chiefly Aragonese

(1) "Ipse amicos res optimæ pariunt, adversæ probant."

Pub. Syrus.

(2) Peter Martyr, *Opus. Epist. epist.* 306, 311.—Rubles, *Vida de Ximenez*, p. 143.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 19.—Lanúza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 19.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 10.

(3) There are several letters of Philip to the Catholic king, written soon after landing, filled with expressions of respect, and affecting a great eagerness for the interview,—which he was so careful to defeat. A letter without date, —probably written just previous to their meeting, concludes in the following manner. The original is somewhat damaged. It is signed, as usual, by Philip, *El Rey*. "Con el y intyenden en fero concordio y espero en fero señor q' quando fuéres llegado a bucnayete quedara tan poque q' hazer q' las vistas seran como v. al. dicho para ver plazer y no para negocios, y asy suplico a v. al. q' asi se faga, pues suy voluntad no es otra syno de ser . . . echandolos muy obediente á v. al. y a lo q' v. al. diche . . . quant me pesa dello. q' estan movidos en estos reynos . . . muy humyl y obediente hijo q' sus reales manos besa."

"El Rey."

Autografa de Felipe, MS.

(4) The only pretext for all this pomp of war was the rumour that the king was levying a considerable force, and the duke of Alva mustering his followers in Leon;—rumours willingly circulated, no doubt, if not a sheer device of the enemy.—Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 7, cap. 2.

and Italians, riding on mules, and simply attired in the short black cloak and bonnet of the country, with no other weapon than the sword usually worn. The king trusted, says Zurita, to the majesty of his presence, and the reputation he had acquired by his long and able administration.

The Castilian nobles, brought into contact with Ferdinand, could not well avoid paying their obeisance to him. He received them in his usual gracious and affable manner, making remarks, the good humour of which was occasionally seasoned with something of a more pungent character. To the duke of Najara, who was noted for being a vain-glorious person, and who came forward with a gallant retinue in all the panoply of war, he exclaimed, "So, duke, you are mindful as ever, I see, of the duties of a great captain!" Among others, was Garcilasso de la Vega, Ferdinand's minister formerly at Rome. Like many of the Castilian lords, he wore armour under his dress, the better to guard against surprise. The king, embracing him, felt the mail beneath, and, tapping him familiarly on the shoulder, said, "I congratulate you, Garcilasso; you have grown wonderfully lusty since we last met." The desertion, however, of one who had received so many favours from him, touched him more nearly than all the rest.

As Philip drew near, it was observed he wore an anxious, embarrassed air, while his father-in-law maintained the same serene and cheerful aspect as usual. After exchanging salutations, the two monarchs alighted, and entered a small hermitage in the neighbourhood, attended only by Manuel and Archbishop Ximenes. They had no sooner entered, than the latter, addressing the favourite with an air of authority it was not easy to resist, told him, "It was not meet to intrude on the private concerns of their masters;" and, taking his arm, led him out of the apartment, and coolly locked the door on him, saying, at the same time, that "he would serve as porter." The conference led to no result. Philip was well schooled in his part, and remained, says Martyr, immovable as a rock.<sup>(1)</sup> There was so little mutual confidence between the parties, that the name of Joanna, whom Ferdinand desired so much to see, was not even mentioned during the interview.<sup>(2)</sup>

But, however reluctant Ferdinand might be to admit it, he was no longer in a condition to stand upon terms; and, in addition to the entire loss of influence in Castile, he received such alarming accounts from Naples as made him determine on an immediate visit in person to that kingdom. He resolved,

<sup>(1)</sup> "Durius Caucasiam rupe, paternum nihil auscultavit." — Opus Epist. epist. 310.

<sup>(2)</sup> Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 43. — Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, pp. 146—149. — Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 20. — Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 5. — Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 61, 62. — Abanca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 15. — Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1506. — Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 204.

therefore, to bow his head to the present storm, in hopes that a brighter day was in reserve for him. He saw the jealousy hourly springing up between the Flemish and Castilian courtiers; and he probably anticipated such misrule as would afford an opening, perhaps with the good will of the nation, for him to resume the reins so unceremoniously snatched from his grasp.(1) At any rate, should force be necessary, he would be better able to employ it effectively, with the aid of his ally, the French king, after he had adjusted the affairs of Naples.(2)

Whatever considerations may have influenced the prudent monarch, he authorised the archbishop of Toledo, who kept near the person of the archduke, to consent to an accommodation on the very grounds proposed by the latter. On the 27th of June he signed and solemnly swore to an agreement, by which he surrendered the entire sovereignty of Castile to Philip and Joanna, reserving to himself only the grandmasterships of the military orders, and the revenues secured by Isabella's testament.(3)

On the following day he executed another instrument of most singular import, in which, after avowing in unequivocal terms his daughter's incapacity, he engages to assist Philip in preventing any interference in her behalf, and to maintain him, as far as in his power, in the sole exclusive authority.(4)

Before signing these papers, he privately made a protest in the presence of several witnesses, that what he was about to do was not of his own free will, but from necessity, to extricate himself from his perilous situation, and shield the country from the impending evils of a civil war. He concluded with asserting that, so far from relinquishing his claims to the regency, it was his design to enforce them, as well as to rescue his daughter from her captivity, as soon as he was in a condition to do so.(5) Finally, he completed this chain of inconsistencies by addressing a circular letter, dated July 1st, to the different parts of the kingdom, announcing his resignation of the government into the hands of Philip and Joanna, and declaring the act one which, notwithstanding his own right and power to the contrary, he had previously determined on executing so soon as his children should set foot in Spain.(6)

(1) Lord Bacon remarks, in allusion to Philip's premature death, "There was an observation by the wisest of that court, that, if he had lived, his father would have gained upon him in that sort, as he would have governed his council, and designs, if not his affections." (Hist. of Henry VII., Works, vol. v. p. 180.) The prediction must have been suggested by the general estimation of their respective characters; for the parties never met again after Ferdinand withdrew to Aragon.

(2) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 8.

(3) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 204.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1505.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 210.

(4) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 8.

(5) Zurita, Anales, ubi supra.

(6) Idem, ubi supra. Ferdinand's manifesto, as well as the instrument.

It is not easy to reconcile this monstrous tissue of incongruity and dissimulation with any motives of necessity or expediency. Why should he, so soon after preparing to raise the kingdom in his daughter's cause, thus publicly avow her imbecility, and deposit the whole authority in the hands of Philip? Was it to bring odium on the head of the latter, by encouraging him to a measure which he knew must disgust the Castilians?(1) But Ferdinand by this very act shared the responsibility with him. Was it in the expectation that uncontrolled and undivided power, in the hands of one so rash and improvident, would the more speedily work his ruin? As to his clandestine protest, its design was obviously to afford a plausible pretext at some future time for re-asserting his claims to the government, on the ground that his concessions had been the result of force. But then, why neutralise the operation of this by the declaration, spontaneously made in his manifesto to the people, that his abdication was not only a free, but most deliberate and premeditated act? He was led to this last avowal, probably, by the desire of covering over the mortification of his defeat; a thin varnish which could impose on nobody. The whole of the proceedings are of so ambiguous a character as to suggest the inevitable inference that they flowed from habits of dissimulation too strong to be controlled, even when there was no occasion for its exercise. We occasionally meet with examples of a similar fondness for superfluous manœuvring in the humbler concerns of private life.

After these events, one more interview took place between King Ferdinand and Philip (July 5th), in which the former prevailed on his son-in-law to pay such attention to decorum, and exhibit such outward marks of a cordial reconciliation, as, if they did not altogether impose on the public, might at least throw a decent veil over the coming separation. Even at this last meeting, however, such was the distrust and apprehension entertained of him, that the unhappy father was not permitted to see and embrace his daughter before his departure.(2)

declaring his daughter's incapacity, are given at length by Zurita. The secret protest rests on the unsupported authority of the historian; and surely a better authority cannot easily be found, considering his proximity to the period, his resources as national historiographer, and the extreme caution and candour with which he discriminates between fact and rumour. It is very remarkable, however, that Peter Martyr, with every opportunity for information, as a member of the royal household, apparently high in the king's confidence, should have made no allusion to this secret protest in his correspondence with Tendilla and Talavera, both attached to the royal party, and to whom he appears to have communicated all matters of interest without reserve.

(1) This motive is charitably imputed to him by Gallard. (*Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 311.) The same writer commends Ferdinand's *habileté* in extricating himself from his embarrassments by the treaty "*aquei il fit consentir Philippe dans leur entrevue!*" p. 310.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 10.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 21.—Gomez, *de Rebus Gestis*, fol. 61.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 210.

Throughout the whole of these trying scenes, says his biographer, the king maintained that propriety and entire self-possession which comported with the dignity of his station and character, and strikingly contrasted with the conduct of his enemies. However much he may have been touched with the desertion of a people who had enjoyed the blessings of peace and security under his government for more than thirty years, he manifested no outward sign of discontent. On the contrary, he took leave of the assembled grandees with many expressions of regard, noticing kindly their past services to him, and studying to leave such an impression as should efface the recollection of recent differences.<sup>(1)</sup> The circum-spect monarch looked forward, no doubt, to the day of his return. The event did not seem very improbable; and there were other sagacious persons besides himself, who read in the dark signs of the times abundant augury of some speedy revolution.<sup>(2)</sup>

---

The principal authorities for the events in this chapter, as the reader may remark, are Martyr and Zurita. The former, not merely a spectator, but actor in them, had undoubtedly the most intimate opportunities of observation. He seems to have been sufficiently impartial too, and prompt to do justice to what was really good in Philip's character; although that of his royal master was of course calculated to impress the deepest respect on a person of Martyr's uncommon penetration and sagacity. The Aragonese chronicler, however, though removed to a somewhat further distance as to time, was from that circumstance placed in a point of view more favourable for embracing the whole field of action, than if he had taken part, and jostled in the crowd as one of it. He has accordingly given much wider scope to his survey, exhibiting full details of the alleged grievances, pretensions, and policy of the opposite party; and, although condemning them himself without reserve, has conveyed impressions of Ferdinand's conduct less favourable, on the whole, than Martyr.

But neither the Aragonese historian nor Martyr, nor any contemporary writer, native or foreign, whom I have consulted, countenances the extremely unfavourable portrait which Dr. Robertson has given of Ferdinand in his transactions with Philip. It is difficult to account for the bias which this eminent historian's mind has received in this matter, unless it be that he has taken his impressions from the popular notions entertained of the character of the parties, rather than from the circumstances of the particular case under review; a mode of proceeding extremely objectionable in the present instance, where Philip, however good his natural qualities, was obviously a mere tool in the hands of corrupt and artful men, working exclusively for their own selfish purposes.

---

(1) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 10.—Oviedo, *Quineuaguanas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 9.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 10.—See also the melancholy vaticinations of Martyr (*Opus Epist.* epist. 311), who seems to echo back the sentiments of his friends Tenuilla and Talavera.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## COLUMBUS.—HIS RETURN TO SPAIN.—HIS DEATH.

1504—1506.

Return of Columbus from his Fourth Voyage—His Illness—Neglected by Ferdinand—His Death—His Person—and Character.

WHILE the events were passing which occupy the beginning of the preceding chapter, Christopher Columbus returned from his fourth and last voyage. It had been one unbroken series of disappointment and disaster. After quitting Hispaniola, and being driven by storms nearly to the island of Cuba, he traversed the Gulf of Honduras, and coasted along the margin of the golden region which had so long flitted before his fancy. The natives invited him to strike into its western depths in vain, and he pressed forward to the south, now solely occupied with the grand object of discovering a passage into the Indian Ocean. At length, after having with great difficulty advanced somewhat beyond the point of Nombro de Dios, he was compelled, by the fury of the elements and the murmurs of his men, to abandon the enterprise and retrace his steps. He was subsequently defeated in an attempt to establish a colony on terra firma, by the ferocity of the natives; was wrecked on the island of Jamaica, where he was permitted to linger more than a year, through the malice of Ovando, the new governor of St. Domingo; and finally, having re-embarked with his shattered crew in a vessel freighted at his own expense, was driven by a succession of terrible tempests across the ocean, until, on the 7th of November, 1504, he anchored in the little port of St. Lucar, twelve leagues from Seville.(1)

In this quiet haven Columbus hoped to find the repose his broken constitution and wounded spirit so much needed, and to obtain a speedy restitution of his honours and emoluments from the hand of Isabella. But here he was to experience his

(1) Martyr, de Rebus Oceanicis, dec. 3, lib. 4.—Benzoni, Novi Orbis Hist. lib. 1, cap. 14.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 63—108.—Herrera, Indias Occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 5, cap. 2—12; lib. 6, cap. 1—13.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. pp. 282—325. The best authorities for the fourth voyage are the relations of Mendez and Porras, both engaged in it; and, above all, the admiral's own letter to the sovereigns from Jamaica. They are all collected in the first volume of Navarrete. (Ubi supra.) Whatever cloud may be thrown over the early part of Columbus's career, there is abundant light on every step of his path after the commencement of his great enterprise.

bitterest disappointment. At the time of his arrival, the queen was on her death-bed; and in a very few days Columbus received the afflicting intelligence that the friend on whose steady support he had so confidently relied was no more. It was a heavy blow to his hopes, for "he had always experienced favour and protection from her," says his son Ferdinand; "while the king had not only been indifferent, but positively unfriendly to his interests." (1) We may readily credit that a man of the cold and prudent character of the Spanish monarch would not be very likely to comprehend one so ardent and aspiring as that of Columbus, nor to make allowance for his extravagant sallies; and if nothing has hitherto met our eye to warrant the strong language of the son, yet we have seen that the king, from the first, distrusted the admiral's projects, as having something unsound and chimerical in them.

The affliction of the latter at the tidings of Isabella's death is strongly depicted in a letter written immediately after to his son Diego. "It is our chief duty," he says, "to commend to God most affectionately and devoutly the soul of our deceased lady the queen. Her life was always Catholic and virtuous, and prompt to whatever could redound to his holy service; wherefore we may trust she now rests in glory, far from all concern for this rough and weary world." (2)

Columbus, at this time, was so much crippled by the gout, to which he had been long subject, that he was unable to undertake a journey to Segovia, where the court was, during the winter. He lost no time, however, in laying his situation before the king, through his son Diego, who was attached to the royal household. He urged his past services, the original terms of the capitulation made with him, their infringement in almost every particular, and his own necessitous condition. But Ferdinand was too busily occupied with his own concerns, at this crisis, to give much heed to those of Columbus, who repeatedly complains of the inattention shown to his application. (3) At length, on the approach of a milder season, the admiral having obtained a dispensation in his favour from the ordinance prohibiting the use of mules, was able by easy journeys to reach Segovia, and present himself before the monarch (May, 1505). (4)

He was received with all the outward marks of courtesy and regard by Ferdinand, who assured him that "he fully estimated his important services, and, far from stinting his recom-

(1) Hist. del Almirante, cap. 108.

(2) Cartas de Colon, apud Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. p. 341.

(3) See his interesting correspondence with his son Diego; now printed for the first time by Señor Navarrete from the original MSS. in the duke of Veragua's possession.—Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. p. 338 et seq.

(4) Herrera, Indias Occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 8, cap. 14.—Fernando Colon, Hist. del Almirante, cap. 108.

pense to the precise terms of the capitulation, intended to confer more ample favours on him in Castile." (1)

These fair words, however, were not seconded by actions. The king probably had no serious thoughts of reinstating the admiral in his government. His successor, Ovando, was high in the royal favour. His rule, however objectionable as regards the Indians, was every way acceptable to the Spanish colonists; (2) and even his oppression of the poor natives was so far favourable to his cause, that it enabled him to pour much larger sums into the royal coffers than had been gleaned by his more humane predecessor. (3)

The events of the last voyage, moreover, had probably not tended to dispel any distrust which the king previously entertained of the admiral's capacity for government. His men had been in a state of perpetual insubordination; while his letter to the sovereigns, written under distressing circumstances, indeed, from Jamaica, exhibited such a deep colouring of despondency, and occasionally such wild and visionary projects, as might almost suggest the suspicion of a temporary alienation of mind. (4)

But, whatever reasons may have operated to postpone Columbus's restoration to power, it was the grossest injustice to withhold from him the revenues secured by the original contract with the crown. According to his own statement, he was so far from receiving his share of the remittances made by Ovando, that he was obliged to borrow money, and had actually incurred a heavy debt for his necessary expenses. (5) The truth was, that as the resources of the new countries began to develop themselves more abundantly, Ferdinand felt greater reluctance to comply with the letter of the original capitulation; he now considered the compensation as too vast, and altogether disproportioned to the services of any subject; and at length was so ungenerous as to propose that the admiral should relinquish his claims in consideration of other estates and dignities to be assigned him in Castile. (6) It argued less knowledge of character than the king usually showed, that he should have thought the man who

(1) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 6, cap. 14.

(2) *Ibid.* dec. 1, lib. 5, cap. 12.

(3) *Ibid.* dec. 1, lib. 5, cap. 12; lib. 6, cap. 16—18.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 10, cap. 14.

(4) This document exhibits a medley, in which sober narrative and sound reasoning are strangely blended with crazy dreams, doleful lamentation, and wild schemes for the recovery of Jerusalem, the conversion of the Grand Khan, &c. Vagaries like these, which come occasionally like clouds over his soul, to shut out the light of reason, cannot fail to fill the mind of the reader, as they doubtless did those of the sovereigns at the time, with mingled sentiments of wonder and compassion.—See *Cartas de Colon*, apud Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. i. p. 296.

(5) *Cartas de Colon*, apud Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. 1.

(6) Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 108.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, lib. 6, cap. 14.



had broken off all negotiations on the threshold of a dubious enterprise, rather than abate one tittle of his demands, would consent to such abatement when the success of that enterprise was so gloriously established.

What assistance Columbus actually received from the crown at this time, or whether he received any, does not appear. He continued to reside with the court, and accompanied it in its removal to Valladolid. He no doubt enjoyed the public consideration due to his high repute and extraordinary achievements; though by the monarch he might be regarded in the unwelcome light of a creditor, whose claims were too just to be disavowed, and too large to be satisfied.

With spirits broken by this unthankful requital of his services, and with a constitution impaired by a life of unmitigated hardship, Columbus's health now rapidly sunk under the severe and reiterated attacks of his disorder. On the arrival of Philip and Joanna, he addressed a letter to them, through his brother Bartholomew, in which he lamented the infirmities which prevented him from paying his respects in person, and made a tender of his future services. The communication was graciously received, but Columbus did not survive to behold the young sovereigns.(1)

His mental vigour, however, was not impaired by the ravages of disease, and, on the 19th of May, 1506, he executed a codicil, confirming certain testamentary dispositions formerly made, with special reference to the entail of his estates and dignities; manifesting, in his latest act, the same solicitude he had shown through life to perpetuate an honourable name. Having completed these arrangements with perfect composure, he expired on the following day, being that of our Lord's ascension (May 20, 1506), with little apparent suffering, and in the most Christian spirit of resignation.(2) His remains, first deposited in the convent of St. Francis at Valladolid, were, six years later, removed to the Carthusian monastery of Las Cuevas at Seville, where a costly monument was raised over them by King Ferdinand, with the memorable inscription

"A Castilla y a Leon,  
Nuevo mundo dió Colon;"

"the like of which," says his son Ferdinand, with as much truth as simplicity, "was never recorded of any man in ancient or modern times."(3) From this spot his body was

(1) Navarrete has given the letter, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. iii. p. 590.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, ubi supra.

(2) Zuniga, *Annales de Sevilla*, p. 429.—Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 108.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 131.—Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. 158.

(3) *Hist. del Almirante*, ubi sup. The following eulogium of Paolo Giovio is a pleasing tribute to the deserts of the great navigator, showing the high estimation in which he was held, abroad as well as at home, by the enlightened

transported, in the year 1536, to the island of St. Domingo, the proper theatre of his discoveries; and, on the cession of that island to the French in 1795, was again removed to Cuba, where his ashes now quietly repose in the cathedral church of its capital. (1)

There is considerable uncertainty as to Columbus's age, though it seems probable it was not far from seventy at the time of his death. (2) His person has been minutely described by his son. He was tall and well made, his head large, with an aquiline nose, small light-blue or greyish eyes, a fresh complexion and red hair, though incessant toil and exposure had bronzed the former, and bleached the latter, before the age of thirty. He had a majestic presence, with much dignity, and at the same time affability of manner. He was fluent, even eloquent in discourse; generally temperate in deportment, but sometimes hurried by a too lively sensibility into a sally of passion. (3) He was abstemious in his diet, indulged little in amusements of any kind, and, in truth, seemed too much absorbed by the great cause to which he had consecrated his life, to allow scope for the lower pursuits and pleasures which engage ordinary men. Indeed, his imagination, by feeding too exclusively on this lofty theme, acquired an unnatural exaltation, which raised him too much above the sober realities of existence, leading him to spurn at difficulties which in the end proved insurmountable, and to colour the future with those rainbow tints which too often melted into air.

This exalted state of the imagination was the result, in part, no doubt, of the peculiar circumstances of his life; for the glorious enterprise which he had achieved almost justified the conviction of his acting under the influence of some higher inspiration than mere human reason, and led his devout mind to discern intimations respecting himself in the dark and mysterious annunciations of sacred prophecy. (4)

of his own day: "Incomparabilis Liguribus honos, eximium Italianæ decus, et præfulgidum jubar seculo nostro nasceretur, quod præcorum heroum, Herculis, et Liberi patris famam obscuraret. Quorum memoriam grata olim mortalitas æternis litterarum monumentis cælo consecrârit."—*Elogia Virorum Illust.* lib. 4, p. 123.

(1) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. 177. On the left of the grand altar of this stately edifice is a bust of Columbus, placed in a niche in the wall; and near it a silver urn, containing all that now remains of the illustrious voyager.—See Abbot's "Letters from Cuba," a work of much interest and information, with the requisite allowance for the inaccuracies of a posthumous publication.

(2) The various theories respecting the date of Columbus's birth cover a range of twenty years, from 1436 to 1456. There are sturdy objections to either of the hypotheses; and the historian will find it easier to cut the knot than to unravel it.—Comp. Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. i. Intr. sec. 54.—Muñoz, *Hist. del Nuevo-Mundo*, lib. 2, sec. 12.—Spotorno, *Memorials of Columbus*, pp. 12, 25.—Irving, *Life of Columbus*, vol. iv. book 18, chap. 4.

(3) Fernando Colon, *Hist. del Almirante*, cap. 3.—*Novi Orbis Hist.* lib. 1, cap. 14.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 6, cap. 16.

(4) See the extracts from Columbus's book of Prophecies (apud Navarrete,

liating incongruity. Whether we contemplate it in its public or private relations, in all its features it wears the same noble aspect. It was in perfect harmony with the grandeur of his plans, and their results more stupendous than those which Heaven has permitted any other mortal to achieve.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### REIGN AND DEATH OF PHILIP I.—PROCEEDINGS IN CASTILE.— FERDINAND VISITS NAPLES.

1506.

Philip and Joanna—Their reckless administration—Ferdinand distrusts Gonsalvo—He sails for Naples—Philip's Death and Character—The Provisional Government—Joanna's Condition—Ferdinand's Entry into Naples—Discontent caused by his Measures there.

KING FERDINAND had no sooner concluded the arrangement with Philip, and withdrawn into his hereditary dominions, than the archduke and his wife proceeded towards Valladolid to receive the homage of the estates convened in that city. Joanna, oppressed with an habitual melancholy, and clad in the sable habiliments better suited to a season of mourning than rejoicing, refused the splendid ceremonial and festivities with which the city was prepared to welcome her. Her dissipated husband, who had long since ceased to treat her not merely with affection, but even decency, would fain have persuaded the cortes to authorise the confinement of his wife, as disordered in intellect, and to devolve on him the whole charge of the government. In this he was supported by the archbishop of Toledo and some of the principal nobility. But the thing was distasteful to the commons, who could not brook such an indignity to their own "natural sovereign;" and they were so stanchly supported by the admiral Enriquez,

greatest bulwark of civil liberty, was well maintained under King Ferdinand.—(Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. ii. Doc. Dipl. Nos. 163, 164; tom. iii. Supl. Col. Dipl. No. 69.) The young *admiral* subsequently married a lady of the great Toledo family, niece of the duke of Alva.—(Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 8.) This alliance with one of the most ancient branches of the haughty aristocracy of Castile proves the extraordinary consideration which Columbus must have attained during his own lifetime. A new opposition was made by Charles V. to the succession of Diego's son; and the latter, discouraged by the prospect of this interminable litigation with the crown, prudently consented to commute his claims, too vast and indefinite for any subject to enforce, for specific honours and revenues in Castile. The titles of duke of Veragua and marquis of Jamaica, derived from the places visited by the admiral in his last voyage, still distinguish the family; whose proudest title, above all that monarchs can confer, is, to have descended from Columbus.—Spotorno, Memorials of Columbus, p. 133.

a grandee of the highest authority, from his connoction with the crown, that Philip was at length induced to abandon his purpose, and to content himself with an act of recognition similar to that made at Toro. (1) No notice whatever was taken of the Catholic king, or of his recent arrangement transferring the regency to Philip (July 12, 1506). The usual oaths of allegiance were tendered to Joanna, as queen and lady proprietor of the kingdom, and to Philip as her husband, and finally to their eldest son, Prince Charles, as heir apparent and lawful successor on the demise of his mother. (2)

By the tenor of these acts the royal authority would seem to be virtually vested in Joanna. From this moment, however, Philip assumed the government into his own hands. The effects were soon visible in the thorough revolution introduced into every department. Old incumbents in office were ejected without ceremony, to make way for new favourites. The Flemings, in particular, were placed in every considerable post, and the principal fortresses of the kingdom intrusted to their keeping. No length or degree of service was allowed to plead in behalf of the ancient occupant. The marquis and marchioness of Moya, the personal friends of the late queen, and who had been particularly recommended by her to her daughter's favour, were forcibly expelled from Segovia, whose strong citadel was given to Don Juan Manuel. There were no limits to the estates and honours lavished on this crafty minion. (3)

The style of living at the court was on the most thoughtless scale of wasteful expenditure. The public revenues, notwithstanding liberal appropriations by the late cortes, were wholly unequal to it. To supply the deficit, offices were sold to the highest bidder. The income drawn from the silk manufactures of Granada, which had been appropriated to defray King Ferdinand's pension, was assigned by Philip to one of the royal treasurers. Fortunately, Ximenes obtained possession of the order, and had the boldness to tear it in pieces. He then waited on the young monarch, and remonstrated with him on the recklessness of measures which must infallibly ruin his credit with the people. Philip yielded in this instance;

(1) Marina tells an anecdote, too long for insertion here, in relation to this cortes, showing the sturdy stuff of which a Castilian commoner in that day was made.—(Teoria, part 2, cap. 7.) It will scarcely gain credit without a better voucher than the anonymous scribbler from whom he has borrowed it.

(2) Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 22.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 11.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 15. Joanna on this occasion was careful to inspect the powers of the deputies herself, to see they were all regularly authenticated. Singular astuteness for a mad woman!

(3) Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 312.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 22.—Lanuzo, Historias, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 21.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 65.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. bat. i, quinc. 1, dial. 23.

but although he treated the archbishop with the greatest outward deference, it is not easy to discern the habitual influence over his counsels claimed for the prelate by his adulatory biographers.(1)

All this could not fail to excite disgust and disquietude throughout the nation. The most alarming symptoms of insubordination began to appear in different parts of the kingdom. In Andalusia, in particular, a confederation of the nobles was organised, with the avowed purpose of reseuing the queen from the duress in which it was said she was held by her husband. At the same time the most tumultuous scenes were exhibited in Cordova, in consequence of the high hand with which the Inquisition was carrying matters there. Members of many of the principal families, including persons of both sexes, had been arrested on the charge of heresy. This sweeping proscription provoked an insurrection, countenanced by the marquis of Priego, in which the prisons were broken open, and Lucero, an inquisitor who had made himself deservedly odious by his cruelties, narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the infuriated populace.(2) The grand inquisitor, Deza, archbishop of Seville, the steady friend of Columbus, but whose name is unhappily registered on some of the darkest pages of the tribunal, was so intimidated as to resign his office.(3) The whole affair was referred to the royal council by Philip, whose Flemish education had not predisposed him to any reverence for the institution; a circumstance which operated quite as much to his prejudice with the more bigoted part of the nation, as his really exceptionable acts.(4)

(1) Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 17.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 65.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 16.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 3, cap. 14.

(2) Lucero (whom honest Martyr, with a sort of backhanded pun, usually nicknames Tenebrero) resumed his inquisitorial functions on Philip's death. Among his subsequent victims was the good archbishop Talavera, whose last days were embittered by his persecution. His insane violence at length provoked again the interference of government. His case was referred to a special commission, with Ximenes at its head. Sentence was pronounced against him. The prisons he had filled were emptied. His judgments were reversed, as founded on insufficient and frivolous grounds. But alas! what was this to the hundreds he had consigned to the stake, and the thousands he had plunged in misery? He was in the end sentenced,—not to be roasted alive,—but to retire to his own benefice, and confine himself to the duties of a Christian minister!—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 77.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 333, 334, et al.—Llorente, Hist. de l'Inquisition, tom. i. chap. 10, art. 3, 4.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. dial. de Deza.

(3) Oviedo has given an ample notice of this prelate, Ferdinand's confessor, in one of his dialogues. He mentions a singular taste in one respect, quite worthy of an inquisitor. The archbishop kept a tame lion in his palace, which used to accompany him when he went abroad, and lie down at his feet when he said mass in the church. The monster had been stripped of his teeth and claws when young, but he was "espartable en su vista é aspeto," says Oviedo, who records two or three of his gambols, lion's play at best.—Quincuagenas, MS.

(4) Llorente, Hist. de l'Inquisition, tom. i. chap. 10, art. 3, 4.—Abarca,

The minds of the wise and the good were filled with sadness as they listened to the low murmurs of popular discontent, which seemed to be gradually swelling into strength for some terrible convulsion; and they looked back with fond regret to the halcyon days which they had enjoyed under the temperate rule of Ferdinand and Isabella.

The Catholic king, in the mean time, was pursuing his voyage to Naples. He had been earnestly pressed by the Neapolitans to visit his new dominions soon after the conquest.<sup>(1)</sup> He now went; less, however, in compliance with that request, than to relieve his own mind by assuring himself of the fidelity of his viceroy, Gonsalvo de Cordova. That illustrious man had not escaped the usual lot of humanity; his brilliant successes had brought on him a full measure of the envy which seems to wait on merit like its shadow. Even men like Rojas, the Castilian ambassador at Rome, and Prospero Colonna, the distinguished Italian commander, condescended to employ their influence at court to depreciate the Great Captain's services, and raise suspicions of his loyalty. His courteous manners, bountiful largesses, and magnificent style of living, were represented as politic arts to seduce the affections of the soldiery and the people. His services were in the market for the highest bidder. He had received the most splendid offers from the king of France and the pope. He had carried on a correspondence with Maximilian and Philip, who would purchase his adhesion, if possible, to the latter, at any price; and, if he had not hitherto committed himself by any overt act, it seemed probable he was only waiting to be determined in his future course by the result of King Ferdinand's struggle with his son-in-law.<sup>(2)</sup>

Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 16.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 333, 335, et al. "Toda la gente," says Zurita, in reference to this affair, "noble y de limpia sangre se avia escandalizado dello" (Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 11); and he plainly intimates his conviction that Philip's profane interference brought Heaven's vengeance on his head in the shape of a premature death. Zurita was secretary of the Holy Office in the early part of the sixteenth century. Had he lived in the nineteenth, he might have acted the part of a Llorente. He was certainly not born for a bigot.

(1) Saumonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iv. lib. 6, cap. 5.  
(2) Giovio, Vita illust. Virorum, p. 276.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 16.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 5, 11, 17, 27, 31; lib. 7, cap. 14.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 123.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 36.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 23. Gonsalvo, in one of his letters to the king, notices these imputations so prejudicial to his honour. He implores his master to take no precipitate measures in consequence, and concludes with the most vehement protestations of loyalty and devotion to his service. The document is so curious, that I will lay the whole of it before the reader, and it may serve as a sample of the Great Captain's style of composition and orthography, which last, as with some other great captains of a more modern date, will hardly stand a comparison with his military science. "Al muy alto y muy poderoso y catolyco princype Rei y Señor el Rey despaña y de las dos çedillas, mi Señor. Muy alto muy poderoso y catolyco Rey y Señor. Por algunas letras e dado avysso a v. m<sup>ta</sup> de las causas que man detenydo y asy por

These suggestions, in which some truth, as usual, was mingled with a large infusion of error, gradually excited more and more uneasiness in the breast of the cautious and naturally distrustful Ferdinand. He at first endeavoured to abridge the powers of the Great Captain by recalling half the troops in his service, notwithstanding the unsettled state of the kingdom.(1) He then took the decisive step of ordering his return to Castile, on pretence of employing him in affairs of great importance at home. To allure him more effectually, he solemnly pledged himself, by an oath, to transfer to him, on his landing in Spain, the grand mastership of St. Jago, with all its princely dependencies and emoluments, the noblest gift in the possession of the crown. Finding all this ineffectual, and that Gonsalvo still procrastinated his return on various prettexts, the king's uneasiness increased to such a degree that he determined to press his own departure for Naples, and bring back, if not too late, his too powerful vassal.(2)

no saber que v. al. las aya recebydo como por satisfacer a la çertfycaçion que deve tener de my aynmo y devo dar de my serçytud a v. mta syntiendo que alla y en otras partes algunas synfyfican tener alguna yntiligencia e platyca conigo a su proposyto y en gran perjuycio de mi onrra y de vuestro serçyçio de lo qual dios quito su poder y my voluntad como ellos bien saben y syntiendo que algunos dalla escriven a rroma y otras partes no estan sus hyjos con v. al. en tanto acuerdo como al byen dellos y destos rreynos conuerna delybre enbyar albornos presona propya con lo presente creyendo que mas presto navegara por las portas el que yo por goifos a suplycallo y asy se lo suplyco y sus reales pies y manos beso por ello ny my tardança puez a sydo por aver myrado su serçyçio my duda que de my se le ponga no le haga haser cosa que no conuenga a su estado y serçyçio que por esta letra de my mano y propia voluntad escryta çertfyco y prometo á v. Mta que no tyene presona mas suya. ni eyerta para beyr y morir en vuestra fe y serçyçio que yo y *unquie v. al. se redusyere a un cavallo solo* y en el mayor estremo que mala fortuna pudiese obrar y en my mayno estuyere la potestad del mundo con el auctoridad y libertad que pudiese desear afyrmo que no e de rreconoser en mys dias otro rey ni señor syno a v. alteza quanto me querra por su syervo y vasallo en fyrmesa de lo qual por esta *lo juro a dyos y a santa maria y a los santos quatro evangelos como çrystiano* y liago pleyto oincenaje dello á vra. alteza como cavallero y en fe dello pongo aqui my nombre y sello con el sello de mys armas y la enbyo a v. mta porque de my tenga lo que asta agora no tyene aunque creo que para equi v. al. ny para mas oblygarme de lo que yo lo este y por my voluntad y devida no sea negesario mas porque se habla en lo escusado respondo con parte de lo que devo y con ayuda de dios my presona sera muy presto con v. al. por satysfazer a mas sy conuerna y esta la acabo pidiendo a nuestro Señor que la real presona y estado de v. al. con vitoria prospere. de Napoles en Castil-novo escrita a dos dias de Julyo de *ovr* años.

de V. al.  
muy unyl serçydor que sus  
reales pies y manos beso  
Gonçalo Hernandez Duque de  
Terranova."

(1) Mariana, Hist. do España, lib. 28, cap. 12.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 5.

(2) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 6.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. iv. p. 12, ed. di Milano, 1803.—Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 30, cap. 1.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 280.—Oviedo, Quincungenas, MS. bat. 1, quine. 3, dial. 9.

On the 4th of September, 1506, Ferdinand embarked at Barcelona, on board a well-armed squadron of Catalan galleys; taking with him his young and beautiful bride, and a numerous train of Aragonese nobles. On the 24th of the month, after a boisterous and tedious passage, he reached the port of Genoa. Here, to his astonishment, he was joined by the Great Captain, who, advised of the king's movements, had come from Naples with a small fleet to meet him. This frank conduct of his general, if it did not disarm Ferdinand of his suspicions, showed him the policy of concealing them; and he treated Gonsalvo with all the consideration and show of confidence which might impose, not merely on the public, but on the immediate subject of them.(1)

The Italian writers of the time express their astonishment that the Spanish general should have so blindly trusted himself into the hands of his suspicious master.(2) But he, doubtless, felt strong in the consciousness of his own integrity. There appears to have been no good reason for impeaching this. His most equivocal act was his delay to obey the royal summons; but much weight is reasonably due to his own explanation, that he was deterred by the distracted state of the country, arising from the proposed transfer of property to the Angevin barons, as well as from the precipitate disbanding of the army, which it required all his authority to prevent from breaking into open mutiny.(3) To these motives may be probably added the natural, though, perhaps, unconscious, reluctance to relinquish the exalted station, little short of absolute sovereignty, which he had so long and so gloriously filled.

He had, indeed, lorded it over his vicerealty with most princely sway; but he had assumed no powers to which he was not entitled by his services and peculiar situation. His public operations in Italy had been uniformly conducted for the advantage of his country, and, until the late final treaty with France, were mainly directed to the expulsion of that power beyond the Alps.(4) Since that event, he had busily occupied

(1) Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, ubi supra.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iv. lib. 6, cap. 5.—L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 187.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 123.—Capmany, *Mem. de Barcelona*, tom. i. p. 152.—“Este,” says Capmany of the squadron which bore the king from Barcelona, “se puede decir fué el último armamento que salió de aquella capital.”

(2) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 38.—Machiavelli, *Legazione Seconda a Roma*, let. 23.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 30, cap. 1.

(3) Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 6, cap. 31. There are several letters from Gonsalvo, in the year 1506, announcing his speedy return, and explaining the postponement of it by the unsettled state of the kingdom, which, indeed, forms the burden of his correspondence at this time. See in particular his letter to the king, dated Oct. 31, 1505, and another of his duchess to the same, written Jan. 17, 1506, MSS.

(4) My limits will not allow room for the complex politics and feuds of Italy, into which Gonsalvo entered with all the freedom of an independent potentate. See the details, apud *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap.



himself with the internal affairs of Naples, for which he made many excellent provisions, contriving by his consummate address to reconcile the most conflicting interests and parties. Although the idol of the army and of the people, there is not the slightest evidence of an attempt to pervert his popularity to an unworthy purpose. There is no appearance of his having been corrupted, or even dazzled, by the splendour offered repeatedly made him by the different potentates of Europe. On the contrary, the proud answer recorded of him, to Pope Julius the Second, breathes a spirit of determined loyalty, perfectly irreconcilable with anything sinister or selfish in his motives.(1) The Italian writers of the time, who affect to speak of these motives with some distrust, were little accustomed to such examples of steady devotion;(2) but the historian, who reviews all the circumstances, must admit that there was nothing to justify such distrust, and that the only exceptionable acts in Gonsalvo's administration were performed, not to advance his own interests, but those of his master, and in too strict obedience to his commands: King Ferdinand was the last person who had cause to complain of them.

After quitting Genoa, the royal squadron was driven by contrary winds into the neighbouring harbour of Portofino, where Ferdinand received intelligence which promised to change his destination altogether. This was the death of his son-in-law, the young king of Castile.

This event, so unexpected and awfully sudden, was occasioned by a fever, brought on by too violent exercise at a game of ball, at an entertainment made for Philip by his favourite, Manuel, in Burgos, where the court was then held. Through the unskilfulness of his physicians, as it was said, who neglected to bleed him, the disorder rapidly gained ground;(3) and on the sixth day after his attack, being the 25th of September, 1506, he breathed his last.(4) He was but twenty-eight years

112.—127.—Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xiii. chap. 103.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iii. p. 235 et alibi.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 7, 9.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 7.—Carta del Gran Capitan á los Reyes. De Napoles, 25 de Agosto, 1503, MS.

(1) Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 6, cap. 11.

(2) "Il Gran Capitan," says Guicciardini, "conscio dei sospetti, i quali il re forse non vamente aveva avuti di lui," &c. (*Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 30.) This way of damning a character by surmise, is very common with Italian writers of this age, who uniformly resort to the very worst motive as the key of whatever is dubious or inexplicable in conduct. Not a sudden death, for example, occurs, without at least a *sospetto* of poison from some hand or other. What a fearful commentary on the morals of the land!

(3) Philip's disorder was lightly regarded at first by his Flemish physicians, whose practice and predictions were alike condemned by their coadjutor Ludovico Marliano, an Italian doctor, highly commended by Martyr, as "inter philosophos et medicos lucida lampas." He was at least the better prophet on this occasion.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 313.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 14.

(4) Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 9.—Fortunately for Ferdinand's reputation, Philip's death was attended by too unequivocal cir-

old; of which brief period he had enjoyed, or endured, the "golden cares" of sovereignty but little more than two months, dating from his recognition by the cortes. His body, after being embalmed, lay in state for two days, decorated with the insignia,—the mockery of royalty, as it had proved to him,—and was then deposited in the convent of Miraflores, near Burgos, to await its final removal to Granada, agreeably to his last request.(1)

Philip was of the middle height; he had a fair florid complexion, regular features, long flowing locks, and a well-made, symmetrical figure. Indeed, he was so esteemed for comeliness both of person and countenance, that he is designated on the roll of Spanish sovereigns as *Felipo el Hermoso*, or the Handsome.(2) His mental endowments were not so extraordinary. The father of Charles the Fifth possessed scarcely a single quality in common with his remarkable son. He was rash and impetuous in his temper, frank, and careless. He was born to great expectations, and early accustomed to command, which seemed to fill him with a crude, intemperate ambition, impatient alike of control or counsel. He was not without generous, and even magnanimous sentiments; but he abandoned himself to the impulse of the moment, whether for good or evil; and, as he was naturally indolent and fond of pleasure, he willingly reposed the burden of government on others, who, as usual, thought more of their own interests than those of the public. His early education exempted him from the bigotry characteristic of the Spaniards; and, had he lived, he might have done much to mitigate the grievous abuses of the Inquisition. As it was, his premature death deprived him of the opportunity of compensating, by this single good act, the manifold mischiefs of his administration.

This event, too improbable to have formed any part of the calculations of the most far-sighted politician, spread general consternation throughout the country. The old adherents of Ferdinand, with Ximenes at their head, now looked forward

circumstances, and recorded by too many eyewitnesses, to admit the suggestion of poison. It seems he drank freely of cold water while very hot. The fever he brought on was an epidemic, which at that time afflicted Castile.—*Marchiavelli*, *Legazione Seconda a Roma*, let. 29.—*Zuñiga*, *Annales de Sevilla*, año 1506.

(1) *Peter Martyr*, *Opus Epist.* 313, 316.—*Bernaldez*, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 206.—*Gomez*, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 66.—*Carbajal*, *Anales*, MS. año 1506.—*L. Marineo*, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 187.—*Sandoval*, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. 1, p. 11.

(2) *L. Marineo*, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 187, 188.—*Sandoval*, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* ubi supra. Martyr, touched with the melancholy fate of his young sovereign, pays the following not inelegant, and certainly not parsimonious tribute to his memory, in a letter written a few days after his death, which, it may be noticed, he makes a day earlier than other contemporary accounts: "*Octavo Calendas Octobris animam emisit ille juvenis, formosus, pulcher, elegans, animo pollens et ingenio, proceræ valldæque naturæ, uti flos vernus evanuit.*"—*Opus Epist.* epist. 316.

with confidence to his re-establishment in the regency. Many others, however, like Garcilasso de la Vega, whose loyalty to their old master had not been proof against the times, viewed this with some apprehension.(1) Others, again, who had openly from the first linked their fortunes to those of his rival, as the duke of Najara, the marquis of Villena, and, above all, Don Juan Manuel, saw in it their certain ruin, and turned their thoughts towards Maximilian, or the king of Portugal, or any other monarch whose connection with the royal family might afford a plausible pretext for interference in the government. On Philip's Flemish followers the tidings fell like a thunder-bolt; and in their bewilderment they seemed like so many famished birds of prey, still hovering round the half-devoured carcass from which they had been unceremoniously seared.(2)

The weight of talent and popular consideration was undoubtedly on the king's side. The most formidable of the opposition, Manuel, had declined greatly in credit with the nation during the short disastrous period of his administration; while the archbishop of Toledo, who might be considered as the leader of Ferdinand's party, possessed talents, energy, and reputed sanctity of character, which, combined with the authority of his station, gave him unbounded influence over all classes of the Castilians. It was fortunate for the land, in this emergency, that the primacy was in such able hands. It justified the wisdom of Isabella's choice, made in opposition, it may be remembered, to the wishes of Ferdinand, who was now to reap the greatest benefit from it.

That prelate, foreseeing the anarchy likely to arise on Philip's death, assembled the nobility present at the court, in his own palace, the day before this event took place. It was there agreed to name a provisional council, or regency, who should carry on the government, and provide for the tranquillity of the kingdom. It consisted of seven members, with the archbishop of Toledo at its head; the duke of Infantado; the grand constable and the admiral of Castile, both connected with the royal family; the duke of Najara, a principal leader of the opposite faction; and two Flemish lords. No mention was made of Manuel.(3)

The nobles, in a subsequent convention on the 1st of October, ratified these proceedings, and bound themselves not to carry

(1) Garcilasso de la Vega appears to have been one of those dubious politicians, who, to make use of a modern phrase, are always "on the fence." The wags of his day applied to him a coarse saying of the old duke of Alva in Henry IV.'s time, "Que era como el perro del ventero, que ladra a los de fuera, y muerde a los de dentro."—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 39.

(2) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 2.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 206.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 22.

(3) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 15.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 1.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 317.—Zúñiga, *Anales de Sevilla*, año 1506.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 67.

on private war, or attempt to possess themselves of the queen's person, and to employ all their authority in supporting the provisional government, whose term was limited to the end of December.(1)

A meeting of cortes was wanting to give validity to their acts, as well as to express the popular will in reference to a permanent settlement of the government. There was some difference of opinion, even among the king's friends, as to the expediency of summoning that body at this crisis; but the greatest impediment arose from the queen's refusal to sign the writs.(2)

This unhappy lady's condition had become truly deplorable. During her husband's illness she had never left his bedside; but neither then, nor since his death, had been seen to shed a tear. She remained in a state of stupid insensibility, sitting in a darkened apartment, her head resting on her hand, and her lips closed, as mute and immovable as a statue. When applied to for issuing the necessary summons for the cortes, or to make appointments to office, or for any other pressing business which required her signature, she replied, "My father will attend to all this when he returns; he is much more conversant with business than I am; I have no other duties now but to pray for the soul of my departed husband." The only orders she was known to sign were for paying the salaries of her Flemish musicians; for in her abject state she found some consolation in music, of which she had been passionately fond from childhood. The few remarks which she uttered were discreet and sensible, forming a singular contrast with the general extravagance of her actions. On the whole, however, her pertinacity in refusing to sign anything

(1) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 16. I find no authority for the statement made by Alvaro Gomez (De Rebus Gestis, fol. 68), and faithfully echoed by Robles (*Vida de Jimenez*, cap. 17), and Quintanilla (*Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 14), that Jimenez filled the office of sole regent at this juncture. It is not warranted by Martyr (*Opus Epist.* epist. 317), and is contradicted by the words of the original instrument cited as usual by Zurita (*ubi supra*). The archbishop's biographers, one and all, claim as many merits and services for their hero as if, like Quintanilla, they were working expressly for his beatification.

(2) The duke of Alva, the staunch supporter of King Ferdinand in all his difficulties, objected to calling the cortes together, on the grounds, that the summonses, not being by the proper authority, would be informal; that many cities might consequently refuse to obey them, and the acts of the remainder be open to objection, as not those of the nation; that, after all, should cortes assemble, it was quite uncertain under what influences it might be made to act, and whether it would pursue the course most expedient for Ferdinand's interests; and finally, that if the intention was to procure the appointment of a regency, this had already been done by the nomination of King Ferdinand at Toro, in 1505; that to start the question anew, was unnecessarily to bring that act into doubt. The duke does not seem to have considered that Ferdinand had forfeited his original claim to the regency by his abdication; perhaps, on the ground that it had never been formally accepted by the commons. I shall have occasion to return to this hereafter.—See the discussion *in extenso*, apud Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 7, cap. 26.

was attended with as much good as evil, since it prevented her name from being used, as it would undoubtedly have often been, in the existing state of things, for pernicious and party purposes.(1)

Finding it impossible to obtain the queen's co-operation, the council at length resolved to issue the writs of summons in their own name, as a measure justified by necessity. The place of meeting was fixed at Burgos in the ensuing month of November; and great pains were taken that the different cities should instruct their representatives in their views respecting the ultimate disposition of the government.(2)

Long before this, indeed immediately after Philip's death, letters had been dispatched by Ximenes and his friends to the Catholic king, acquainting him with the state of affairs, and urging his immediate return to Castile. He received them at Portofino. He determined, however, to continue his voyage, in which he had already advanced so far, to Naples. The wary monarch perhaps thought that the Castilians, whose attachment to his own person he might with some reason distrust, would not be the less inclined to his rule after having tasted the bitterness of anarchy. In his reply, therefore, after briefly expressing a decent regret at the untimely death of his son-in-law, and his undoubting confidence in the loyalty of the Castilians to their queen his daughter, he prudently intimates that he retains nothing but kindly recollections of his ancient subjects, and promises to use all possible dispatch in adjusting the affairs of Naples, that he may again return to them.(3)

After this, the king resumed his voyage, and having touched at several places on the coast, in all which he was received with great enthusiasm, arrived before the capital of his new dominions in the latter part of October. All were anxious, says the great Tuscan historian of the time, to behold the prince who had acquired a mighty reputation throughout Europe for his victories both over Christian and infidel, and whose name was everywhere revered for the wisdom and equity with which he had ruled in his own kingdom. They looked to his coming, therefore, as an event fraught with importance, not merely to Naples, but to all Italy, where his personal presence and authority might do so much to heal existing feuds, and esta-

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 318.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 2.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 71—73.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 7, cap. 22.

(3) L. Marineo, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 187.—Zúñiga, *Annales de Sevilla*, año 1506.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 317.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 68, 69, 71. Shall we wrong Ferdinand much by applying to him the pertinent verses of Luean on a somewhat similar occasion?

"Tutumque putavit

Jam bonus esse socer; lacrymas non sponte eadentes

Effudit, gemitusque expressit pectore lecto,

Non aliter manifesta putans abscondere mentis

Gaudia, quam lacrymis."—Phar:alla, lib. 9.

blish permanent tranquillity.(1) The Neapolitans, in particular, were intoxicated with joy at his arrival. The most splendid preparations were made for his reception. A fleet of twenty vessels of war came out to meet him and conduct him into port; and, as he touched the shores of his new dominions, the air was rent with acclamations of the people, and with the thunders of artillery from the fortresses which crowned the heights of the city, and from the gallant navy which rode in her waters.(2)

The faithful chronicler of Los Palacios, who generally officiates as the master of ceremonies on these occasions, dilates with great complacency on all the circumstances of the celebration, even to the minutest details of the costume worn by the king and his nobility. According to him, the monarch was arrayed in a long flowing mantle of crimson velvet, lined with satin of the same colour. On his head was a black velvet bonnet, garnished with a resplendent ruby, and a pearl of inestimable price. He rode a noble white charger, whose furnished caparisons dazzled the eye with their splendour. By his side was his young queen, mounted on a milk-white palfrey, and wearing a skirt or under-garment of rich brocade, and a French robe, simply fastened with clasps, or loops of fine-wrought gold.

On the mole they were received by the Great Captain, who, surrounded by his guard of halberdiers, and his silken array of pages wearing his device, displayed all the pomp and magnificence of his household. After passing under a triumphal arch, where Ferdinand swore to respect the liberties and privileges of Naples, the royal pair moved forward under a gorgeous canopy, borne by the members of the municipality, while the reins of their steeds were held by some of the principal nobles. After them followed the other lords and cavaliers of the kingdom, with the clergy, and ambassadors assembled from every part of Italy and Europe, bearing congratulations and presents from their respective courts. As the procession halted in the various quarters of the city, it was greeted with joyous bursts of music from a brilliant assemblage of knights and ladies, who did homage by kneeling down and saluting the hands of their new sovereigns. At length, after defiling through the principal streets and squares, it reached the great cathedral, where the day was devoutly closed with solemn prayer and thanksgiving.(3)

(1) "Un re glorioso per tante vittorie avute contro gl'Infedeli, e contro i Cristiani, venerabile per opinione di prudenza, e del quale risonava fama Cristianissima, che avesse con singolare giustizia e tranquillità governato i reami suoi."—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 31.—Also, Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 124.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 30, cap. 1.

(2) Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iv. lib. 6, cap. 5.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 31.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 278, 279.—Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 7.

(3) Bernaldiz, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 210.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7.

Ferdinand was too severe an economist of time to waste it willingly on idle pomp and ceremonial. His heart swelled with satisfaction, however, as he gazed on the magnificent capital thus laid at his feet, and pouring forth the most lively expressions of a loyalty which of late he had been led to distrust. With all his impatience, therefore, he was not disposed to rebuke this spirit, by abridging the season of hilarity; but, after allowing sufficient scope for its indulgence, he devoted himself assiduously to the great purposes of his visit.

He summoned a parliament general of the kingdom, where, after his own recognition, oaths of allegiance were tendered to his daughter Joanna and her posterity, as his successors, without any allusion being made to the rights of his wife. This was a clear evasion of the treaty with France; but Ferdinand, though late, was too sensible of the folly of that stipulation, which secured the reversion of his wife's dower to the latter crown, to allow it to receive any sanction from the Neapolitans.(1)

Another, and scarcely less disastrous provision of the treaty, he complied with in better faith. This was the re-establishment of the Angevin proprietors in their ancient estates; the greater part of which, as already noticed, had been parcelled out among his own followers, both Spaniards and Italians. It was of course a work of extraordinary difficulty and vexation. When any flaw or impediment could be raised in the Angevin title, the transfer was evaded. When it could not, a grant of other land or money was substituted, if possible. More frequently, however, the equivalent, which probably was not very scrupulously meted out, was obliged to be taken by the Aragonese proprietor. To accomplish this, the king was compelled to draw largely on the royal patrimony in Naples, as well as to make liberal appropriations of land and rents in his native dominions. As all this proved insufficient, he was driven to the expedient of replenishing the exchequer by draughts on his new subjects.(2)

The result, although effected without violence or disorder, was unsatisfactory to all parties. The Angevins rarely received the full extent of their demands. The loyal partisans of Aragon saw the fruits of many a hard-fought battle snatched from their grasp, to be given back again to their enemies.(3) Lastly,

cap. 20.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, ubi supra.—Garibay, *Compendio*, lib. 20, cap. 9.

(1) Zurita, *Anales*, ubi supra.—Guicciardius, *Istoria*, tom. iv. pp. 72, 73.

(2) Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 30, cap. 1.—Sannunte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iv. lib. 6, cap. 5.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 129.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 71.

(3) Such, for example, was the fate of the doughty little cavalier Pedro de la Paz, the gallant Leyva, so celebrated in the subsequent wars of Charles V., the ambassador Rojas, the Quixotic Paredes, and others. The last of these adventurers, according to Mariana, endeavoured to repair his broken fortunes by driving the trade of a corsair in the Levant.—*Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 4.

the wretched Neapolitans, instead of the favours and immunities incident to a new reign, found themselves burdened with additional imposts, which, in the exhausted state of the country, were perfectly intolerable. So soon were the fair expectations formed of Ferdinand's coming, like most other indefinite expectations, clouded over by disappointment; and such were some of the bitter fruits of the disgraceful treaty with Louis the Twelfth.(1)

## CHAPTER XX.

### FERDINAND'S RETURN AND REGENCY.—GONSALVO'S HONOURS AND RETIREMENT.

1506—1509.

Joanna's mad Conduct—She changes her Ministers—Disorders in Castile—Ferdinand's politic Behaviour—He leaves Naples—His brilliant Reception by Louis XII.—Honours to Gonsalvo—Ferdinand's Return to Castile—His excessive Severity—Neglect of the Great Captain—His honourable Retirement.

WHILE Ferdinand was thus occupied in Naples, the representatives of most of the cities summoned by the provisional government had assembled in Burgos (Nov. 1506). Before entering on business, they were desirous to obtain the queen's sanction to their proceedings. A committee waited on her for that purpose, but she obstinately refused to give them audience.(2)

She still continued plunged in moody melancholy, exhibiting, however, occasionally the wildest freaks of insanity. Towards the latter end of December, she determined to leave Burgos, and remove her husband's remains to their final resting-place in Granada. She insisted on seeing them herself, before her departure. The remonstrances of her counsellors, and the holy men of the monastery of Miraflores, proved equally fruitless. Opposition only roused her passions into frenzy, and they were obliged to comply with her mad humours. The corpse was removed from the vault; the two coffins of lead and wood were opened, and such as choso gazed on the mouldering relics,

(1) If any one would see a perfect specimen of the triumph of style, let him compare the interminable prolixities of Zurita with Mariana, who, in this portion of his narrative, has embodied the facts and opinions of his predecessors, with scarcely an alteration, save that of greater condensation, in his own transparent and harmonious diction. It is quite as great a miracle in its way as the *refacimento* of Berni.

(2) Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 2.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 29.



which, notwithstanding their having been embalmed, exhibited scarcely a trace of humanity. The queen was not satisfied till she touched them with her own hand; which she did without shedding a tear, or testifying the least emotion. The unfortunate lady, indeed, was said never to have been seen to weep since she detected her husband's intrigue with the Flemish courtesan.

The body was then placed on a magnificent car, or hearse, drawn by four horses. It was accompanied by a long train of ecclesiastics and nobles, who, together with the queen, left the city on the night of the 20th of December. She made her journeys by night, saying, that "a widow, who had lost the sun of her own soul, should never expose herself to the light of day." When she halted, the body was deposited in some church or monastery, where the funeral services were performed, as if her husband had just died; and a corps of armed men kept constant guard, chiefly, as it would seem, with the view of preventing any female from profaning the place by her presence; for Joanna still retained the same jealousy of her sex which she had unhappily so much cause to feel during Philip's lifetime. (1)

In a subsequent journey, when at a short distance from Torquemada, she ordered the corpse to be carried into the courtyard of a convent, occupied, as she supposed, by monks. She was filled with horror, however, on finding it a nunnery, and immediately commanded the body to be removed into the open fields. Here she encamped with her whole party at dead of night; not, however, until she had caused the coffins to be unsealed, that she might satisfy herself of the safety of her husband's relics; although it was very difficult to keep the torches, during the time, from being extinguished by the violence of the wind, and leaving the company in total darkness. (2)

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. cpist.* 324, 332, 339, 363.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 3.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1506.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 206.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 17. "Childish as was the affection," says Dr. Dunham, "of Joanna for her husband, she did not, as Robertson relates, cause the body to be removed from the sepulchre after it was buried, and brought to her apartment. She once visited the sepulchre, and, after affectionately gazing on the corpse, was persuaded to retire. Robertson seems not to have read, at least not with care, the authorities for the reign of Fernando."—(*History of Spain and Portugal*, vol. ii. p. 287, note.) Whoever will take the trouble to examine these authorities, will probably not find Dr. Dunham much more accurate in the matter than his predecessor. Robertson, indeed, draws largely from the *Epistles of Peter Martyr*, the best voucher for this period, which his critic apparently has not consulted. In the very page preceeding that in which he thus taxes Robertson with inaccuracy, we find him speaking of Charles VIII. as the reigning monarch of France; an error not merely clerical, since it is repeated no less than three times. Such mistakes would be too trivial for notice in any but an author who has made similar ones the ground for unsparing condemnation of others.

(2) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. cpist.* 339. A foolish Carthusian monk, "*laevi siccu folio levior*," to borrow Martyr's words, though more knave than fool

These mad pranks, savouring of absolute idiocy, were occasionally chequered by other acts of more intelligence, but not less startling. She had early shown a disgust to her father's old counsellors, and especially to Ximenes, who, she thought, interfered too authoritatively in her domestic concerns. Before leaving Burgos, however, she electrified her husband's adherents by revoking all grants made by the crown since Isabella's death. This, almost the only act she was ever known to sign, was a severe blow to the courtly tribe of sycophants, on whom the golden favours of the late reign had been so prodigally showered. At the same time she reformed her privy council, by dismissing the present members, and reinstating those appointed by her royal mother, sarcastically telling one of the ejected counsellors, that "he might go and complete his studies at Salamanca." The remark had a biting edge to it, as the worthy jurist was reputed somewhat low in his scholarship.<sup>(1)</sup>

These partial gleams of intelligence, directed in this peculiar way too, led many to discern the secret influence of her father. She still, however, pertinaciously refused to sanction any measures of cortes for his recall; and when pressed by that body on this and other matters, at an audience which she granted before leaving Burgos, she plainly told them "to return to their quarters, and not to meddle further in the public business without her express commands." Not long after this, the legislature was prorogued by the royal council for four months.

The term assigned for the provisional government expired in December, and was not renewed. No other regency was appointed by the nobles; and the kingdom, without even the shadow of protection afforded by its cortes, and with no other guide but its crazy sovereign, was left to drift at random amidst the winds and waves of faction. This was not slow in brewing in every quarter, with the aid especially of the overgrown nobles, whose license, on such occasions as this, proved too plainly that public tranquillity was not founded so much on the stability of law as on the personal character of the reigning sovereign.<sup>(2)</sup>

probably, filled Joanna with absurd hopes of her husband's returning to life, which, he assured her, had happened, as he had read, to a certain prince, after he had been dead fourteen years. As Philip was disembowelled, he was hardly in a condition for such an auspicious event. The queen, however, seems to have been caught with the idea.—(Opus Epist. epist. 328.) Martyr loses all patience at the inventions of this "baetero caeculatus," as he calls him in his abominable Latin, as well as at the mad pranks of the queen, and the ridiculous figure which he and the other grave personages of the court were compelled to make on the occasion. It is impossible to read his *Jeremiads* on the subject without a smile. See, in particular, his whimsical epistle to his old friend the archbishop of Granada.—Opus Epist. epist. 333.

(1) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 3.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 26, 38, 54.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 72.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 11.

(2) Abarca, *Reyes de Aragón*, tom. ii. rey 36, cap. 16.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 346.—Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 7, cap. 36—38.—Zúñiga, *Annales de*

The king's enemies in the mean time were pressing their correspondence with the emperor Maximilian, and urging his immediate presence in Spain. Others devised schemes for marrying the poor queen to the young duke of Calabria, or some other prince whose years or incapacity might enable them to act over again the farce of King Philip. To add to the troubles occasioned by this mesh of intrigue and faction, the country, which of late years had suffered from scarcity, was visited by pestilence, that fell most heavily on the south. In Seville alone, Bernaldez reports the incredible number of thirty thousand persons to have fallen victims to it.(1)

But although the storm was thus darkening from every quarter, there was no general explosion to shake the state to its foundations, as in the time of Henry the Fourth. Orderly habits, if not principles, had been gradually formed under the long reign of Isabella. The great mass of the people had learned to respect the operation, and appreciate the benefits of law; and notwithstanding the menacing attitude, the bustle, and transitory ebullitions of the rival factions, there seemed a manifest reluctance to break up the established order of things, and, by deeds of violence and bloodshed, to renew the days of ancient anarchy.

Much of this good result was undoubtedly to be attributed to the vigorous counsels and conduct of Ximenes,(2) who, together with the grand constable and the duke of Alva, had received full powers from Ferdinand to act in his name. Much is also

Sevilla, año 1507.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 206. The duke of Medina Sidonia, son of the nobleman who bore so honourable a part in the Granadine war, mustered a large force by land and sea for the recovery of his ancient patrimony of Gibraltar.—Isabella's high-spirited friend, the marchioness of Moya, put herself at the head of a body of troops with better success, during her husband's illness, and re-established herself in the strong fortress of Segovia, which Philip had transferred to Manuel.—(Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 343.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 207.) "No one lamented the circumstance," says Oviedo. The marchioness closed her life not long after this, at about sixty years of age. Her husband, though much older, survived her.—Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quine. 1, dial. 23.

(1) Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 208.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 71.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 2. The worthy curate of Los Palacios does not vouch for this exact amount from his own knowledge. He states, however, that 170 died, out of his own little parish of 500 persons; and he narrowly escaped with life himself, after a severe attack.—Ubi supra.

(2) Ximenes equipped and paid out of his own funds a strong corps, for the ostensible purpose of protecting the queen's person, but quite as much to enforce order by checking the turbulent spirit of the grandees; a stretch of authority which this haughty body could ill brook.—(Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 17.) Zurita, indeed, who thinks the archbishop had a strong relish for sovereign power, accuses him of being "at heart much more of a king than a friar."—(Anales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 29.) Gomez, on the contrary, traces every political act of his to the purest patriotism.—(De Rebus Gestis, fol. 70, et alibi.) In the mixed motives of action, Ximenes might probably have been puzzled himself to determine how much belonged to the one principle, and how much to the other.

to be ascribed to the politic conduct of the king. Far from an intemperate zeal to resume the sceptre of Castile, he had shown throughout a discreet forbearance. He used the most courteous and condescending style in his communications to the nobles and the municipalities, expressing his entire confidence in their patriotism, and their loyalty to the queen his daughter. Through the archbishop and other important agents, he had taken effectual measures to soften the opposition of the more considerable lords; until, at length, not only such accommodating statesmen as Garcilasso de la Vega, but more sturdy opponents, as Villona, Benavente, and Bojar, were brought to give in their adhesion to their old master. Liberal promises, indeed, had been made by the emperor, in the name of his grandson Charles, who had already been made to assume the title of king of Castile. But the promises of the imperial braggart passed lightly with the more considerate Castilians, who knew how far they usually outstripped his performance, and who felt, on the other hand, that their true interests were connected with those of a prince whose superior talents and personal relations all concurred to recommend him to the seat which he had once so honourably occupied. The great mass of the common people, too, notwithstanding the temporary alienation of their feelings from the Catholic king by his recent marriage, were driven by the evils they actually suffered, and the vague apprehensions of greater, to participate in the same sentiments; so that, in less than eight months from Philip's death, the whole nation may be said to have returned to its allegiance to its ancient sovereign. The only considerable exceptions were Don Juan Manuel and the duke of Najara. The former had gone too far to recede, and the latter possessed too chivalrous, or too stubborn, a temper to do so.<sup>(1)</sup>

At length, the Catholic monarch, having completed his arrangements at Naples, and waited until the affairs of Castile were fully ripe for his return, set sail from his Italian capital, June 4th, 1507. He proposed to touch at the Genoese port of Savona, where an interview had been arranged between him and Louis the Twelfth. During his residence in Naples, he had assiduously devoted himself to the affairs of the kingdom. He had avoided entering into the local politics of Italy, refusing all treaties and alliances proposed to him by its various states, whether offensive or defensive. He had evaded the importunate solicitations and remonstrances of Maximilian in regard to the Castilian regency, and had declined, moreover, a personal conference proposed to him by the emperor during his stay in

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 351.—L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 187.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 21.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 19, 22, 25, 30, 39.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 76, ed. Milano, 1803.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 17.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 12.

Italy. After the great work of restoring the Angevins to their estates, he had thoroughly re-organised the interior administration of the kingdom; creating new offices, and entirely new departments. He made large reforms, moreover, in the courts of law, and prepared the way for the new system, demanded by its relations as a dependency of the Spanish monarchy. Lastly, before leaving the city, he acceded to the request of the inhabitants for the re-establishment of their ancient university.(1)

In all these sagacious measures he had been ably assisted by his viceroy Gonsalvo de Cordova. Ferdinand's deportment towards the latter had been studied, as I have said, to efface every uncomfortable impression from his mind. On his first arrival, indeed, the king had condescended to listen to complaints, made by certain officers of the exchequer, of Gonsalvo's waste and misapplication of the public moneys. The general simply asked leave to produce his own accounts in his defence. The first item which he read aloud was, two hundred thousand seven hundred and thirty-six ducats, given in alms to the monasteries and the poor, to secure their prayers for the success of the king's enterprise. The second was seven hundred thousand four hundred and ninety-four ducats to the spies employed in his service. Other charges, equally preposterous, followed; while some of the audience stared incredulous, others laughed, and the king himself, ashamed of the paltry part he was playing, dismissed the whole affair as a jest. The common saying of *cuentas del Gran Capitan*, at this day, attests at least the popular faith in the anecdote.(2)

From this moment, Ferdinand continued to show Gonsalvo unbounded marks of confidence; advising with him on all important matters, and making him the only channel of royal favour. He again renewed, in the most emphatic manner, his promise to resign the grandmastership of St. Jago in his favour on their return to Spain, and made formal application to the pope to confirm it.(3) In addition to the princely honours

(1) Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 30, cap. 1—5.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iv. lib. 6, cap. 5.—L. Marincò, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 187.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 129.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 210.—Signorelli, *Cultura nelle Sicilie*, tom. iv. p. 84. The learned Neapolitan civilian Giannone bears emphatic testimony to the general excellence of the Spanish legislation for Naples.—*Ubi supra*.

(2) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 102.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3.

(3) Machiavelli expresses his astonishment that Gonsalvo should have been the dupe of promises, the very magnitude of which made them suspicious. "Ho sentito ragionare di questo accordo fra Gonsalvo e il Re, e maravigliarsi ciascuno che Gonsalvo se ne fidi; e quanto quel Re è stato più liberale verso di lui, tanto più ne insospettisce la brigata, pensando che il Re abbi fatto per assicurarli, e per poterne meglio disporre sotto questa sicurtà."—(Legazione Seconda a Roma, let. 23, Oct. 6.) But what alternative had he, unless, indeed, that of open rebellion, for which he seems to have had no relish? And, if he had, it was too late after Ferdinand was in Naples.

already conferred on the Great Captain, he granted him the noble duchy of Sessa, by an instrument which, after a pompous recapitulation of his stately titles and manifold services, declares that these latter were too great for recompense.<sup>(1)</sup> Unfortunately for both king and subject, this was too true.<sup>(2)</sup>

Gonsalvo remained a day or two behind his royal master in Naples to settle his private affairs. In addition to the heavy debts incurred by his own generous style of living, he had assumed those of many of his old companions in arms with whom the world had gone less prosperously than with himself. The claims of his creditors, therefore, had swollen to such an amount, that, in order to satisfy them fully, he was driven to sacrifice part of the domains lately granted him. Having discharged all the obligations of a man of honour, he prepared to quit the land over which he had ruled with so much splendour and renown for nearly four years. The Neapolitans in a body followed him to the vessel; and nobles, cavaliers, and even ladies of the highest rank, lingered on the shore to bid him a last adieu. Not a dry eye, says the historian, was to be seen. So completely had he dazzled their imaginations, and captivated their hearts, by his brilliant and popular manners, his munificent spirit, and the equity of his administration,—qualities more useful, and probably more rare in those turbulent times, than military talent. He was succeeded in the office of grand constable of the kingdom by Prospero Colonna, and in that of viceroy by the count of Ribagorza, Ferdinand's nephew.<sup>(3)</sup>

On the 28th of June, the royal fleet of Aragon entered the little port of Savona, where the king of France had already

(1) *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 3.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 6, 49.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 279. "Vos el ilustre Don Gonzalo Hernandez de Cordoba," begins the instrument, "Duque de Terra Nova, Marques de Santangelo y Vitonto, y mi Condestable del reyno de Nápoles, nuestro muy charo y muy amado primo, y uno del nuestro secreto Consejo," &c.—(See the document apud Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. Apend. No. 1.) The revenues from his various estates amounted to 40,000 ducats. Zurita speaks of another instrument, a public manifesto of the Catholic king, proclaiming to the world his sense of his general's exalted services and unimpeachable loyalty.—(*Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 3.) This sort of testimony seems to contain an implication not very flattering, and, on the whole, is so improbable, that I cannot but think the Aragonese historian has confounded it with the grant of Sessa, bearing precisely the same date, February 25, and containing also, though incidentally, and as a thing of course, the most ample tribute to the Great Captain.—Comp. also Pulgar, *Sum.* p. 138.

(2) Tacitus may explain why. "Beneficia eò usque læta sunt, dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multum attonenere, pro gratià odium redditur."—(*Annales*, lib. 4, sect. 18.) "Il n'est pas si dangereux," says Rochefoucault, in a more caustic vein, "de faire du mal à la plupart des hommes, que de leur faire trop de bien."

(3) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 280, 281.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 20, cap. 9.—Giammone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 30, cap. 1.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iv. lib. 6, cap. 5.—Guleciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 72.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 4.

been waiting for it several days. The French navy was ordered out to receive the Catholic monarch; and the vessels on either side, gaily decorated with the national flags and ensigns, rivalled each other in the beauty and magnificence of their equipments. King Ferdinand's galleys were spread with rich carpets and awnings of yellow and scarlet, and every sailor in the fleet exhibited the same gaudy-coloured livery of the royal house of Aragon. Louis the Twelfth came to welcome his illustrious guests, attended by a gallant train of his nobility and chivalry; and, in order to reciprocate, as far as possible, the confidence reposed in him by the monarch with whom he had been so recently at deadly feud, immediately went on board the vessel of the latter.(1) Horses and mules richly caparisoned awaited them at the landing. The French king mounting his steed, gallantly placed the young queen of Aragon behind him. His cavaliers did the same with the ladies of her suite, most of them French women, though attired, as an old chronicler of the nation rather peevishly complains, after the Spanish fashion; and the whole party, with the ladies *en croupe*, galloped off to the royal quarters in Savona.(2)

Blithe and jocund were the revels which rung through the halls of this fair city during the brief residence of its royal visitors. Abundance of good cheer had been provided by Louis's orders, writes an old cavalier,(3) who was there to profit by it: and the larders of Savona were filled with the choicest game, and its cellars well stored with the delicious wines of Corsica, Languedoc, and Provence. Among the followers of Louis were the marquis of Mantua, the brave La Palice, the veteran D'Aubigny, and many others of renown, who had so lately measured swords with the Spaniards on the fields of Italy, and

(1) "Spettacolo certamente memorabile, vedere insieme due Re potentissimi tra tutti i Principi Cristiani stati poco innanzi sì acerbissimi inimici, non solo riconciliati, e congiunti di parentado, ma depositi i segni dell' odio, e della memoria delle offese, commettere ciascuno di loro la vita propria in arbitrio dell' altro con non minore confidenza, che se sempre fossero stati concordissimi fratelli."—(Gulicciardini, Istoria, tom. iv. p. 75.) This astonishment of the Italian is an indifferent tribute to the habitual good faith of the times.

(2) D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII. part 3, chap. 38.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 132.—St. Gelais, Hist. de Louis XII. p. 204. Germaine appears to have been no great favourite with the French chroniclers: "Et y estoit sa femme Germaine de Fouez, qui tenoit une merveilleuse audace. Elle fist peu de compte de tous les François, mesmement de son frère, le gentil duc de Nemours."—(Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 27, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xv.)—See also Fleurance (Mémoires, chap. 19, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xvi.) who notices the same arrogant bearing.

(3) For fighting, and feasting, and all the generous pastimes of chivalry, none of the old French chroniclers of this time rivals D'Auton. He is the very Froissart of the 16th century. A part of his work still remains in manuscript. That which is printed retains the same form, I believe, in which it was given to the public by Godefroy, in the beginning of the seventeenth century; while many an inferior chronicler and memoir-monger has been published and republished, with all the lights of editorial erudition.

who now vied with each other in rendering them these more grateful, and no less honourable, offices of chivalry.(1)

As the gallant D'Aubigny was confined to his apartment by the gout, Ferdinand, who had always held his talents and conduct in high esteem, complimented him by a visit in person. But no one excited such general interest and attention as Gonsalvo de Cordova, who was emphatically the hero of the day. At least, such is the testimony of Guicciardini, who will not be suspected of undue partiality. Many a Frenchman there had had bitter experience of his military prowess. Many others had grown familiar with his exploits in the exaggerated reports of their countrymen. They had been taught to regard him with mingled feelings of fear and hatred, and could scarcely credit their senses as they beheld the bugbear of their imaginations distinguished above all others for "the majesty of his presence, the polished elegance of his discourse, and manners in which dignity was blended with grace."(2)

But none were so open in their admiration as King Louis. At his request Gonsalvo was admitted to sup at the same table with the Aragonese sovereigns and himself. During the repast he surveyed his illustrious guest with the deepest interest, asking him various particulars respecting those memorable campaigns which had proved so fatal to France. To all these the Great Captain responded with becoming gravity, says the chronicler; and the French monarch testified his satisfaction at parting, by taking a massive chain of exquisite workmanship from his own neck, and throwing it round Gonsalvo's. The historians of the event appear to be entirely overwhelmed with the magnitude of the honour conferred on the Great Captain, by thus admitting him to the same table with three crowned heads; and Guicciardini does not hesitate to pronounce it a more glorious epoch in his life than even that of his triumphant entry into the capital of Naples.(3)

During this interview, the monarchs held repeated confer-

(1) D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 3, chap. 38.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. ubi supra.—Bembo, *Istoria Vmiziana*, lib. 7.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 204.

(2) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. pp. 76, 77.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 232.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 3, cap. 4. "Ma non dava minore materia al ragionamenti il Gran Capitano, al quale non erano meno volti gli occhi degli uomini per la fama del suo valore, e per la memoria di tante vittorie, la quale faceva, che i Franzesi, ancora che vinti tante volte di lui, e che solevano aver in sommo odio e orrore il suo nome, non si saziassero di contemplarlo e onorarlo. \* \* \* \* E accresceva l'ammirazione degli uomini la maestà eccellente della presenza sua, la magnificenza delle parole, i gesti, e la maniera piena di gravità condita di grazia; ma sopra tutti il Re di Francia," &c.—Guicciardini, ubi supra.

(3) Brantôme, *Vies des Hommes Illustres*, disc. 6.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 3, cap. 4.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. pp. 77, 78.—D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* ubi supra.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 319.—*Mémoires de Bayard*, chap. 27, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xv.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 210.—Pulgar, *Sumario*, p. 195.



ences, at which none were present but the papal envoy, and Louis's favourite minister, D'Amboise. The subject of discussion can only be conjectured by the subsequent proceedings, which make it probable that it related to Italy; and that it was in this season of idle dalliance and festivity that the two princes who held the destinies of that country in their hands matured the famous league of Cambray, so disastrous to Venice, and reflecting little credit on its projectors, either on the score of good faith or sound policy. But to this we shall have occasion to return hereafter.(1)

At length, after enjoying for four days the splendid hospitality of their royal entertainer, the king and queen of Aragon re-embarked, and reached their own port of Valencia, after various detentions, on the 20th of July 1507. Ferdinand, having rested a short time in his beautiful capital, pressed forward to Castile, where his presence was eagerly expected. On the borders he was met by the dukes of Albuquerque and Medina Celi, his faithful follower the count of Cifuentes, and many other nobles and cavaliers. He was soon after joined by deputies from many of the principal cities in the kingdom, and, thus escorted, made his entry into it by the way of Monteagudo, on the 21st of August. How different from the forlorn and outcast condition in which he had quitted the country a short year before! He intimated the change in his own circumstances by the greater state and show of authority which he now assumed. The residue of the old Italian army, just arrived under the celebrated Pedro Navarro, count of Oliveto,(2) preceded him on the march; and he was personally attended by his *alcaldes*, *alguazils*, and *kings-at-arms*, with all the appropriate insignia of royal supremacy.(3)

At Tortoles he was met by the queen his daughter, accompanied by Archbishop Ximenes. The interview between them had more of pain than pleasure in it. The king was greatly shocked by Joanna's appearance; for her wild and haggard features, emaciated figure, and the mean, squalid attire in which she was dressed, made it difficult to recognise any trace of the daughter from whom he had been so long separated. She discovered more sensibility on seeing him than she had shown since her husband's death, and henceforth resigned herself to her father's will with little opposition. She was soon after induced by him to change her unsuitable residence for

(1) D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.* part 3, chap. 35.—Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 133.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 36.

(2) King Ferdinand had granted him the title and territory of Oliveto, in the kingdom of Naples, in recompence for his eminent services in the Italian war.—Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. p. 178.—Glorio, *Vita Illust. Vitorum*, p. 196.

(3) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 210.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 4, 7.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 359.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 74.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS.

more commodious quarters at Tordesillas. Her husband's remains were laid in the monastery of Santa Clara, adjoining the palace, from whose windows she could behold his sepulchre. From this period, although she survived forty-seven years, she never quitted the walls of her habitation; and, although her name appeared jointly with that of her son, Charles the Fifth, in all public acts, she never afterwards could be induced to sign a paper, or take part in any transactions of a public nature. She lingered out a half-century of dreary existence, as completely dead to the world as the remains which slept in the monastery of Santa Clara beside her.(1)

From this time the Catholic king exercised an authority nearly as undisputed, and far less limited and defined, than in the days of Isabella. So firm did he feel in his seat, indeed, that he omitted to obtain the constitutional warrant of cortes. He had greatly desired this at the late irregular meeting of that body; but it broke up, as we have seen, without effecting anything; and, indeed, the disaffection of Burgos, and some other principal cities, at that time, must have made the success of such an application very doubtful. But the general cordiality with which Ferdinand was greeted, gave no ground for apprehending such a result at present.

Many, indeed, of his partisans objected to any intervention of the legislature in this matter, as superfluous; alleging that he held the regency as natural guardian of his daughter, nominated, moreover, by the queen's will, and confirmed by the cortes at Toro. Those rights, they argued, were not disturbed by his resignation, which was a compulsory act, and had never received any express legislative sanction; and which, in any event, must be considered as intended only for Philip's lifetime, and to be necessarily determined with that.

But, however plausible these views, the irregularity of Ferdinand's proceedings furnished an argument for disobedience on the part of the discontented nobles, who maintained that they knew no supreme authority but that of their queen Joanna, till some other had been sanctioned by the legislature. The whole affair was finally settled, with more attention to constitutional forms, in the cortes held at Madrid, October 8th, 1510, when the king took the regular oaths as administrator of the realm in his daughter's name, and as guardian of her son.(2)

(1) Gomcz, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 75.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 363.—Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 8, cap. 49.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 13. Philip's remains were afterwards removed to the cathedral church of Granada; where they were deposited, together with those of his wife Joanna, in a magnificent sepulchre erected by Charles V. near that of Ferdinand and Isabella.—Pedraza, *Antigüedad de Granada*, lib. 3, cap. 7.—Colmenar, *Délices de l'Espagne et du Portugal* (Leide, 1715), tom. iii. p. 490.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 26, 34; lib. 9, cap. 20. See the bold language of the protest of the marquis of Priego against this assumption of the

Ferdinand's deportment, on his first return, was distinguished by a most gracious clemency, evinced not so much, indeed, by any excessive remuneration of services, as by the politic oblivion of injuries. If he ever alluded to these, it was in a sportive way, implying that there was no rancour or ill-will at heart. "Who would have thought," he exclaimed, one day to a courtier near him, "that you could so easily abandon your old master for one so young and inexperienced?" "Who would have thought," replied the other with equal bluntness, "that my old master would have outlived my young one?" (1)

With all this complaisance, however, the king did not neglect precautions for placing his authority on a sure basis, and fencing it round so as to screen it effectually from the insults to which it had been formerly exposed. He retained in pay most of the old Italian levies, with the ostensible purpose of an African expedition. He took good care that the military orders should hold their troops in constant readiness, and that the militia of the kingdom should be in condition for instant service. He formed a body-guard to attend the royal person on all occasions. It consisted at first of only two hundred men, armed and drilled after the fashion of the Swiss ordonnance, and placed under the command of the chronicler Ayora, an experienced martinet, who made some figure at the defence of Salsas. This institution probably was immediately suggested by the *garde-du-corps* of Louis the Twelfth, at Savona, which, altogether on a more formidable scale, indeed, had excited his admiration by the magnificence of its appointments and its thorough discipline. (2)

Notwithstanding the king's general popularity, there were still a few considerable persons who regarded his resumption

regency by the Catholic king. "En caso tan grande," he says, "que se trata de gobernacion de grandes reynos é señorios justa é razonable cosa fuera, é seria que fuéramos llamados é certificados de ello, porque yo é los otros caballeros grandes é las ciudades é alcaldes mayores vieramos lo que debiamos hacer é consentir como vasallos é leales servidores de la reina nuestra señora, porque la administracion é gobernacion destos reynos se diera é concediera á quien las leyes destos reynos mandan que se den é encomienden en caso," &c. — (MS. de la Biblioteca de la Real Acad. de Hist. apud Marina, Teoría, tom. ii. part 2, cap. 18.) Marina, however, is not justified in regarding Ferdinand's subsequent convocation of cortes for this purpose as a concession to the demands of the nation. — (Teoría, ubi supra.) It was the result of the treaty of Blois, with Maximilian, guaranteed by Louis XII., the object of which was to secure the succession to the Archduke Charles. — Zurita, Anales, lib. 8, cap. 47.

(1) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 292. — *Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 3, cap. 4.

(2) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 10. — MSS. de Torres y de Oviedo, apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. lib. 6. — D'Auton, *Hist. de Louis XII.* part 3, chap. 38. The Catholic king was very minute in his inquiries, according to Auton, "du faict et de l'estat des gardes du Roy, et de ses Gentilshommes, qu'il réputoit à grande chose, et triomphale ordonnance." — *Ubi supra*.

of authority with an evil eye. Of these, Don Juan Manuel had fled the kingdom before his approach, and taken refuge at the court of Maximilian, where the counsellors of that monarch took good care that he should not acquire the ascendancy he had obtained over Philip. The duke of Najara, however, still remained in Castile, shutting himself up in his fortresses, and refusing all compromise or obedience. The king without hesitation commanded Navarro to march against him with his whole force. Najara was persuaded by his friends to tender his submission, without waiting the encounter; and he surrendered his strongholds to the king, who, after detaining them some time in his keeping, delivered them over to the duke's eldest son.<sup>(1)</sup>

With another offender he dealt more sternly. This was Don Pedro de Cordova, marquis of Priego, who, the reader may remember, when quite a boy, narrowly escaped the bloody fate of his father, Alonso de Aguilar, in the fatal slaughter of the Sierra Vermeja. This nobleman, in common with some other Andalusian lords, had taken umbrage at the little estimation and favour shown them, as they conceived, by Ferdinand, in comparison with the nobles of the north; and his temerity went so far as not only to obstruct the proceedings of one of the royal officers sent to Cordova to inquire into recent disturbances there, but to imprison him in the dungeons of his castle of Montilla.

This outrage on the person of his own servant exasperated the king beyond all bounds. He resolved at once to make such an example of the offender as should strike terror into the disaffected nobles, and shield the royal authority from the repetition of similar indignities. As the marquis was one of the most potent and extensively allied grandees in the kingdom, Ferdinand made his preparations on a formidable scale; ordering, in addition to the regular troops, a levy of all between the ages of twenty and seventy throughout Andalusia. Priego's friends, alarmed at these signs of the gathering tempest, besought him to avert it, if possible, by instant concession; and his uncle, the Great Captain, urged this most emphatically, as the only way of escaping utter ruin.

The rash young man, finding himself likely to receive no support in the unequal contest, accepted the counsel, and hastened to Toledo to throw himself at the king's feet. The indignant monarch, however, would not admit him into his presence, but ordered him to deliver up his fortresses, and to remove to the distance of five leagues from the court. The Great Captain soon after sent the king an inventory of his nephew's castles and estates, at the same time deprecating his

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 210.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 363.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 75.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 15.

wrath, in consideration of the youth and inexperience of the offender.

Ferdinand, however, without heeding this, went on with his preparations, and, having completed them, advanced rapidly to the south. When arrived at Cordova, he ordered the imprisonment of the marquis (Sept. 1508). A formal process was then instituted against him before the royal council, on the charge of high treason. He made no defence, but threw himself on the mercy of his sovereign. The court declared that he had incurred the penalty of death, but that the king, in consideration of his submission, was graciously pleased to commute this for a fine of twenty millions of maravedis, perpetual banishment from Cordova and its district, and the delivery of his fortresses into the royal keeping, with the entire demolition of the offending castle of Montilla. This last, famous as the birthplace of the Great Captain, was one of the strongest and most beautiful buildings in all Andalusia.<sup>(1)</sup> Sentence of death was at the same time pronounced against several cavaliers and other inferior persons concerned in the affair, and was immediately executed.

The Castilian aristocracy, alarmed and disgusted by the severity of a sentence which struck down one of the most considerable of their order, were open in their remonstrances to the king, beseeching him, if no other consideration moved him in favour of the young nobleman, to grant something to the distinguished services of his father and his uncle. The latter, as well as the grand constable Velasco, who enjoyed the highest consideration at court, were equally pressing in their solicitations. Ferdinand, however, was inexorable; and the sentence was executed. The nobles chafed in vain; although the constable expostulated with the king in a tone which no subject in Europe but a Castilian grandee would have ventured to assume. Gonsalvo coolly remarked, "It was crime enough in Don Pedro to be related to me."<sup>(2)</sup>

This illustrious man had had good reason to feel, before this, that his credit at court was on the wane. On his return to Spain he was received with unbounded enthusiasm by the nation. He was detained by illness a few days behind the court; and his journey towards Burgos to rejoin it, on his recovery, was a triumphal procession the whole way. The

(1) "Montiliana," writes Peter Martyr, "illa atria, quæ vidisti aliquando, multo auro, multoque eboræ compta ornataque, prohi dolor! funditus dirui sunt jussa."—(Opus Epist. epist. 405.) He was well acquainted with the lordly halls of Montilla, for he had been preceptor to their young master, who was a favourite pupil, to judge from the bitter wailings of the kind-hearted pedagogue over his fate.—See epist. 404, 405.

(2) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 215.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 392, 393, 405.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 284.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 20, 21, 22.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1507.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 20, cap. 10.—Crónica del Gran Capitán, lib. 3, cap. 6.—Sandoval, Hist. del. Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 13.

roads were thronged with multitudes so numerous, that accommodations could scarcely be found for them in the towns on the route; (1) for they came from the remotest parts of the country, all eager to catch a glimpse of the hero whose name and exploits, the theme of story and of song, were familiar to the meanest peasant in Castile. In this way he made his entry into Burgos, amid the cheering acclamations of the people, and attended by a *cortège* of officers, who pompously displayed on their own persons and the equipments of their steeds the rich spoils of Italian conquests. The old count of Urcña, his friend, who, with the whole court, came out by Ferdinand's orders to receive him, exclaimed, with a prophetic sigh, as he saw the splendid pageant come sweeping by, "This gallant ship, I fear, will require deeper water to ride in than she will find in Castile!" (2)

Ferdinand showed his usual gracious manners in his reception of Gonsalvo. It was not long, however, before the latter found that this was all he was to expect. No allusion was made to the grandmastership. When it was at length brought before the king, and he was reminded of his promises, he contrived to defer their performance under various pretexts; until, at length, it became too apparent that it was his intention to evade them altogether.

While the Great Captain and his friends were filled with an indignation at this duplicity which they could ill suppress, a circumstance occurred to increase the coldness arising in Ferdinand's mind towards his injured subject. This was the proposed marriage (a marriage which, from whatever cause, never took place) (3) of Gonsalvo's daughter Elvira to his friend the Constable of Castile. (4) Ferdinand had designed to secure her large inheritance to his own family, by an alliance with his grandson, Juan de Aragon, son of the archbishop of Saragossa. His displeasure, at finding himself crossed in this, was further sharpened by the petulant spirit of his young

(1) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 282.—Pulgar, *Sumario*, p. 197.

(2) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 210.—Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, ubi supra.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 3, cap. 5.

(3) Quintana errs in stating that Doña Elvira married the constable.—(*Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 321.) He had two wives, Doña Blanca de Herrera, and Doña Juana de Aragon, and at his death was laid by their side in the church of Santa Clara de Medina del Pomar.—(Salazar de Mendoza, *Dignidades*, lib. 3, cap. 21.) Elvira married the count of Cabra.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 42.

(4) Bernardino de Velasco, *grand constable* of Castile, as he was called, *par excellence*, succeeded in 1492 to that dignity, which became hereditary in his family. He was third count of Haro, and was created by the Catholic sovereigns, for his distinguished services, duke of Frías. He had large estates, chiefly in Old Castile; with a yearly revenue, according to L. Marinco, of 60,000 ducats. He appears to have possessed many noble and brilliant qualities, accompanied, however, with a haughtiness which made him feared rather than loved. He died in February, 1512, after a few hours' illness, as appears by a letter of Peter Martyr.—*Opus Epist. cpist.* 479.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Dignidades*, ubi supra.—L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 23.

queen. The constable, now a widower, had been formerly married to a natural daughter of Ferdinand. Queen Germaine, adverting to his intended union with the lady Elvira, unceremoniously asked him, "if he did not feel it a degradation to accept the hand of a subject, after having wedded the daughter of a king?" "How can I feel it so," he replied, alluding to the king's marriage with her, "when so illustrious an example has been set me?" Germaine, who certainly could not boast the magnanimity of her predecessor, was so stung with the retort, that she not only never forgave the constable, but extended her petty resentment to Gonsalvo, who saw the duke of Alva from this time installed in the honours he had before exclusively enjoyed, of immediate attendance on her royal person whenever she appeared in public.<sup>(1)</sup>

However indifferent Gonsalvo may have been to the little mortifications inflicted by female spleen, he could no longer endure his residence at a court where he had lost all consideration with the sovereign, and experienced nothing but duplicity and base ingratitude. He obtained leave, without difficulty, to withdraw to his own estates; where, not long after, the king, as if to make some amends for the gross violation of his promises, granted him the royal city of Loja, not many leagues from Granada. It was given to him for life; and Ferdinand had the effrontery to propose, as a condition of making the grant perpetual to his heirs, that Gonsalvo should relinquish his claim to the grandmastership of St. Jago. But the latter haughtily answered, "*He would not give up the right of complaining of the injustice done him for the finest city in the king's dominions.*"<sup>(2)</sup>

From this time he remained on his estates in the south, chiefly at Loja, with an occasional residence in Granada, where he enjoyed the society of his old friend and military instructor, the count of Tendilla. He found abundant occupation in schemes for improving the condition of his tenantry, and of the neighbouring districts. He took great interest in the fate of the unfortunate Moriscoes, numerous in this quarter, whom he shielded as far as possible from the merciless grasp of the Inquisition, while he supplied teachers and other enlightened means for converting them, or confirming them in a pure faith. He displayed the same magnificence and profuse hospitality in his living that he had always done. His house was visited by such intelligent foreigners as came to Spain, and by the most distinguished of his countrymen, especially the younger nobility and cavaliers, who resorted to it as the best school of high-bred and knightly courtesy. He showed a lively curiosity in all that

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, pp. 282, 283.

(2) Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 284, 285.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 6.—Pulgar, *Sumario*, p. 208.

was going on abroad, keeping up his information by an extensive correspondence with agents whom he regularly employed for the purpose in the principal European courts. When the league of Cambray was adjusted, the king of France and the pope were desirous of giving him the command of the allied armies; but Ferdinand had injured him too sensibly, to care to see him again at the head of a military force in Italy. He was as little desirous of employing him in public affairs at home, and suffered the remainder of his days to pass away in distant seclusion; a seclusion, however, not unpleasing to himself, nor unprofitable to others.(1) The world called it disgrace; and the old count of Ureña exclaimed, "The good ship is stranded at last, as I predicted!" "Not so," said Gonsalvo, to whom the observation was reported, "she is still in excellent trim, and waits only the rising of the tide to bear away as bravely as ever."(2)

## CHAPTER XXI.

### XIMENES.—CONQUESTS IN AFRICA.—UNIVERSITY OF ALCALA.— POLYGLOT BIBLE.

1508—1510.

Enthusiasm of Ximenes—His warlike Preparations—He sends an Army to Africa—Storms Oran—His triumphant Entry—The King's Distrust of him—He returns to Spain—Navarro's African Conquests—Magnificent Endowments of Ximenes—University of Alcalá—Complutensian Polyglot.

THE high-handed measures of Ferdinand in regard to the marquis of Priego and some other nobles excited general disgust among the jealous aristocracy of Castile; but they appear to have found more favour with the commons, who were probably not unwilling to see that haughty body humbled which had so often trampled on the rights of its inferiors.(3) As a matter

(1) The inscription on Guicciardini's monument might have been written on Gonsalvo's—

"Cujus negotium, an otium, gloriosius incertum."

See Pignotti, *Storia della Toscana* (Pisa, 1813), tom. ix. p. 155.

(2) Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 322—334.—Giovio, *Vita Illust. Virorum*, p. 286.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 7—9.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 560.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. pp. 77, 78.

(3) On his return from Cordova, he experienced a most loyal and enthusiastic reception from the ancient capital of Andalusia. The most interesting part of the pageant was the troops of children, gaily dressed, who came out to meet him, presenting the keys of the city and an imperial crown; after which the whole procession moved under thirteen triumphal arches, each inscribed with the name of one of his victories. For a description of these civic honours, see Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 216; and Zuñiga, *Annales de Sevilla*, año 1508.



of policy, however, even with the nobles, this course does not seem to have been miscalculated; since it showed that the king, whose talents they had always respected, was now possessed of power to enforce obedience, and was fully resolved to exert it.

Indeed, notwithstanding a few deviations, it must be allowed that Ferdinand's conduct on his return was extremely lenient and liberal; more especially, considering the subjects of provocation he had sustained, in the personal insults and desertion of those on whom he had heaped so many favours. History affords few examples of similar moderation on the restoration of a banished prince or party. In fact, a violent and tyrannical course would not have been agreeable to his character, in which passion, however strong by nature, was habitually subjected to reason. The present, as it would seem, excessive acts of severity, are to be regarded, therefore, not as the sallies of personal resentment, but as the dictates of a calculating policy, intended to strike terror into the turbulent spirits whom fear only could hold in check.

To this energetic course he was stimulated, as was said, by the counsels of Ximenes. This eminent prelate had now reached the highest ecclesiastical honours short of the papacy. Soon after Ferdinand's restoration, he received a cardinal's hat from Pope Julius the Second;(1) and this was followed by his appointment to the office of inquisitor-general of Castile, in the place of Deza, archbishop of Seville. The important functions devolved on him by these offices, in conjunction with the primacy of Spain, might be supposed to furnish abundant subject and scope for his aspiring spirit. But his views, on the contrary, expanded with every step of his elevation, and now fell little short of those of an independent monarch. His zeal glowed fiercer than ever for the propagation of the Catholic faith. Had he lived in the age of the crusades, he would indubitably have headed one of those expeditions himself; for the spirit of the soldier burned strong and bright under his monastic weeds.(2) Indeed, like Columbus, he had formed plans for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre, even at this late day.(3) But his zeal found a better direction in a cru-

(1) He obtained this dignity at the king's solicitation, during his visit to Naples. See Ferdinand's letter, apud Quintanilla, copied from the archives of Alcalá.—Archetypo, Apend. No. 15.

(2) "Ego tamen dum universas ejus actiones comparo," says Alvaro Gomez, "magis ad bellica exercitia à naturâ effectum esse judico. Erat enim vir animi invicti et sublimis, omniâque in melius asserere conantis."—*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 95.

(3) From a letter of King Emanuel of Portugal, it appears that Ximenes had endeavoured to interest him, together with the kings of Aragon and England, in a crusade to the Holy Land. There was much method in his madness, if we may judge from the careful survey he had procured of the coast, as well as his plan of operations. The Portuguese monarch praises in round terms the edifying zeal of the primate, but wisely confined himself to his own crusades

sade against the neighbouring Moslems of Africa, who had retaliated the wrongs of Granada by repeated descents on the southern coasts of the Peninsula, calling in vain for the interference of government. At the instigation, and with the aid of Ximenes, an expedition had been fitted out soon after Isabella's death, which resulted in the capture of Mazarquivir, an important port, and formidable nest of pirates, on the Barbary coast, nearly opposite Carthage (Sept. 13, 1505). He now meditated a more difficult enterprise, the conquest of Oran. (1)

This place, situated about a league from the former, was one of the most considerable of the Moslem possessions in the Mediterranean, being a principal mart for the trade of the Levant. It contained about twenty thousand inhabitants, was strongly fortified, and had acquired a degree of opulence by its extensive commerce, which enabled it to maintain a swarm of cruisers that swept this inland sea, and made fearful depredations on its populous borders. (2)

No sooner was Ferdinand quietly established again in the government, than Ximenes urged him to undertake this new conquest. The king saw its importance, but objected the want of funds. The cardinal, who was prepared for this, replied, that "he was ready to lend whatever sums were necessary, and to take sole charge of the expedition, leading it, if the king pleased, in person." Ferdinand, who had no objection to this mode of making acquisitions, more especially as it would open a vent for the turbulent spirits of his subjects, readily acquiesced in the proposition.

The enterprise, however disproportionate it might seem to the resources of a private individual, was not beyond those of the cardinal. He had been carefully husbanding his revenues for some time past, with a view to this object; although he had occasionally broken in upon his appropriations to redeem unfortunate Spaniards who had been swept into slavery. He had obtained accurate surveys of the Barbary coast from an Italian engineer named Vianelli. He had advised, as to the best mode of conducting operations, with his friend Gonsalvo de Cordova; to whom, if it had been the king's pleasure, he would gladly have intrusted the conduct of the expedition. At his suggestion, that post was now assigned to the celebrated engineer Count Pedro Navarro. (3)

in India, which were likely to make better returns, at least in this world, than those to Palestine. The letter is still preserved in the archives of Alcalá. See a copy in Quintanilla, *Archetipo*, Apend. No. 16.

(1) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 15.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 77.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 17.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1507.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 15; lib. 29, cap. 9.

(2) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 418.

(3) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 96—100.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 218.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 17.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 413.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 7.

No time was lost in completing the requisite preparations. Besides the Italian veterans, levies were drawn from all quarters of the country, especially from the cardinal's own diocese. The chapter of Toledo entered heartily into his views, furnishing liberal supplies, and offering to accompany the expedition in person. An ample train of ordnance was procured, with provisions and military stores for the maintenance of an army for months. Before the close of spring, in 1500, all was in readiness; and a fleet of ten galleys and eighty smaller vessels rode in the harbour of Carthage, having on board a force amounting in all to four thousand horse and ten thousand foot. Such were the resources, activity, and energy displayed by a man whose life, until within a very few years, had been spent in cloistered solitudes, and in the quiet practices of religion; and who now, oppressed with infirmities more than usual, had passed the seventieth year of his age.

In accomplishing all this, the cardinal had experienced greater obstacles than those arising from bodily infirmity or age. His plans had been constantly discouraged and thwarted by the nobles, who derided the idea of a "a monk fighting the battles of Spain, while the Great Captain was left to stay at home, and count his beads like a hermit." The soldiers, especially those of Italy, as well as their commander Navarro, trained under the banners of Gonsalvo, showed little inclination to serve under their spiritual leader. The king himself was cooled by these various manifestations of discontent. But the storm which prostrates the weaker spirit, serves only to root the stronger more firmly in its purpose; and the genius of Ximenes, rising with the obstacles it had to encounter, finally succeeded in triumphing over all, in reconciling the king, disappointing the nobles, and restoring obedience and discipline to the army.<sup>(1)</sup>

On the 16th of May, 1500, the fleet weighed anchor, and on the following day reached the African port of Mazarquivir. No time was lost in disembarking; for the fires on the hilltops showed that the country was already in alarm. It was proposed to direct the main attack against a lofty height, or ridge of land; rising between Mazarquivir and Oran, so near the latter as entirely to command it. At the same time, the fleet was to drop down before the Moorish city, and by opening a brisk cannonade, divert the attention of the inhabitants from the principal point of assault.

As soon as the Spanish army had landed, and formed in order of battle, Ximenes mounted his mule, and rode along the ranks. He was dressed in his pontifical robes, with a belted sword at his side. A Franciscan friar rode before him, bearing

(1) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 100—102.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, ubi supra.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 19.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap.

aloft the massive silver cross, the archiepiscopal standard of Toledo. Around him were other brethren of the order, wearing their monastic frocks, with scimitars hanging from their girdles. As the ghostly cavalcade advanced, they raised the triumphant hymn of *Vexilla regis*, until at length the cardinal ascending a rising ground, imposed silence, and made a brief but animated harangue to his soldiers. He reminded them of the wrongs they had suffered from the Moslems, the devastation of their coasts, and their brethren dragged into merciless slavery. When he had sufficiently aroused their resentment against the enemies of their country and religion, he stimulated their cupidity by dwelling on the golden spoil which awaited them in the opulent city of Oran; and he concluded his discourse by declaring that he had come to peril his own life in the good cause of the Cross, and to lead them on to battle, as his predecessors had often done before him.(1)

The venerable aspect and heart-stirring eloquence of the primate kindled a deep reverential enthusiasm in the bosoms of his martial audience, which showed itself by the profoundest silence. The officers, however, closed around him at the conclusion of the address, and besought him not to expose his sacred person to the hazard of the fight; reminding him that his presence would probably do more harm than good, by drawing off the attention of the men to his personal safety. This last consideration moved the cardinal, who, though reluctantly, consented to relinquish the command to Navarro; and, after uttering his parting benediction over the prostrate ranks, he withdrew to the neighbouring fortress of Mazarquivir.

The day was now far spent, and dark clouds of the enemy were seen gathering along the tops of the sierra which it was proposed first to attack. Navarro seeing this post so strongly occupied, doubted whether his men would be able to carry it before nightfall, if indeed at all, without previous rest and refreshment, after the exhausting labours of the day. He returned, therefore, to Mazarquivir, to take counsel of Ximenes. The latter, whom he found at his devotions, besought him "not to falter at this hour, but to go forward in God's name, since both the blessed Saviour and the false prophet Mahomet conspired to deliver the enemy into his hands." The soldier's scruples vanished before the intrepid bearing of the prelate, and, returning to the army, he gave instant orders to advance.(2)

Slowly and silently the Spanish troops began their ascent up the steep sides of the sierra, under the friendly cover of a thick

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. ubi supra.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 30.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 108.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. dial. de Ximenez.

(2) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 103—110.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 3, cap. 19.—Zurita, Anales, lib. 8, cap. 30.

mist, which, rolling heavily down the skirts of the hills, shielded them for a time from the eye of the enemy. As soon as they emerged from it, however, they were saluted with showers of balls, arrows, and other deadly missiles, followed by the desperate charges of the Moors, who, rushing down, endeavoured to drive back the assailants. But they made no impression on the long pikes and deep ranks of the latter, which remained unshaken as a rock. Still the numbers of the enemy, fully equal to those of the Spaniards, and the advantages of their position, enabled them to dispute the ground with fearful obstinacy. At length Navarro got a small battery of heavy guns to operate on the flank of the Moors. The effect of this movement was soon visible. The exposed sides of the Moslem column, finding no shelter from the deadly volleys, were shaken and thrown into disorder. The confusion extended to the leading files, which now, pressed heavily by the iron array of spearmen in the Christian van, began to give ground. Retreat was soon quickened into a disorderly flight. The Spaniards pursued; many of them, especially the raw levies, breaking their ranks, and following up the flying foe without the least regard to the commands or menaces of their officers; a circumstance which might have proved fatal, had the Moors had strength or discipline to rally. As it was, the scattered numbers of the Christians, magnifying to the eye their real force, served only to increase the panic and accelerate the speed of the fugitives.<sup>(1)</sup>

While this was going on, the fleet had anchored before the city, and opened a very heavy cannonade, which was answered with equal spirit from sixty pieces of artillery which garnished the fortifications. The troops on board, however, made good their landing, and soon joined themselves to their victorious countrymen, descending from the sierra. They then pushed forward in all haste towards Oran, proposing to carry the place by escalade. They were poorly provided with ladders, but the desperate energy of the moment overleaped every obstacle; and planting their long pikes against the walls, or thrusting them into the crevices of the stones, they clambered up with incredible dexterity, although they were utterly unable to repeat the feat the next day in cold blood. The first who gained the summit was Sousa, captain of the cardinal's guard, who, shouting forth "St. Jago and Ximenes!" unfurled his colours, emblazoned with the primate's arms on one side and the Cross on the other, and planted them on the battlements. Six other banners were soon seen streaming from the ramparts; and the soldiers, leaping into the town, got possession of the gates, and threw them open to their comrades. The whole army now

(1) Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 418.—Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 218.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 110, 111.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 18.

rushed in, sweeping everything before it. Some few of the Moors endeavoured to make head against the tide, but most fled into the houses and mosques for protection. Resistance and flight were alike unavailing. No mercy was shown; no respect for age or sex; and the soldiery abandoned themselves to all the brutal license and ferocity which seem to stain religious wars above every other. It was in vain Navarro called them off. They returned like bloodhounds to the slaughter, and never slackened, till at last, wearied with butchery, and gorged with the food and wine found in the houses, they sunk down to sleep promiscuously in the streets and public squares.(1)

The sun, which on the preceding morn had shed its rays on Oran flourishing in all the pride of commercial opulence, and teeming with a free and industrious population, next rose on a captive city, with its ferocious conquerors stretched in slumber on the heaps of their slaughtered victims.(2) No less than four thousand Moors were said to have fallen in the battle, and from five to eight thousand were made prisoners. The loss of the Christians was inconsiderable. As soon as the Spanish commander had taken the necessary measures for cleansing the place from its foul and dismal impurities, he sent to the cardinal and invited him to take possession of it. The latter embarked on board his galley, and, as he coasted along the margin of the city, and saw its gay pavilions and sparkling minarets reflected in the waters, his soul swelled with satisfaction at the glorious acquisition he had made for Christian Spain. It seemed incredible, that a town so strongly manned and fortified should have been carried so easily.

As Ximenes landed and entered the gates, attended by his train of monkish brethren, he was hailed with thundering acclamations by the army as the true victor of Oran, in whose behalf Heaven had condescended to repeat the stupendous miracle of Joshua, by stopping the sun in his career.(3) But

(1) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, ubi supra.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 218.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 22.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. ubi supra.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 3, cap. 19.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1509.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 15.

(2) "Sed tandem somnus ex labore et vino obortus eos oppressit et cruentis hostium cadaveribus tantâ securitate et fiducia indormierunt ut permulti in Oranis urbis plateis ad multam diem stertuerint."—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 111.

(3) To accommodate the Christians, as the day was far advanced when the action began, the sun was permitted to stand still several hours: there is some discrepancy as to the precise number; most authorities, however, make it four. There is no miracle in the whole Roman Catholic budget better vouched than this. It is recorded by four eye-witnesses, men of learning and character. It is attested, moreover, by a cloud of witnesses, who depose to have received it, some from tradition, others from direct communication with their ancestors present in the action; and who all agree that it was matter of public notoriety and belief at the time. See the whole formidable array of evidence

the cardinal, humbly disclaiming all merits of his own; was heard to repeat aloud the sublime language of the Psalmist, "Non nobis, Domine, non nobis," while he gave his benedictions to the soldiery. He was then conducted to the alcazar, and the keys of the fortress were put into his hand. The spoil of the captured city, amounting, as was said, to half a million of gold ducats, the fruit of long successive trade and piracy, was placed at his disposal for distribution. But that which gave most joy to his heart was the liberation of three hundred Christian captives, languishing in the dungeons of Oran. A few hours after the surrender, the *mezuar* of Tremecen arrived with a powerful reinforcement to its relief; but instantly retreated on learning the tidings. Fortunate, indeed, was it that the battle had not been deferred till the succeeding day. This, which must be wholly ascribed to Ximenes, was by most referred to direct inspiration. Quite as probable an explanation may be found in the boldness and impetuous enthusiasm of the cardinal's character.(1)

The conquest of Oran opened unbounded scope to the ambition of Ximenes, who saw in imagination the banner of the Cross floating triumphant from the walls of every Moslem city on the Mediterranean. He experienced, however, serious impediments to his further progress. Navarro, accustomed to an independent command, chafed in his present subordinate situation, especially under a spiritual leader, whose military science he justly held in contempt. He was a rude unlettered soldier, and bluntly spoke his mind to the primate. He told him, "his commission under him terminated with the capture of Oran; that two generals were too many in one army; that the cardinal should rest contented with the laurels he had already won, and, instead of playing the king, go home to his flock, and leave fighting to those to whom the trade belonged."(2)

But what troubled the prelate more than this insolence of his general was a letter which fell into his hands, addressed by the king to Count Navarro, in which he requested him to be sure to find some pretence for detaining the cardinal in Africa as long as his presence could be made any way serviceable. Ximenes had good reason before to feel that the royal favour to him flowed from selfishness rather than from any personal regard. The king had always wished the archbishopric of Toledo for

set forth by Quintanilla (*Archetypo*, pp. 236 et seq. and *Apend.* p. 103). It was scarcely to have been expected that so astounding a miracle should escape the notice of all Europe, where it must have been as apparent as at Oran. This universal silence may be thought, indeed, the greater miracle of the two.

(1) Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 218.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 22.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 113.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. i, cap. 22.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 15.

(2) Flécher, *Histoire de Ximenes*, pp. 308, 309.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 18.

also, he declined; choosing to pass into the town by the regular avenue, with no peculiar circumstance attending his entrance, save only a small train of camels, led by African slaves, and laden with gold and silver plate from the mosques of Oran, and a precious collection of Arabian manuscripts for the library of his infant university of Alcalá.

He showed similar modesty and simplicity in his deportment and conversation. He made no allusion to the stirring scenes in which he had been so gloriously engaged; and, if others made any, turned the discourse into some other channel, particularly to the condition of his college, its discipline and literary progress, which, with the great project for the publication of his famous Polyglot Bible, seemed now almost wholly to absorb his attention.(1)

His first care, however, was to visit the families in his diocese, and minister consolation and relief, which he did in the most benevolent manner, to those who were suffering from the loss of friends, whether by death or absence, in the late campaign. Nor did he in his academical retreat lose sight of the great object which had so deeply interested him, of extending the empire of the Cross over Africa. From time to time he remitted supplies for the maintenance of Oran; and he lost no opportunity of stimulating Ferdinand to prosecute his conquests.

The Catholic king, however, felt too sensibly the importance of his new possessions to require such admonition; and Count Pedro Navarro was furnished with ample resources of every kind, and, above all, with the veterans formed under the eye of Gonsalvo de Cordova. Thus placed on an independent field of conquest, the Spanish general was not slow in pushing his advantages. His first enterprise was against Bugia (January 13, 1510), whose king, at the head of a powerful army, he routed in two pitched battles, and got possession of his flourishing capital (January 31). Algiers, Tennes, Tremecen, and other cities on the Barbary coast, submitted, one after another, to the Spanish arms. The inhabitants were received as vassals of the Catholic king, engaging to pay the taxes usually imposed by their Moslem princes, and to serve him in war, with the addition of the whimsical provision, so often found in the old Granadine treaties, to attend him in cortes. They guaranteed, moreover, the liberation of all Christian captives in their dominions; for which the Algerines, however, took care to indemnify themselves, by extorting the full ransom from their Jewish residents. It was of little moment to the wretched Israelite which party won the day, Christian or Mussulman; he was sure to be stripped in either case.(2)

(1) Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 3, cap. 20.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 119, 120.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 30.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 22.

(2) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 9, cap. 1, 2, 4, 13.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist.



On the 26th of July, 1510, the ancient city of Tripoli, after a most bloody and desperate defence, surrendered to the arms of the victorious general, whose name had now become terrible along the whole northern borders of Africa. In the following month, however (August 28), he met with a serious discomfiture in the island of Gelves, where four thousand of his men were slain or made prisoners. (1) This check in the brilliant career of Count Navarro put a final stop to the progress of the Castilian arms in Africa under Ferdinand. (2)

epist. 435—437.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 3, cap. 20.—Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. 20, cap. 22.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 122—123.—Bernáldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 222.—Zurita gives at length the capitulation with Algiers, lib. 9, cap. 13.

(1) Chénier, Recherches sur les Maures, tom. ii. pp. 355, 356. It is but just to state, that this disaster was imputable to Don García de Toledo, who had charge of the expedition, and who expiated his temerity with his life. He was eldest son of the old duke of Alva, and father of that nobleman who subsequently acquired such gloomy celebrity by his conquests and cruelties in the Netherlands. The tender poet Garcilasso de la Vega offers sweet incense to the house of Toledo in one of his pastorals, in which he mourns over the disastrous day of Gelves:—

“O patria lagrimosa, i como buelves  
los ojos a los Gelves sospirando!”

The death of the young nobleman is veiled under a beautiful simile, which challenges comparison with the great masters of Latin and Italian song, from whom the Castilian bard derived it:—

“Puso en el duro suelo la hermosa  
cara, como la rosa matutina,  
cuando ya el sol declina ‘l medio día;  
que pierde su alegría, i marchitando  
va la color mudando; o en el campo  
cual queda el lirio blanco, qu’ el arado  
erudamente cortado al passar dexa;  
del cual aun no s’alexa pressuroso  
aquel color hermoso, o se deslerra;  
mas ya la madre tierra desecada,  
no l’administra nada do su allenta  
qu’ era el sustentamiento i vigor suyo;  
tal está el rostro tuyo en el arena,  
fresca rosa, agüena blanca i pura.”

Garcilasso de la Vega, Obras, ed. de Herrera, pp. 507, 508.

(2) The reader may feel some curiosity respecting the fate of Count Pedro Navarro. He soon after this went to Italy, where he held a high command, and maintained his reputation in the wars of that country until he was taken by the French in the great battle of Ravenna. Through the carelessness or coldness of Ferdinand, he was permitted to languish in captivity, till he took his revenge by enlisting in the service of the French monarch. Before doing this, however, he resigned his Neapolitan estates, and formally renounced his allegiance to the Catholic king, of whom, being a Navarrese by birth, he was not a native subject. He unfortunately fell into the hands of his own countrymen, in one of the subsequent actions in Italy; and was imprisoned at Naples, in Castel Nuovo, which he had himself formerly gained from the French. Here he soon after died; if we are to believe Brantôme, being privately dispatched by command of Charles V.; or, as other writers intimate, by his own hand. His remains, first deposited in an obscure corner of the church of Santa Maria, were afterwards removed to the chapel of the great Gonsalvo, and a superb mausoleum was erected over them by the prince of Sessa, grandson of

The results already obtained, however, were of great importance, whether we consider the value of the acquisitions, being some of the most opulent marts on the Barbary coast, or the security gained for commerce, by sweeping the Mediterranean of the pestilent hordes of marauders which had so long infested it. Most of the new conquests escaped from the Spanish crown in later times, through the imbecility or indolence of Ferdinand's successors. The conquests of Ximenes, however, were placed in so strong a posture of deference, as to resist every attempt for their recovery by the enemy, and to remain permanently incorporated with the Spanish empire.(1)

This illustrious prelate, in the mean while, was busily occupied, in his retirement at Alcalá de Henares, with watching over the interests and rapid development of his infant university. This institution was too important in itself, and exercised too large an influence over the intellectual progress of the country, to pass unnoticed in a history of the present reign.

As far back as 1497, Ximenes had conceived the idea of establishing a university in the ancient town of Alcalá, where the salubrity of the air, and the sober, tranquil complexion of the scenery, on the beautiful borders of the Henares, seemed well suited to academic study and meditation. He even went so far as to obtain plans at this time for his buildings from a celebrated architect. Other engagements, however, postponed the commencement of the work till 1500, when the cardinal himself laid the corner-stone of the principal college, with a solemn ceremonial,(2) and invocation of the blessing of Heaven

the hero.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 124.—Alcson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. pp. 226, 289, 406.—Brantôme, *Vies des Hommes Illustres*, disc. 9.—Glovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, pp. 190—193.

(1) Ximenes continued to watch over the city which he had so valiantly won, long after his death. He never failed to be present in seasons of extraordinary peril. At least, the gaunt, gigantic figure of a monk, dressed in the robes of his order, and wearing a cardinal's hat, was seen, sometimes stalking along the battlements at midnight, and, at others, mounted on a white charger, and brandishing a naked sword in the thick of the fight. His last appearance was in 1643, when Oran was closely beleaguered by the Algerines. A sentinel on duty saw a figure moving along the parapet, one clear moonlight night, dressed in a Franciscan frock, with a general's baton in his hand. As soon as it was hailed by the terrified soldier, it called to him to "tell the garrison to be of good heart, for the enemy should not prevail against them." Having uttered these words, the apparition vanished without ceremony. It repeated its visit in the same manner on the following night; and, a few days after, its assurance was verified by the total discomfiture of the Algerines in a bloody battle under the walls. See the evidence of these various apparitions, as collected, for the edification of the court of Rome, by that prince of miracle-mongers, Quintanilla (*Archetypo*, pp. 317, 335, 338, 340). Bishop Flechier appears to have no misgivings as to the truth of these old wives' tales.—(*Histoire de Ximenes*, liv. 6.) Oran, after resisting repeated assaults by the Moors, was at length so much damaged by an earthquake, in 1790, that it was abandoned, and its Spanish garrison and population were transferred to the neighbouring city of Mazarguir.

(2) The custom, familiar at the present day, of depositing coins and other tokens, with inscriptions, bearing the names of the architect and founder,

on his designs. From that hour, amidst all the engrossing cares of church and state, he never lost sight of this great object. When at Alcalá, he might be frequently seen on the ground, with the rule in his hand, taking the admeasurements of the buildings, and stimulating the industry of the workmen by seasonable rewards.(1)

The plans were too extensive, however, to admit of being speedily accomplished. Besides the principal college of San Ildefonso, named in honour of the patron saint of Toledo, there were nine others, together with an hospital for the reception of invalids at the university. These edifices were built in the most substantial manner; and such parts as admitted of it, as the libraries, refectories, and chapels, were finished with elegance and even splendour. The city of Alcalá underwent many important and expensive alterations, in order to render it more worthy of being the seat of a great and flourishing university. The stagnant water was carried off by drains, the streets were paved, old buildings removed, and now and spacious avenues thrown open.(2)

At the expiration of eight years, the cardinal had the satisfaction of seeing the whole of his vast design completed, and every apartment of the spacious pile carefully furnished with all that was requisite for the comfort and accommodation of the student. It was indeed a noble enterprise, more particularly when viewed as the work of a private individual. As such it raised the deepest admiration in Francis the First, when he visited the spot a few years after the cardinal's death. "Your Ximenes," said he, "has excelled more than I should have dared to conceive; he has done with his single hand what in France it has cost a line of kings to accomplish." (3)

The erection of the buildings, however, did not terminate the labours of the primate, who now assumed the task of digesting a scheme of instruction and discipline for his infant seminary. In doing this, he sought light wherever it was to be found; and borrowed many useful hints from the venerable university of Paris. His system was of the most enlightened kind, being directed to call all the powers of the student into action, and not to leave him a mere passive recipient in the hands of his teachers. Besides daily recitations and lectures,

and date of the building, under the corner-stone, was observed on this occasion, where it is noted as of ancient usage, *more prisco*.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 28.

(1) Fléchier, Histoire de Ximenes, p. 597.

(2) Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 16.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, p. 178.—Colmenar, Délices de l'Espagne, tom. ii. pp. 308—310.—Navagiero, Viaggio, fol. 7, who notices particularly the library, "piena di molti libri et Latini et Greci et Hebraici." The good people accused the cardinal of too great a passion for building, and punningly said, "The church of Toledo had never had a bishop of greater edification, in every sense, than Ximenes."—Fléchier, Histoire de Ximenes, p. 597.

(3) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 79.

he was required to take part in public examinations and discussions, so conducted as to prove effectually his talent and acquisitions. In these gladiatorial displays Ximenes took the deepest interest, and often encouraged the generous emulation of the scholar by attending in person.

Two provisions may be noticed as characteristic of the man. One, that the salary of a professor should be regulated by the number of his disciples: another, that every professor should be re-eligible at the expiration of every four years. It was impossible that any servant of Ximenes should sleep on his post. (1)

Liberal foundations were made for indigent students, especially in divinity. Indeed, theological studies, or rather such a general course of study as should properly enter into the education of a Christian minister, was the avowed object of the institution; for the Spanish clergy, up to this period, as before noticed, were too often deficient in the most common elements of learning. But, in this preparatory discipline, the comprehensive mind of Ximenes embraced nearly the whole circle of sciences taught in other universities. Out of the forty-two chairs, indeed, twelve only were dedicated to divinity and the canon law, while fourteen were appropriated to grammar, rhetoric, and the ancient classics; studies which, probably, found especial favour with the cardinal, as furnishing the only keys to a correct criticism and interpretation of the Scriptures. (2)

Having completed his arrangements, the cardinal sought the most competent agents for carrying his plans into execution; and this indifferently from abroad and at home. His mind was too lofty for narrow local prejudices; and the tree of knowledge, he knew, bore fruit in every clime. (3) He took especial care that the emolument should be sufficient to tempt talent from obscurity, and from quarters, however remote, where it was to be found. In this he was perfectly successful, and we find the university catalogue at this time inscribed with the names of the most distinguished scholars in their various departments, many of whom we are enabled to appreciate by

(1) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 82—84.

(2) Navagiero says, it was prescribed the lectures should be in Latin.—*Viaggio*, fol. 7.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 16. Of these professorships, six were appropriated to theology; six to canon law; four to medicine; one to anatomy; one to surgery; eight to the arts, as they were called, embracing logic, physics, and metaphysics; one to ethics; one to mathematics; four to the ancient languages; four to rhetoric, and six to grammar. One is struck with the disproportion of the mathematical studies to the rest. Though an important part of general education, and consequently of the course embraced in most universities, it had too little reference to a religious one to find much favour with the cardinal.

(3) Lampillas, in his usual patriotic vein, stoutly maintains that the chairs of the university were all supplied by native Spaniards: "Trovó in Spagna," he says of the cardinal, "tutta quella scelta copia di grandi uomini, quali richiedeva la grande impresa," &c.—*Letteratura Spagnuola*, tom. i. part 2, p. 160. Alvaro Gomez, who flourished two centuries earlier, and personally knew the professors, is the better authority.—*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 80—82.

the enduring memorials of erudition which they have bequeathed to us.(1)

In July, 1508, the cardinal received the welcome intelligence that his academy was opened for the admission of pupils; and in the following month the first lecture, being on Aristotle's *Ethics*, was publicly delivered. Students soon flocked to the new university, attracted by the reputation of its professors, its ample apparatus, its thorough system of instruction, and, above all, its splendid patronage, and the high character of its founder. We have no information of their number in Ximenes' lifetime; but it must have been very considerable, since no less than seven thousand came out to receive Francis the First, on his visit to the university, within twenty years after it was opened.(2)

Five years after this period, in 1513, King Ferdinand, in an excursion made for the benefit of his declining health, paid a visit to Alcalá. Ever since his return from Oran, the cardinal, disgusted with public life, had remained, with a few brief exceptions, in his own diocese, devoted solely to his personal and professional duties. It was with proud satisfaction that he now received his sovereign, and exhibited to him the noble testimony of the great objects to which his retirement had been consecrated. The king, whose naturally inquisitive mind no illness could damp, visited every part of the establishment, and attended the examinations, and listened to the public disputations of the scholars with interest. With little learning of his own, he had been made too often sensible of his deficiencies not to appreciate it in others. His acute perception readily discerned the immense benefit to his kingdom, and the glory conferred on his reign, by the labours of his ancient minister; and he did ample justice to them in the unqualified terms of his commendation.

It was on this occasion that the rector of San Ildefonso, the head of the university, came out to receive the king, preceded by his usual train of attendants, with their maces, or wands of office. The royal guard, at this exhibition, called out to them to lay aside these insignia, as unbecoming any subject in the presence of his sovereign. "Not so," said Ferdinand, who had the good sense to perceive that majesty could not be degraded by its homage to letters; "not so; this is the seat of the Muses, and those who are initiated in their mysteries have the best right to reign here." (3)

In the midst of his pressing duties, Ximenes found time for the execution of another work, which would alone have been

(1) L. Marineo, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 13. Alvaro Gomez knew several of these savans, whose scholarship (and he was a competent judge) he notices with liberal panegyric.—*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 80 et seq.

(2) Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 17.

(3) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 86. The reader will readily call to mind the familiar anecdote of King Charles and Dr. Busby.

sufficient to render his name immortal in the republic of letters. This was his famous Bible, or Complutensian Polyglot, as usually termed, from the place where it was printed. (1) It was on the plan, first conceived by Origen, of exhibiting in one view the Scriptures in their various ancient languages. It was a work of surpassing difficulty, demanding an extensive and critical acquaintance with the most ancient, and consequently the rarest manuscripts. The character and station of the cardinal afforded him, it is true, uncommon facilities. The precious collection of the Vatican was liberally thrown open to him, especially under Leo the Tenth, whose munificent spirit delighted in the undertaking. (2) He obtained copies, in like manner, of whatever was of value in the other libraries of Italy, and, indeed, of Europe generally; and Spain supplied him with editions of the Old Testament of great antiquity, which had been treasured up by the banished Israelites. (3) Some idea may be formed of the lavish expenditure in this way, from the fact that four thousand gold crowns were paid for seven foreign manuscripts, which, however, came too late to be of use in the compilation. (4)

The conduct of the work was intrusted to nine scholars, well skilled in the ancient tongues, as most of them had evinced by works of critical acuteness and erudition. After the labours of the day, these learned sages were accustomed to meet, in order to settle the doubts and difficulties which had arisen in the course of their researches, and, in short, to compare the results of their observations. Ximenes, who, however limited his attainments in general literature, (5) was an excellent biblical critic, frequently presided, and took a prominent part in these deliberations. "Loso no time, my friends," he would say, "in

(1) "Alcalá de Henares," says Martyr, in one of his early letters, "quæ dicitur esse Complutum. Sit, vel ne, nil mihi curæ."—(Opus Epist. epist. 254.) These irreverent doubts were uttered before it had gained its literary celebrity. L. Marinco derives the name *Complutum* from the abundant fruitfulness of the soil,—"cumplumiento que tiene de cada cosa."—*Cosas Memorables*, fol. 13.

(2) Ximenes acknowledges his obligations to his Holiness, in particular for the Greek MSS.: "Atque ex ipsis [exemplaribus] quidem Græca Sanctitatis tuæ debemus; qui ex istâ Apostolicâ bibliothecâ antiquissimos tam Veteris quam Novi codices perquam humane ad nos misisti."—*Biblia Polyglotta* (Compluti, 1514-17), Prólogo.

(3) "Maximam," says the cardinal in his preface, "laboris nostri partem in eo præcipue fuisse versatam; ut et virorum in linguarum cognitione eminentissimorum operâ uteremur, et castigatissima omni ex parte vetustissimaque exemplaria pro archetypis haberemus: quorum quidem, tam Hebræorum quam Græcorum ac Latinorum, multiplicem copiam, variis ex locis, non sine summo labore acquisivimus."—*Biblia Polyglotta*, Compluti, Prólogo.

(4) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 39.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 10.

(5) Martyr speaks of Ximenes, in one of his epistles, as "doctrinâ singulari oppletum."—(Opus Epist. epist. 108.) He speaks with more distrust in another: "Aliud esse virum, si non literis, morum tamen sanctitate egregium."—(Epist. 166.) This was written some years later, when he had better knowledge of him.

the prosecution of our glorious work; lest, in the casualties of life, you should lose your patron, or I have to lament the loss of those whose services are of more price in my eyes than wealth and worldly honours.”(1)

The difficulties of the undertaking were sensibly increased by those of the printing. The art was then in its infancy, and there were no types in Spain, if indeed in any part of Europe, in the oriental character. Ximenes, however, careful to have the whole executed under his own eye, imported artists from Germany, and had types cast in the various languages required, in his foundries at Alcalá.(2)

The work, when completed, occupied six volumes folio;(3) the first four devoted to the Old Testament, the fifth to the New; the last containing a Hebrew and Chaldaic vocabulary, with other elementary treatises of singular labour and learning. It was not brought to an end till 1517, fifteen years after its commencement, and a few months only before the death of its illustrious projector. Alvaro Gomez relates, that he had often heard John Broccario, the son of the printer,(4) say, that when the last sheet was struck off, he, then a child, was dressed in his best attire, and sent with a copy to the cardinal. The latter, as he took it, raised his eyes to heaven, and devoutly offered up his thanks for being spared to the completion of this good work. Then, turning to his friends who were present, he said, that, “of all the acts which distinguished his administration, there was none, however arduous, better entitled to their congratulation than this.”(5)

This is not the place, if I were competent, to discuss the merits of this great work, the reputation of which is familiar to

(1) *Quintanilla, Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 10.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 38. The scholars employed in the compilation were the venerable Lebrija, the learned Nuñez, or Pinciano, of whom the reader has had some account, Lopez de Zuñiga, a controversialist of Erasmus, Bartholomeo de Castro, the famous Greek Demetrius Cretensis, and Juan de Vergara:—all thorough linguists, especially in the Greek and Latin. To these were joined Paulo Cornet, Alfonso a physician, and Alfonso Zamora, converted Jew, and familiar with the Oriental languages. Zamora has the merit of the philological compilations relative to the Hebrew and Chaldaic, in the last volume.—*Ibidem* auct. ut *supra*; et *Suma de la Vida de Cisneros*, MS.

(2) *Quintanilla, Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 10.

(3) The work was originally put at the extremely low price of six ducats and a half a copy.—(*Biblia Polyglotta*, Compluti, Prefix.) As only 600 copies, however, were struck off, it has become exceedingly rare and valuable. According to Brunet, it has been sold as high as 63*l*.

(4) “*Industria et solertia honorabilis viri Arnaldi Guillelmi de Broccario, artis impressoris Magistri. Anno Domini 1517. Julii die decimo.*”—*Biblia Polyglotta*, Compluti. Postscript to 4th and last part of *Vetus Test.*

(5) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 38. The part devoted to the Old Testament contains the Hebrew original with the Latin Vulgate, the Septuagint version, and the Chaldaic paraphrase, with Latin translations by the Spanish scholars. The new Testament was printed in the original Greek, with the Vulgate of Jerome. After the completion of this work, the cardinal projected an edition of Aristotle on the same scale, which was unfortunately defeated by his death.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 39.

every scholar. Critics, indeed, have disputed the antiquity of the manuscripts used in the compilation, as well as the correctness and value of the emendations.(1) Unfortunately, the destruction of the original manuscripts, in a manner which forms one of the most whimsical anecdotes in literary history, makes it impossible to settle the question satisfactorily.(2) Undoubtedly, many blemishes may be charged on it, necessarily incident to an age when the science of criticism was imperfectly understood,(3) and the stock of materials much more limited, or, at least, more difficult of access, than at the present day.(4) After every deduction, however, the Cardinal's Bible has the merit of being the first successful attempt at a polyglot version of the Scriptures, and consequently of facilitating, even by its errors, the execution of more perfect and later works of the kind.(5)

(1) The principal controversy on this subject was carried on in Germany between Wetstein and Goeze; the former impugning, the latter defending the Complutensian Bible. The cautious and candid Michaelis, whose prepossessions appear to have been on the side of Goeze, decides ultimately, after his own examination, in favour of Wetstein, as regards the value of the MSS. employed; not, however, as relates to the grave charge of wilfully accommodating the Greek text to the Vulgate. See the grounds and merits of the controversy, apud Michaelis, Introduction to the New Testament, translated by Marsh, vol. ii. part 1, chap. 12, sec. 1; part 2, notes.

(2) Professor Moldenhauer, of Germany, visited Alcalá in 1784, for the interesting purpose of examining the MSS. used in the Complutensian Polyglot. He there learned that they had all been disposed of, as so much waste paper (*membranus inutiles*), by the librarian of that time, to a racket-maker of the town, who soon worked them up in the regular way of his vocation! He assigns no reason for doubting the truth of the story. The name of the librarian, unfortunately, is not recorded. It would have been as imperishable as that of Omar.—Marsh's Michaelis, vol. ii. part 1, chap. 12, sec. 1, note.

(3) The celebrated text of "the three witnesses," formerly cited in the Trinitarian controversy, and which Porson so completely overturned, rests in part on what Gibbon calls "the honest bigotry of the Complutensian editors." One of the three Greek manuscripts in which that text is found, is a forgery from the Polyglot of Alcalá, according to Mr. Norton, in his recent work, "The Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels" (Boston, 1837, vol. i. Additional Notes, p. xxxix);—a work which few can be fully competent to criticise, but which no person can peruse without confessing the acuteness and strength of its reasoning, the nice discrimination of its criticism, and the precision and purity of its diction. Whatever difference of opinion may be formed as to some of its conclusions, no one will deny that the originality and importance of its views make it a substantial accession to theological science; and that, within the range permitted by the subject, it presents, on the whole, one of the noblest specimens of scholarship and elegance of composition to be found in our youthful literature.

(4) "Accedit," say the editors of the Polyglot, adverting to the blunders of early transcribers, "ubiqueque Latinorum codicum varietas est, aut depravata lectionis suspitio (id quod librorum imperitia simul et negligentia frequentissime accidere videmus), ad primam Scripturæ originem recurrendum est."—Biblia Polyglotta, Compluti, Prólogo.

(5) Tiraboschi adduces a Psalter, published in four of the ancient tongues, at Genoa, in 1516, as the first essay of a polyglot version.—(Letteratura Italiana, tom. viii. p. 191.) Lampillas does not fail to add this enormity to the black catalogue which he has mustered against the librarian of Modena.—(Letteratura Spagnuola, tom. ii. part 2, p. 290.) The first three volumes of the Complutensian Bible were printed before 1516, although the whole work did not pass the press till the following year.



Nor can we look at it in connection with the age, and the auspices under which it was accomplished, without regarding it as a noble monument of piety, learning, and munificence, which entitles its author to the gratitude of the whole Christian world.

Such were the gigantic projects which amused the leisure hours of this great prelate. Though gigantic, they were neither beyond his strength to execute, nor beyond the demands of his age and country. They were not like those works which, forced into being by whim or transitory impulse, perish with the breath that made them; but, taking deep root, were cherished and invigorated by the national sentiment, so as to bear rich fruit for posterity. This was particularly the case with the institution at Alcalá. It soon became the subject of royal and private benefaction. Its founder bequeathed it, at his death, a clear revenue of fourteen thousand ducats. By the middle of the seventeenth century, this had increased to forty-two thousand, and the colleges had multiplied from ten to thirty-five.(1)

The rising reputation of the new academy, which attracted students from every quarter of the Peninsula to its halls, threatened to eclipse the glories of the ancient seminary at Salamanca, and occasioned bitter jealousies between them. The field of letters, however, was wide enough for both, especially as the one was more immediately devoted to theological preparation, to the entire exclusion of civil jurisprudence, which formed a prominent branch of instruction at the other. In this state of things, their rivalry, far from being productive of mischief, might be regarded as salutary, by quickening literary ardour, too prone to languish without the spur of competition. Side by side the sister universities went forward, dividing the public patronage and estimation. As long as the good era of letters lasted in Spain, the academy of Ximenes, under the influence of its admirable discipline, maintained a reputation inferior to none other in the Peninsula,(2) and continued to send forth its sons to occupy the most exalted posts in church and state, and shed the light of genius and science over their own and future ages.(3)

(1) Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 17.—Oviedo, *Quincuagena*, MS. dial. de Ximeni. Ferdinand and Isabella conceded liberal grants and immunities to Alcalá on more than one occasion.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 43, 45.

(2) Erasmus, in a letter to his friend Vergara, in 1527, perpetrates a Greek pun on the classic name of Alcalá, intimating the highest opinion of the state of science there. "*Gratulor tibi, ornatissime adolescens, gratulor vestre Hispanicæ ad pristinam eruditionis laudem veluti postliminio reforescenti. Gratulor Compluto, quod duorum presulum Francisci et Alfonsi felicibus auspiciis sic efflorescit omni genere studiorum, ut jure optimo *παμπλουτου* appellare possimus.*"—*Epistolæ*, p. 771.

(3) Quintanilla is for passing the sum total of the good works of these war-things of Alcalá to the credit of its founder. They might serve as a make-weight, to turn the scale in favour of his beatification.—*Archetypo*, lib. 3, cap. 17.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## WARS AND POLITICS OF ITALY.

1508—1513.

League of Cambray—Alarm of Ferdinand—Holy League—Battle of Ravenna—Death of Gaston de Foix—Retreat of the French—The Spaniards victorious.

THE domestic history of Spain, after Ferdinand's resumption of the regency, contains few remarkable events. Its foreign relations were more important. Those with Africa have been already noticed, and we must now turn to Italy and Navarre.

The possession of Naples necessarily brought Ferdinand within the sphere of Italian politics. He showed little disposition, however, to avail himself of it for the further extension of his conquests. Gonsalvo, indeed, during his administration, meditated various schemes for the overthrow of the French power in Italy, but with a view rather to the preservation than enlargement of his present acquisitions. After the treaty with Louis the Twelfth, even these designs were abandoned; and the Catholic monarch seemed wholly occupied with the internal affairs of his kingdom, and the establishment of his rising empire in Africa.<sup>(1)</sup>

The craving appetite of Louis the Twelfth, on the other hand, sharpened by the loss of Naples, sought to indemnify itself by more ample acquisitions in the north. As far back as 1504, he had arranged a plan with the emperor for the partition of the continental possessions of Venice, introducing it into one of those abortive treaties at Blois for the marriage of his daughter.<sup>(2)</sup> The scheme is said to have been communicated to Ferdinand in the royal interview at Savona. No immediate action followed; and it seems probable that the latter monarch, with his usual circumspection, reserved his decision until he should be more clearly satisfied of the advantages to himself.<sup>(3)</sup>

At length the projected partition was definitely settled by the celebrated treaty of Cambray, December 10th, 1508, between Louis the Twelfth and the emperor Maximilian; in

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iii. lib. 5, p. 257, ed. Milano, 1803.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 7, 9, et alibi.

(2) Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv, part 1, No. 30.—Flassan, *Diplomatie Française*, tom. i. pp. 282, 283.

(3) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 78.

which the pope, King Ferdinand, and all princes who had any claims by spoiliations by the Venetians, were invited to take part. The share of the spoil assigned to the Catholic monarch was the five Neapolitan cities, Trani, Brindisi, Gallipoli, Pulignano, and Otranto, pledged to Venice for considerable sums advanced by her during the late war.(1) The Spanish court, and not long after, Julius the Second, ratified the treaty, although it was in direct contravention of the avowed purpose of the pontiff, to chase the barbarians from Italy. It was his bold policy, however, to make use of them first for the aggrandisement of the church; and then to trust to his augmented strength and more favourable opportunities for eradicating them altogether.

Never was there a project more destitute of principle or sound policy. There was not one of the contracting parties who was not at that very time in close alliance with the state the dismemberment of which he was plotting. As a matter of policy, it went to break down the principal barrier on which each of those powers could rely for keeping in check the overweening ambition of its neighbours, and maintaining the balance of Italy.(2) The alarm of Venice was quieted for a time by assurance from the courts of France and Spain, that the league was solely directed against the Turks, accompanied by the most hypocritical professions of good-will, and amicable offers to the republic.(3)

The preamble of the treaty declares, that it being the intention of the allies to support the pope in a crusade against the infidel, they first proposed to recover from Venice the territories of which she had despoiled the church and other powers, to the manifest hindrance of these pious designs. The more flagitious the meditated enterprise, the deeper was the veil of hypocrisy thrown over it in this corrupt age. The true reasons for the confederacy are to be found in a speech delivered at the German Diet, some time after, by the French minister Hélian. "We," he remarks, after enumerating various enormities of the republic, "we wear no fine purple; feast from no sumptuous services of plate; have no coffers overflowing with gold. We are barbarians. Surely," he continues in another place, "if it is derogatory to princes to act the part of merchants, it is unbecoming in merchants to assume the state of princes."(4)

(1) Flassan, *Diplomatie Française*, tom. i. lib. 2, p. 283.—Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part 1, No. 52.

(2) This argument, used by Machiavelli against Louis's rupture with Venice, applies with more or less force to all the other allies.—Opere, II Principe, cap. 3.

(3) Du Bos, *Ligue de Cambray*, tom. i. pp. 66, 67.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 36, 37.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. iv. p. 141.—Dembó, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. ii. lib. 7.

(4) See a liberal extract from this harangue, apud Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. liv. 23;—also apud Du Bos, *Ligue de Cambray*, tom. i. pp. 240 et seq.

This, then, was the true key to the conspiracy against Venice; envy of her superior wealth and magnificence, hatred engendered by her too arrogant bearing, and lastly, the evil eye with which kings naturally regard the movements of an active aspiring republic.(1)

To secure the co-operation of Florence, the kings of France and Spain agreed to withdraw their protection from Pisa, for a stipulated sum of money. There is nothing in the whole history of the merchant princes of Venice so mercenary and base as this bartering away for gold the independence for which this little republic had been so nobly contending for more than fourteen years.(2)

Early in April, 1509, Louis the Twelfth crossed the Alps at the head of a force which bore down all opposition. City and castle fell before him; and his demeanour to the vanquished, over whom he had no rights beyond the ordinary ones of war, was that of an incensed master taking vengeance on his rebellious vassals. In revenge for his detention before Peschiera, he hung the Venetian governor and his son from the battlements. This was an outrage on the laws of chivalry, which, however hard they bore on the peasant, respected those of high degree. Louis's rank, and his heart it seems, unhappily raised him equally above sympathy with either class.(3)

—The old poet Jean Marot sums up the sins of the republic in the following verse:—

“Autre Dieu n'ont que l'or, c'est leur créance.”

—Œuvres de Clement Marot, avec les Ouvrages de Jean Marot (La Haye, 1731), tom. v. p. 71.

(1) See the undisguised satisfaction with which Martyr, a Milanese, predicts (Opus Epist. epist. 410), and Guicciardini, a Florentine, records, the humiliation of Venice.—(Istoria, lib. 4, p. 137.) The arrogance of the rival republic does not escape the satirical lash of Machiavelli:—

“San Marco, impetuoso ed importuno,  
Credendosi haver sempre il vento in poppa,  
Non si curò di rovinare ognuno;  
Ne vidde come la potenza troppa  
Era nociva.”—Dell' Asino d'Oro, cap. 5.

(2) Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. 29, cap. 15.—Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 28, p. 286.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 423. Louis XII. was in alliance with Florence, but insisted on 100,000 ducats as the price of his acquiescence in her recovery of Pisa. Ferdinand, or rather his general Gonzalvo de Cordova, had taken Pisa under his protection, and the king insisted on 50,000 ducats for his abandonment of her. This honourable transaction resulted in the payment of the respective amounts to the royal jobbers; the 50,000 excess of Louis's portion being kept a profound secret from Ferdinand, who was made to believe by the parties that his ally received only a like sum with himself.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. iv. pp. 78, 80, 156, 157.

(3) Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 30.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 8.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. iv. p. 183. Jean Marot describes the execution in the following cool and summary style:—

“Ce chastelain de là, aussi le capitaine,  
Pour la derrision et response vilaine  
Qu'ils firent au hérault, furent pris et sanglez  
Puis devant tout le monde pendus et estranglez.”

Œuvres, tom. v. p. 153.

On the 14th of May, 1509, was fought the bloody battle of Agnadol, which broke the power of Venice, and at once decided the fate of the war.(1) Ferdinand had contributed nothing to those operations, except by his diversion on the side of Naples, where he possessed himself without difficulty of the cities allotted to his share. They were the cheapest, and, if not the most valuable, were the most permanent acquisitions of the war, being re-incorporated in the monarchy of Naples.

Then followed the memorable decree by which Venice released her continental provinces from their allegiance, authorising them to provide in any way they could for their safety; a measure which, whether originating in panic or policy, was perfectly consonant with the latter.(2) The confederates, who had remained united during the chase, soon quarrelled over the division of the spoil. Ancient jealousies revived. The republic, with cool and consummate diplomacy, availed herself of this state of feeling.

Pope Julius, who had gained all that he had proposed, and was satisfied with the humiliation of Venice, now felt all his former antipathies and distrust of the French return in full force. The rising flame was diligently fanned by the artful emissaries of the republic, who at length effected a reconciliation on her behalf with the haughty pontiff. The latter, having taken this direction, went forward in it with his usual impetuosity. He planned a new coalition for the expulsion of the French, calling on the other allies to take part in it. Louis retaliated by summoning a council to inquire into the pope's conduct, and by marching his troops into the territories of the church.(3)

The advance of the French, who had now got possession of Bologna (May 21, 1511), alarmed Ferdinand. He had secured the objects for which he had entered into the war, and was loath to be diverted from enterprises in which he was interested nearer home. "I know not," writes Peter Martyr, at this time, "on what the king will decide. He is intent on following up his

(1) The fullest account, probably, of the action is in the "Voyage de Venise," of Jean Marot.—(Œuvres, tom. v. pp. 124—139.) This pioneer of French song, since eclipsed by his more polished son, accompanied his master, Louis XII. on his Italian expedition, as his poet chronicler; and the subject has elicited occasionally some sparks of poetic fire, though struck out with a rude hand. The poem is so conscientious in its facts and dates, that it is commended by a French critic as the most exact record of the Italian campaign.—*Ibid.* Remarques, p. 16.

(2) Foreign historians impute this measure to the former motive, the Venetians to the latter. The cool and deliberate conduct of this government, from which all passion, to use the language of the abbé Du Bos, seems to have been banished, may authorise our acquiescence in the statement most flattering to the national vanity.—See the discussion *apud* Ligue de Cambray, pp. 125 et seq.

(3) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 221.—Fleurbaey, Mémoires, chap. 7.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 416.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. iv. pp. 178, 179, 190, 191; tom. v. pp. 71, 82, 86.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 7, 9, 10.

African conquests. He feels natural reluctance at breaking with his French ally. But I do not well see how he can avoid supporting the pope and the church, not only as the cause of religion, but of freedom; for if the French get possession of Rome, the liberties of all Italy and of every state in Europe are in peril."(1)

The Catholic king viewed it in this light, and sent repeated and earnest remonstrances to Louis the Twelfth against his aggressions on the church; beseeching him not to interrupt the peace of Christendom, and his own pious purpose, more particularly, of spreading the banners of the Cross over the infidel regions of Africa. The very sweet and fraternal tone of these communications filled the king of France, says Guicciardini, with much distrust of his royal brother; and he was heard to say, in allusion to the great preparations which the Spanish monarch was making by sea and land, "I am the Saracene against whom they are directed."(2)

To secure Ferdinand more to his interests, the pope granted him the investiture, so long withheld, of Naples, on the same easy terms on which it was formerly held by the Aragonese line. His holiness further released him from the obligation of his marriage treaty, by which the moiety of Naples was to revert to the French crown in case of Germaine's dying without issue. This dispensing power of the successors of St. Peter, so convenient for princes in their good graces, is undoubtedly the severest tax ever levied by superstition on human reason.(3)

(1) Opus Epist. epist. 463.—Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 46.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 26.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 225.

(2) Istoria, lib. 9, p. 135.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1511.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 225.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 465. Machiavelli's friend Vettori, in one of his letters speaks of the Catholic king as the principal author of the new coalition against France, and notices three hundred lances which he furnished the pope in advance for this purpose.—(Machiavelli, Opere, Lettere Famigliari, No. 8.) He does not seem to understand that these lances were part of the services due for the fief of Naples. The letter above quoted of Martyr, a more competent and unsuspicious authority, shows Ferdinand's sincere aversion to a rupture with Louis at the present juncture; and a subsequent passage of the same epistle shows him too much in earnest in his dissuaves to be open to the charge of insincerity. "Ut mitibus verbis ipsum, Regnum ejus uxorem, ut consiliarios omnes Cabanillas alloquatur, ut agant apud regem suum de pace, dat in frequentibus mandatis."—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. ubi supra. See further, epist. 454.

(3) Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. No. 441.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. II. lib. 29, cap. 24.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 164.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 18. The act of investiture was dated July 3rd, 1510. In the following August, the pontiff remitted the feudal service for the annual tribute of a white palfrey, and the aid of 300 lances when the estates of the church should be invaded.—(Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 9, cap. 11.) The pope had hitherto refused the investiture, except on the most exorbitant terms; which so much disgusted Ferdinand that he passed by Ostia, on his return from Naples, without condescending to meet his holiness, who was waiting there for a personal interview him.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 353.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. iv. p. 73.

On the 4th of October, 1511, a treaty was concluded between Julius the Second, Ferdinand, and Venice, with the avowed object of protecting the church,—in other words, driving the French out of Italy.(1) From the pious purpose to which it was devoted, it was called the Holy League. The quota to be furnished by the king of Aragon was twelve hundred heavy and one thousand light cavalry, ten thousand foot, and a squadron of eleven galleys, to act in concert with the Venetian fleet. The combined forces were to be placed under the command of Hugh de Cardona, viceroy of Naples, a person of polished and engaging address, but without the resolution or experience requisite to military success. The rough old pope sarcastically nicknamed him "Lady Cardena." It was an appointment that would certainly have never been made by Queen Isabella. Indeed, the favour shown this nobleman on this and other occasions was so much beyond his deserts, as to raise a suspicion in many that he was more nearly allied by blood to Ferdinand than was usually imagined.(2)

Early in 1512, France, by great exertions and without a single confederate out of Italy, save the false and fluctuating emperor, got an army into the field superior to that of the allies in point of numbers, and still more so in the character of its commander. This was Gaston de Foix, duke de Nemours, and brother of the queen of Aragon. Though a boy in years, for he was but twenty-two, he was ripe in understanding, and possessed consummate military talents. He introduced a severer discipline into his army, and an entirely new system of tactics. He looked forward to his results with stern indifference to the means by which they were to be effected. He disregarded the difficulties of the roads and the inclemency of the season, which had hitherto put a check on military operations. Through the midst of frightful morasses, or in the depth of winter snows, he performed his marches with a celerity unknown in the warfare of that age. In less than a fortnight after leaving Milan, he relieved Bologna (February 5), then besieged by the allies, made a countermarch on Brescia, defeated a detachment by the way, and the whole Venetian army under its walls; and, on the same day with the last event, succeeded in carrying the place by storm. After a few weeks' dissipation of the carnival,

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, p. 207.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 5.—Rymer, *Fœdera*, tom. xii. pp. 305—308.

(2) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, p. 203.—Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. ii. lib. 12.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 5, 14.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 483. Vettori, it seems, gave credence to the same suggestion. "Spagna ha sempre amato assai questo suo Viceré, e per errore che abbia fatto non l'ha gastigato, ma più presto fatto più grande, e si può pensare, come molti dicono, che *sta suo figlio*, e che *abbia in pensiero lasciarlo Re di Napoli*."—Machiavelli, *Opere*, let. di 16 Maggio, 1514. According to Aleon, the king would have appointed Navarro to the post of commander-in-chief, had not his low birth disqualified him for it in the eyes of the allies.—*Annales de Navarra*, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 12.

he again put himself in motion, and, descending on Ravenna, succeeded in bringing the allied army to a decisive action under its walls. Ferdinand, well understanding the peculiar characters of the French and of the Spanish soldier, had cautioned his general to adopt the Fabian policy of Gonsalvo, and avoid a close encounter as long as possible.(1)

✦ This battle, fought with the greatest numbers, was also the most murderous which had stained the fair soil of Italy for a century (April 11, 1512). No less than eighteen or twenty thousand, according to authentic accounts, fell in it, comprehending the best blood of France and Italy.(2) The viceroy, Cardona, went off somewhat too early for his reputation. But the Spanish infantry, under the count Pedro Navarro, behaved in a style worthy of the school of Gonsalvo. During the early part of the day, they lay on the ground, in a position which sheltered them from the deadly artillery of Este, then the best mounted and best served of any in Europe. When at length, as the tide of battle was going against them, they were brought into the field, Navarro led them at once against a deep column of landsknechts, who, armed with the long German pike, were bearing down all before them. The Spaniards received the shock of this formidable weapon on the mailed panoply with which their bodies were covered, and, dexterously gliding into the hostile ranks, contrived with their short swords to do such execution on the enemy, unprotected except by corslets in front, and incapable of availing themselves of their long weapon, that they were thrown into confusion, and totally discomfited. It was repeating the experiment more than once made during these wars, but never on so great a scale; and it fully established the superiority of the Spanish arms.(3)

The Italian infantry, which had fallen back before the lands-

(1) Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 230, 231.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. v. lib. 10, pp. 260—272.—Giovio, Vita Leonis X. apud Vitæ Illust. Virorum, lib. 2, pp. 37, 38.—Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 48.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 26—28.

(2) Ariosto introduces the bloody rout of Ravenna among the visions of Melissa; in which the courtly prophetess (or rather poet) predicts the glories of the house of Este.

“Nuoteranno i destrier fino alla pancia  
Nel sangue uman per tutta la campagna;  
Ch' a seppellire il popol verrà manco  
Tedesco, Ispano, Greco, Italo, e Franco.”

Orlando Furioso, canto 3, st. 55.

(3) Brantôme, Vies des Hommes Illustres, disc. 6.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. v. lib. 10, pp. 290—305.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 231, 233.—Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 54.—Du Bellay, Mémoires, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xvii. p. 234.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 29, 30.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. ii. lib. 12. Machiavelli does justice to the gallantry of this valiant corps, whose conduct on this occasion furnishes him with a pertinent illustration, in estimating the comparative value of the Spanish, or rather Roman arms, and the German. —Opere, tom. iv. Arte della Guerra, lib. 2, p. 67.



knechts, now rallied under cover of the Spanish charge; until at length the overwhelming clouds of French gendarmerie, headed by Ives d'Alègre, who lost his own life in the *mêlée*, compelled the allies to give ground. The retreat of the Spaniards, however, was conducted with admirable order, and they preserved their ranks unbroken as they repeatedly turned to drive back the tide of pursuit. At this crisis, Gaston de Foix, flushed with success, was so exasperated by the sight of this valiant corps going off in so cool and orderly a manner from the field, that he made a desperate charge at the head of his cavalry, in hopes of breaking it. Unfortunately, his wounded horse fell under him. It was in vain his followers called out, "It is our viceroy, the brother of your queen!" The words had no charm for a Spanish ear, and he was dispatched with a multitude of wounds. He received fourteen or fifteen in the face; good proof, says the *loyal serviteur*, "that the gentle prince had never turned his back." (1)

There are few instances in history, if indeed there be any, of so brief, and at the same time so brilliant a military career, as that of Gaston de Foix; and it well entitled him to the epithet his countrymen gave him of the "thunderbolt of Italy." (2) He had not merely given extraordinary promise, but in the course of a very few months had achieved such results as might well make the greatest powers of the Peninsula tremble for their possessions. His precocious military talents, the early age at which he assumed the command of armies, as well as many peculiarities of his discipline and tactics, suggest some resemblance to the beginning of Napoleon's career.

Unhappily, his brilliant fame is sullied by a recklessness of human life, the more odious in one too young to be steelled by familiarity with the iron trade to which he was devoted. It may be fair, however, to charge this on the age rather than on the individual; for surely never was there one characterised by greater brutality, and more unsparing ferocity in its wars. (3)

(1) *Mémoires du Bayard*, chap. 54.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, pp. 306—309.—Peter Martyr, *epist.* 483.—Brantôme, *Vies des Hommes Illustres*, disc. 24. The best, that is, the most perspicuous and animated description of the flight of Ravenna, among contemporary writers, will be found in Guicciardini (*ubi supra*); among the modern, in Sismondi (*Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xiv. chap. 109), an author who has the rare merit of combining profound philosophical analysis with the superficial and picturesque graces of narrative.

(2) "Le foudre de l'Italie" (Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 391);—light authority, I acknowledge, even for a *sobriquet*.

(3) One example may suffice, occurring in the war of the League, in 1510. When Vicenza was taken by the Imperialists, a number of the inhabitants, amounting to one, or, according to some accounts, six thousand, took refuge in a neighbouring grotto with their wives and children, comprehending many of the principal families of the place. A French officer, detecting their retreat, caused a heap of fagots to be piled up at the mouth of the cavern and set on fire. Out of the whole number of fugitives only one escaped with life; and the blackened and convulsed appearance of the bodies showed too plainly the cruel agonies of suffocation.—(*Mémoires du Bayard*, ch. 40.—Bembo, *Istoria*

So little had the progress of civilisation done for humanity. It is not until a recent period that a more generous spirit has operated; that a fellow-creature has been understood not to forfeit his rights as a man because he is an enemy; that conventional laws have been established, tending greatly to mitigate the evils of a condition which, with every alleviation, is one of unspeakable misery; and that those who hold the destinies of nations in their hands have been made to feel that there is less true glory, and far less profit, to be derived from war than from the wise prevention of it.

The defeat at Ravenna struck a panic into the confederates. The stout heart of Julius the Second faltered, and it required all the assurances of the Spanish and Venetian ministers to keep him staunch to his purpose. King Ferdinand issued orders to the Great Captain to hold himself in readiness for taking the command of forces to be instantly raised for Naples. There could be no better proof of the royal consternation.(1)

The victory of Ravenna, however, was more fatal to the French than to their foes. The uninterrupted successes of a commander are so far unfortunate that they incline his followers, by the brilliant illusion they throw around his name, to rely less on their own resources than on him whom they have hitherto found invincible; and thus subject their own destiny to all the casualties which attach to the fortunes of a single individual. The death of Gaston de Foix seemed to dissolve the only bond which held the French together. The officers became divided, the soldiers disheartened, and, with the loss of their young hero, lost all interest in the service. The allies, advised of this disorderly state of the army, recovered confidence, and renewed their exertions. Through Ferdinand's influence over his son-in-law, Henry the Eighth of England, the latter had been induced openly to join the League in the beginning of the present year.(2) The Catholic king had the address, moreover, just before the battle, to detach the emperor from France, by effecting a truce between him and Venice.(3) The French, now menaced and pressed on every side, began their retreat under the brave La Palice; and to such an impotent state were they

Viniziana, tom. ii. lib. 10.) Bayard executed two of the authors of this diabolical act on the spot. But the "chevalier sans reproche" was an exception to, rather than an example of, the prevalent spirit of the age.

(1) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, pp. 310—312, 322, 323.—*Crónica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 3, cap. 7.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 9.—Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 3, p. 238.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1512.—See also *Lettere di Vettori*, Maggio 16, 1514, apud Machiavelli, *Opere*.

(2) Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. p. 137. He had become a party to it as early as November 17 of the preceding year; he deferred its publication, however, until he had received the last instalment of a subsidy that Louis XII. was to pay him for the maintenance of peace.—(Rymer, *Fœdera*, tom. xiii. pp. 311—323.—Sismondi, *Hist. de Français*, tom. xv. p. 355.) Even the chivalrous Henry the Eighth could not escape the trickish spirit of the age.

(3) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, p. 320.

reduced, that in less than three months after the fatal victory (June 28), they were at the foot of the Alps, having abandoned not only their recent, but all their conquests in the north of Italy.(1)

The same results now took place as in the late war against Venice. The confederates quarrelled over the division of the spoil. The republic, with the largest claims, obtained the least concessions. She felt that she was to be made to descend to an inferior rank in the scale of nations. Ferdinand earnestly remonstrated with the pope, and subsequently, by means of his Venetian minister, with Maximilian, on this mistaken policy;(2) but the indifference of the one, and the avarice of the other, were closed against argument. The result was precisely what the prudent monarch foresaw. Venice was driven into the arms of her perfidious ancient ally; and on the 23rd of March, 1513, a definitive treaty was arranged with France for their mutual defence.(3) Thus the most efficient member was alienated from the confederacy; all the recent advantages of the allies were compromised; new combinations were to be formed, and new and interminable prospects of hostility opened.

Ferdinand, relieved from immediate apprehensions of the French, took comparatively little interest in Italian politics. He was too much occupied with settling his conquests in Navarre. The army, indeed, under Cardona, still kept the field in the north of Italy. The viceroy, after re-establishing the Medici in Florence, remained inactive. The French, in the mean while, had again mustered in force, and crossing the mountains, encountered the Swiss in a bloody battle at Novara (June 6, 1513), where the former were entirely routed. Cardona, then reusing from his lethargy, traversed the Milanese without opposition, laying waste the ancient territories of Venice, burning the palaces and pleasure-houses of its lordly inhabitants on the beautiful banks of the Brenta, and approaching so near to the "Queen of the Adriatic" as to throw a few impotent balls into the monastery of San Secondo.

The indignation of the Venetians and of Alviano, the same general who had fought so gallantly under Gonsalvo at the Garigliano, hurried them into an engagement with the allies near La Motta (October 7), at two miles' distance from Vicenza. Cardona, loaded with booty and entangled among the mountain-passes, was assailed under every disadvantage. The German allies gave way before the impetuous charge of Alviano; but

(1) Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 55.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 31.—Ferrer, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 389, 391.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. v. lib. 10, pp. 335, 336.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 20.

(2) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 44.—48.—Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 11, p. 52. Martyr reports a conversation that he had with the Venetian minister in Spain touching this business.—Opus Epist. epist. 520.

(3) Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part 1, No. 86.

the Spanish infantry stood its ground unshaken; and, by extraordinary discipline and valour, succeeded in turning the fortunes of the day. More than four thousand of the enemy were left on the field; and a large number of prisoners, including many of rank, with all the baggage and artillery, fell into the hands of the victors.(1)

Thus ended the campaign of 1513; the French driven again beyond the mountains; Venice cooped up within her sea-girt fastnesses, and compelled to enrol her artisans and common labourers in her defence,—but still strong in resources, above all in the patriotism and unconquerable spirit of her people.(2)

---

Count Daru has supplied the desideratum, so long standing, of a full, authentic history of a state whose institutions were the admiration of earlier times, and whose long stability and success make them deservedly an object of curiosity and interest to our own. The style of the work, at once lively and condensed, is not that best suited to historic writing, being of the piquant, epigrammatic kind, much affected by French writers. The subject, too, of the revolutions of empire, does not afford room for the dramatic interest attaching to works which admit of more extended biographical development. Abundant interest will be found, however, in the dexterity with which he has disentangled the tortuous politics of the republic; in the acute and always sensible reflections with which he clothes the dry skeleton of fact, and in the novel stores of information he has opened. The foreign policy of Venice excited too much interest among friends and enemies in the day of her glory, not to occupy the pens of the most intelligent writers. But no Italian chronicler, not even one intrusted with the office by the government itself, has been able to exhibit the interior workings of the complicated machinery so satisfactorily as M. Daru has done, with the aid of these voluminous state papers, which were as jealously guarded from inspection, until the downfall of the republic, as the records of the Spanish Inquisition.

---

(1) Guleciardini, *Istoria*, tom. vi. lib. 11, pp. 101—138.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* epist. 523.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 21.—Fleury, *Mémoires*, cap. 36, 37.—Also an original letter of King Ferdinand to Archbishop Deza, apud Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 242. Alviano died a little more than a year after this defeat, at sixty years of age. He was so much beloved by the soldiery, that they refused to be separated from his remains, which were borne at the head of the army for some weeks after his death. They were finally laid in the church of St. Stephen in Venice; and the senate, with more gratitude than is usually conceded to republics, settled an honourable pension on his family.

(2) Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. pp. 615, 616.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## CONQUEST OF NAVARRE.

1512—1513.

Sovereigns of Navarre—Ferdinand demands a Passage—Invasion and Conquest of Navarre—Treaty of Orthis—Ferdinand settles his Conquests—His Conduct examined—Gross abuse of the Victory.

WHILE the Spaniards were thus winning barren laurels on the fields of Italy, King Ferdinand was making a most important acquisition of territory nearer home. The reader has already been made acquainted with the manner in which the bloody sceptre of Navarre passed from the hands of Eleanor, Ferdinand's sister, after a reign of a few brief days, into those of her grandson Phoebus (1479). A fatal destiny hung over the house of Foix; and the latter prince lived to enjoy his crown only four years, when he was succeeded by his sister Catherine (1483).

It was not to be supposed that Ferdinand and Isabella, so attentive to enlarge their empire to the full extent of the geographical limits which nature seemed to have assigned it, would lose the opportunity now presented of incorporating into it the hitherto independent kingdom of Navarre by the marriage of their own heir with its sovereign. All their efforts, however, were frustrated by the queen-mother Magdalene, sister of Louis the Eleventh, who, sacrificing the interests of the nation to her prejudices, evaded the proposed match under various pretexts, and in the end effected a union between her daughter and a French noble, Jean d'Albret, heir to considerable estates in the neighbourhood of Navarre. This was a most fatal error. The independence of Navarre had hitherto been maintained less through its own strength than the weakness of its neighbours. But, now that the petty states around her had been absorbed into two great and powerful monarchies, it was not to be expected that so feeble a barrier would be longer respected, or that it would not be swept away in the first collision of these formidable forces. But although the independence of the kingdom must be lost, the princes of Navarre might yet maintain their station by a union with the reigning family of France or Spain: by the present connection with a mere private individual they lost both the one and the other.(1)

(1) See Part I. vol. i. Chapters 10, 11, 12.

Still the most friendly relations subsisted between the Catholic king and his niece during the lifetime of Isabella. The sovereigns assisted her in taking possession of her turbulent dominions, as well as in allaying the deadly feuds of the Beaumonts and Agramonts, with which they were rent asunder. They supported her with their arms in resisting her uncle Jean, viscount of Narbonne, who claimed the crown on the groundless pretext of its being limited to male heirs.(1) The alliance with Spain was drawn still closer by the avowed purpose of Louis the Twelfth to support his nephew, Gaston de Foix, in the claims of his deceased father.(2) The death of the young hero, however, at Ravenna, wholly changed the relations and feelings of the two countries. Navarre had nothing immediately to fear from France. She felt distrust of Spain on more than one account, especially for the protection afforded the Beaumontese exiles, at the head of whom was the young count of Lerin, Ferdinand's nephew.(3)

France, too, standing alone, and at bay against the rest of Europe, found the alliance of the little state of Navarre of importance to her; especially at the present juncture, when the project of an expedition against Guienne, by the combined armies of Spain and England, naturally made Louis the Twelfth desirous to secure the good-will of a prince who might be said to wear the keys of the Pyrenees, as the king of Sardinia did those of the Alps, at his girdle. With these amicable dispositions, the king and queen of Navarre dispatched their plenipotentiaries to Blois, early in May, soon after the battle of Ravenna, with full powers to conclude a treaty of alliance and confederation with the French government.(4)

In the mean time, June 8th, an English squadron arrived at Passage, in Guipuscoa, having ten thousand men on board, under Thomas Grey, marquis of Dorset,(5) in order to co-operate with King Ferdinand's army in the descent on Guienne. This latter force, consisting of two thousand five hundred horse, light and heavy, six thousand foot, and twenty pieces of artillery, was placed under Don Fadrique de Toledo, the old duke of Alva, grandfather of the general who wrote his name in indelible characters of blood in the Netherlands, under Philip

(1) *Histoire du Royaume de Navarre*, pp. 567, 570.—Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. lib. 34, cap. 1, fol.—*Diccionario Geográfico-Histórico de España*, por la Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid, 1802), tom. ii. p. 117.

(2) Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 13.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 9, cap. 54.—Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. p. 590.

(3) Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, ubi supra.

(4) Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part 1, p. 147.—See also the king's letter to Deza, dated Burgos, July 20th, 1512, apud Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 235.

(5) Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. p. 245.—Herbert, *Life and Reign of Henry VIII.* (London, 1649), p. 26.—Hollinshed, *Chronicles*, p. 568 (London, 1810).—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ix. p. 315. His Valencian editors correct his text, by substituting marquis of Dorchester!

the Second.(1) Before making any movement, however, Ferdinand, who knew the equivocal dispositions of the Navarrese sovereigns, determined to secure himself from the annoyance which their strong position enabled them to give him on whatever route he adopted. He accordingly sent to request a free passage through their dominions, with the demand, moreover, that they should intrust six of their principal fortresses to such Navarrese as he should name, as a guarantee for their neutrality during the expedition. He accompanied this modest proposal with the alternative, that the sovereigns should become parties to the Holy League; engaging, in that case, to restore certain places in his possession which they claimed, and pledging the whole strength of the confederacy to protect them against any hostile attempts of France.(2)

The situation of these unfortunate princes was in the highest degree embarrassing. The neutrality they had so long and sedulously maintained was now to be abandoned; and their choice, whichever party they espoused, must compromise their possessions on one or the other side of the Pyrenees, in exchange for an ally, whose friendship had proved, by repeated experience, quite as disastrous as his enmity. In this dilemma they sent ambassadors into Castile, to obtain some modification of the terms, or, at least, to protract negotiations till some definitive arrangement should be made with Louis the Twelfth.(3)

On the 17th of July, their plenipotentiaries signed a treaty with that monarch at Blois, by which France and Navarre mutually agreed to defend each other, in case of attack, against all enemies whatever. By another provision, obviously directed against Spain, it was stipulated that neither nation should allow a passage to the enemies of the other through its dominions; and, by a third, Navarre pledged herself to declare war on the English, now assembled in Guipuscoa, and all those co-operating with them.(4)

(1) The young poet, Garcilasso de la Vega, gives a brilliant sketch of this stern old nobleman in his younger days, such as our imagination would scarcely have formed of him at any period:

"Otro Marte 'n guerra, en corte Fobo.  
Mostravase moixebro en las señales  
del rostro, qu' eran talos, qu' esperanza  
i ciera confianza claro davan  
a quantos lo miravan: qu'el seria,  
en quien s' informaria un ser divino."

Obras, ed. de Herrera, p. 505.

(2) Lebrija, de Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 3.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 4, 5.—Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 488.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. ubi supra.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 25.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 25.

(3) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 7, 8.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 487.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 25.

(4) Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part 1, No. 69.—Carta del Rey a D. Diego Deza, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 235.

Through a singular accident, Ferdinand was made acquainted with the principal articles of this treaty before its signature. (1) His army had remained inactive in its quarters around Vittoria ever since the landing of the English. He now saw the hopelessness of further negotiation, and, determining to anticipate the stroke prepared for him, commanded his general to invade without delay, and occupy Navarre.

The duke of Alva crossed the borders on the 21st of July, proclaiming that no harm should be offered to those who voluntarily submitted. On the 23rd, he arrived before Pampelona. King John, who, all the while he had been thus dallying with the lion, had made no provision for defence, had already abandoned his capital, leaving it to make the best terms it could for itself. On the following day, the city, having first obtained assurance of respect for all its franchises and immunities, surrendered; "a circumstance," devoutly exclaims King Ferdinand, "in which we truly discern the hand of our blessed Lord, whose miraculous interposition has been visible through all this enterprise, undertaken for the weal of the church, and the extirpation of the accursed schism." (2)

The royal exile, in the mean while, had retreated to Lumbier, where he solicited the assistance of the duke of Longueville, then encamped on the northern frontier, for the defence of Bayonne. The French commander, however, stood too much in awe of the English, still lying in Guipuscoa, to weaken himself by a detachment into Navarre; and the unfortunate monarch, unsupported either by his own subjects or his new ally, was compelled to cross the mountains, and take refuge with his family in France. (3)

(1) A confidential secretary of King Jean of Navarre was murdered in his sleep by his mistress. His papers, containing the heads of the proposed treaty with France, fell into the hands of a priest of Pampelona, who was induced by the hopes of a reward to betray them to Ferdinand. The story is told by Martyr, in a letter dated July 18th, 1512.—(Opus Epist. epist. 490.) Its truth is attested by the conformity of the proposed terms with those of the actual treaty.

(2) Carta del Rey a D. Diego Deza, Burgos, July 25th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 236.—Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 620—627.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 495.—Alcson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15. Bernaldez has incorporated into his Chronicle several letters of King Ferdinand, written during the progress of the war. It is singular, that, coming from so high a source, they should not have been more freely resorted to by the Spanish writers. They are addressed to his confessor, Deza, archbishop of Seville, with whom Bernaldez, curate of a parish in his diocese, was, as appears from other parts of his work, on terms of intimacy.

(3) Alcson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15.—Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, p. 622.—Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 4. "Jean d'Albret, you were born," said Catharine to her unfortunate husband, as they were flying from their kingdom, "and Jean d'Albret you will die. Had I been king, and you queen, we had been reigning in Navarre at this moment."—(Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 26.) Father Abarca treats the story as an old wife's tale, and Garibay as an old woman for repeating it.—Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.



The duke of Alva lost no time in pressing his advantage; opening the way by a proclamation of the Catholic king, that it was intended only to hold possession of the country as security for the pacific disposition of its sovereigns, until the end of his present expedition against Guionne. From whatever cause, the Spanish general experienced so little resistance, that in less than a fortnight he overran and subdued nearly the whole of Upper Navarre. So short a time sufficed for the subversion of a monarchy, which, in defiance of storm and stratagem, had maintained its independence unimpaired, with a few brief exceptions, for seven centuries.(1)

On reviewing these extraordinary events, we are led to distrust the capacity and courage of a prince who could so readily abandon his kingdom, without so much as firing a shot in its defence. John had shown, however, on more than one occasion, that he was destitute of neither. He was not, it must be confessed, of the temper best suited to the fierce and stirring times on which he was cast. He was of an amiable disposition, social and fond of pleasure, and so little jealous of his royal dignity, that he mixed freely in the dances and other entertainments of the humblest of his subjects. His greatest defect was the facility with which he reposed the cares of state on favourites, not always the most deserving. His greatest merit was his love of letters.(2) Unfortunately, neither his merits nor defects were of a kind best adapted to extricate him from his present perilous situation, or enable him to cope with his wily and resolute adversary. For this, however, more commanding talents might well have failed. The period had arrived, when, in the regular progress of events, Navarre must yield up her independence to the two great nations on her borders; who, attracted by the strength of her natural position, and her political weakness, would be sure, now that their own domestic discords were healed, to claim each the moiety which seemed naturally to fall within its own territorial limits. Particular events might accelerate or retard this result; but it was not in the power of human genius to avert its final consummation.

King Ferdinand, who desisted the storm now gathering on the side of France, resolved to meet it promptly, and commanded his general to cross the mountains and occupy the districts of Lower Navarre. In this he expected the co-operation of the English; but he was disappointed. The marquis of Dorset alleged, that the time consumed in the reduction of Navarre made it too late for the expedition against Guionne, which was now placed in a posture of defence. He loudly com-

(1) Manifesto del Rey D. Fernando, July 30th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 236.—Lebrija, De Bello Navaricensi, lib. 1, cap. 5.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 26.

(2) Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 2.—Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 603, 604.

plained that his master had been duped by the Catholic king, who had used his ally to make conquests solely for himself; and, in spite of every remonstrance, he re-embarked his whole force, without waiting for orders; "a proceeding," says Ferdinand, in one of his letters, "which touches me most deeply, from the stain it leaves on the honour of the most serene king my son-in-law, and the glory of the English nation, so distinguished in times past for high and chivalrous enterprise." (1)

The duke of Alva, thus unsupported, was no match for the French under Longueville, strengthened, moreover, by the veteran corps returned from Italy with the brave La Palice. Indeed, he narrowly escaped being hemmed in between the two armies, and only succeeded in anticipating by a few hours the movements of La Palice, so as to make good his retreat through the pass of Roneesvalles, and throw himself into Pampelona. (2) Either he was speedily followed by the French general, accompanied by Jean d'Albret. On the 27th of November, the besiegers made a desperate, though ineffectual, assault on the city, which was repeated with equal ill fortune on the two following days. The beleaguering forces, in the mean time, were straitened for provisions; and at length, after a siege of some weeks, on learning the arrival of fresh reinforcements under the duke of Najara, (3) they broke up their encampment, and withdrew across the mountains; and with them faded the last ray of hope for the restoration of the unfortunate monarch of Navarre. (4)

(1) See the king's third letter to Deza, Logroño, November 12th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 236.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 80, cap. 12.—Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 7.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 499.—Herbert, Life of Henry VIII. p. 24.—Holinshed, Chronicles, p. 371.

(2) Garcilasso de la Vega alludes to these military exploits of the duke in his second eclogue:—

"Con mas illustre nombre los arneses  
de los fieros Franceses abollava."

Obras, ed. de Herrera, p. 505.

(3) Such was the power of the old duke of Najara, that he brought into the field on this occasion 1,100 horse and 3,000 foot, raised and equipped on his own estates.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 507.

(4) Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 53, 56.—Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 33.—Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 8, 9.—Abarca, Reyes de Aragón, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.)—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1512.—Jean and Catharine d'Albret passed the remainder of their days in their territories on the French side of the Pyrenees. They made one more faint and fruitless attempt to recover their dominions during the regency of Cardinal Ximenes.—(Carbajal, Anales, MS. cap. 12.) Broken in spirits, their health gradually declined; and neither of them long survived the loss of their crown. Jean died June 23rd, 1517; and Catharine followed on the 12th of February of the next year; happy, at least, that, as misfortune had no power to divide them in life, so they were not long separated by death.—(Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, p. 643.—Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 20, 21.) Their bodies sleep side by side in the cathedral church of Lescar, in their own dominions of Bearn; and their fate is justly noticed by the Spanish historians as one of the most striking examples of that stern decree, by which the sins of the fathers are visited on the children to the third and fourth generation.

On the 1st of April in the following year, 1513, Ferdinand effected a truce with Louis the Twelfth, embracing their respective territories west of the Alps. It continued a year, and at its expiration was renewed for a similar time.<sup>(1)</sup> This arrangement, by which Louis sacrificed the interests of his ally, the king of Navarre, gave Ferdinand ample time for settling and fortifying his new conquests; while it left the war open in a quarter where, he well knew, others were more interested than himself to prosecute it with vigour. The treaty must be allowed to be more defensible on the score of policy than of good faith.<sup>(2)</sup> The allies loudly inveighed against the treachery of their confederate, who had so unscrupulously sacrificed the common interest, by relieving France from the powerful diversion he was engaged to make on her western borders. It is no justification of wrong, that similar wrongs have been committed by others; but those who commit them (and there was not one of the allies who could escape the imputation amid the political profligacy of the times) certainly forfeit the privilege to complain.<sup>(3)</sup>

(1) Flassan, *Diplomatie Française*, tom. i. p. 296.—Rymer, *Fœdera*, tom. xiii. pp. 350—352.—Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. vi. lib. 11, p. 82; lib. 12, p. 168.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 22.—“Fu cosa ridicola,” says Guicciardini, in relation to this truce, “che noi medesimi giurid, che la si bandiva solennemente per tutta la Spagna, venne un araldo a significargli in nome del Re d’Inghilterra gli apparati potentissimi, che ci faceva per assaltare la Francia, o a sollecitare che egli medesimamente movesse, secondo che aveva promesso, la guerra dalla parte di Spagna.”—*Istoria*, tom. vi. lib. 12, p. 84.

(2) Francesco Vettori, the Florentine ambassador at the papal court, writes to Machiavelli, that he lay awake two hours that night speculating on the real motives of the Catholic king in making this truce, which, regarded simply as a matter of policy, he condemns *in toto*. He accompanies this with various predictions respecting the consequences likely to result from it. These consequences never occurred, however; and the failure of his predictions may be received as the best refutation of his arguments.—Machiavelli, *Opere*, Lett. Famigl. Aprile 21, 1513.

(3) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. vi. lib. 11, pp. 81, 82.—Machiavelli, *Opere*, *libi supra*.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.* 638. On the 5th of April a treaty was concluded at Mechlin, in the names of Ferdinand, the king of England, the emperor, and the pope. (Rymer, *Fœdera*, tom. xiii. pp. 354—358.) The Castilian envoy, Don Luis Carroz, was not present at Mechlin, but it was ratified and solemnly sworn to by him, on behalf of his sovereign, in London, April 18th. (*Ibid.* tom. xiii. p. 363.) By this treaty, Spain agreed to attack France in Guienne, while the other powers were to co-operate by a descent on other quarters. (See also Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part 1, No. 79.) This was in direct contradiction of the treaty signed only five days before at Orchès; and, if made with the privity of King Ferdinand, must be allowed to be a gratuitous display of perfidy, not easily matched in that age. As such, of course, it is stigmatised by the French historians, that is, the later ones, for I find no comment on it in contemporary writers. (See Rapin, *History of England*, translated by Tindal; London, 1785-9; vol. ii. pp. 98, 94.—Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. p. 626.) Ferdinand, when applied to by Henry VIII. to ratify the acts of his minister in the following summer, refused, on the ground that the latter had transcended his powers. (Herbert, *Life of Henry VIII.* p. 29.) The Spanish writers are silent. His assertion derives some probability from the tenor of one of the articles, which provides that in case he refuses to confirm the treaty, it shall still be binding between England and the emperor;

Ferdinand availed himself of the interval of repose now secured to settle his new conquest. He had transferred his residence, first to Burgos, and afterwards to Logroño, that he might be near the theatre of operations. He was indefatigable in raising reinforcements and supplies; and expressed his intention at one time, notwithstanding the declining state of his health, to take the command in person. He showed his usual sagacity in various regulations for improving the police, healing the domestic feuds,—as fatal to Navarre as the arms of its enemies,—and confirming and extending its municipal privileges and immunities, so as to conciliate the affections of his new subjects.(1)

On the 23rd of March, 1513, the estates of Navarre took the usual oaths of allegiance to King Ferdinand.(2) On the 15th of June, 1515, the Catholic monarch, by a solemn act in cortes, held at Burgos, incorporated his new conquests into the kingdom of Castile.(3) The event excited some surprise, considering his more intimate relations with Aragon: but it was to the arms of Castile that he was chiefly indebted for the conquest; and it was on her superior wealth and resources that he relied for maintaining it. With this was combined the politic consideration, that the Navarrese, naturally turbulent and factious, would be held more easily in subordination when associated with Castile, than with Aragon, where the spirit of independence was higher, and often manifested itself in such bold assertion of popular rights as falls most unwelcome on a royal ear. To all this must be added the despair of issue by his present marriage, which had much abated his personal interest in enlarging the extent of his patrimonial domains.

Foreign writers characterise the conquest of Navarre as a bold, unblushing usurpation, rendered more odious by the mask of religious hypocrisy. The national writers, on the other hand, have employed their pens industriously to vindicate it; some endeavouring to rake a good claim for Castile out of its ancient union with Navarre, almost as ancient, indeed,

language which, as it anticipates, may seem to authorise such a contingency. Public treaties have, for obvious reasons, been generally received as the surest basis for history. One might well doubt this who attempts to reconcile the multifarious discrepancies and contradictions in those of the period under review. The science of diplomacy, as then practised, was a mere game of finesse and falsehood, in which the more solemn the protestations of the parties, the more ground for distrusting their sincerity.

(1) Carta del Rey a Don Diego Deza, Nov. 12th, 1512, apud Bernaldez. Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 236.—Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 16.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 13, 36, 43.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1512.

(2) Hist. du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 629, 630.—Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 16.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 30, cap. 1.

(3) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 92.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1515.—Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 30, cap. 1.—Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 7.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 26.

as the Moorish conquest. Others resort to considerations of expediency, relying on the mutual benefits of the connection to both kingdoms; arguments which prove little else than the weakness of the cause.(1) All lay more or less stress on the celebrated bull of Julius the Second, of February 18th, 1512, by which he excommunicated the sovereigns of Navarre as heretics, schismatics, and enemies of the church; releasing their subjects from their allegiance, laying their dominions under an interdict, and delivering them over to any who should take, or had already taken, possession of them.(2) Most, indeed, are content to rest on this as the true basis and original ground of the conquest. The total silence of the Catholic king respecting this document before the invasion, and the omission of the national historians since to produce it, have caused much scepticism as to its existence. And although its recent publication puts this beyond doubt, the instrument contains, in my judgment, strong internal evidence for distrusting the accuracy of the date affixed to it, which should have been posterior to the invasion; a circumstance materially affecting the argument, and which makes the papal sentence not the original basis of the war, but only a sanction subsequently obtained to cover its injustice, and authorise retaining the fruits of it.(3)

(1) The honest canon Salazar de Mendoza (taking the hint from Lebrija, indeed) finds abundant warrant for Ferdinand's treatment of Navarre in the hard measure dealt by the Israelites of old to the people of Ephraim, and to Sihon king of the Amorites. (*Monarquía*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 8.) It might seem strange that a Christian should look for authority in the practices of the race he so much abominates, instead of the inspired precepts of the Founder of his religion! But, in truth, your thorough-bred casuist is apt to be very little of a Christian.

(2) See the original bull of Julius II. apud Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ix. Apend. No. 2, ed. Valencia, 1796. "*Joannem et Catharinam*," says the bull, in the usual conciliatory style of the Vatican, "*perditionis filios, excommunicatos, anathematizatos, maledictos, eterni supplicii reos*," &c. "Our armies swore terribly in Flanders, cried my uncle Toby, but nothing to this. For my own part, I could not have a heart to curse my dog so."

(3) The ninth volume of the splendid Valencian edition of Mariana contains, in the Appendix, the famous bull of Julius II. of Feb. 18th, 1512, the original of which is to be found in the royal archives of Barcelona. The editor, Don Francisco Ortiz y Sanz, has accompanied it with an elaborate disquisition, in which he makes the apostolic sentence the great authority for the conquest. It was a great triumph, undoubtedly, to be able to produce the document, to which the Spanish historians had been so long challenged in vain by foreign writers, and the existence of which might well be doubted, since no record of it appears on the papal register. (*Abarca, Reyes de Aragón*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.) Paris de Grassis, *maître des cérémonies* of the chapel of Julius II. and Leo X., makes no mention of bull or excommunication, although very exact and particular in reporting such facts. (*Bréguigny, Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roy*, tom. ii. p. 570.) There is no reason that I know for doubting the genuineness of the present instrument. There are conclusive reasons to my mind, however, for rejecting its date, and assigning it to some time posterior to the conquest:—1st, The bull denounces John and Catherine as having openly joined themselves to Louis XII., and borne arms with him against England, Spain, and the church; a charge for which there was no pretence till five months later. 2nd, With this bull the editor has given another, dated Rome, July 21st, 1512, noticed by Peter Martyr. (*Opus Epist.*

But, whatever authority such a sanction may have had in the sixteenth century; it will find little respect in the present, at least beyond the limits of the Pyrenees. The only way in which the question can be fairly tried must be by those maxims of public law universally recognised as settling the intercourse of civilised nations; a science, indeed, imperfectly developed at that time, but in its general principles the same as now, founded, as these are, on the immutable basis of morality and justice.

We must go back a step beyond the war, to the proximate cause of it. This was Ferdinand's demand of a free passage for his troops through Navarre. The demand was perfectly fair, and in ordinary cases would doubtless have been granted by a neutral nation; but that nation must, after all, be the only judge of its propriety, and Navarre may find a justification for her refusal on these grounds. First, that, in her weak and defenceless state, it was attended with danger to herself. Secondly, that as, by a previous and existing treaty with Spain, the validity of which was recognised in her new one of July 17th with France, she had agreed to refuse the right of passage to the latter nation, she consequently could not grant it to Spain without a violation of her neutrality.(1) Thirdly,

epist. 497.) This latter is general in its import, being directed against all nations whatever engaged in alliance with France against the church. The sovereigns of Navarre are not even mentioned, nor the nation itself, any further than to warn it of the imminent danger in which it stood of falling into the schism. Now it is obvious that this second bull, so general in its import, would have been entirely superfluous in reference to Navarre, after the publication of the first; while, on the other hand, nothing could be more natural than that these general menaces and warnings, having proved ineffectual, should be followed by the particular sentence of excommunication contained in the bull of February.—3rd, In fact, the bull of February makes repeated allusion to a former one, in such a manner as to leave no doubt that the bull of July 21st is intended; since not only the sentiments, but the very form of expression, are perfectly coincident in both for whole sentences together.—4th, Ferdinand makes no mention of the papal excommunication, either in his private correspondence, where he discusses the grounds of the war, or in his manifesto to the Navarrese, where it would have served his purpose quite as effectually as his arms. I say nothing of the negative evidence afforded by the silence of contemporary writers, as Lebrija, Carbajal, Bernaldez, and Martyr, who, while they allude to a sentence of excommunication passed in the consistory, or to the publication of the bull of July, give no intimation of the existence of that of February; a silence altogether inexplicable. The inference from all this is, that the date of the bull of February 18th, 1512, is erroneous; that it should be placed at some period posterior to the conquest, and consequently could not have served as the ground of it; but was probably obtained at the instance of the Catholic king, in order, by the odium which it threw on the sovereigns of Navarre as excommunicate, to remove that under which he lay himself, and at the same time secure what might be deemed a sufficient warrant for retaining his acquisitions. Readers in general may think more time has been spent on the discussion than it is worth; but the important light in which it is viewed by those who entertain more deference for a papal decree, is sufficiently attested by the length and number of disquisitions on it down to the present century.

(1) Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part 1, No. 69.

that the demand of a passage, however just in itself, was coupled with another, the surrender of the fortresses, which must compromise the independence of the kingdom.(1)

But although, for these reasons, the sovereigns of Navarre were warranted in refusing Ferdinand's request, they were not therefore authorised to declare war against him, which they virtually did by entering into a defensive alliance with his enemy Louis the Twelfth, and by pledging themselves to make war on the English and their confederates; an article pointedly directed at the Catholic king.

True, indeed, the treaty of Blois had not received the ratification of the Navarrese sovereigns; but it was executed by their plenipotentiaries duly authorised, and, considering the intimate intercourse between the two nations, was undoubtedly made with their full knowledge and concurrence. Under these circumstances, it was scarcely to be expected that King Ferdinand, when an accident had put him in possession of the result of these negotiations, should wait for a formal declaration of hostilities, and thus deprive himself of the advantage of anticipating the blow of his enemy.

The right of making war would seem to include that of disposing of its fruits; subject, however, to those principles of natural equity which should regulate every action, whether of a public or private nature. No principle can be clearer, for example, than that the penalty should be proportioned to the offence. Now, that inflicted on the sovereigns of Navarre, which went so far as to dispossess them of their crown, and annihilate the political existence of their kingdom, was such as nothing but extraordinary aggressions on the part of the conquered nation, or the self-preservation of the victors, could justify. As neither of these contingencies existed in the present case, Ferdinand's conduct must be regarded as a flagrant example of the abuse of the rights of conquest. We have been but too familiar, indeed, with similar acts of political injustice, and on a much larger scale, in the present civilized age; but, although the number and splendour of the precedents may blunt our sensibility to the atrocity of the act, they can never constitute a legitimate warrant for its perpetration.

While thus freely condemning Ferdinand's conduct in this transaction, I cannot go along with those who, having inspected the subject less minutely, are disposed to regard it as the result of a cool, premeditated policy from the outset. The

(1) According to Galindez de Carbajal, only three fortresses were originally demanded by Ferdinand. (Anales, MS. año 1512.) He may have confounded the number with that said to have been finally conceded by the king of Navarre; a concession, however, which amounted to little, since it excluded by name two of the most important places required, and the sincerity of which may well be doubted, if, as it would seem, it was not made till after the negotiations with France had been adjusted. — See Zurita, Anales, lib. 10, cap. 7.

propositions originally made by him to Navarre appear to have been conceived in perfect good faith. The requisition of the fortresses, impudent as it may seem, was nothing more than had been before made in Isabella's time, when it had been granted, and the security subsequently restored, as soon as the emergency had passed away.(1) The alternative proposed, of entering into the holy league, presented many points of view so favourable to Navarre, that Ferdinand, ignorant as he then was of the precise footing on which he stood with France, might have seen no improbability in her closing with it. Had either alternative been embraced, there would have been no pretext for the invasion. Even when hostilities had been precipitated by the impolitic conduct of Navarre, Ferdinand (to judge not from his public manifestoes only, but from his private correspondence) would seem to have at first contemplated holding the country only till the close of his French expedition.(2) But the facility of retaining these conquests, when once acquired, was too strong a temptation. It was easy to find some plausible pretext to justify it, and obtain such a sanction from the highest authority as should veil the injustice of the transaction from the world,—and from his own eyes. And that these were blinded is but too true, if, as an Aragonese historian declares, he could remark on his death-bed, "that, independently of the conquest having been undertaken at the instance of the sovereign pontiff for the extirpation of the schism, he felt his conscience as easy in keeping it as in keeping his crown of Aragon." (3)

---

I have made use of three authorities exclusively devoted to Navarre, in the present History.—1. "L'Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, par un des Secrétaires Interprètes de sa Majesté," Paris, 1596, 8vo. This anonymous work, from the pen of one of Henry IV.'s secretaries, is little else than a meagre compilation of facts, and these deeply coloured by the national prejudices of the writer. It derives some value from the circumstance, however, in the contrast it affords to the Spanish version of the same transactions.—2. A tract entitled, "*Acti Antonii Nebrissenſis de Bello Navariensi Libri Duo.*" It covers less than thirty pages folio, and is chiefly occupied, as the title imports, with the military events of the conquest by the duke of Alva. It was originally incorporated in the volume containing its learned author's version, or rather paraphrase, of Pulgar's Chronicle, with some other matters; and first appeared from the press of the younger Lebrija, "apud Inclytam Granatam, 1545."—3. But the great work illustrating the history of Navarre is the "*Annales del Reyno*;" of which the best edition is that in seven volumes folio, from the press of Ibañez, Pamplona, 1766. Its typographical execution would be creditable to any country. The three first volumes were written by Moret, whose profound acquaintance with the antiquities of his nation has made his

---

(1) Aleson, *Annales de Navarra*, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 1, 3.—Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 13.

(2) See King Ferdinand's letter, July 20th, and his manifesto, July 30th, 1512, apud Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 235.—Lebrija, *De Bello Navariensi*, lib. 1, cap. 7.

(3) Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.



book indispensable to the student of this portion of its history. The fourth and fifth are the continuation of his work by Francisco de Aleson, a Jesuit, who succeeded Moret as historiographer of Navarre. The two last volumes are devoted to investigations illustrating the antiquities of Navarre, from the pen of Moret, and are usually published separately from his great historic work. Aleson's continuation, extending from 1350 to 1527, is a production of considerable merit. It shows extensive research on the part of its author, who, however, has not always confined himself to the most authentic and accredited sources of information. His references exhibit a singular medley of original contemporary documents and apocryphal authorities of a very recent date. Though a Navarrese, he has written with the impartiality of one in whom local prejudices were extinguished in the more comprehensive national feelings of a Spaniard.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### DEATH OF GONSALVO DE CORDOVA.—ILLNESS AND DEATH OF FERDINAND.—HIS CHARACTER.

1513—1516.

Gonsalvo ordered to Italy—General Enthusiasm—The King's Distrust—Gonsalvo in Retirement—Decline of his Health—His Death, and noble Character—Ferdinand's Illness—It increases—He dies—His Character—A Contrast to Isabella—The Judgment of his Contemporaries.

NOTWITHSTANDING the good order which King Ferdinand maintained in Castile by his energetic conduct, as well as by his policy of diverting the effervescing spirits of the nation to foreign enterprise, he still experienced annoyance from various causes. Among these were Maximilian's pretensions to the regency, as paternal grandfather of the heir apparent. The emperor, indeed, had more than once threatened to assert his preposterous claims to Castile in person; and although this Quixotic monarch, who had been tilting against windmills all his life, failed to excite any powerful sensation, either by his threats or his promises, it furnished a plausible pretext for keeping alive a faction hostile to the interests of the Catholic king.

In the winter of 1509 an arrangement was made with the emperor, through the mediation of Louis the Twelfth, by which he finally relinquished his pretensions to the regency of Castile, in consideration of the aid of three hundred lances, and the transfer to him of the fifty thousand ducats which Ferdinand was to receive from Pisa.<sup>(1)</sup> No bribe was too paltry for a prince whose means were as narrow as his projects were vast and chimerical. Even after this pacification, the Austrian

(1) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 21.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 45, 47.

party contrived to disquiet the king, by maintaining the arch-duke Charles's pretensions to the government in the name of his unfortunate mother; until at length, the Spanish monarch came to entertain not merely distrust, but positive aversion for his grandson; while the latter, as he advanced in years, was taught to regard Ferdinand as one who excluded him from his rightful inheritance by a most flagrant act of usurpation.(1)

Ferdinand's suspicious temper found other grounds for uneasiness, where there was less warrant for it, in his jealousy of his illustrious subject Gonsalvo de Cordova. This was particularly the case when circumstances had disclosed the full extent of that general's popularity. After the defeat of Ravenna, the pope and the other allies of Ferdinand urged him in the most earnest manner to send the Great Captain into Italy, as the only man capable of checking the French arms, and restoring the fortunes of the league. The king, trembling for the immediate safety of his own dominions, gave a reluctant assent, and ordered Gonsalvo to hold himself in readiness to take command of an army to be instantly raised for Italy (May, 1512).(2)

These tidings were received with enthusiasm by the Castilians. Men of every rank pressed forward to serve under a chief whose service was itself sufficient passport to fame. "It actually seemed," says Martyr, "as if Spain were to be drained of all her noble and generous blood. Nothing appeared impossible, or even difficult, under such a leader. Hardly a cavalier in the land but would have thought it a reproach to remain behind. Truly marvellous," he adds, "is the authority which he has acquired over all orders of men!"(3)

Such was the zeal with which men enlisted under his banner, that great difficulty was found in completing the necessary levies for Navarre, then menaced by the French. The king, alarmed at this, and relieved from apprehensions of immediate danger to Naples by subsequent advices from that country, sent orders greatly reducing the number of forces to be raised. But this had little effect, since every man who had the means preferred acting as a volunteer under the Great Captain, to any other service however gainful; and many a poor cavalier was there, who expended his little all, or incurred a heavy debt, in order to appear in the field in a style becoming the chivalry of Spain.

Ferdinand's former distrust of his general was now augmented tenfold by this evidence of his unbounded popularity. He saw

(1) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 55, 69.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 531.

(2) Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 486.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 7.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 2.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 3, p. 288.

(3) Opus Epist. epist. 497.—Pulgar, Sumario, p. 201.

in imagination much more danger to Naples from such a subject, than from any enemy, however formidable. He had received intelligence, moreover, that the French were in full retreat towards the north. He hesitated no longer, but sent instructions to the Great Captain at Cordova, to disband his levies, as the expedition would be postponed till after the present winter; at the same time inviting such as chose to enlist in the service of Navarre (August, 1512).<sup>(1)</sup>

These tidings were received with indignant feelings by the whole army. The officers refused, nearly to a man, to engage in the proposed service. Gonsalvo, who understood the motives of this change in the royal purpose, was deeply sensible to what he regarded as a personal affront. He, however, enjoined on his troops implicit obedience to the king's commands. Before dismissing them, as he knew that many had been drawn into expensive preparations far beyond their means, he distributed largesses among them, amounting to the immenso sum, if we may credit his biographers, of one hundred thousand ducats. "Never stint your hand," said he to his steward, who remonstrated on the magnitude of the donative; "there is no mode of enjoying one's property, like giving it away." He then wrote a letter to the king, in which he gave freo vent to his indignation, bitterly complaining of the ungenerous requital of his services, and asking leave to retire to his duchy of Terranova in Naples, since he could be no longer useful in Spain. This request was not calculated to lull Ferdinand's suspicions. He answered, however, "in the soft and pleasant style which he knew so well how to assume," says Zurita; and after specifying his motives for relinquishing, however reluctantly, the expedition, he recommended Gonsalvo's return to Loja, at least until some more definite arrangement could be made respecting the affairs of Italy.<sup>(2)</sup>

Thus condemned to his former seclusion, the Great Captain resumed his late habits of life, freely opening his mansion to persons of merit, interesting himself in plans for ameliorating the condition of his tenantry and neighbours, and in this quiet way winning a more unquestionable title to human gratitude than when piling up the blood-stained trophies of Victory. Alas for humanity, that it should have deemed otherwise!

Another circumstance, which disquieted the Catholic king, was the failure of issue by his present wife. The natural desire of offspring was further stimulated by hatred of the

(1) Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 3, p. 289.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 7, 8.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 38.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 496.—Pulgar, *Sumario*, p. 201.

(2) Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 14.—Giovio, *Vita Illust. Virorum*, pp. 290, 291.—*Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 7, 8, 9.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 28.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 328—332.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 20.—Pulgar, *Sumario*, pp. 201—208.

house of Austria, which made him eager to abridge the ample inheritance about to descend on his grandson Charles. It must be confessed, that it reflects little credit on his heart or his understanding, that he should have been so ready to sacrifice to personal resentment those noble plans for the consolidation of the monarchy, which had so worthily occupied the attention both of himself and of Isabella in his early life. His wishes had nearly been realised. Queen Germaine was delivered of a son, March 3rd, 1509. Providence, however, as if unwilling to defeat the glorious consummation of the union of the Spanish kingdoms, so long desired and nearly achieved, permitted the infant to live only a few hours.(1)

Ferdinand repined at the blessing denied him now more than over. In order to invigorate his constitution, he resorted to artificial means.(2) The medicines which he took had the opposite effect. At least from this time, the spring of 1513, he was afflicted with infirmities before unknown to him. Instead of his habitual equanimity and cheerfulness, he became impatient, irritable, and frequently a prey to morbid melancholy. He lost all relish for business, and even for amusements, except field sports, to which he devoted the greater part of his time. The fever which consumed him made him impatient of long residence in any one place, and during these last years of his life, the court was in perpetual migration. The unhappy monarch, alas! could not fly from disease, or from himself.(3)

In the summer of 1515, he was found one night by his attendants in a state of insensibility, from which it was difficult to rouse him. He exhibited flashes of his former energy after this, however. On one occasion he made a journey to Aragon, in order to preside at the deliberations of the cortes, and enforce the grant of supplies, to which the nobles, from selfish considerations, made resistance. The king failed, indeed, to bend their intractable tempers, but he displayed on the occasion all his wonted address and resolution.(4)

On his return to Castile, which, perhaps from the greater refinement and deference of the people, seems to have been

(1) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1509.—Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 55.

(2) They are detailed with such curious precision by Martyr,—who is much too precise, indeed, for our pages,—as to leave little doubt of the fact.—Opus Epist. epist. 531.

(3) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1513, et seq.—L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, fol. 188.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 146.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 27. “Non idem est vultus,” says Peter Martyr of the king, in a letter, dated in October, 1513, “non eadem facultas in audiendis, non eadem lenitas. Tria sunt illi, ne priores resumat vires, opposita: senilis ætas; secundum namque agit et sexagesimum annum: uxor, quam a latere nunquam abigit: et venatus cæloque vivendi cupiditas, quæ illum in sylvis detinet, ultra quam in juvenili ætate, citra salutem, fas esset.”—Opus Epist. epist. 529.

(4) Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 93, 94.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1515.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 530.

celebrated with great magnificence in the ancient Moorish capital, under the superintendence of the count of Tendilla, the son and successor of Gonsalvo's old friend, the late governor of Granada.(1) His remains, first deposited in the Franciscan monastery, were afterwards removed, and laid beneath a sumptuous mausoleum, in the church of San Gerónimo;(2) and more than a hundred banners and royal pennons, waving in melancholy pomp around the walls of the chapel, proclaimed the glorious achievements of the warrior who slept beneath.(3) His noble wife, Doña Maria Manrique, survived him but a few days. His daughter Elvira inherited the princely titles and estates of her father, which, by her marriage with a kinsman, the count of Cabra, were perpetuated in the house of Cordova.(4)

Father de Aponte, in which the king directs him to wait on the duchess, and tender her the consolations proper under her bereavement, with the assurance of the unalterable continuance of the royal favour and protection. The sympathetic tone of the epistle, and the delicate terms in which it is expressed, are honourable to the monarch.

(1) Peter Martyr notices the death of this estimable nobleman, full of years and of honours, in a letter dated July 18th, 1515. It is addressed to Tendilla's son, and breathes the consolation flowing from the mild and philosophical spirit of its amiable author. The count was made marquis of Mondejar by Ferdinand, a short time before his death. His various titles and dignities, including the government of Granada, descended to his eldest son, Don Luis, Martyr's early pupil; his genius was inherited in full measure by a younger, the famous Diego Hurtado de Mendoza.

(2) The following epitaph is placed over them :—

"Gonzali Fernandez de Cordova,  
Qui propria virtute  
Magni Ducis nomen  
Proprium sibi fecit,  
Ossa,  
Perpetue tandem  
Luci restituenda,  
Huic interca tumultu  
Credita sunt;  
Gloria minime consepulta."

See the London Quarterly Review, No. 127, art. 1. The writer copied the inscription from the tablet.

(3) Navagiero, Viaggio, fol. 24. On the top of the monument was seen the marble effigy of the Great Captain, armed and kneeling. The banners and other military trophies, which continued to garnish the walls of the chapel, according to Pedraza, as late as 1600, had disappeared before the eighteenth century; at least we may infer so from Colmenar's silence respecting them in his account of the sepulchre.—Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, fol. 114.—Colmenar; Délices de l'Espagne, tom. iii. p. 505.

(4) Crónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 3, cap. 9.—Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Vironum, fol. 292. Gonsalvo was created duke of Terra Nuova and Sessa, and marquis of Bitonto, all in Italy, with estates of the value of 40,000 ducats rent. He was also grand constable of Naples, and a nobleman of Venice. His princely honours were transmitted by Doña Elvira to her son, Gonzalo Hernandez de Cordova, who filled the posts, under Charles V., of governor of Milan and captain-general of Italy. Under Philip II. his descendants were raised to a Spanish dukedom, with the title of dukes of Baena.—L. Marinco, Cosas Memorables, fol. 24.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 41.—Salazar de Mendoza, Dignidades, p. 307.

Gonsalvo, or, as he is called in Castilian, Gonzalo Hernandez de Cordova, was sixty-two years old at the time of his death. His countenance and person are represented to have been extremely handsome; his manners, elegant and attractive, were stamped with that lofty dignity which so often distinguishes his countrymen. "He still bears," says Martyr, speaking of him in the last years of his life, "the same majestic port as when in the height of his former authority; so that every one who visits him acknowledges the influence of his noble presence as fully as when, at the head of armies, he gave laws to Italy." (1)

His splendid military successes, so gratifying to Castilian pride, have made the name of Gonsalvo as familiar to his countrymen as that of the Cid; which, floating down the stream of popular melody, has been treasured up as a part of the national history. His shining qualities, even more than his exploits, have been often made the theme of fiction; and fiction, as usual, has dealt with them in a fashion to leave only confused and erroneous conceptions of both. More is known of the Spanish hero, for instance, to foreign readers, from Florian's agreeable novel, than from any authentic record of his actions. Yet Florian, by dwelling only on the dazzling and popular traits of his hero, has depicted him as the very personification of romantic chivalry. This certainly was not his character, which might be said to have been formed after a ripper period of civilisation than the age of chivalry. At least, it had none of the nonsense of that age,—its fanciful vagaries, reckless adventure, and wild romantic gallantry. (2) His characteristics were prudence, coolness, steadiness of purpose, and intimate knowledge of man. He understood, above all, the temper of his own countrymen. He may be said, in some degree, to have formed their military character; their patience of severe training and hardship, their unflinching obedience, their inflexible spirit under reverses, and their decisive energy in the hour of action. It is certain that the Spanish soldier, under his hands, assumed an entirely new aspect from that which he had displayed in the romantic wars of the Peninsula.

Gonsalvo was untainted with the coarser vices characteristic of the time. He discovered none of that gripping avarice, too often the reproach of his countrymen in these wars. His hand and heart were liberal as the day. He betrayed none of the cruelty and licentiousness which disgraced the age of chivalry. On all occasions he was prompt to protect women from injury

(1) *Opus Epist. epist.* 498.—*Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, p. 292.—*Pulgar, Sumario*, p. 212.

(2) Gonsalvo assumed for his device a cross-bow, moved by a pulley, with the motto, "*Ingenium superat vires.*" It was characteristic of a mind trusting more to policy than force and daring exploit.—*Brantôme, Œuvres*, tom. i. p. 75.

or insult. Although his distinguished manners and rank gave him obvious advantages with the sex, he never abused them; (1) and he has left a character, unimpeached by any historian, of unblemished morality in his domestic relations. This was a rare virtue in the sixteenth century.

Gonsalvo's fame rests on his military prowess; yet his character would seem, in many respects, better suited to the calm and cultivated walks of civil life. His government of Naples exhibited much discretion and sound policy; (2) and there, as afterwards in his retirement, his polite and liberal manners secured, not merely the good-will, but the strong attachment, of those around him. His early education, like that of most of the noble cavaliers who came forward before the improvements introduced under Isabella, was taken up with knightly exercises more than intellectual accomplishments. He was never taught Latin, and had no pretensions to scholarship; but he honoured and nobly recompensed it in others. His solid sense and liberal taste supplied all deficiencies in himself, and led him to select friends and companions from among the most enlightened and virtuous of the community. (3)

On this fair character there remains one foul reproach. This is his breach of faith in two memorable instances; first, to the young duke of Calabria, and afterwards to Caesar Borgia, both of whom he betrayed into the hands of King Ferdinand, their personal enemy, and in violation of his most solemn pledges. (4) True, it was in obedience to his master's

(1) Giovio, *Vita Illust. Virorum*, p. 271.

(2) *Ibid.* p. 281.—Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 30, cap. 1, 5.

(3) Giovio, *Vita Illust. Virorum*, p. 271.

“Amigo de sus amigos,  
qué Señor para criados  
y parientes!  
qué enemigo de enemigos!  
qué maestro de esforzados  
y valientes!  
qué seso para discretos!  
qué gracia para donosos!  
qué razón!  
muy benigno á los sugetos,  
y á los bravos y dañosos  
un león.”

Coplas de Don Jorge Manrique.

(4) Borgia, after his father Alexander VI.'s death, escaped to Naples under favour of a safe-conduct signed by Gonsalvo. Here, however, his intriguing spirit soon engaged him in schemes for troubling the peace of Italy, and, indeed, for subverting the authority of the Spaniards there; in consequence of which the Great Captain seized his person, and sent him prisoner to Castile. Such, at least, is the Spanish version of the story, and of course the one most favourable to Gonsalvo. Mariana dismisses it with coolly remarking, that “the Great Captain seems to have consulted the public good in the affair more than his own fame; a conduct well worthy to be pondered and emulated by all princes and rulers!”—*Hist. de España*, lib. 28, cap. 8.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 72.—Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, pp. 302, 303.

commands, and not to serve his own purposes; and true also, this want of faith was the besetting sin of the age. But history has no warrant to tamper with right and wrong, or to brighten the character of its favourites, by diminishing one shade of the abhorrence which attaches to their vices. They should rather be held up in their true deformity, as the more conspicuous from the very greatness with which they are associated. It may be remarked, however, that the reiterated and unsparing opprobrium with which foreign writers, who have been little sensible to Gonsalvo's merits, have visited these offences, affords tolerable evidence that they are the only ones of any magnitude that can be charged on him. (1)

As to the imputation of disloyalty, we have elsewhere had occasion to notice its apparent groundlessness. It would be

(1) That but one other troubled him, appears from the fact (if it be a fact) of Gonsalvo's declaring, on his death-bed, that "there were three acts of his life which he deeply repented." Two of these were his treatment of Borgia and the duke of Calabria. He was silent respecting the third. "Some historians suppose," says Quintana, "that by this last he meant his omission to possess himself of the crown of Naples when it was in his power!" These historians, no doubt, like Fouché, considered a blunder in politics as worse than a crime.

Since the publication of the fourth edition of this work, I have received from Spain a copy of a remarkable letter, which states some particulars that, had they sooner come under my notice, would undoubtedly have been taken into the account in making up my estimate of Gonsalvo's integrity. The letter, which is dated November 2nd, 1515, is addressed to King Ferdinand by the bishop of Trinopol, his ambassador at the court of London. It details a conversation with the English monarch, Henry VIII., in which the latter, after some inquiries about Gonsalvo, remarks, "I well believe that the king, my father-in-law, has some ground for distrusting the Great Captain, as I know that he held a negotiation both with the late king of France and with the present king" (Charles VIII. and Louis XII.). "If I were in my father's place, I would sift the matter to the bottom; and, if it were proved against the Great Captain, I would punish him for it; and if it were not proved, I would make use of his services. I must further tell you, that the Great Captain once made an offer of his services to me, sending one of his own followers to Tournay, where I then was, for the purpose; but, although I was at that time not on the best terms with King Ferdinand, I did not choose to give him encouragement." The bishop endeavours to explain the nature of these services in such a way as not to compromise the loyalty of Gonsalvo. In regard to his correspondence with the French court, Henry's language is too vague to authorise any definite conclusion. Yet it must be confessed that it leaves an imputation that one might wish—though with little chance of success at this day—to see cleared away from the memory of Gonsalvo. The letter is of so much interest and importance, that, as it has not found its way into print, I will give an extract from the original. "*El no respondio bien creo que el Rey mi padre tiene alguna causa de desconfianza del Gran Capitan por que yo se que ha tenido platicas con el Rey de Francia muerto, y con este de agora; pero si yo fuesse que el Rey mi padre sobria si es assi la verdad y siendo assi castigarlo ya, y shio servirle ya del: y aun quiero vos dezir quel dho Gran Capitan me ha deseado servir a mi y me ha embiado un suyo à Tornay, mas yo no quise fazer nada, aunque estava enojado del Rey mi padre: pero si viene al proposito del Rey mi padre, y me lo quiere emblar aqui con alguna cosa yo se lo guardaré que no tenga platicas de Francia antes podra ser que nos sirvamos del contra Francea, yo la dixi que v. al. no creya que tuviese alguna desconfianza del dho Gran Capitan antes creya que lo guardaba para quando hubiesse necesidad de servirse del."*



strange, indeed, if the ungenerous treatment which he had experienced ever since his return from Naples had not provoked feelings of indignation in his bosom. Nor would it be surprising, under these circumstances, if he had been led to regard the archduke Charles's pretensions to the regency, as he came of age, with a favourable eye. There is no evidence, however, of this, or of any act, unfriendly to Ferdinand's interests. His whole public life, on the contrary, exhibited the truest loyalty; and the only stains that darken his fame were incurred by too unhesitating devotion to the wishes of his master. He is not the first nor the last statesman who has reaped the royal recompense of ingratitude, for serving his king with greater zeal than he had served his Maker.

Ferdinand's health, in the mean time, had declined so sensibly, that it was evident he could not long survive the object of his jealousy.<sup>(1)</sup> His disease had now settled into a dropsy, accompanied with a distressing affection of the heart. He found difficulty in breathing, complained that he was stifled in the crowded cities, and passed most of his time, even after the weather became cold, in the fields and forests, occupied, as far as his strength permitted, with the fatiguing pleasures of the chase. As the winter advanced, he bent his steps towards the south. He passed some time, in December, at a country seat of the duke of Alva, near Placentia, where he hunted the stag. He then resumed his journey to Andalusia, but fell so ill on the way, at the little village of Madrigalejo, near Truxillo, that it was found impossible to advance further. (January, 1516).<sup>(2)</sup>

(1) The miraculous bell of Velilla, a little village in Aragon, nine leagues from Saragossa, about this time gave one of those prophetic tintinnabulations which always boded some great calamity to the country. The side on which the blows fell denoted the quarter where the disaster was to happen. Its sound, says Dr. Dormer, caused dismay and contrition, with dismal "fear of change," in the hearts of all who heard it. No arm was strong enough to stop it on these occasions, as those found to their cost who profanely attempted it. Its ill-omened voice was heard for the twentieth and last time in March, 1679. As no event of importance followed, it probably tolled for its own funeral. See the edifying history, in Dr. Diego Dormer, of the miraculous powers and performances of this celebrated bell, as duly authenticated by a host of witnesses.—*Disursos Varios*, pp. 198—244.

(2) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. años 1513—1516.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 146.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 542, 558, 561, 564.—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 99. Carbajal states, that the king had been warned by some soothsayer, to beware of Madrigal, and that he had ever since avoided entering into the town of that name in Old Castile. The name of the place he was now in was not precisely that indicated, but corresponded near enough for a prediction. The event proved, that the witches of Spain, like those of Scotland,

"Could keep the word of promise to the ear,  
And break it to the hope."

The story derives little confirmation from the character of Ferdinand. He was not superstitious, at least while his faculties were in vigour.

The king seemed desirous of closing his eyes to the danger of his situation as long as possible. He would not confess, nor even admit his confessor into his chamber.<sup>(1)</sup> He showed similar jealousy of his grandson's envoy, Adrian of Utrecht. This person, the preceptor of Charles, and afterwards raised, through his means, to the papacy, had come into Castile some weeks before, with the ostensible view of making some permanent arrangement with Ferdinand in regard to the regency. The real motive, as the powers which he brought with him subsequently proved, was, that he might be on the spot when the king died, and assume the reins of government. Ferdinand received the minister with cold civility; and an agreement was entered into, by which the regency was guaranteed to the monarch not only during Joanna's life, but his own. Concessions to a dying man cost nothing. Adrian, who was at Guadalupe at this time, no sooner heard of Ferdinand's illness, than he hastened to Madrigalejo. The king, however, suspected the motives of his visit. "He has come to see me die," said he; and, refusing to admit him into his presence, ordered the mortified envoy back again to Guadalupe.<sup>(2)</sup>

At length the medical attendants ventured to inform the king of his real situation, conjuring him, if he had any affairs of moment to settle, to do it without delay. He listened to them with composure, and from that moment seemed to recover all his customary fortitude and equanimity. After receiving the sacrament, and attending to his spiritual concerns, he called his attendants around his bed, to advise with them respecting the disposition of the government. Among those present, at this time, were his faithful followers, the duke of Alva, and the marquis of Denia, his major-domo, with several bishops and members of his council.<sup>(3)</sup>

The king, it seems, had made several wills. By one, executed at Burgos, in 1512, he had committed the government of Castile and Aragon to the infante Ferdinand, during his brother Charles's absence. This young prince had been educated in

(1) "A la verdad," says Carbajal, "le tentó mucho el enemigo en aquel paso con incredulidad que le poula de no morir tan presto, para que ni confesase ni recibiese los Sacramentos." According to the same writer, Ferdinand was buoyed up by the prediction of an old sibyl, "la beata del Barco," that "he should not die till he had conquered Jerusalem."—(Anales, MS. cap. 2.) We are again reminded of Shakspeare:—

"It hath been prophesied to me many years,  
I should not die but in Jerusalem."—King Henry IV.

(2) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 1.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, ubi supra.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 565.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emper. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 35.

(3) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 2. Dr. Carbajal, who was a member of the royal council, was present with him during the whole of his last illness; and his circumstantial and spirited narrative of it forms an exception to the general character of his *itinerary*.

Spain under the eye of his grandfather, who entertained a strong affection for him. The counsellors remonstrated in the plainest terms against this disposition of the regency. Ferdinand, they said, was too young to take the helm into his own hands. His appointment would be sure to create new factions in Castile; it would raise him up to be, in a manner, a rival of his brother, and kindle ambitious desires in his bosom which could not fail to end in his disappointment, and perhaps destruction.(1)

The king, who would never have made such a devise in his better days, was more easily turned from his purpose now than he would once have been. "To whom then," he asked, "shall I leave the regency?" "To Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo," they replied. Ferdinand turned away his face, apparently in displeasure; but after a few moments' silence rejoined, "It is well; he is certainly a good man, with honest intentions. He has no importunate friends or family to provide for. He owes everything to Queen Isabella and myself; and, as he has always been true to the interests of our family, I believe he will always remain so."(2)

He, however, could not so readily abandon the idea of some splendid establishment for his favourite grandson; and he proposed to settle on him the grand-masterships of the military orders. But to this his attendants again objected, on the same grounds as before; adding, that this powerful patronage was too great for any subject, and imploring him not to defeat the object which the late queen had so much at heart, of incorporating it with the crown. "Ferdinand will be left very poor then," exclaimed the king, with tears in his eyes. "He will have the good-will of his brother," replied one of his honest counsellors, "the best legacy your highness can leave him."(3)

The testament, as finally arranged, settled the succession of Aragon and Naples on his daughter Joanna and her heirs. The administration of Castile during Charles's absence was intrusted to Ximenes; and that of Aragon to the king's natural son, the archbishop of Saragossa, whose good sense and popular manners made him acceptable to the people. He granted several places in the kingdom of Naples to the infante Ferdinand, with an annual stipend of fifty thousand ducats, chargeable on the public revenues. To his queen Germaine he left the yearly income of thirty thousand gold florins, stipulated by the marriage settlement, with five thousand a year more during widowhood.(4) The will contained, besides, several appropria-

(1) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 2.

(2) Ibid. ubi supra.

(3) Ibid. ubi supra.

(4) Ferdinand's gay widow did not long enjoy this latter pension. Soon after his death, she gave her hand to the marquis of Brandenburg; and he dying, she again married the prince of Calabria, who had been detained in a sort of honourable captivity in Spain ever since the dethronement of his father King

The king seemed desirous of closing his eyes to the danger of his situation as long as possible. He would not confess, nor even admit his confessor into his chamber.(1) He showed similar jealousy of his grandson's envoy, Adrian of Utrecht. This person, the preceptor of Charles, and afterwards raised, through his means, to the papacy, had come into Castile some weeks before, with the ostensible view of making some permanent arrangement with Ferdinand in regard to the regency. The real motive, as the powers which he brought with him subsequently proved, was, that he might be on the spot when the king died, and assume the reins of government. Ferdinand received the minister with cold civility; and an agreement was entered into, by which the regency was guaranteed to the monarch not only during Joanna's life, but his own. Concessions to a dying man cost nothing. Adrian, who was at Guadalupe at this time, no sooner heard of Ferdinand's illness, than he hastened to Madrigalejo. The king, however, suspected the motives of his visit. "He has come to see me die," said he; and, refusing to admit him into his presence, ordered the mortified envoy back again to Guadalupe.(2)

At length the medical attendants ventured to inform the king of his real situation, conjuring him, if he had any affairs of moment to settle, to do it without delay. He listened to them with composure, and from that moment seemed to recover all his customary fortitude and equanimity. After receiving the sacrament, and attending to his spiritual concerns, he called his attendants around his bed, to advise with them respecting the disposition of the government. Among those present, at this time, were his faithful followers, the duke of Alva, and the marquis of Denia, his major-domo, with several bishops and members of his council.(3)

The king, it seems, had made several wills. By one, executed at Burgos, in 1512, he had committed the government of Castile and Aragon to the infante Ferdinand, during his brother Charles's absence. This young prince had been educated in

(1) "A la verdad," says Carbajal, "le tentó mucho el enemigo en aquel paso con incredulidad que le ponía de no morir tan presto, para que ni confesase ni recibiese los Sacramentos." According to the same writer, Ferdinand was buoyed up by the prediction of an old sibyl, "la benta del Barco," that "he should not die till he had conquered Jerusalem."—(Anales, MS. cap. 2.) We are again reminded of Shakspeare:—

"It hath been prophesied to me many years,  
I should not die but in Jerusalem."—King Henry IV.

(2) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 1.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, ubi supra.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 565.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emper. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 35.

(3) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 2. Dr. Carbajal, who was a member of the royal council, was present with him during the whole of his last illness; and his circumstantial and spirited narrative of it forms an exception to the general character of his *itinerary*.

Spain under the eye of his grandfather, who entertained a strong affection for him. The counsellors remonstrated in the plainest terms against this disposition of the regency. Ferdinand, they said, was too young to take the helm into his own hands. His appointment would be sure to create new factions in Castile; it would raise him up to be, in a manner, a rival of his brother, and kindle ambitious desires in his bosom which could not fail to end in his disappointment, and perhaps destruction.(1)

The king, who would never have made such a devise in his better days, was more easily turned from his purpose now than he would once have been. "To whom then," he asked, "shall I leave the regency?" "To Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo," they replied. Ferdinand turned away his face, apparently in displeasure; but after a few moments' silence rejoined, "It is well; he is certainly a good man, with honest intentions. He has no importunate friends or family to provide for. He owes everything to Queen Isabella and myself; and, as he has always been true to the interests of our family, I believe he will always remain so."(2)

He, however, could not so readily abandon the idea of some splendid establishment for his favourite grandson; and he proposed to settle on him the grand-masterships of the military orders. But to this his attendants again objected, on the same grounds as before; adding, that this powerful patronage was too great for any subject, and imploring him not to defeat the object which the late queen had so much at heart, of incorporating it with the crown. "Ferdinand will be left very poor then," exclaimed the king, with tears in his eyes. "He will have the good-will of his brother," replied one of his honest counsellors, "the best legacy your highness can leave him."(3)

The testament, as finally arranged, settled the succession of Aragon and Naples on his daughter Joanna and her heirs. The administration of Castile during Charles's absence was intrusted to Ximenes; and that of Aragon to the king's natural son, the archbishop of Saragossa, whose good sense and popular manners made him acceptable to the people. He granted several places in the kingdom of Naples to the infante Ferdinand, with an annual stipend of fifty thousand ducats, chargeable on the public revenues. To his queen, Germaine he left the yearly income of thirty thousand gold florins, stipulated by the marriage settlement, with five thousand a year more during widowhood.(4) The will contained, besides, several appropri-

(1) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1516, cap. 2.

(2) *Ibid.* ubi supra.

(3) *Ibid.* ubi supra.

(4) Ferdinand's gay widow did not long enjoy this latter pension. Soon after his death, she gave her hand to the marquis of Brandenburg; and he dying, she again married the prince of Calabria, who had been detained in a sort of honourable captivity in Spain ever since the dethronement of his father King

tions for pious and charitable purposes, but nothing worthy of particular note.(1) Notwithstanding the simplicity of the various provisions of the testament, it was so long, from the formalities and periphrases with which it was encumbered, that there was scarce time to transcribe it in season for the royal signature. On the evening of the 22nd of January, 1516, he executed the instrument; and a few hours later, between one and two of the morning of the 23rd, Ferdinand breathed his last.(2) The scene of this event was a small house belonging to the friars of Guadalupe. "In so wretched a tenement," exclaims Martyr, in his usual moralizing vein, "did this lord of so many lands close his eyes upon the world."(3)

Ferdinand was nearly sixty-four years old, of which forty-one had elapsed since he first swayed the sceptre of Castile, and thirty-seven since he held that of Aragon. A long reign; long enough, indeed, to see most of those whom he had honoured and trusted of his subjects gathered to the dust, and a succession of contemporary monarchs come and disappear like shadows.(4) He died deeply lamented by his native subjects, who entertained a partiality natural towards their own hereditary sovereign. The event was regarded with very different feelings by the Castilian nobles, who calculated their gains on the transfer of the reins from such old and steady hands into those of a young and inexperienced master. The commons, however, who had felt the good effect of this curb on the nobility in their own personal security, held his memory in reverence as that of a national benefactor.(5)

Frederic.—(Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. lat. 1, quinc. 4, dial. 44.) It was the second sterile match, says Guicciardini, which Charles V., for obvious politic reasons, provided for the rightful heir of Naples.—*Istoria*, tom. viii. lib. 15, p. 10.

(1) Ferdinand's testament is to be found in Carbajal, *Anales*, MS.—Dornier, *Discursos Varios*, p. 393 et seq.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, ed. Valencia, tom. ix. Apend. No. 2.

(2) Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. lat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 9.—The queen was at Alcalá de Henares when she received tidings of her husband's illness. She posted with all possible despatch to Madrigalejo; but, although she reached it on the 20th, she was not admitted, says Gomez, notwithstanding her tears, to a private interview with the king till the testament was executed, a few hours only before his death.—*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 147.

(3) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1516.—L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 188.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 148. "Tot regnorum dominus, totque palmarum cumulis ornatus, Christiane religionis amplificator, et prostrator hostium, Rex in rusticana obiit casa, et pauper contra hominum opinionem obiit."—Péter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 566.—Brantôme (*Vies des Hommes Illustres*, p. 72), who speaks of Madrigalejo as a "meschant village," which he had seen.

(4) Since Ferdinand ascended the throne, he had seen no less than four kings of England, as many of France, and also of Naples, three of Portugal, two German emperors, and half a dozen popes. As to his own subjects, scarcely one of all those familiar to the reader in the course of our history now survived, except, indeed, the Nestor of his time, the octogenarian Ximenes.

(5) Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 100.—Blancas, *Commentarii*, p. 275.—Lanusa, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 25.

Ferdinand's remains were interred, agreeably to his orders, in Granada. A few of his most faithful adherents accompanied them; the greater part being deterred by a prudent caution of giving umbrage to Charles.(1) The funeral train, however, was swelled by contributions from the various towns through which it passed. At Cordova, especially, it is worthy of note, that the marquis of Priego, who had slender obligations to Ferdinand, came out with all his household to pay the last melancholy honours to his remains. They were received with similar respect in Granada, where the people, while they gazed on the sad spectacle, says Zurita, were naturally affected, as they called to mind the pomp and splendour of his triumphal entry on the first occupation of the Moorish capital.(2)

By his dying injunctions, all unnecessary ostentation was interdicted at his funeral. His body was laid by the side of Isabella's in the monastery of the Alhambra; and the year following,(3) when the royal chapel of the metropolitan church was completed, they were both transported thither. A magnificent mausoleum of white marble was erected over them by their grandson Charles the Fifth. It was executed in a style worthy of the age. The sides were adorned with figures of angels and saints, richly sculptured in bas-relief. On the top reposed the effigies of the illustrious pair, whose titles and merits were commemorated in the following brief and not very felicitous inscription:—

“*MAHOMETICÆ SECTÆ PROSTRATORES, ET HÆRETICÆ PERVICACIÆ EXTINGUENTES, FERNANDUS ARAGONUM, ET HELISABETA CASTELLÆ, VIR ET UXOR UNANIMES, CATHOLICI APPELLATI, MARMOREO CLAUDUNTUR HOC TUMULO.*”(4)

King Ferdinand's personal appearance has been elsewhere noticed. “He was of the middle size,” says a contemporary who

(1) Zurita, *Anales*, ubi supra. The honest Martyr was one of the few who paid this last tribute of respect to their ancient master. “Ego ut mortuo debitum prestem,” says he in a letter to Prince Charles's physician, “corpus ejus exanime, Granatam, sepulchro sedem destinatum, comitabor.”—*Opus Epist. epist.* 566.

(2) *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 100.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 572.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 24.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1516, cap. 5.

(3) *Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. llist. 21. According to Pedraza, this event did not take place till 1525.—*Antigüedad de Granada*, lib. 3, cap. 7.

(4) Pedraza, *Antigüedad de Granada*, lib. 3, cap. 7. “Assai bello per Spagna,” says Navagiero, who, as an Italian, had a right to be fastidious.—(*Viaggio*, fol. 23.) The artist, however, was not a Spaniard; at least common tradition assigns the work to Philip of Burgundy, an eminent sculptor of the period, who has left many specimens of his excellence in Toledo and other parts of Spain.—(*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. p. 577.) Laborde's magnificent work contains an engraving of the monuments of the Catholic sovereigns and Philip and Joanna: “qui rappellent la renaissance des arts en Italie, et sont, à la fois d'une belle exécution et d'une conception noble.”—Laborde, *Voyage Pittoresque*, tom. ii. p. 26.

knew him well. "His complexion was fresh; his eyes bright and animated; his nose and mouth small and finely formed, and his teeth white; his forehead lofty and serene; with flowing hair of a bright chestnut colour. His manners were courteous, and his countenance seldom clouded by anything like spleen or melancholy. He was grave in speech and action, and had a marvellous dignity of presence. His whole demeanour, in fine, was truly that of a great king." For this flattering portrait Ferdinand must have sat at an earlier and happier period of his life.(1)

His education, owing to the troubled state of the times, had been neglected in his boyhood, though he was early instructed in all the generous pastimes and exercises of chivalry.(2) He was esteemed one of the most perfect horsemen of his court. He led an active life, and the only kind of reading he appeared to relish was history. It was natural that so busy an actor on the great political theatre should have found peculiar interest and instruction in this study.(3)

He was naturally of an equable temper, and inclined to moderation in all things. The only amusement for which he cared much was hunting, especially falconry, and that he never carried to excess till his last years.(4) He was indefatigable in application to business. He had no relish for the pleasures of the table, and, like Isabella, was temperate even to abstemiousness in his diet.(5) He was frugal in his domestic and personal expenditure; partly, no doubt, from a willingness to rebuke the opposite spirit of wastefulness and ostentation in his nobles. He lost no good opportunity of doing this. On one occasion, it is said, he turned to a gallant of the court, noted for his extravagance in dress, and, laying his hand on his own doublet, exclaimed, "Excellent stuff this; it has lasted me three pair of sleeves!"(6) This spirit of economy was carried so far as to bring on him the reproach of parsimony.(7) And parsimony,

(1) L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 182. Pulgar's portrait of the king, taken also in the morning of his life, the close of which the writer did not live to see, is equally bright and pleasing. "Había," says he, "una gracia singular, que qualquier con él fablese, luego le amaba e le deseaba servir, porque tenía la comunicación amigable."—*Reyes Católicos*, p. 36.

(2) "He tilted lightly," says Pulgar, "and with a dexterity not surpassed by any man in the kingdom."—*Reyes Católicos*, p. 36.

(3) L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 153.—Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 24.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 37.

(4) Pulgar, indeed, notices his fondness for chess, tennis, and other games of skill in early life.—*Reyes Católicos*, part 2, cap. 3.

(5) L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 182.—Pulgar, *Reyes Católicos*, part 2, cap. 3. "Stop and dine with us," he was known to say to his uncle, the grand admiral Henriquez, "we are to have a fowl for dinner to-day."—(Sempere, *Hist. del Luxo*, tom. ii. p. 2, nota.) The royal *cuisine* would have afforded small scope for the talents of a Vatel or an Ude.

(6) Sempere, *Hist. del Luxo*, ubi supra.

(7) Machiavelli, by a single *coup de pinceau*, thus characterises, or caricatures, the princes of his time: "Un imperatore instabile e vario; un re di Francia sdegnoso e pauroso; un re d'Inghilterra ricco, feroce, e cupido di gloria;



though not so pernicious, on the whole, as the opposite vice of prodigality, has always found far less favour with the multitude, from the appearance of disinterestedness which the latter carries with it. Prodigality in a king, however, who draws not on his own resources, but on the public, forfeits even this equivocal claim to applause. But, in truth, Ferdinand was rather frugal than parsimonious. His income was moderate; his enterprises numerous and vast. It was impossible that he could meet them without husbanding his resources with the most careful economy.(1) No one has accused him of attempting to enrich his exchequer by the venal sale of office, like Louis the Twelfth, or by griping extortion, like another royal contemporary, Henry the Seventh. He amassed no treasure,(2) and indeed died so poor, that he left scarcely enough in his coffers to defray the charge of his funeral.(3)

Ferdinand was devout; at least he was scrupulous in regard to the exterior of religion. He was punctual in attendance on mass; careful to observe all the ordinances and ceremonies of his church; and left many tokens of his piety, after the fashion of the time, in sumptuous edifices and endowments for religious purposes. Although not a superstitious man for the age, he is certainly obnoxious to the reproach of bigotry; for he co-operated with Isabella in all her exceptionable measures in

*un re di Spagna tucagno e avaro; per gli altri re, io no li conosco.*—Cicero, with his usual practical good sense, does not disdain to enumerate frugality in his catalogue of royal virtues: “*Omnes sunt in illo regie virtutes; sed præcipue singularis et admiranda frugalitas; etsi hoc verbo scio laudari reges non solvere.*”—Oratio pro Rege Defotaro.

(1) The revenues of his own kingdom of Aragon were very limited. His principal foreign expeditions were undertaken solely on account of that crown; and this, notwithstanding the aid from Castile, may explain, and in some degree excuse, his very scanty remittances to his troops.

(2) On one occasion, having obtained a liberal supply from the states of Aragon (a rare occurrence), his counsellors advised him to lock it up against a day of need. “*Mas el Rey,*” says Zurita, “*que siempre supogastar su dinero provechosamente, y nunca fue escasso en despendello en las cosas del estado, tuvo mas aparejo para emplearlo, que para encerrarlo.*”—(Anales, tom. vi. fol. 225.) The historian, it must be allowed, lays quite as much emphasis on his liberality as it will bear.

(3) *Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 24.*—Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 100.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 566. “*Vix ad funeris pompam et paucis familiaribus præbendis vestes pullatas, pecunie apud eum, neque alibi congestæ, repertæ sunt; quod nemo unquam de vivente judicavit.*”—(Peter Martyr, *ubi supra.*) Guicciardini alludes to the same fact as evidence of the injustice of the imputations on Ferdinand: “*Ma accade,*” adds the historian, truly enough, “*quasi sempre per il giudizio corrotto degli uomini, che nei Re è più lodata la prodigalità, benchè a quella sia annessa la rapacità, che la parsinomia congiunta cou l’astinenza dalla roba di altri.*”—(Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 12, p. 273.) The state of Ferdinand’s coffers formed, indeed, a strong contrast to that of his brother monarch’s, Henry VII., “*whose treasure of store,*” to borrow the words of Bacon, “*left at his death, under his own key and keeping, amounted unto the sum of eighteen hundred thousand pounds sterling; a huge mass of money, even for those times.*”—(Hist. of Henry VII. Works, vol. v. p. 183.) Sir Edward Coke swells this huge mass to “*fifty and three hundred thousand pounds!*”—*Institutes*, part 4, chap. 35.

Castile, and spared no effort to fasten the odious yoke of the Inquisition on Aragon, and subsequently, though happily with less success, on Naples.(1)

Ferdinand has incurred the more serious charge of hypocrisy. His Catholic zeal was observed to be marvellously efficacious in furthering his temporal interests.(2) His most objectionable enterprises, even, were covered with the veil of religion. In this, however, he did not materially differ from the practice of the age. Some of the most scandalous wars of that period were ostensibly at the bidding of the church, or in defence of Christendom against the infidel. This ostentation of a religious motive was indeed very usual with the Spanish and Portuguese. The enraging spirit nourished by their struggle with the Moors, and subsequently by their African and American expeditions, gave such a religious tone habitually to their feelings, as shed an illusion over their actions and enterprises, frequently disguising their true character even from themselves.

It will not be so easy to acquit Ferdinand of the reproach of perfidy which foreign writers have so deeply branded on his name,(3) and which those of his own nation have sought rather to palliate than to deny.(4) It is but fair to him, however, even

(1) Abaren, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 24.—L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 182.—Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 9, cap. 26. Ferdinand's conduct in regard to the Inquisition in Aragon displayed singular duplicity. In consequence of the remonstrance of cortes, in 1512, in which that high-spirited body set forth the various usurpations of the Holy Office, Ferdinand signed a compact, abridging its jurisdiction. He repented of these concessions, however, and in the following year obtained a dispensation from Rome from his engagements. This proceeding produced such an alarming excitement in the kingdom, that the monarch found it expedient to renounce the papal brief, and apply for another, confirming his former compact.—(Florente, *Hist. de l'Inquisition*, tom. i. pp. 371 et seq.) One may well doubt whether bigotry entered as largely, as less pardonable motives of state policy, into this miserable juggling.

(2) "Disoit-on," says Brantôme, "que la reyne Isabelle de Castille estoit une fort devote et religieuse princesse; et que luy, quel grand zelo qu'il y eust, n'estoit devotieux que par ypoecrisie, couvrant ses actes et ambitions par ce saint zelo de religion."—(Œuvres, tom. i. p. 70.) "Copri," says Guicciardini, "quasi tutto lo sue cupidità sotto colore di onesto zelo della religione e di santa intenzione al bene comune."—(Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 12, p. 274.) The penetrating eye of Machiavelli glances at the same trait.—*Il Principe*, cap. 21.

(3) Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 12, p. 273.—Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xvii. p. 272.—Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 11, p. 160; lib. 16, p. 336.—Machiavelli, *Opere*, tom. ix. Lett. Diverse, No. 6, ed. Milano, 1805.—Herbert, *Life of Henry VIII.* p. 63.—Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xvi. cap. 112.—Voltaire sums up Ferdinand's character in the following pithy sentence: "On l'appelloit en Espagne *le sage, le prudent*; en Italie *le pieux*; en France et à Londres *le perfide*."—*Essai sur les Mœurs*, chap. 114.

(4) "Home era de verdad," says Pulgar, "como quiera que las necesidades grandes en que le pusieron las guerras, le facian algunas veces variar."—(Reyes Católicos, part 2, cap. 8.) Zurita exposes and condemns this blemish in his hero's character with a candour which does him credit: "Fue muy notado, no solo de los estrangeros, pero de sus naturales, que no guardava

here, to take a glance at the age. He came forward when government was in a state of transition from the feudal forms to those which it has assumed in modern times, when the superior strength of the great vassals was circumvented by the superior policy of the reigning princes. It was the dawn of the triumph of intellect over the brute force which had hitherto controlled the movements of nations, as of individuals. The same policy which these monarchs had pursued in their own domestic relations they introduced into those with foreign states, when, at the close of the fifteenth century, the barriers that had so long kept them asunder were broken down. Italy was the first field on which the great powers were brought into anything like a general collision. It was the country, too, in which this crafty policy had been first studied, and reduced to a regular system. A single extract from the political manual of that age (1) may serve as a key to the whole science, as then understood. "A prudent prince," says Machiavelli, "will not, and ought not, to observe his engagements when it would operate to his disadvantage, and the causes no longer exist which induced him to make them." (2) Sufficient evidence of the practical application of the maxim may be found in the manifold treaties of the period, so contradictory, or, what is to the same purpose for our present argument, so confirmatory of one another in their tenor, as clearly to show the impotence of all engagements. There were no less than four several treaties in the course of three years, solemnly stipulating the marriage of the archduke Charles and Claude of France. Louis the Twelfth violated his engagements, and the marriage after all never took place. (3)

Such was the school in which Ferdinand was to make trial of his skill with his brother monarchs. He had an able instructor in his father, John the Second of Aragon, and the result showed that the lessons were not lost on him. "He was vigilant, wary, and subtle," writes a French contemporary; "and few histories make mention of his being outwitted in the whole course of his life." (4) He played the game with more adroitness than his opponents, and he won it. Success,

la verdad, y fe que prometia; y que se anteponia siempre, y sobrepajava el respeto de su propia utilidad, a lo que era justo y honesto."—Amades, tom. vi. fol. 406.

(1) Charles V. in particular testified his respect for Machiavelli, by having the "*Principe*" translated for his own use.

(2) Machiavelli, *Opere*, tom. vi.—11 *Principe*, cap. 18, ed. Genova, 1798.

(3) Dumout, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part 1, Nos. 7, 11, 28, 29.—Seyssel, *Hist. de Louys XII.* pp. 228—230.—St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.* p. 184.

(4) *Mémoires de Bayard*, chap. 61. "This prince," says Lord Herbert, who was not disposed to overrate the talents, any more than the virtues of Ferdinand, "was thought the most active and politique of his time. No man knew better how to serve his turn on everybody, or to make their ends conduce to his."—*Life of Henry VIII.* p. 63.

as usual, brought on him the reproaches of the losers. This is particularly true of the French, whose master, Louis the Twelfth, was more directly pitted against him.(1) Yet Ferdinand does not appear to be a whit more obnoxious to the charge of unfairness than his opponent.(2) If he deserted his allies when it suited his convenience, he, at least, did not deliberately plot their destruction, and betray them into the hands of their deadly enemy, as his rival did with Venice, in the league of Cambray.(3) The partition of Naples, the most scandalous transaction of the period, he shared equally with Louis; and if the latter has escaped the reproach of the usurpation of Navarre, it was because the premature death of his general deprived him of the pretext and means for achieving it. Yet Louis the Twelfth, the "father of his people," has gone down to posterity with a high and honourable reputation.(4)

Ferdinand, unfortunately for his popularity, had nothing of the frank and cordial temper, the genial expansion of the soul, which begets love. He carried the same cautious and impenetrable frigidity into private life that he showed in public. "No one," says a writer of the time, "could read his thoughts by any change of his countenance." (5) Calm and calculating, even in trifles, it was too obvious that everything had exclusive reference to self. He seemed to estimate his friends only by the amount of services they could render him. He was not always mindful of these services. Witness his ungenerous

(1) According to them, the Catholic king took no great pains to conceal his treachery. "Quelqu'un disant un jour à Ferdinand, que Louis XII. Paressoit de l'avoir trompé trois fois, Ferdinand parut mécontent qu'il lui ravit une partie de sa gloire; *Il en a bien menti, Pieroque*, dit-il, avec toute la grossièreté du temps, *je l'ai trompé plus de dix*."—(Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 240.) The anecdote has been repeated by other modern writers, I know not on what authority. Ferdinand was too shrewd a politician to hazard his game by playing the braggart.

(2) Paolo Giovio strikes the balance of their respective merits in this particular, in the following terms:—"Ex horum enim longè maximorum nostre tempestatis regum ingenis, et tam liquidè et nullam autem præclarè compertum est, nihil omnino sanctum et inviolabile, vel in ritè conceptis sanctisque fœderibus reperi, quòd, in profereendis imperiis augendisque opibus, apud eos nihil ad illustris fame decus interesset, dolone et nusquam sine fallaciis, an fide integrâ verâque virtute niterentur."—Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 11, p. 160.

(3) An equally pertinent example occurs in the efficient support he gave Cæsar Borgia in his flagitious enterprises against some of the most faithful allies of France. See Sismondi, Républiques Italiennes, tom. xiii. cap. 101.

(4) Read the honeyed panegyrics of Seyssel, St. Gelais, Voltaire even, to say nothing of Gaillard, Varillas, *e tutti quanti*, undiluted by scarce a drop of censure. Rare indeed is it to find one so imbued with the spirit of philosophy as to raise himself above the local or national prejudices which pass for patriotism with the vulgar. Sismondi is the only writer in the French language, that has come under my notice, who has weighed the deserts of Louis XII. in the historic balance with impartiality and candour. And Sismondi is not a Frenchman.

(5) Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 16, p. 335.

treatment of Columbus, the Great Captain, Navarro, Ximenes, —the men who shed the brightest lustre and the most substantial benefits on his reign. Witness, also, the insensibility to the virtues and long attachment of Isabella, whose memory he could so soon dishonour by a union with one every way unworthy to be her successor.

Ferdinand's connection with Isabella, while it reflected infinite glory on his reign, suggests a contrast most unfavourable to his character. Hers was all magnanimity, disinterestedness, and deep devotion to the interests of her people. His was the spirit of egotism. The circle of his views might be more or less expanded, but self was the steady unchangeable centre. Her heart beat with the generous sympathies of friendship, and the purest constancy to the first, the only object of her love. We have seen the measure of his sensibilities in other relations. They were not more refined in this; and he proved himself unworthy of the admirable woman with whom his destinies were united, by indulging in those vicious gallantries too generally sanctioned by the age.<sup>(1)</sup> Ferdinand, in fine, a shrewd and politic prince, "surpassing," as a French writer, not his friend, has remarked, "all the statesmen of his time in the science of the cabinet,"<sup>(2)</sup> may be taken as the representative of the peculiar genius of the age. While Isabella, discarding all the petty artifices of state policy, and pursuing the noblest ends by the noblest means, stands far above her age.

In his illustrious consort Ferdinand may be said to have lost his good genius.<sup>(3)</sup> From that time his fortunes were under

(1) Ferdinand left four natural children, one son and three daughters. The former, Don Alonso de Aragon, was born of the viscountess of Eboli, a Catalan lady. He was made archbishop of Saragossa when only six years old. There was little of the religious profession, however, in his life. He took an active part in the political and military movements of the period, and seems to have been even less scrupulous in his gallantries than his father. His manners in private life were attractive, and his public conduct discreet. His father always regarded him with peculiar affection, and intrusted him with the regency of Aragon, as we have seen, at his death. Ferdinand had three daughters also, by three different ladies, one of them a noble Portuguese. The eldest child was named Doña Juana, and married the grand constable of Castile. The others, each named Maria, embraced the religious profession in a convent in Madrigal.—L. Marineo, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 188.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Monarquía*, tom. i. p. 410.

(2) "Enfin il surpassa tous les Princes de son siècle en la science du Cabinet, et c'est à lui qu'on doit attribuer le premier et le souverain usage de la politique moderne."—Varillas, *Politique de Ferdinand*, liv. 3, disc. 10.

(3) Brantôme notices a *sobriquet* which his countrymen had given to Ferdinand. "Nos François appelloient ce roy Ferdinand Jehan Gipon, je ne scay pour quelle dérision; mais il nous eust bon, et nous fist bien du mal, et fut un grand roy et sage." Which his ancient editor thus explains: "Gipon de l'italien *giubone*, c'est que nous appellons *jupon* et *jupe*; voulant par là taxer ce prince de s'être laissé gouverner par Isabelle, reine de Castille, sa femme, dont il endossoit la *jupe*, pour ainsi dire, pendant qu'elle portoit les *chausses*."—(Vies des Hommes Illustres, disc. 5). There is more humour than truth in the etymology. The *gipon* was part of a man's attire, being, as Mr. Tyrwhitt defines it, "a short cassock," and was worn under the

a cloud. Not that victory sat less constantly on his banner; but at home he had lost

"All that should accompany old age,  
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends."

His ill-advised marriage disgusted his Castilian subjects. He ruled over them, indeed, but more in severity than in love. The beauty of his young queen opened new sources of jealousy; (1) while the disparity of their ages, and her fondness for frivolous pleasure, as little qualified her to be his partner in prosperity as his solace in declining years. (2) His tenacity of power drew him into vulgar squabbles with those most nearly allied to him by blood, which settled into a mortal aversion. Finally, bodily infirmity broke the energies of his mind, sour suspicions corroded his heart, and he had the misfortune to live long after he had lost all that could make life desirable.

Let us turn from this gloomy picture to the brighter season of the morning and meridian of his life, when he sat with Isabella on the united thrones of Castile and Aragon, strong in the love of his own subjects, and in the fear and respect of his enemies. We shall then find much in his character to admire; his impartial justice in the administration of the laws; his watchful solicitude to shield the weak from the oppression of the strong; his wise economy, which achieved great results, without burdening his people with oppressive taxes; his sobriety and moderation; the decorum and respect for religion which he maintained among his subjects; the industry he promoted by wholesome laws and his own example; his consummate sagacity, which crowned all his enterprises with brilliant success, and made him the oracle of the princes of the age.

armour. Thus Chaucer, in the Prologue to his "Canterbury Tales," says of his knight's dress,

"Of fustian he wored a gipon,  
Alle besmotred with his habergeon."

Again, in his "Knight's Tale,"

"Some wol ben armed in an habergeon,  
And in a brest-plate, and in a gipon."

(1) When Ferdinand visited Aragon, in 1515, during his troubles with the cortes, he imprisoned the vice-chancellor, Antonio Agustín; being moved to this, according to Carbajal, by his jealousy of that minister's attention to his young queen.—(Anales, MS. año 1515.) It is possible. Zurita, however, treats it as mere scandal, referring the imprisonment to political offences exclusively.—Anales, tom. vi. fol. 393.—See also Dormer, Anales de la Corona de Aragon (Zaragoza, 1697), lib 1, cap. 9.

(2) "Era poco hermosa," says Sandoval, who grudges her even this quality, "algo coja, amiga mucho de holgarse, y andar en banquetes, huertos y jardines, y en fiestas. Introduxo esta Señora en Castilla comidas soberbias, siendo los Castellanos, y aun sus Reyes muy moderados en esto. Pasabansse pocos dias que no convidase, ó fuese convidada. La que mas gastaba en fiestas y banquetes con ella, era mas su amiga."—Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 12.

Machiavelli, indeed, the most deeply read of his time in human character, imputes Ferdinand's successes, in one of his letters, to " cunning and good luck, rather than superior wisdom." (1) He was, indeed, fortunate; and the "star of Austria," which rose as his declined, shone not with a brighter or steadier lustre. But success through a long series of years sufficiently, of itself, attests good conduct. "The winds and waves," says Gibbon, truly enough, "are always on the side of the most skilful mariner." The Florentine statesman has recorded a ripen and more deliberate judgment in the treatise which he intended as a mirror for the rulers of the time. "Nothing," says he, "gains estimation for a prince like great enterprises. Our own age has furnished a splendid example of this in Ferdinand of Aragon. We may call him a new king, since, from a feeble one, he has made himself the most renowned and glorious monarch of Christendom; and, if we ponder well his manifold achievements, we must acknowledge all of them very great, and some truly extraordinary." (2)

Other eminent foreigners of the time join in this lofty strain of panegyric. (3) The Castilians, mindful of the general security and prosperity they had enjoyed under his reign, seem willing to bury his frailties in his grave. (4) While his own hereditary subjects, exulting with patriotic pride in the glory to which he had raised their petty state, and touched with grateful recollections of his mild paternal government, deplore his loss in strains

(1) Opere, tom. ix. Lettere Diverse, No. 6, ed. Milano, 1805. His correspondent, Vettori, is still more severe in his analysis of Ferdinand's public conduct. (Let. di 16 Maggio, 1514.) These statesmen were the friends of France, with whom Ferdinand was at war, and personal enemies of the Medici, whom that prince re-established in the government. As political antagonists, therefore, every way, of the Catholic king, they were not likely to be altogether unbiassed in their judgments of his policy.—These views, however, find favour with Lord Herbert, who had evidently read, though he does not refer to this correspondence.—Life of Henry VIII. p. 63.

(2) Opere, tom. vi.—Il Principe, cap. 21, ed. Genova, 1798.

(3) Martyr, who had better opportunities than any other foreigner for estimating the character of Ferdinand, affords the most honourable testimony to his kingly qualities, in a letter written when the writer had no motive for flattery, after that monarch's death, to Charles V.'s physician.—(Opus Epist. epist. 507.) Guicciardini, whose national prejudices did not lie in this scale, comprehends nearly as much in one brief sentence "Re di eccellentissimo consiglio, e virtù, e nel quale, se fosse stato costante nelle promesse, no potresti facilmente riprendere cosa alcuna."—(Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 12, p. 273.)—See also Brantôme (Œuvres, tom. iv. disc. 5).—Giovio, with scarcely more qualification, Hist. sui Temporis, lib. 16, p. 336.—Navagiero Viaggio, fol. 27.—et alios.

(4) "Principe el mas señalado," says the prince of the Castilian historians, in his pithy manner, "en valor y justicia y prudencia que en muchos siglos España tuvo. Tachas á nadie pueden saltar sea por la fragilidad propia, ó por la malicia y envidia agena que combate principal mente los altos lugares. Espejo sin duda por sus grandes virtudes en que todos los Príncipes de España se deben mirar."—(Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ix. p. 375, cap. ult.) See also a similar tribute to his deserts, with greater amplification, in Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 20, cap. 24.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 148.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V. fol. 42.—Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. ix. pp. 426, et seq.—et plurimis auct. antiq. et recentibus.

of national sorrow, as the last of the revered line, who was to preside over the destinies of Aragon as a separate and independent kingdom. (1)

## CHAPTER XXV.

### ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, AND CHARACTER OF CARDINAL XIMENES.

1516, 1517.

Ximenes Governor of Castile—Charles proclaimed King—Ximenes's Domestic Policy—He intimidates the Nobles—Public Discontents—Charles, land in Spain—His Ingratitude to Ximenes—The Cardinal's Illness and Death—His extraordinary Character.

THE personal history of Ferdinand the Catholic terminates, of course, with the preceding chapter. In order to bring the history of his reign, however, to a suitable close, it is necessary to continue the narrative through the brief regency of Ximenes, to the period when the government was delivered into the hands of Ferdinand's grandson and successor, Charles the Fifth.

By the testament of the deceased monarch, as we have seen, Cardinal Ximenez de Cisneros was appointed sole regent of Castile. He met with opposition, however, from Adrian, the dean of Louvain, who produced powers of similar purport from Prince Charles. Neither party could boast a sufficient warrant.

(1) See the closing chapter of the great Aragonese annalist, who terminates his historic labours with the death of Ferdinand the Catholic.—(Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 100.) I will cite only one extract from the profuse panegyrics of the national writers, which attests the veneration in which Ferdinand's memory was held in Aragon. It is from one whose pen is never prostituted to parasitical or party purposes, and whose judgment is usually as correct as the expression of it is candid: "Quo plangore ac lamentatione universa civitas complebatur. Neque solum homines, sed ipsa tecta, et parietes urbis videbantur acerbum illius, qui omnibus clarissimus erat, interitum lugere. Et meritò. Erat enim, ut scitis, exemplum prudentiæ ac fortitudinis: summus in re domesticâ continentia: eximius in publicâ dignitatis: humanitatis prætereâ ac leporis admirabilis. . . . Neque eos solum, sed omnes certè tantâ amplectebatur benevolentia, ut interdum non nobis Rex, sed uniuscujusque nostrum genitor ac parens videretur. Post ejus interitum omnis nostra juvenitûs languet, delictis plus dedita quam deceret: nec perinde, ac debuerat, in laudis et gloriæ cupiditate versatur. . . . Quid plura? nulla res fuit in usu bene regnandi posita, quæ illius Regis scientiam effugeret. . . . Fuit enim extingui corporis venustate præditus. Sed pluri facere debuerent consiliorum ac virtutum suarum, quam posteris reliquit, effigiem: quibus denique factum videmus, ut ab eo usque ad hoc tempus, non solum nobis, sed Hispaniæ cunctæ, diuturnitas pacis otium confirmaret. Hæc aliquæ ejusmodi quotidie à nostris senibus de Catholici Regis memoriâ enarrantur: quæ à rei veritate nequaquam abhorrent."—Blancas, *Commentarii*, p. 276.



for exercising this important trust; the one claiming it by the appointment of an individual, who, acting merely as regent himself, had certainly no right to name his successor; while the other had only the sanction of a prince, who, at the time of giving it, had no jurisdiction whatever in Castile. The misunderstanding which ensued was finally settled by an agreement of the parties to share the authority in common, till further instructions should be received from Charles.(1)

It was not long before they arrived (Feb. 14th, 1516). They confirmed the cardinal's authority in the fullest manner, while they spoke of Adrian only as an ambassador. They intimated, however, the most entire confidence in the latter; and the two prelates continued, as before, to administer the government jointly. Ximenes sacrificed nothing by this arrangement; for the tame and quiet temper of Adrian was too much overawed by the bold genius of his partner to raise any opposition to his measures.(2)

The first requisition of Prince Charles was one that taxed severely the power and popularity of the new regent. This was to have himself proclaimed king; a measure extremely distasteful to the Castilians, who regarded it not only as contrary to established usage, during the lifetime of his mother, but as an indignity to her. It was in vain that Ximenes and the council remonstrated on the impropriety and impolicy of the measure.(3) Charles, fortified by his Flemish advisers, sturdily persisted in his purpose. The cardinal, consequently, called a meeting of the prelates and principal nobles of Madrid, to which he had transferred the seat of government, and whose central position and other local advantages made it, from this time forward, with little variation, the regular capital of the kingdom.(4) The doctor Carbajal prepared a studied and plausible argument in support of the measure.(5) As it failed, however, to produce conviction in his audience, Ximenes, chafed by the opposition, and probably distrusting its real motives, peremptorily declared that those who refused to acknowledge

(1) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 8.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 18.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 150.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 4, cap. 5.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS. dial. de Ximeni.

(2) Carbajal has given us Charles's epistle, which is subscribed "El Principe." He did not venture on the title of king in his correspondence with the Castilians, though he affected it abroad.—Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 10.

(3) The letter of the council is dated March 14th, 1516. It is recorded by Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 10.

(4) It became permanently so in the following reign of Philip II.—Seniario Erudito, tom. iii. p. 79.

(5) Carbajal penetrates into the remotest depths of Spanish history for an authority for Charles's claim. He can find none better, however, than the examples of Alfonso VIII. and Ferdinand III.; the former of whom used force, and the latter obtained the crown by the voluntary cession of his mother. His argument, it is clear, rests much stronger on expediency than precedent.—Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 11.

Charles as king, in the present state of things, would refuse to obey him when he was so. "I will have him proclaimed in Madrid to-morrow," said he, "and I doubt not every other city in the kingdom will follow the example." He was as good as his word; and the conduct of the capital was imitated, with little opposition, by all the other cities in Castile. Not so in Aragon, whose people were too much attached to their institutions to consent to it, till Charles first made oath in person to respect the laws and liberties of the realm.(1)

The Castilian aristocracy, it may be believed, did not much relish the new yoke imposed on them by their priestly regent. On one occasion, it is said, they went in a body and demanded of Ximenes by what powers he held the government so absolutely. He referred them for answer to Ferdinand's testament and Charles's letter. As they objected to these, he led them to a window of the apartment and showed them a park of artillery below, exclaiming at the same time, "There are my credentials then!" The story is characteristic; but, though often repeated, must be admitted to stand on slender authority.(2)

One of the regent's first acts was the famous ordinance, encouraging the burgesses, by liberal rewards, to enrol themselves into companies, and submit to regular military training at stated seasons. The nobles saw the operation of this measure too well not to use all their efforts to counteract it. In this they succeeded for a time, as the cardinal, with his usual boldness, had ventured on it without waiting for Charles's sanction, and in opposition to most of the council. The resolute spirit of the minister, however, eventually triumphed over all resistance; and a national corps was organised, competent, under proper guidance, to protect the liberties of the people, but which, unfortunately, was ultimately destined to be turned against them.(3)

Armed with this strong physical force, the cardinal now projected the boldest schemes of reform, especially in the finances,

(1) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 151 et seq.—Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1516, cap. 9—11.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 2, cap. 2.—Dorner, *Anales de Aragon*, lib. 1, cap. 1, 13.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist. epist.* 572, 590, 603.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 53.

(2) Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 18.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 158.—Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 2, cap. 4. Alvaro Gomez finds no better authority than vulgar rumour for this story. According to Robles, the cardinal, after this bravado, twirled his cordelier's belt about his fingers, saying, "he wanted nothing better than this to tame the pride of the Castilian nobles with!" But Ximenes was neither a fool nor a madman, although his over-zealous biographers make him sometimes one and sometimes the other. Voltaire, who never lets the opportunity slip of seizing a paradox in character or conduct, speaks of Ximenes as one "qui, toujours vêtu en cordelier, met son faste à fouler sous ses sandales le faste Espagnol."—*Essai sur les Mœurs*, chap. 121.

(3) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1516, cap. 13.—Quintanilla, *Archetipo*, lib. 4, cap. 5.—Sempere, *Hist. des Cortès*, chap. 25.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 159.—Oviedo, *Quincuagena*, MS.

which had fallen into some disorder in the latter days of Ferdinand. He made a strict inquisition into the funds of the military orders, in which there had been much waste and misappropriation; he suppressed all superfluous offices in the state; retrenched excessive salaries, and cut short the pensions granted by Ferdinand and Isabella, which he contended should determine with their lives. Unfortunately, the state was not materially benefited by these economical arrangements, since the greater part of what was thus saved was drawn off to supply the waste and avarice of the Flemish court, who dealt with Spain with all the merciless rapacity that could be shown to a conquered province.(1)

The foreign administration of the regent displayed the same courage and vigour. Arsenals were established in the southern maritime towns, and a numerous fleet was equipped in the Mediterranean against the Barbary corsairs. A large force was sent into Navarre, which defeated an invading army of French (March 25, 1516); and the cardinal followed up the blow by demolishing the principal fortresses of the kingdom; a precautionary measure, to which, in all probability, Spain owes the permanent preservation of her conquest.(2)

The regent's eye penetrated to the farthest limits of the monarchy. He sent a commission to Hispaniola, to inquire into, and ameliorate, the condition of the natives. At the same time he earnestly opposed (though without success, being overruled in this by the Flemish counsellors) the introduction of negro slaves into the colonies, which, he predicted, from the character of the race, must ultimately result in a servile war. It is needless to remark how well the event has verified the prediction.(3)

It is with less satisfaction that we must contemplate his policy in regard to the Inquisition. As head of that tribunal, he enforced its authority and pretensions to the utmost. He extended a branch of it to Oran, and also to the Canaries, and the New World.(4) In 1512, the *new Christians* had offered Ferdinand a large sum of money to carry on the Navarrese war, if he would cause the trials before the tribunal to be conducted in the same manner as in other courts, where the accuser and

(1) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 174 et seq.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 12.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 13.

(2) Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1516, cap. 11.—Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. p. 327.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 570.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 4, cap. 5.

(3) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 164, 165.—Herrera, Indias Occidentales, tom. i. p. 278.—Las Casas, Œuvres, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 239. Robertson states the ground of Ximenez's objection to have been the iniquity of reducing one set of men to slavery in order to liberate another.—(History of America, vol. i. p. 285.) A very enlightened reason, for which, however, I find not the least warrant in Herrera (the authority cited by the historian), nor in Gomez, nor in any other writer.

(4) Llorente, Hist. de l'Inquisition, tom. i. chap. 10, art. 5.

the evidence were confronted openly with the defendants. To this reasonable petition Ximenes objected, on the wretched plea, that, in that event, none would be found willing to undertake the odious business of informer. He backed his remonstrance with such a liberal donative from his own funds as supplied the king's immediate exigency, and effectually closed his heart against the petitioners. The application was renewed in 1516 by the unfortunate Israelites, who offered a liberal supply in like manner to Charles, on similar terms; but the proposal, to which his Flemish counsellors, who may be excused at least from the reproach of bigotry, would have inclined the young monarch, was finally rejected through the interposition of Ximenes.(1)

The high-handed measures of the minister (1517), while they disgusted the aristocracy, gave great umbrage to the dean of Louvain, who saw himself reduced to a mere cipher in the administration. In consequence of his representation, a second, and afterwards a third minister, was sent to Castile, with authority to divide the government with the cardinal. But all this was of little avail. On one occasion, the co-regents ventured to rebuke their haughty partner, and assert their own dignity by subscribing their names first to the despatches, and then sending them to him for his signature. But Ximenes coolly ordered his secretary to tear the paper in pieces, and make out a new one, which he signed, and sent out without the participation of his brethren. And this course he continued during the remainder of his administration.(2)

The cardinal not only assumed the sole responsibility of the most important public acts, but, in the execution of them, seldom condescended to calculate the obstacles or the odds arrayed against him. He was thus brought into collision, at the same time, with three of the most powerful grandees of Castile; the dukes of Alva and Infantado, and the count of Urcña. Don Pedro Giron, the son of the latter, with several other young noblemen, had maltreated and resisted the royal officers while in the discharge of their duty. They then took refuge in the little town of Villafraña, which they fortified and prepared for a defence. The cardinal without hesitation mustered several thousand of the national militia, and, investing

(1) Paramo, De Origine Inquisitionis, lib. 2, tit. 2, cap. 5.—Llorente, Hist. de l'Inquisition, tom. i. chap. 11, art. 1.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 184, 185.

(2) Carbalal, Anales, MS. año 1517, cap. 2.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 189, 190.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 18.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 581.—Ovicio, Quincuagenas, MS.—“Ni propteraveritis,” says Martyr, in a letter to Marliano, Prince Charles's physician, “ruent omnia. Nescit Hispania parere non regibus, aut non legitime regnantibus. Nauseam inducit magnanimitas viris hujus fratris, licet potentis et reipublicæ amatoris, gubernatio. Est quippe grandis animo, et ipse, ad ædificandum literatosque viros fovendum natus magis quam ad imperandum, bellicis colloquiis et apparatusibus gaudet.”—Opus Epist. epist. 573.

the place, set it on fire, and deliberately razed it to the ground. The refractory nobles, struck with consternation, submitted. Their friends interceded for them in the most humble manner; and the cardinal, whose lofty spirit disdained to trample on a fallen foe, showed his usual clemency by soliciting their pardon from the king.(1)

But neither the talents nor authority of Ximenes, it was evident, could much longer maintain subordination among the people, exasperated by the shameless extortions of the Flemings, and the little interest shown for them by their new sovereign. The most considerable offices in church and state were put up to sale; and the kingdom was drained of its funds by the large remittances continually made, on one pretext or another, to Flanders. All this brought odium, undeserved indeed, on the cardinal's government;(2) for there is abundant evidence that both he and the council remonstrated in the boldest manner on these enormities; while they endeavoured to inspire nobler sentiments in Charles's bosom by recalling the wise and patriotic administration of his grandparents.(3) The people, in the mean while, outraged by these excesses, and despairing of redress from a higher quarter, loudly clamoured for a convocation of cortes, that they might take the matter into their own hands. The cardinal evaded this as long as possible. He was never a friend to popular assemblies, much less in the present inflamed state of public feeling, and in the absence of the sovereign. He was more anxious for his return than any other individual, probably, in the kingdom. Braved by the aristocracy at home, thwarted in every favourite measure by the Flemings abroad, with an injured indignant people to control, and oppressed, moreover, by infirmities and years, even his stern inflexible spirit could scarcely sustain him under a burden too grievous, in these circumstances, for any subject.(4)

(1) Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 198—201.—Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 567, 584, 590.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1517, cap. 3, 6.—Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 73.

(2) In a letter to Mariano, Martyr speaks of the large sums, "ab hoc gubernatore ad vos misse, sub parandæ classis prætextu."—(Opus Epist. epist. 576.) In a subsequent epistle to his Castilian correspondents he speaks in a more sarcastic tone. "*Bonus ille frater Ximenez Cardinalis gubernator thesauros ad Belgas transmittendos coacervavit. \* \* \* \* Glacialis Oceani accolæ ditabuntur, vestra expilabitur Castilla.*"—(Epist. 606.) From some cause or other, it is evident the cardinal's government was not at all to honest Martyr's taste. Gomez suggests, as the reason, that his salary was clipped off in the general retrenchment, which he admits was a very hard case.—(De Rebus Gestis, fol. 177.) Martyr, however, was never an extravagant encomiast of the cardinal, and one may imagine much more creditable reasons than that assigned for his disgust with him now.

(3) See a letter in Carbajal, containing this honest tribute to the illustrious dead.—(Anales, MS. año 1517, cap. 4.) Charles might have found an antidote to the poison of his Flemish sycophants in the faithful counsels of his Castilian ministers.

(4) Peter Martyr, Opus Epist. epist. 602.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 194.—Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 16. Martyr, in a letter written just before

At length the young monarch, having made all preliminary arrangements, prepared, though still in opposition to the wishes of his courtiers, to embark for his Spanish dominions. Previously to this, on the 13th of August, 1516, the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries signed a treaty of peace at Noyen. The principal article stipulated the marriage of Charles to the daughter of Francis the First, who was to cede, as her dowry, the French claims on Naples. The marriage, indeed, never took place. But the treaty itself may be considered as finally adjusting the hostile relations, which had subsisted during so many years of Ferdinand's reign, with the rival monarchy of France, and as closing the long series of wars which had grown out of the league of Cambray.(1)

On the 17th of September, 1517, Charles landed at Villaviciosa, in the Asturias. Ximenes at this time lay ill at the Franciscan monastery of Aguilera, near Aranda on the Douro. The good tidings of the royal landing operated like a cordial on his spirits, and he instantly dispatched letters to the young monarch, filled with wholesome counsel as to the conduct he should pursue in order to conciliate the affections of the people. He received at the same time messages from the king, couched in the most gracious terms, and expressing the liveliest interest in his restoration to health.

The Flemings in Charles's suite, however, looked with great apprehension to his meeting with the cardinal. They had been content that the latter should rule the state when his arm was needed to curb the Castilian aristocracy; but they dreaded the ascendancy of his powerful mind over their young sovereign, when brought into personal contact with him. They retarded this event by keeping Charles in the north as long as possible. In the mean time they endeavoured to alienate his regards from the minister by exaggerated reports of his arbitrary conduct and temper, rendered more morose by the peevishness of age. Charles showed a facility to be directed by those around him in early years, which gave little augury of the greatness to which he afterwards rose.(2)

By the persuasions of his evil counsellors, he addressed that memorable letter to Ximenes, which is unmatched, even in court annals, for cool and base ingratitude. He thanked the regent for all his past services; named a place for a personal

the king's landing, notices the cardinal's low state of health and spirits. "Cardinalis gubernator Matriti febribus regrotaverat; convalescerat; nunc recedivavit. \* \* \* Breves fore dies illius Medici autumant. Est octogenario major; ipse regis adventum affectu avidissimo desiderare videtur. Sentit sine rege non rite posse cetera Hispanorum moderari ac regi."—*Epist.* 598.

(1) Plassan, *Diplomatique Française*, tom. i. p. 313.—Dumout, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part 1, No. 106.

(2) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1517, cap. 9.—Dormer, *Anales de Aragón*, lib. 1, cap. 1.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.* fol. 43.—Dolce, *Vita di Carlo V.* p. 12.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 212.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 83.

interview with him, where he might obtain the benefit of his counsels for his own conduct and the government of the kingdom; after which he would be allowed to retire to his diocese, and seek from Heaven that reward, which Heaven alone could adequately bestow! (1)

Such was the tenor of this cold-blooded epistle, which in the language of more than one writer, killed the cardinal. This, however, is stating the matter too strongly. The spirit of Ximenes was of too stern a stuff to be so easily extinguished by the breath of royal displeasure. (2) He was, indeed, deeply moved by the desertion of the sovereign whom he had served so faithfully; and the excitement which it occasioned brought on a return of his fever, according to Carbajal, in full force. But anxiety and disease had already done their work upon his once hardy constitution; and this ungrateful act could only serve to wean him more effectually from a world that he was soon to part with. (3)

In order to be near the king, he had previously transferred his residence to Roa. He now turned his thoughts to his approaching end. Death may be supposed to have but little terrors for the statesman who in his last moments could aver "that he had never intentionally wronged any man; but had rendered to every one his due, without being swayed, as far as he was conscious, by fear or affection." Yet Cardinal Richelieu, on his death-bed, declared the same! (4)

(1) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. ubi supra.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 215.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 84.

(2) "Cette terrible lettre qui fut la cause de sa mort," says Marsollier plumply; a writer who is sure either to misstate or overstate. (*Ministère du Card. Ximenez*, p. 447.) Byron, alluding to the fate of a modern poet, ridicules the idea of

"The mind, that fiery particle,  
Being extinguished by an Article!"

The frown of a critic, however, might as well prove fatal as that of a king. In both cases, I imagine, it would be hard to prove any closer connection between the two events than that of time.

(3) "Con aquel despedimiento," says Galindez de Carbajal, "con esto acabó de tantos servicios luego que llegó esta carta el Cardenal recibió alteracion y tomole recia calentura que en pocos dias le despachó." (*Anales*, MS. año 1517, cap. 9.) Gomez tells a long story of poison administered to the cardinal in a trout. (*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 206.) Others say, in a letter from Flanders. (See Moreri, *Dictionnaire Historique*, *voyez* Ximenes.) Oviedo notices a rumour of his having been poisoned by one of his secretaries; but vouches for the innocence of the individual accused, whom he personally knew. (*Quincuagenas*, MS. dial. de Xim.) Reports of this kind were too rife in these days to deserve credit, unless supported by very clear evidence. Martyr and Carbajal, both with the court at the time, intimate no suspicion of foul play.

(4) Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1517, cap. 9.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 213, 214.—Quintanilla, *Archetypo*, lib. 4, cap. 8.—Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS. "Voilà mon juge, qui prononcera bientôt ma sentence. Je le prie de tout mon cœur de me condamner, si, dans mon ministère, je me suis proposé autre chose que le bien de la religion et celui de l'état." Le lendemain, au point du jour, il voulut recevoir l'extrême onction.—Jay, *Histoire du Ministère du Cardinal Richelieu* (Paris, 1816), tom. ii. p. 217.

As a last attempt, he began a letter to the king. His fingers refused, however, to perform their office, and after tracing a few lines he gave it up. The purport of these seems to have been to recommend his university at Alcalá to the royal protection. He now became wholly occupied with his devotions, and manifested such contrition for his errors, and such humble confidence in the divine mercy, as deeply affected all present. In this tranquil frame of mind, and in the perfect possession of his powers, he breathed his last, November 8th, 1517, in the eighty-first year of his age, and the twenty-second since his elevation to the primacy. The last words that he uttered were those of the Psalmist, which he used frequently to repeat in health, "In te, Domine, speravi."—"In thee, Lord, have I trusted."

His body, arrayed in his pontifical robes, was seated in a chair of state, and multitudes of all degrees thronged into the apartment to kiss the hands and feet. It was afterwards transported to Alcalá, and laid in the chapel of the noble college of San Ildefonso, erected by himself. His obsequies were celebrated with great pomp, contrary to his own orders, by all the religious and literary fraternities of the city; and his virtues commemorated in a funeral discourse by a doctor of the university, who, considering the death of the good a fitting occasion to lash the vices of the living, made the most caustic allusion to the Flemish favourites of Charles, and their pestilential influence on the country. (1)

Such was the end of this remarkable man; the most remarkable, in many respects, of his time. His character was of that storn and lofty cast which seems to rise above the ordinary wants and weaknesses of humanity. His genius, of the severest order, like Dante's or Michael Angelo's in the regions of fancy, impresses us with ideas of power, that excite admiration akin to terror. His enterprises, as we have seen, were of the boldest character; his execution of them equally bold. He disdained to woo fortune by any of those soft and pliant arts which are often the most effectual. He pursued his ends by the most direct means. In this way he frequently multiplied difficulties; but difficulties seemed to have a charm for him, by the opportunities they afforded of displaying the energies of his soul.

(1) Robles, Vida de Ximenez, cap. 18.—Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 215—217.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 4, cap. 12—15, who quotes Marañón, an eye-witness.—Carbajal, Anales, MS. año 1517, cap. 9, who dates the cardinal's death December 8th, in which he is followed by Lanuza. The following epitaph, of no great merit, was inscribed on his sepulchre, composed by the learned John Vergara in his younger days:—

"Condideram musis Franciscus grande lyceum,  
Condor in exiguo nunc ego sarcophago.  
Prætextam junxi saccho, galcanque galero,  
Frater, dux, præsul, cardineusque pater.  
Quin virtute mea junctum est diadema cucullo,  
Cum mihi regnanti paruit Hesperia."



With these qualities he combined a versatility of talent usually found only in softer and more flexible characters. Though bred in the cloister, he distinguished himself both in the cabinet and the camp. For the latter, indeed, so repugnant to his regular profession, he had a natural genius, according to the testimony of his biographer; and he evinced his relish for it by declaring, that "the smell of gunpowder was more grateful to him than the sweetest perfume of Arabia!" (1) In every situation, however, he exhibited the stamp of his peculiar calling; and the stern lineaments of the monk were never wholly concealed under the mask of the statesman or the visor of the warrior. He had a full measure of the religious bigotry which belonged to the age; and he had melancholy scope for displaying it, as chief of that dread tribunal over which he presided during the last ten years of his life. (2)

He carried the arbitrary ideas of his profession into political life. His regency was conducted on the principles of a military despotism. It was his maxim, that "a prince must rely mainly on his army for securing the respect and obedience of his subjects." (3) It is true he had to deal with a martial and factious nobility, and the end which he proposed was to curb their licentiousness and enforce the equitable administration of justice; but in accomplishing this, he showed little regard to the constitution, or to private rights. His first act, the proclaiming of Charles king, was in open contempt of the usages and rights of the nation. He evaded the urgent demands of the Castilians for a convocation of cortes; for it was his opinion, "that freedom of speech, especially in regard to their own grievances, made the people insolent and irreverent to their rulers." (4) The people, of course, had no voice in the measures

(1) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 160.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 17. "And who can doubt," exclaims Gonzalo de Oviedo, "that powder against the infidel is incense to the Lord?"—Quincanagenas, MS.

(2) During this period, Ximenes "permitted the condemnation," to use the mild language of Llorente, of more than 2,500 individuals to the stake, and nearly 50,000 to other punishments!—(*Hist. de l'Inquisition*, tom. i. chap. 10, art. 5; tom. iv. chap. 46.) In order to do justice to what is really good in the character of this age, one must absolutely close his eyes against that odious fanaticism which enters more or less into all, and into the best, unfortunately, most largely.

(3) "Persuasum haberet, non aliâ ratione animos humanos imperia aliorum laturos, nisi vi factâ aut adhibita. Quare pro certo affirmare solebat, nullum unquam principem exteris populis formidini, aut suis reverentiae fuisse, nisi comparato militum exercitu, atque omnibus belli instrumentis ad manum paratis." (Gomez, *de Rebus Gestis*, fol. 95.) We may well apply to the cardinal what Cato, or rather Lucan, applied to Pompey,—

"Prætulit arma togæ; sed pacem armatus amavit."

*Pharsalia*, lib. 9.

(4) "Nullâ enim re magis populos inolescere, et irreverentiam omnem exhibere, quam cum libertatem loquendi nacti sunt, et pro libidine, suas vulgo jactant querimonias." Gomez quotes the language of Ximenes in his correspondence with Charles.—*De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 194.

which involved their most important interests. His whole policy, indeed, was to exalt the royal prerogative, at the expenso of the inferior orders of the state : (1) and his regency, short as it was, and highly beneficial to the country in many respects, must be considered as opening the way to that career of despotism which the Austrian family followed up with such hard-hearted constancy.

But while we condemn the politics, we cannot but respect the principles of the man. However erroneous his conduct in our eyes, he was guided by his sense of duty. It was this, and the conviction of it in the minds of others, which constituted the secret of his great power. It made him reckless of difficulties, and fearless of all personal consequences. The consciousness of the integrity of his purposes rendered him, indeed, too unscrupulous as to the means of attaining them. He held his own life cheap in comparison with the great reforms that he had at heart. Was it surprising that he should hold as lightly the convenience and interests of others when they thwarted their execution ?

His views were raised far above considerations of self. As a statesman, he identified himself with the state; as a churchman, with the interests of his religion. He severely punished every offence against these. He as freely forgave every personal injury. He had many remarkable opportunities of showing this. His administration provoked numerous lampoons and libels. He despised them as the miserable solace of spleen and discontent, and never persecuted their authors. (2) In this he formed an honourable contrast to Cardinal Richelieu, whose character and condition suggest many points of resemblance with his own.

His disinterestedness was further shown by his mode of dispensing his large revenues. It was among the poor, and on great public objects. He built up no family. He had brothers and nephews; but he contented himself with making their condition comfortable, without diverting to their benefit the great trusts confided to him for the public. (3) The greater

(1) Oviedo makes a reflection, showing that he conceived the cardinal's policy better than most of his biographers. He states that the various immunities and the military organisation which he gave to the towns enabled them to raise the insurrection known as the war of the "comunidades," at the beginning of Charles's reign: but he rightly considers this as only an indirect consequence of his policy, which made use of the popular arm only to break down the power of the nobles, and establish the supremacy of the crown.—Quincuagenas, MS. dial. de Xim.

(2) Quincuagenas, MS. ubi supra. Mr. Burke notices this noble trait, in a splendid panegyric which he poured forth on the character of Ximenes, at Sir Joshua Reynolds's table, as related by Madame d'Arlay, in the last, and not least remarkable of her productions. (Memoirs of Dr. Burney, vol. ii. pp. 231 et seq.) The orator, if the lady reports him right, notices as two of the cardinal's characteristics, his freedom from bigotry and despotism !

(3) Their connection with so distinguished a person, however, enabled most of them to form high alliances; of which Oviedo gives some account.—Quincuagenas, MS.

part of the funds which he left at his death was settled on the university of Alcalá.(1)

He had, however, none of that pride which would make him ashamed of his poor and humble relatives. He had, indeed, a confidence in his own powers approaching to arrogance, which led him to undervalue the abilities of others, and to look on them as his instruments rather than his equals: but he had none of the vulgar pride founded on wealth or station. He frequently alluded to his lowly condition in early life with great humility, thanking Heaven, with tears in his eyes, for its extraordinary goodness to him. He not only remembered, but did many acts of kindness to his early friends, of which more than one touching anecdote is related. Such traits of sensibility, gleaming through the natural austerity and sternness of a disposition like his, like light breaking through a dark cloud, affect us the more sensibly by contrast.

He was irreproachable in his morals, and conformed literally to all the rigid exactions of his severe order in the court as faithfully as in the cloister. He was sober, abstemious, chaste. In the latter particular, he was careful that no suspicion of the license which so often soiled the clergy of the period should attach to him.(2) On one occasion, while on a journey, he was invited to pass the night at the house of the duchess of Maqueda, being informed that she was absent. The duchess was at home, however, and entered the apartment before he retired to rest. "You have deceived me, lady," said Ximenes, rising in anger; "if you have any business with me, you will find me to-morrow at the confessional." So saying, he abruptly left the palace.(3)

He carried his austerities and mortifications so far as to endanger his health. There is a curious brief extant of Pope Leo the Tenth, dated the last year of the cardinal's life, enjoining him to abate his severe penance, to eat meat and eggs on the ordinary fasts, to take off his Franciscan frock, and sleep in linen, and on a bed. He would never consent, however, to divest himself of his monastic weeds. "Even laymen," said

(1) "Die and endow a college or a cat!"

The verse is somewhat stale, but expresses, better than a page of prose can, the credit due to such posthumous benefactions, when they set aside the dearest natural ties for the mere indulgence of a selfish vanity. Such motives cannot be imputed to Ximenes. He had always conscientiously abstained from appropriating his archiepiscopal revenues, as we have seen, to himself or his family. His dying bequest, therefore, was only in keeping with his whole life.

(2) The good father Quintanilla vindicates his hero's chastity somewhat at the expense of his breeding. "His purity was unexampled," says he. "He shunned the sex, like so many evil spirits; looking on every woman as a devil, let her be never so holy. Had it not been in the way of his professional calling, it is not too much to say, he would never have suffered his eyes to light on one of them!"—Archetypo, p. 80.

(3) Fléclier, Histoire de Ximenes, liv. 6, p. 634.

he, alluding to the custom of the Roman Catholics, "put these on when they are dying; and shall I, who have worn them all my life, take them off at that time!"(1)

Another anecdote is told in relation to his dress. Over his coarse woollen frock he wore the costly apparel suited to his rank. An impertinent Franciscan preacher took occasion one day, before him, to launch out against the luxuries of the time, especially in dress, obviously alluding to the cardinal, who was attired in a superb suit of ermine, which had been presented to him. He heard the sermon patiently to the end, and after the services were concluded, took the preacher into the sacristy, and, having commended the general tenor of his discourse, showed under his furs and fine linen, the coarse frock of his order, next his skin. Some accounts add, that the friar, on the other hand, wore fine linen under his monkish frock. After the cardinal's death, a little box was found in his apartment, containing the implements with which he used to mend the rents of his threadbare garment with his own hands.(2)

With so much to do, it may well be believed that Ximenes was avaricious of time. He seldom slept more than four, or, at most, four hours and a half. He was shaved in the night, hearing at the same time some edifying reading. He followed the same practice at his meals, or varied it with listening to the arguments of some of his theological brethren, generally on some subtle question of school divinity. This was his only recreation. He had as little taste as time for lighter and more elegant amusements. He spoke briefly and always to the point. He was no friend of idle ceremonies and useless visits, though his situation exposed him more or less to both. He frequently had a volume lying open on the table before him; and when his visitor stayed too long, or took up his time with light and frivolous conversation, he intimated his dissatisfaction by resuming his reading. The cardinal's book must have been as fatal to a reputation as Fontenelle's ear-trumpet.(3)

I will close this sketch of Ximenez de Cisneros with a brief outline of his person. His complexion was sallow; his countenance sharp and emaciated; his nose aquiline; his upper lip

(1) Quintanilla has given the brief of his Holiness in *extenso*, with commentaries thereon, twice as long.—See Archetypo, lib. 4, cap. 10.

(2) Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 219.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 2, cap. 4. The reader may find a *pendant* to this anecdote in a similar one recorded of Ximenes' predecessor, the grand cardinal Mendoza, in Part II. Chapter 5, of this History. The conduct of the two primates on the occasion was sufficiently characteristic.

(3) Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS.—Gomez, *de Rebus Gestis*, ubi supra.—Robles, *Vida de Ximenez*, cap. 13.—Quintanilla, Archetypo, lib. 2, cap. 5, 7, 8; who cites Dr. Vergara, the cardinal's friend. It is Baron Grimm, I think, who tells us of Fontenelle's habit of dropping his trumpet when the conversation did not pay him for the trouble of holding it up. The goodnatured Reynolds, according to Goldsmith, could "shift his trumpet" on such an emergency also.

projected far over the lower. His eyes were small, deep-set in his head, dark, vivid, and penetrating. His forehead ample, and what was remarkable, without a wrinkle, though the expression of his features was somewhat severe.(1) His voice was clear, but not agreeable. His enunciation measured and precise. His demeanour was grave, his carriage firm and erect; he was tall in stature, and his whole presence commanding. His constitution, naturally robust, was impaired by his severe austerities and severer cares; and in the latter years of his life, was so delicate as to be extremely sensible to the vicissitudes and inclemency of the weather.(2)

I have noticed the resemblance which Ximenes bore to the great French minister Cardinal Richelieu. It was, after all, however, more in the circumstances of situation, than in their characters; though the most prominent traits of these were not dissimilar.(3) Both, though bred ecclesiastics, reached the highest honours of the state, and, indeed, may be said to have directed the destinies of their countries.(4) Richelieu's authority, however, was more absolute than that of Ximenes, for he was screened by the shadow of royalty; while the latter was exposed, by his insulated and unsheltered position, to the full blaze of envy, and, of course, opposition. Both were ambitious of military glory, and showed capacity for attaining it. Both achieved their great results by that rare union of high mental endowments and great efficiency in action which is always irresistible.

The moral basis of their characters was entirely different. The French cardinal's was selfishness, pure and unmitigated. His religion, politics, his principles, in short, in every sense, were subservient to this. Offences against the state he could forgive; those against himself he pursued with implacable rancour. His authority was literally cemented with blood. His immense powers and patronage were perverted to the

(1) Ximenes' head was examined some forty years after his interment, and the skull was found to be without sutures.—(Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 218.) Richelieu's was found to be perforated with little holes. The abbé Richard deduces a theory from this, which may startle the physiologist even more than the facts: "On ouvrit son Test, on y trouva 12 petits trous par où s'exhaloient les vapeurs de son cerveau, ce qui fit qu'il n'eût jamais aucun mal de tête; au lieu que le Test de Ximenes étoit sans suture, à quoi l'on attribua les effroyables douleurs de tête qu'il avoit presque toujours."—*Parallèle*, p. 177.

(2) Robles, *Vida de Ximenes*, cap. 18.—Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 218.

(3) A little treatise has been devoted to this very subject, entitled "*Parallèle du Card. Ximenes et du Card. Richelieu*, par Mons. l'Abbé Richard; à Trevoux, 1795:" 222 pp. 12mo. The author, with a candour rare indeed where national vanity is interested, strikes the balance without hesitation in favour of the foreigner Ximenes.

(4) The catalogue of the various offices of Ximenes occupies near half a page of Quintanilla. At the time of his death, the chief ones that he filled were those of archbishop of Toledo, and consequently primate of Spain, grand chancellor of Castile, cardinal of the Roman church, inquisitor-general of Castile, and regent.

aggrandisement of his family. Though bold to temerity in his plans, he betrayed more than once a want of true courage in their execution. Though violent and impetuous, he could stoop to be a dissembler. Though arrogant in the extreme, he courted the soft incense of flattery. In his manners he had the advantage over the Spanish prelate. He could be a courtier in courts, and had a more refined and cultivated taste. On one respect he had the advantage over Ximenes in morals. He was not, like him, a bigot. He had not the religious basis in his composition, which is the foundation of bigotry.—Their deaths were typical of their characters. Richelieu died, as he had lived, so deeply execrated, that the enraged populace would scarcely allow his remains to be laid quietly in the grave. Ximenes, on the contrary, was buried amid the tears and lamentations of the people; his memory was honoured even by his enemies, and his name is revered by his countrymen to this day, as that of a saint.

---

Dr. Lorenzo Galindez de Carbal, one of the best authorities for transactions in the latter part of our History, was born of a respectable family, at Placencia, in 1472. Little is gathered of his early life, but that he was studious in his habits, devoting himself assiduously to the acquisition of the civil and canon law. He filled the chair of professor in this department at Salamanca for several years. His great attainments and respectable character recommended him to the notice of the Catholic queen, who gave him a place in the royal council. In this capacity he was constantly at the court, where he seems to have maintained himself in the esteem of his royal mistress, and of Ferdinand after her death. The queen testified her respect for Carbal by appointing him one of the commissioners for preparing a digest of the Castilian law. He made considerable progress in this arduous work; but how great is uncertain, since, from whatever cause (there appears to be a mystery about it), the fruits of his labour were never made public; a circumstance deeply regretted by the Castilian jurists. (Asso y Manuel, *Instituciones*, Introd. p. 99.)

Carbal left behind him several historical works, according to Nic. Antonio, whose catalogue, however, rests on very slender grounds. (*Bibliotheca Nova*, tom. ii. p. 3.) The work by which he is best known to Spanish scholars, is his "*Anales del Rey Don Fernando el Católico*," which still remains in manuscript. There is certainly no Christian country for which the invention of printing, so liberally patronised there at its birth, has done so little as for Spain. Her libraries teem at this day with manuscripts of the greatest interest for the illustration of every stage of her history; but which, alas! in the present gloomy condition of affairs, have less chance of coming to the light, than at the close of the fifteenth century, when the art of printing was in its infancy.

Carbal's *Annals* cover the whole ground of our narrative, from the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, to the coming of Charles V. into Spain. They are plainly written, without ambition of rhetorical show or refinement. The early part is little better than memoranda of the principal events of the period, with particular notice of all the migrations of the court. In the concluding portion of the work, however, comprehending Ferdinand's death, and the regency of Ximenes, the author is very full and circumstantial. As he had a conspicuous place in the government, and was always with the court, his testimony in regard to this important period is of the highest value, as that of an eyewitness and an actor, and, it may be added, a man of sagacity and sound principles. No better commentary on the merit of his work need be

required than the brief tribute of Alvaro Gomez, the accomplished biographer of Cardinal Ximenes. "Porro Annales Laurentii Calendi Caravajali, quibus vir gravissimus rerumque illarum cum primis particeps quinquaginta ferme annorum memoriam complexus est, haud vulgariter meam operam juverunt." —*De Rebus Gestis, Præfatio.*

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA.

Policy of the Crown—towards the Nobles—the Clergy—Consideration of the Commons—Advancement of Prerogative—Legal Complications—The Legal Profession—Trade—Manufactures—Agriculture—Restrictive Policy—Revenues—Progress of Discovery—Colonial Administration—General Prosperity—Increase of Population—Chivalrous Spirit—The Period of National Glory.

WE have now traversed that important period of history, comprehending the latter part of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century; a period when the convulsions which shook to the ground the ancient political fabrics of Europe roused the minds of its inhabitants from the lethargy in which they had been buried for ages. Spain, as we have seen, felt the general impulse. Under the glorious rule of Ferdinand and Isabella, we have beheld her emerging from chaos into a new existence; unfolding, under the influence of institutions adapted to her genius, energies of which she was before unconscious; enlarging her resources from all the springs of domestic industry and commercial enterprise; and insensibly losing the ferocious habits of a feudal age, in the refinements of an intellectual and moral culture.

In the fulness of time, when her divided powers had been concentrated under one head, and the system of internal economy completed, we have seen her descend into the arena with the other nations of Europe, and in a very few years achieve the most important acquisitions of territory, both in that quarter and in Africa; and finally crowning the whole by the discovery and occupation of a boundless empire beyond the waters. In the progress of the action, we may have been too much occupied with its details to attend sufficiently to the principles which regulated them; but, now that we have reached the close, we may be permitted to cast a parting glance over the field that we have traversed, and briefly survey the principal steps by which the Spanish sovereigns, under Divine Providence, led their nation up to such a height of prosperity and glory.

Ferdinand and Isabella, on their accession, saw at once that the chief source of the distractions of the country lay in the

overgrown powers and factious spirit of the nobility. Their first efforts, therefore, were directed to abate these as far as possible. A similar movement was going forward in the other European monarchies; but in none was it crowned with so speedy and complete success as in Castile, by means of those bold and decisive measures which have been detailed in an early chapter of this work.(1) The same policy was steadily pursued during the remainder of their reign; less indeed by open assault than by indirect means.(2)

Among these, one of the most effectual was the omission to summon the privileged orders to cortes, in several of the most important sessions of that body. This, so far from being a new stretch of prerogative, was only an exercise of the anomalous powers already familiar to the crown, as elsewhere noticed.(3) Nor does it seem to have been viewed as a grievance by the other party, who regarded these meetings with the more indifference, since their aristocratic immunities exempted them from the taxation which was generally the prominent object of them. But, from whatever cause proceeding, by this impolitic acquiescence they surrendered, undoubtedly, the most valuable of their rights,—one which has enabled the British aristocracy to maintain its political consideration unimpaired, while that of the Castilian has faded away into an empty pageant.(4)

Another practice steadily pursued by the sovereigns was to raise men of humble station to offices of the highest trust; not, however, like their contemporary Louis the Eleventh, because their station was humble, in order to mortify the higher orders, but because they courted merit wherever it was to be found,(5) —a policy much and deservedly commended by the sagacious observers of the time.(6) The history of Spain does not pro-

(1) Ante, Part I. Chapter 6.

(2) Among the minor means for diminishing the consequence of the nobility, may be mentioned the regulation respecting the "privilegios rodados;" instruments formerly requiring to be countersigned by the great lords and prelates, but which, from the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, were submitted for signature only to officers especially appointed for the purpose.—Salazar de Mendoza, *Dignidades*, lib. 2, cap. 12.

(3) Ante, *Introd.* Sect. 1.

(4) A pertinent example of this policy of the sovereigns occurred in the cortes of Madrigal, 1476; where, notwithstanding the important subjects of legislation, none but the third estate were present.—(Pulgar, *Reyes Católicos*, p. 94.) An equally apposite illustration is afforded by the care to summon the great vassals to the cortes of Toledo, in 1480, when matters nearly touching them, as the revocation of their honours and estates, were under discussion, but not till then.—*Ibid.* p. 165.

(5) The same principle made them equally vigilant in maintaining the purity of those in office. Oviedo mentions, that in 1407 they removed a number of jurists on the charge of bribery and other malversation, from their seats in the royal council.—Quinecugenas, *MS. dial. de Grizio*.

(6) See a letter of the council to Charles V. commending the course adopted by his grandparents in their promotions to office, apud Carbajal, *Anales*, MS. año 1517, cap. 4.



bably afford another example of a person of the lowly condition of Ximenes attaining, not merely the highest offices in the kingdom, but eventually its uncontrolled supremacy.(1) The multiplication of legal tribunals, and other civil offices, afforded the sovereigns ample scope for pursuing this policy, in the demand created for professional science. The nobles, intrusted hitherto with the chief direction of affairs, now saw it pass into the hands of persons who had other qualifications than martial prowess or hereditary rank. Such as courted distinction were compelled to seek it by the regular avenues of academic discipline. How extensively the spirit operated, and with what brilliant success, we have already seen.(2)

But, whatever the aristocracy may have gained in refinement of character, it resigned much of its prescriptive power, when it condescended to enter the arena on terms of equal competition with its inferiors for the prizes of talent and scholarship.

Ferdinand pursued a similar course in his own dominions of Aragon, where he uniformly supported the commons, or may more properly be said to have been supported by them, in the attempt to circumscribe the authority of the great feudatories. Although he accomplished this to a considerable extent, their power was too firmly intrenched behind positive institutions to be affected like that of the Castilian aristocracy, whose rights had been swelled beyond their legitimate limits by every species of usurpation.(3)

With all the privileges retrieved from this order, it still possessed a disproportionate weight in the political balance. The great lords still claimed some of the most considerable posts, both civil and military.(4) Their revenues were immense, and their

(1) Yet strange instances of promotion are not wanting in Spanish history; witness the adventurer Ripperda in Philip V.'s time, and the Prince of the Peace of our own; men who, owing their success less to their own powers than the imbecility of others, could lay no claim to the bold and independent sway exercised by Ximenes.

(2) Ante, Part I. vol. i. Chapter 19.—"No os parece á vos," says Oviedo, in one of his Dialogues, "que es mejor ganado eso, que les dá su príncipe por sus servieios, é lo que llevan justamente de sus oficios, que lo que se adquiere robando capas agenas, é mataudo é vertiendo sangre de Cristianos?"—(Quincuagenas, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 9.) The sentiment would have been too enlightened for a Spanish cavalier of the fifteenth century.

(3) In the cortes of Calatayud, in 1515, the Aragonese nobles withheld the supplies, with the design of compelling the crown to relinquish certain rights of jurisdiction which it assumed over their vassals. "Les parecia," said the archbishop of Saragossa, in a speech on the occasion, "que auian perdido mucho, en que el ceptro real cobrasse lo suyo, por su industria. . . . Esto los otros estados del reyno lo atribuyeron á gran virtud: y lo estimauan por beneficio immortal."—(Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 93.) The other estates, in fact, saw their interests too clearly, not to concur with the crown in this assertion of its ancient prerogative.—Blancas, Modo de Proceder, fol. 180.

(4) Such, for example, were those of great chancellor, of admiral, and of constable of Castile. The first of these ancient offices was permanently united by Isabella with that of archbishop of Toledo. The office of admiral became

rounded always by a troop of ghostly advisers, and avowing religion as the great end of her principal operations at home and abroad.(1) It is certain, however, that, while in all her acts she confessed the influence of religion, she took more effectual means than any of her predecessors to circumscribe the temporal powers of the clergy.(2) The volume of her *pragmáticas* is filled with laws designed to limit their jurisdiction, and restrain their encroachments on the secular authorities.(3) Towards the Roman see she maintained, as we have often had occasion to notice, the same independent attitude. By the celebrated concordat made with Sixtus the Fourth, in 1482, the pope conceded to the sovereigns the right of nominating to the higher dignities of the church.(4) The Holy See, however, still assumed the collation to inferior benefices, which were too often lavished on non-residents and otherwise unsuitable persons. The queen sometimes extorted a papal indulgence, granting the right of presentation for limited time; on which occasions she showed such alacrity, that she is known to have disposed, in a single day, of more than twenty prebends and inferior dignities. At other times, when the nomination made by his holiness, as not unfrequently happened, was distasteful to her, she would take care to defeat it, by forbidding the bull to be published until laid before the privy council; at the same time sequestrating the revenues of the vacant benefice till her own requisitions were complied with.(5)

She was equally solicitous in watching over the morals of the

(1) "Como quier que oia el parecer de *personas religiosas* é de los otros letrados que cerca della eran, pero la mayor parte seguia las cosas por su arbitrio."—Pulgar, *Reyes Católicos*, part 1, cap. 4.

(2) Lucio Marineo has collected many particulars respecting the great wealth of the Spanish clergy in his time. There were four metropolitan sees in Castile.

Toledo, income . . .	80,000 ducats.
St. James, " . . .	24,000 "
Seville, " . . .	20,000 "
Granada, " . . .	10,000 "

There were twenty-nine bishoprics, whose aggregate revenues, very unequally apportioned, amounted to 251,000 ducats. The church livings in Aragon were much fewer and leaner than in Castile. (*Cosas Memorables*, fol. 23.) The Venetian Navagiero speaks of the metropolitan church of Toledo as "the wealthiest in Christendom;" its canons lived in stately palaces, and its revenues, with those of the archbishopric, equalled those of the whole city of Toledo. (*Viaggio*, fol. 9.) He notices also the great opulence of the churches of Seville, Guadalupe, &c. (Fol. 11, 13.)

(3) See *Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 11, 140, 141, 171, et loc. al.—From one of these ordinances it appears the clergy were not backward in remonstrating against what they deemed an infringement of their rights. (Fol. 172.) The queen, however, while she guarded against their usurpations, interfered more than once, with her usual sense of justice, on their application, to shield them from the encroachments of the civil tribunals.—Riol, *Informe*, apud *Semanario Erudito*, tom. iii. pp. 98, 99.

(4) See Part I. chapter 6, of this History.

(5) See examples of this, in Riol, *Informe*, apud *Semanario Erudito*, tom. iii. pp. 95—102.—*Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 14.

clergy, inculcating on the higher prelates to hold frequent pastoral communication with their suffragans, and to report to her such as were delinquent.(1) By these vigilant measures she succeeded in restoring the ancient discipline of the church, and weeding out the sensuality and indolence which had so long defiled it; while she had the inexpressible satisfaction to see the principal places, long before her death, occupied by prelates whose learning and religious principle gave the best assurance of the stability of the reformation.(2) Few of the Castilian monarchs have been brought more frequently into collision, or pursued a bolder policy, with the court of Rome. Still fewer have extorted from it such important graces and concessions; a circumstance which can only be imputed, says a Castilian writer, "to singular good fortune and consummate prudence;"(3) to that deep conviction of the queen's integrity, we may also add, which disarmed resistance, even in her enemies.(4)

The condition of the commons under this reign was probably, on the whole, more prosperous than in any other period of the Spanish history. New avenues to wealth and honours were opened to them; and persons and property were alike protected under the fearless and impartial administration of the law. "Such was the justice dispensed to every one under this auspice-

(1) Riol, Informe, apud Semanario Erudito, tom. iii. p. 94.—L. Marineq, Cosas Memorables, fol. 182.

(2) Oviedo bears emphatic testimony to this. "En nuestros tiempos há habido en España de nuestra Nación grandes varones Letrados, excelentes Peritos y Religiosos y personas que por sus habilidades y sciencias han subido á las mas altas dignidades de Capelos e de Arzobispados y todo lo que mas se puede alcanzar, en la Iglesia de Dios."—Quineuagenas, MS. dial. de Talavera.—Col. de Cédulas, tom. i. p. 440.

(3) "Lo que debe admirar es, que en el tiempo mismo que se contendia con tanto ardor, obtuvieron los Reyes de la santa Sede mas gracias y privilegios que ninguno de sus sucesores; prueba de su felicidad, y de su prudentissima conducta."—Riol, Informe, apud Semanario Erudito, tom. iii. p. 95.

(4) Since the publication of the earlier edition of this work, I have met with an instance of Ferdinand's spirit in the assertion of his ecclesiastical rights quite equal to any displayed by his illustrious consort, and too remarkable to be passed over in silence. It was on occasion of an infringement of what he deemed the immunities of his crown at Naples. It occurred in 1508; and in a letter dated from Burgos, May 22nd of that year, he reproves, in no measured terms, his viceroy, the count of Rivaragoza, for allowing the publication of the papal bull, which had been the cause of offence. He asks why he did not cause the apostolical envoy—*curso apostolico*—to be seized and hanged on the spot! He orders him to recall the mission which had been dispatched to Rome, and declares that if the offensive bull is not at once revoked, he will withdraw the obedience of the crowns of Castile and Aragon from the Holy See! "Y estamos muy determinados si su Santidad no revoca luego el Breve y los autos por virtud del fecho, de le quitar la obediencia de todos los Reynos de las Coronas di Castilla y Aragon y di facer otras provisiones convenientes á caso tan grave y de tanta importancia." It is curious to see how the commentators of a later date endeavour to reconcile this bold bearing of the Catholic king with his loyalty as a true son of the church. A copy of the original document in the royal archives of Naples may be found in the Obras Ineditas de Quevedo, Madrid, 1794, tom. xi. p. 3.

cious reign," exclaims Marineo, "that nobles and cavaliers, citizens and labourers, rich and poor, masters and servants, all equally partook of it." (1) We find no complaints of arbitrary imprisonment, and no attempts, so frequent both in earlier and later times, at illegal taxation. In this particular, indeed, Isabella manifested the greatest tenderness for her people. By her commutation of the capricious tax of the *alcavala* for a determinate one, and still more by transferring its collection from the revenue officers to the citizens themselves, she greatly relieved her subjects. (2)

Finally, notwithstanding the perpetual call for troops for the military operations in which the government was constantly engaged, and notwithstanding the example of neighbouring countries, there was no attempt to establish that iron bulwark of despotism, a standing army; at least, none nearer than that of the voluntary levies of the *hermandad*, raised and paid by the people. The queen never admitted the arbitrary maxims of Ximenes in regard to the foundation of government. Hers was essentially one of opinion, not force. (3) Had it rested on any other than the broad basis of public opinion, it could not have withstood a day the violent shocks to which it was early exposed, nor have achieved the important revolution that it finally did, both in the domestic and foreign concerns of the country.

The condition of the kingdom, on Isabella's accession, necessarily gave the commons unwonted consideration. In the tottering state of her affairs, she was obliged to rest on their

(1) "Porque la igualdad de la justicia que los bienaventurados Principes hazian era tal, que todos los hombres de qualquier condicion que fuesen: aora nobles, y caualeros: aora plebeyos, y labradores, y ricos o pobres, flacos o fuertes, señores o siervos, en lo que a la justicia tocava todos fuesen iguales." —Cosas Memorables, fol. 180.

(2) These beneficial changes were made with the advice, and through the agency of Ximenes. (Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 24.—Quintanilla, Arche-typo, p. 181.) The *alcavala*, a tax of one-tenth on all transfers of property, produced more than any other branch of the revenue. As it was originally designed, more than a century before, to furnish funds for the Moorish war, Isabella, as we have seen in her testament, entertained great scruples as to the right to continue it, without the confirmation of the people, after that was terminated. Ximenes recommended its abolition, without any qualification, to Charles V.; but in vain. (*ibidem* auct. ubi supra.) Whatever be thought of its legality, there can be no doubt it was one of the most successful means ever devised by a government for shackling the industry and enterprise of its subjects.

(3) A pragmatic was issued, September 18th, 1495, prescribing the weapons and the seasons for a regular training of the militia. The preamble declares that it was made at the instance of the representatives of the cities and the nobles, who complained that in consequence of the tranquillity which the kingdom, through the Divine mercy, had for some years enjoyed, the people were very generally unprovided with arms, offensive or defensive, having sold or suffered them to fall into decay, insomuch that, in their present condition, they would be found wholly unprepared to meet either domestic disturbance or foreign invasion. (Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 83.) What a tribute does this afford, in this age of violence, to the mild paternal character of the administration!

strong arm for support. It did not fail her. Three sessions of the legislature, or rather the popular branch of it, were held during the two first years of her reign. It was in these early assemblies that the commons bore an active part in concocting the wholesome system of laws which restored vitality and vigour to the exhausted republic.(1)

After this good work was achieved, the sessions of that body became more rare. There was less occasion for them, indeed, during the existence of the hermandad, which was of itself an ample representation of the Castilian commons, and which by enforcing obedience to the law at home, and by liberal supplies for foreign war, superseded, in a great degree, the call for more regular meetings of cortes.(2) The habitual economy, too, not to say frugality, which regulated the public as well as private expenditure of the sovereigns, enabled them, after this period, with occasional exceptions, to dispense with other aid than that drawn from the regular revenues of the crown.

There is every ground for believing that the political franchises of the people, as then understood, were uniformly respected. The number of cities summoned to cortes, which had so often varied according to the caprice of princes, never fell short of that prescribed by long usage. On the contrary, an addition was made by the conquest of Granada; and, in a cortes held soon after the queen's death, we find a most narrow and impolitic remonstrance of the legislature itself against the alleged unauthorised extension of the privilege of representation.(3)

In one remarkable particular, which may be thought to form a material exception to the last observations, the conduct of the crown deserves to be noticed. This was the promulgation of *pragmáticas*, or royal ordinances, and that to a greater extent, probably, than under any other reign, before or since. This important prerogative was claimed and exercised, more or less freely, by most European sovereigns in ancient times. Nothing could be more natural than that the prince should

(1) The most important were those of Madrigal, in 1476, and of Toledo, in 1480, to which I have often had occasion to refer. "Las mas notables," say Asso and Manuel, in reference to the latter, "y famosas de este Reynado, en el qual podemos asegurar, que tuvo principio el mayor aumento, y arreglo de nuestra Jurisprudencia." (*Instituciones*, Introd. p. 91.) Marina notices this cortes with equal panegyric. (*Teoria*, tom. i. p. 75.) See also Sempere, *Hist. des Cortès*, p. 197.

(2) See Part I. Chapters 10, 11, et alibi.

(3) At Valladolid, in 1506. The number of cities having right of representation, "que acostumbran continuamente embiar procuradores á cortes," according to Pulgar, was seventeen. (*Reyes Católicos*, cap. 95.) This was before Granada was added. Martyr, writing some years after that event, enumerates only sixteen as enjoying the privilege. (*Opus Epist. epist.* 460.) Pulgar's estimate, however, is corroborated by the petition of the cortes of Valladolid, which, with more than usual effrontery, would limit the representation to eighteen cities, as prescribed "por algunas leyes é inmemorial uso."—Marina, *Teoria*, tom. i. p. 151.

assume such authority, or that the people, blind to the ultimate consequences, and impatient of long or frequent sessions of the legislature, should acquiesce in the temperate use of it. As far as these ordinances were of an executive character, or designed as supplementary to parliamentary enactments, or in obedience to previous suggestions of cortes, they appear to lie open to no constitutional objections in Castile.(1) But it was not likely that limits, somewhat loosely defined, would be very nicely observed; and under preceding reigns this branch of prerogative had been most intolerably abused.(2)

A large proportion of these laws are of an economical character, designed to foster trade and manufactures, and to secure fairness in commercial dealings.(3) Many are directed against the growing spirit of luxury, and many more occupied with the organisation of the public tribunals. Whatever be thought of their wisdom in some cases, it will not be easy to detect any attempt to innovate on the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, or on those regulating the transfer of property. When these were to be discussed, the sovereigns were careful to call in the aid of the legislature; an example which found little favour with their successors.(4) It is good evidence of

(1) Many of these *pragmáticas* purport in their preambles to be made at the demand of cortes; many more at the petition of corporations or individuals; and many from the good pleasure of the sovereigns, bound to "remedy all grievances, and provide for the exigencies of the state." These ordinances very frequently are stated to have been made with the advice of the royal council. They were proclaimed in the public squares of the city in which they were executed, and afterwards in those of the principal towns in the kingdom. The doctors Asso and Manuel divide *pragmáticas* into two classes; those made at the instance of cortes, and those emanating from the "sovereign, as supreme legislator of the kingdom, moved by his anxiety for the common weal." "Muchas de este género," they add, "contiene el libro raro intitulado *Pragmáticas del Reyno*, que se imprimió la primera vez en Alcalá en 1528." (Instituciones, Introd. p. 110.) This is an error.

(2) "Por la presente prematise encion," said John II., in one of his ordinances, "lo qual todo é cada cosa della é parte dello quiero é mando é ordeno que se guarde é cumpla daqui adelante para siempre jamás en todas las cibdades é villas é logares non embargante cualesquier leyes é fueros é derechos é ordenamientos, constituciones ó posesiones é premiticas, sençiones, é usos é costumbres, ca en enanta á esto atañe yo los abrogo é derogo." (Marina, Teoría, tom. ii. p. 216.) This was the very essence of despotism, and John found it expedient to retract these expressions, and the subsequent remonstrance of cortes.

(3) Indeed, it is worthy of remark, as evincing the progress of civilisation under this reign, that most of the criminal legislation is to be referred to its commencement, while the laws of the subsequent period chiefly concern the new relations which grow out of an increased domestic industry. It is in the "Ordenanças Reales," and "Leyes de la Hermandad," both published by 1485, that we must look for the measures against violence and rapine.

(4) Thus, for example, the important criminal laws of the Hermandad, and the civil code called the "Laws of Toro," were made under the express sanction of the commons. (Leyes de la Hermandad, fol. 1.—Quaderno de las Leyes y Nuevas Decisiones hechas y ordenadas en la Ciudad de Toro; Medina del Campo, 1555; fol. 49.) Nearly all, if not all, the acts of the Catholic sovereigns introduced into the famous code of the "Ordenanças Reales," were passed in the cortes of Madrigal, in 1476, or Toledo, in 1480.

the public confidence in the government, and the generally beneficial scope of these laws, that although of such unprecedented frequency, they should have escaped parliamentary animadversion.(1) But, however patriotic the intentions of the Catholic sovereigns, and however safe, or even salutary, the power intrusted to such hands, it was a fatal precedent, and under the Austrian dynasty became the most effectual lever for overturning the liberties of the nation.

The preceding remarks on the policy observed towards the commons in this reign must be further understood as applying with far less qualification to the queen than to her husband. The latter, owing perhaps to the lessons which he had derived from his own subjects of Aragon, "who never abated one jot of their constitutional rights," says Martyr, "at the command of a king,"(2) and whose meetings generally brought fewer supplies to the royal coffers than grievances to redress, seems to have had little relish for popular assemblies. He convened them as rarely as possible in Aragon,(3) and when he did, omitted no effort to influence their deliberations.(4) He antici-

(1) It should be stated, however, that the cortes of Valladolid, in 1506, two years after the queen's death, enjoined Philip and Joanna to make no laws without the consent of cortes; remonstrating, at the same time, against the existence of many royal *pragmáticas*, as an evil to be redressed. "Y por esto se estableció lo que no hiciesen ni renovasen leyes sino en cortes. \* \* \* Y porque fuera de estan orden se han hecho muchas premáticas de que estos vuestros reynos se tienen por agraviados, manden que aquellas se reuean y provean y remedien los agravios que las tales premáticas tienen." (Marina, Teoría, tom. ii. p. 218.) Whether this is to be understood of the ordinances of the reigning sovereigns or their predecessors, may be doubted. It is certain that the nation, however it may have acquiesced in the exercise of this power by the late queen, would not have been content to resign it to such incompetent hands as those of Philip and his crazy wife.

(2) "Liberi patris legibus, nil imperio Regis gubernantur."—Opus Epist. epist. 438.

(3) Capmany, however, understates the number, when he limits it to four sessions only during this whole reign.—Práctica y Estilo, p. 62.

(4) "Si quis aliquid," says Martyr, speaking of a cortes general held at Monzon, by Queen Germaine, "sibi contra jus illatum putat, aut a regis coronâ quaquam debere existimat, nunquam dissolvuntur conventus, donec conquerenti satisfiat, neque Regibus parere in exigendis pecuniis, solent aliter. Regina quotidie scribit, se vexari eorum petitionibus, nec exsolvere se quare, quod se maxime optare ostendit. Rex imminutis necessitatibus bellicis vim proponit, ut in aliud tempus querelas differant, per literas, per nuntios, per ministros, conventum præsidentesque hortatur monetque, et summissis fere verbis rogare videtur." 1512. (Opus Epist. epist. 493.) Blaneas notices Ferdinand's astuteness, who, instead of money granted by the Aragonese with difficulty and reservations, usually applied for troops at once, which were furnished and paid by the state. (Modo de Proceder, fol. 100, 101.) Zurita tells us, that both the king and queen were averse to meetings of cortes in Castile oftener than absolutely necessary; and both took care, on such occasions, to have their own agents near the deputies, to influence their proceedings. "Todas las vezes que en lo passado el Rey, y la Reyna doña Isabel llamauan á cortes en Castilla, tenían de las llamar: y después de llamados, y ayuntados los procuradores, ponian tales personas de su parte, que continuamente se juntassen con ellos; por escusar lo que podría resultar de aquellos ayuntamientos: y tambien por darles á entender, que no tenían tanto poder, quanto

pated, perhaps, similar difficulties in Castile, after his second marriage had lost him the affections of the people. At any rate, he evaded calling them together on more than one occasion imperiously demanded by the constitution; (1) and, when he did so, he invaded their privileges, (2) and announced principles of government (3) which formed a discreditable, and, it must be admitted, rare exception to the usual tenor of his administration. Indeed, the most honourable testimony is borne to its general equity and patriotism by a cortes convened soon after the queen's death, when a tribute, as far as she was concerned, still more unequivocally, must have been sincere. (4) A similar testimony is afforded by the panegyrics and the practice of the more liberal Castilian writers, who freely resort to this reign as the great fountain of constitutional precedent. (5)

The commons gained political consideration, no doubt, by the depression of the nobles; but their chief gain lay in the inestimable blessings of domestic tranquillity, and the security of private rights. The crown absorbed the power, in whatever form, retrieved from the privileged orders; the pensions and large domains, the numerous fortified places, the rights of seigniorial jurisdiction, the command of the military orders, and the like. Other circumstances conspired to raise the regal authority still higher; as, for example, the international relations then opened with the rest of Europe, which, whether friendly or hostile, were conducted by the monarch alone, who, unless to obtain supplies, rarely condescended to seek the intervention of the other estates; the concentration of the dismembered provinces of the Peninsula under one government; the immense acquisitions abroad, whether from discovery or con-

ellos se imaginaban." (Anales, tom. vi. fol. 96.) This course is as repugnant to Isabella's character as it is in keeping with her husband's. Under their joint administration, it is not always easy to discriminate the part which belongs to each. Their respective characters, and political conduct in affairs where they were separately concerned, furnish us a pretty safe clue to our judgment in others.

(1) As, for example, both when he resigned, and resumed, the regency. See Part II. chapters 8, 11.

(2) In the first cortes after Isabella's death, at Toro, in 1505, Ferdinand introduced the practice, which has since obtained, of administering an oath of secrecy to the deputies as to the proceedings of the session; a serious wound to popular representation. (Marina, Teoría, tom. i. 273.) Capmany (Práctica y Estilo, p. 232) errs in describing this as "un arteificio Maquiavélico inventado por la política Alemana." The German Machiavellism has quite sins enough in this way to answer for.

(3) The introductory law to the "Leyes de Toro," holds this strange language: "Y porque al rey pertenece y ha poder de hazer fueros y leyes, y de las interpretar y emendar donde vierca que cumple," &c. (Leyes de Toro, fol. 2.) What could John II. or any despot of the Austrian line, claim more!

(4) See the address of the cortes, in Marina, Teoría, tom. i. p. 282.

(5) Among the writers repeatedly cited by me, it is enough to point out the citizen Marina, who has derived more illustrations of his liberal theory of the constitution from the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella than from any other; and who loses no opportunity of panegyric on their "paternal government," and of contrasting it with the tyrannical policy of later times.



quest, regarded in that day as the property of the crown, rather than of the nation; and finally, the consideration flowing from the personal character, and long successful rule, of the Catholic sovereigns. Such were the manifold causes which, without the imputation of a criminal ambition, or indifference to the rights of their subjects, in Ferdinand and Isabella, all combined to swell the prerogative to an unprecedented height under their reign.

This, indeed, was the direction in which all the governments of Europe, at this period, were tending. The people, wisely preferring a single master to a multitude, sustained the crown in its efforts to recover from the aristocracy the enormous powers it so grossly abused. This was the revolution of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The power thus deposited in a single hand was found in time equally incompatible with the great ends of civil government; while it gradually accumulated to an extent which threatened to crush the monarchy by its own weight. But the institutions derived from a Teutonic origin have been found to possess a conservative principle, unknown to the fragile despotisms of the East. The seeds of liberty, though dormant, lay deep in the heart of the nation, waiting only the good time to germinate. That time has at length arrived. Larger experience, and a wider moral culture, have taught men not only the extent of their political rights, but the best way to secure them; and it is the re-assertion of these by the great body of the people which now constitutes the revolution going forward in most of the old communities of Europe. The progress of liberal principles must be controlled, of course, by the peculiar circumstances and character of the nation; but their ultimate triumph, in every quarter, none can reasonably distrust. May it not be abused!

The prosperity of the country under Ferdinand and Isabella, its growing trade and new internal relations, demanded new regulations, which, as before noticed, were attempted to be supplied by the *pragmáticas*. This was adding, however, to the embarrassments of a jurisprudence already far too cumbrous. The Castilian lawyer might despair of a critical acquaintance with the voluminous mass of legislation, which in the form of municipal charters, Roman codes, parliamentary statutes, and royal ordinances, were received as authority in the courts.<sup>(1)</sup> The manifold evils resulting from this unsettled and conflicting jurisprudence had led the legislature repeatedly to urge its digest into a more simple and uniform system. Some approach was made towards this in the code of the "*Ordenanzas Reales*,"

(1) Marina enumerates no less than nine separate codes of civil and municipal law in Castile, by which the legal decisions were to be regulated in Ferdinand and Isabella's time.—*Ensayo Historico-Critico sobre la Antigua Legislacion de Castilla* (Madrid, 1808), pp. 383—386.—Asso y Manuel, *Instituciones*, Introd.

compiled in the early part of the queen's reign.(1) The great body of *pragmáticas*, subsequently issued, were also collected into a separate volume by her command,(2) and printed the year before her death.(3) These two codes may therefore be regarded as embracing the ordinary legislation of her reign.

In 1505, the celebrated little code, called "*Leyes de Toro*," from the place where the cortes was held, received the sanction of that body.(4) Its laws, eighty-four in number, and designed as supplementary to those already existing, are chiefly occupied with the rights of inheritance and marriage. It is here that the ominous term "*mayorazgo*" may be said to have been naturalized in Castilian jurisprudence.(5) The peculiar feature of these laws, aggravated in no slight degree by the glosses of the civilians,(6) is the facility which they give to entails; a fatal facility, which, chiming in with the pride and indolence natural

(1) See Part I. chapter 6, of this History.

(2) "A collection," says Señor Clemencin, "of the last importance, and indispensable to a right understanding of the spirit of Isabella's government, but, nevertheless, little known to Castilian writers, not excepting the most learned of them."—(*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 9.*) No edition of the *Pragmáticas* has appeared since the publication of Philip II.'s "*Nueva Recopilación*" in 1567, in which a large portion of them are embodied. The remainder having no further authority, the work has gradually fallen into oblivion. But, whatever be the cause, the fact is not very creditable to professional science in Spain.

(3) The earliest edition was at Alcalá de Henares, printed by Lanzalao Polono, in 1503. It was revised and prepared for the press by Johan Ramirez, secretary of the royal council, from whom the work is often called, "*Pragmáticas de Ramirez*." It passed through several editions by 1550. Clemencin (*ubi supra*) enumerates five; but his list is incomplete, as the one in my possession, probably the second, has escaped his notice. It is a fine old folio, in black letter, containing in addition some ordinances of Joanna and the "*Laws of Toro*," in 192 folios. On the last is this notice by the printer: "Fue ynpresa la presente obra en la muy noble y muy leal cibdad de Sevilla, por Juan Varela ympressor de libros. Acabose a dos dias del mes de octubre de mill y quinientos y veynte años." The first leaf after the table of contents exhibits the motives of its publication: "E porqué como algunas de ellas (*pragmáticas* sanciones é cartas) ha mucho tiempo que se dieron, é otras se hicieron en diversos tiempos, estan derramadas por muchas partes, no se saben por todos, é aun muchas de las dichas justicias no tienen cumplida noticia de todas ellas, pareciendo ser necesario é provechoso; mandamos á los del nuestro consejo que las hiciesen juntar é corregir é imprimir;" &c.

(4) "*Leyes de Toro*," say Asso and Manuel, "vencradas tanto desde entones, que se les dió el primer lugar de valimiento sobre todas las del Reyno."—*Instituciones*, Introd. p. 95.

(5) See the sensible memorial of Jovellanos, "*Informe al Real y Supremo Consejo en el Expediente de Ley Agraria*."—*Madrid, 1795*. There have been several editions of this code since the first of 1505.—(*Marina, Ensayo*, No. 450.) I have copies of two editions, in black letter, neither of them known to Marina; one, above noticed, printed at Seville, in 1520; and the other at Medina del Campo, in 1555, probably the latest. The laws were subsequently incorporated in the "*Nueva Recopilación*."

(6) "Esta ley," says Jovellanos, "que los jurisconsultos llaman á boca llena injusta y bárbara, lo es mucho mas por la extension que los pragmáticos le dieron en sus comentarios."—(*Informe*, p. 76, nota.) The edition of Medina del Campo, in 1555, is swelled by the commentaries of Mignel de Cifuentes, till the text, in the language of bibliographers, looks like "eymba in oceanus."

to the Spanish character, ranks them among the most efficient agents of the decay of husbandry and the general impoverishment of the country.

Besides these codes, there were the "*Leyes de la Hermandad*," (1) the "*Quaderno de Alcavalas*," with others of less note for the regulation of trade, made in this reign. (2) But still the great scheme of a uniform digest of the municipal law of Castile, although it occupied the most distinguished juriconsultos of the time, was unattained at the queen's death. (3) How deeply it engaged her mind in that hour is evinced by the clause in her codicil, in which she bequeaths the consummation of the work, as an imperative duty, to her successors. (4) It was not completed till the reign of Philip the Second; and the large proportion of Ferdinand and Isabella's laws admitted into that famous compilation, shows the prospective character of their legislation, and the uncommon disengagement with which it was accommodated to the peculiar genius and wants of the nation. (5)

The immense increase of empire, and the corresponding development of the national resources, not only demanded new laws, but a thorough reorganisation of every department of the administration. Laws may be received as indicating the disposition of the ruler, whether for good or for evil; but it is in

(1) Ante, Part I. chapter 6.

(2) *Leyes del Quaderno Nuevo de las Rentas de las Alcavalas y Franquezas*, hecho en la Vega de Granada (Salamanca, 1550); a little code of 37 folios, containing 147 laws for the regulation of the crown rents. It was made in the Vega of Granada, December 10th, 1491. The greater part of these laws, like so many others of this reign, have been admitted into the "*Nueva Recopilacion*."

(3) At the head of these, undoubtedly, must be placed Dr. Alfonso Dias de Montalvo, noticed more than once in the course of this history. He illustrated three successive reigns by his labours, which he continued to the close of a long life, and after he had become blind. The Catholic sovereigns highly appreciated his services, and settled a pension on him of 30,000 maravedis. Besides his celebrated compilation of the "*Ordenanzas Reales*," he wrote commentaries on the ancient code of the "*Fuero Real*," and on the "*Siete Partidas*," printed for the first time, under his own eye, in 1491.—(Mendez, *Typographia Española*, p. 183.) Marina (*Ensayo*, p. 405) has bestowed a beautiful eulogium on this venerable lawyer, who first gave to light the principal Spanish codes, and introduced a spirit of criticism into the national jurisprudence.

(4) This gigantic work was committed, wholly or in part, to Dr. Lorenzo Galindez de Carbajal. He laboured many years on it; but the results of his labours, as elsewhere noticed, have never been communicated to the public.—See Asso y Manuel, *Instituciones*, pp. 50, 99.—Marina, *Ensayo*, pp. 392, 406; and Clemencin, whose *Ilust.* 9 exhibits a most clear and satisfactory view of the legal compilations under this reign.

(5) Lord Bacon's comment on Henry VII.'s laws might apply with equal force to those of Ferdinand and Isabella. "Certainly his times for good commonwealth's laws did excel. \* \* \* For his laws, whose marks them well, are deep, and not vulgar; not made upon the spur of a particular occasion for the present, but out of providence of the future, to make the estate of his people still more and more happy; after the manner of the legislators in ancient and heroic times."—*Hist. of Henry VII.* Works (ed. 1819), vol. v. p. 60.

the conduct of the tribunals that we are to read the true character of his government. It was the upright and vigilant administration of these which constituted the best claim of Ferdinand and Isabella to the gratitude of their country. To facilitate the despatch of business, it was distributed among a number of bureaux or councils; at the head of which stood the "royal council," whose authority and functions I have already noticed.(1) In order to leave this body more leisure for its executive duties, a new audience or chancery, as it was called, was established at Valladolid in 1480, whose judges were drawn from the members of the king's council. A similar tribunal was instituted, after the Moorish conquests, in the southern division of the monarchy; and both had supreme jurisdiction over all civil causes, which were carried up to them from the inferior audiences throughout the kingdom.(2)

The "council of the supreme" was placed over the Inquisition with a special view to the interests of the crown; an end, however, which it very imperfectly answered, as appears from its frequent collision with the royal and secular jurisdictions.(3) The "council of the orders" had charge, as the name imports, of the great military fraternities.(4) The "council of Aragon" was intrusted with the general administration of that kingdom and its dependencies, including Naples; and had besides extensive jurisdiction as a court of appeal.(5) Lastly, the "council of the Indies" was instituted by Ferdinand in 1511, for the control of the American department. Its powers, comprehensive as they were in its origin, were so much enlarged under Charles the Fifth and his successors, that it became the depository of all law, the fountain of all nominations, both ecclesiastical and temporal, and the supreme tribunal, where all questions, whether of government or trade in the colonies, were finally adjudicated.(6)

(1) Ante, Part I. chapter 6.

(2) *Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 24, 30, 39.—*Recop. de las Leyes*, (ed. 1640), tom. i. lib. 2, tit. 5, leyes 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 20; tit. 7, ley 1.—*Ordenanzas Reales*, lib. 2, tit. 4.—The southern chancery, first opened at Ciudad Real in 1494, was subsequently transferred by the sovereigns to Granada.

(3) Ante, vol. i. chap. vii.

(4) See the note in vol. i. p. 177, of this History.

(5) *Riol, Informe*, apud *Semanario Erudito*, tom. iii. p. 149.—It consisted of a vice-chancellor as president, and six ministers, two from each of the three provinces of the crown. It was consulted by the king on all appointments and matters of government. The Italian department was committed to a separate tribunal, called the council of Italy, in 1556. Capmany (*Mem. de Barcelona*, tom. iv. Apend. 17) has explained at length the functions and authority of this institution.

(6) See the nature and broad extent of these powers, in *Recop. de Leyes de las Indias*, tom. i. lib. 2, tit. 2, leyes 1, 2.—Also Solorzano, *Política Indiana*, tom. ii. lib. 5, cap. 15; who goes no further back than the remodelling of this tribunal under Charles V.—*Riol, Informe*, apud *Semanario Erudito*, tom. iii. pp. 159, 160. The third volume of the *Semanario Erudito*, pp. 73—233, contains a report, drawn up by command of Philip V. in 1726, by Don Santiago Agustín

Such were the forms which the government assumed under the hands of Ferdinand and Isabella. The great concerns of the empire were brought under the control of a few departments, which looked to the crown as their common head. The chief stations were occupied by lawyers, who were alone competent to the duties; and the precincts of the court swarmed with a loyal militia, who, as they owed their elevation to its patronage, were not likely to interpret the law to the disparagement of prerogative.(1)

The greater portion of the laws of this reign are directed in some form or other, as might be expected, to commerce and domestic industry. Their very large number, however, implies an extraordinary expansion of the national energy and resources, as well as a most earnest disposition in the government to foster them. The wisdom of these efforts, at all times, is not equally certain. I will briefly enumerate a few of the most characteristic and important provisions.

By a pragmatic of 1500, all persons, whether natives or foreigners, were prohibited from shipping goods in foreign bottoms, from a port where a Spanish ship could be obtained.(2) Another prohibited the sale of vessels to foreigners.(3) Another offered a large premium on all vessels of a certain tonnage and upwards;(4) and others held out protection and various immunities to seamen.(5) The drift of the first of these laws, like that of the famous English Navigation Act, so many years later, was, as the preamble sets forth, to exclude foreigners from the carrying trade; and the others were equally designed to build up a marine, for the defence as well as commerce of the country. In this the sovereigns were favoured by their important colonial acquisitions, the distance of which, moreover, made it expedient to employ vessels of greater burden than those hitherto used. The language of subsequent laws, as

Riol, on the organisation and state of the various tribunals, civil and ecclesiastical, under Ferdinand and Isabella; together with an account of the papers contained in their archives. It is an able memorial, replete with curious information. It is singular that this interesting and authentic document should have been so little consulted, considering the popular character of the collection in which it is preserved. I do not recollect ever to have met with a reference to it in any author. It was by mere accident, in the absence of a general index, that I stumbled on it in the *mare magnum* in which it is ingulfed.

(1) "Pusieron los Reyes Católicos," says the penetrating Mendoza, "el gobierno de la justicia, i cosas públicas en manos de Letrados, gente media entre los grandes i pequeños, sin ofensa de los unos ni de los otros. Cuya profesion eran letras legales, comedimiento, secreto, verdad, vida llana, i sin corrupcion de costumbres."—Guerra de Granada, p. 15.

(2) Granada, September 3rd.—Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 135.—A pragmatic of similar import was issued by Henry III.—Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages, tom. i. Introd. p. 46.

(3) Granada, August 11th, 1501.—Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 137.

(4) Alfaro, November 10th, 1495.—Ibid. fol. 136.

(5) See a number of these, collected by Navarrete, Coleccion de Viages Introd. pp. 43, 44.

well as various circumstances within our knowledge, attest the success of these provisions. The number of vessels in the merchant service of Spain, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, amounted to a thousand, according to Campomanes.<sup>(1)</sup> We may infer the flourishing condition of their commercial marine from their military, as shown in the armaments sent at different times against the Turks, or the Barbary corsairs.<sup>(2)</sup> The convoy which accompanied the Infanta Joanna to Flanders, in 1496, consisted of one hundred and thirty vessels, great and small, having a force of more than twenty thousand men on board; a formidable equipment, inferior only to that of the famed "Invincible Armada."<sup>(3)</sup>

A pragmatic was passed in 1491, at the petition of the inhabitants of the northern provinces, requiring English and other foreign traders to take their returns in the fruits or merchandise of the country, and not in gold or silver. This law seems to have been designed less to benefit the manufacturer, than to preserve the precious metals in the country.<sup>(4)</sup> It was the same in purport with other laws prohibiting the exportation of these metals, whether in coin or bullion. They were not new in Spain, nor indeed peculiar to her.<sup>(5)</sup> They proceeded on the principle that gold and silver, independently of their value as a commercial medium, constituted, in a peculiar sense, the wealth of a country. This error, common, as I have said, to other European nations, was eminently fatal to Spain, since the

(1) Cited by Robertson, *History of America*, vol. iii. p. 305.

(2) The fleet fitted out against the Turks, in 1482, consisted of seventy sail; and that under Gonsalvo, in 1500, of sixty, large and small.—(Ante, Part I. chapter 6; Part II. chapter 19.) See other expeditions, enumerated by Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. i. p. 50.

(3) *Cura de los Palacios*, MS. cap. 153; who, indeed, estimates the complement of this fleet at 25,000 men; a round number, which must certainly include persons of every description. The Invincible Armada consisted, according to Dunham, of about 130 vessels, large and small, 20,000 soldiers, and 8,000 seamen.—(*History of Spain and Portugal*, vol. v. p. 59.) The estimate falls below that of most writers.

(4) En el real de la Vega de Granada, December 20th.—(Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 133.) "Y les apercibays," enjoins the ordinance, "que los maredis porque los vendieren los han de sacar de nuestros reynos en mercaderias: y ni en oro ni en plata ni en moneda amonedada de manera que no pueden pretender ygnorancia: y den fianças llanas y abonadas de lo fazer y cumplir así: y si fallaredes que sacan o lleuan oro o plata o moneda contra el tenor y forma de las dichas leyes y desta nuestra carta mandamos vos que gelo torneys: y sea perdido como las dichas leyes mandan, y demas cayan y incurran en las penas en las leyes de nuestros reynos contenidas contra los que sacan oro o plata o moneda fuera dellos sin nuestra licencia y mandado: las quales executad en ellos y en sus fiadores."—See also a law of similar import, in the following year, 1492, apud Col. de Cédulas, tom. i. No. 67.

(5) Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 92, 134.—These laws were as old as the fourteenth century in Castile, and had been renewed by every succeeding monarch, from the time of John I.—(*Ordenanças Reales*, lib. 6, tit. 9, leyes 17—22.) Similar ones were passed under the contemporary princes, Henry VII. and VIII. of England, James IV. of Scotland, &c.

produce of its native mines before the discovery of America,(1) and of those in that quarter afterwards, formed its great staple. As such, these metals should have enjoyed every facility for transportation to other countries, where their higher value would afford a corresponding profit to the exporter.

The sumptuary laws of Ferdinand and Isabella are open, for the most part, to the same objections with those just noticed. Such laws, prompted in a great degree, no doubt, by the declamations of the clergy against the pomp and vanities of the world, were familiar, in early times, to most European states. There was ample scope for them in Spain, where the example of their Moslem neighbours had done much to infect all classes with a fondness for sumptuous apparel, and a showy magnificence of living. Ferdinand and Isabella fell nothing short of the most zealous of their predecessors in their efforts to restrain this improvident luxury. They did, however, what few princes on the like occasions have done,—enforced the precept by their own example. Some idea of their habitual economy, or rather frugality, may be formed from a remonstrance presented by the commons to Charles the Fifth, soon after his accession, which represents his daily household expenses as amounting to one hundred and fifty thousand maravedis; while those of the Catholic sovereigns were rarely fifteen thousand, or one-tenth of that sum.(2)

They passed several salutary laws for restraining the ambitious expenditure at weddings and funerals; as usual, most affected by those who could least afford it.(3) In 1494, they issued a pragmatic, prohibiting the importation or manufacture of brocades, or of gold or silver embroidery, and also plating with these metals. The avowed object was to check the growth of luxury and the waste of the precious metals.(4)

These provisions had the usual fate of laws of this kind. They

(1) ——— “Balucis malleator Hispanæ,”

says Martial, noticing the noise made by the gold-beaters, hammering out the Spanish ore, as one of the chief annoyances which drove him from the capital. (Lib. 12, ep. 57.) See also the precise statement of Pliny, cited Part I. chapter 8, of this History.

(2) Porque haciéndose así al modo é costumbre de los dichos señores Reyes pasados, cesarán los inmensos gastos y sin provecho que en la mesa é casa de S. M. se hacen; pues el daño desto notoriamente paresce porque se halla en el plato real y en los platos que se hacen á los privados é criados de su casa gastarse cada un día ciento y cinquenta mil maravedis; y los católicos Reyes D. Hernando é Doña Isabel, seyendo tan excelentes y tan poderosos, en su plato y en el plato del príncipe D. Joan que haya gloria, é de las señoras infantas con gran número y multitud de damas no se gastar cada un día, seyendo mui abastados como de tales Reyes, mas de doce á quinze mil maravedis.”—Petición de la Junta de Tordesillas, October 20, 1520, apud Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V. tom. i. p. 230.

(3) In 1493; repeated in 1501. Recop. de las Leyes, tom. ii. fol. 3.—In 1502. Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 139.

(4) At Segovia, September 2nd; also in 1496 and 1498. Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 123, 125, 126.

gave an artificial and still higher value to the prohibited article. Some evaded them. Others indemnified themselves for the privation, by some other and scarcely less expensive variety of luxury. Such, for example, were the costly silks which came into more general use after the conquest of Granada. But here the government, on remonstrance of the cortes, again interposed its prohibition, restricting the privilege of wearing them to certain specified classes.(1) Nothing, obviously, could be more impolitic than these various provisions directed against manufactures, which, under proper encouragement, or indeed without any, from the peculiar advantages afforded by the country, might have formed an important branch of industry, whether for the supply of foreign markets, or for home consumption.

Notwithstanding these ordinances, we find one, in 1500, at the petition of the silk-growers in Granada, against the introduction of silk thread from the kingdom of Naples;(2) thus encouraging the production of the raw material, while they interdicted the uses to which it could be applied. Such are the inconsistencies into which a government is betrayed by an over-zealous and impertinent spirit of legislation!

The chief exports of the country in this reign, were the fruits and natural products of the soil, the minerals, of which a great variety was deposited in its bosom, and the simpler manufactures, as sugar, dressed skins, oil, wine, steel, &c.(3) The breed of Spanish horses, celebrated in ancient times, had been greatly improved by the cross with the Arabian. It had, however, of late years, fallen into neglect; until the government, by a number of judicious laws, succeeded in restoring it to such repute, that this noble animal became an extensive article of foreign trade.(4) But the chief staple of the country was

(1) At Granada, in 1499.—This on petition of cortes, in the year preceeding. Sempere, in his sensible "*Historia del Luxo*," has exhibited the series of the manifold sumptuary laws in Castile. It is a history of the impotent struggle of authority against the indulgence of the innocent propensities implanted in our nature, and naturally increasing with increasing wealth and civilisation.

(2) En la nombrada y gran cibdad de Granada, Agosto 20.—*Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 135.

(3) *Pragmáticas del Reyno*, passim.—*Diccionario Geográfico-Hist. do España*, tom. i. p. 333.—Capmany, *Mem. de Barcelona*, tom. iii. part 3, cap. 2.—Mines of lead, copper, and silver, were wrought extensively in Guipuscoa and Biscay.—*Col. de Céd.* tom. i. No. 25.

(4) *Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 127, 128.—The cortes of Toledo, in 1525, complained, "que habia tantos caballos Españoles en Francia como en Castilla."—(*Mem. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. p. 285.) The trade, however, was contraband; the laws against the exportation of horses being as ancient as the time of Alfonso XI.—(See also *Ordenanças Reales*, fol. 85, 86.) Laws can never permanently avail against national prejudices. Those in favour of mules have been so strong in the Peninsula, and such the consequent decay of the fine breed of horses, that the Spaniards have been compelled to supply themselves with the latter from abroad. Bourgoignere reckons that 20,000 were annually imported into the country from France at the close of the last century.—*Travels in Spain*, tom. i. chap. 4.



wool; which, since the introduction of English sheep at the close of the fourteenth century, had reached a degree of fineness and beauty that enabled it, under the present reign, to compete with any other in Europe.(1)

To what extent the finer manufactures were carried, or made an article of export, is uncertain. The vagueness of statistical information in these early times has given rise to much crude speculation and to extravagant estimates of their resources, which have been met by a corresponding scepticism in later and more scrutinising critics. Capmany, the most acute of these, has advanced the opinion, that the coarser cloths only were manufactured in Castile, and those exclusively for home consumption.(2) The royal ordinances, however, imply, in the character and minuteness of their regulations, a very considerable proficiency in many of the mechanic arts.(3) Similar testimony is borne by intelligent foreigners, visiting or residing in the country at the beginning of the sixteenth century; who notice the fine cloths and manufacture of arms in Segovia,(4) the silks and velvets of Granada and Valencia,(5) the woollen and silk fabrics of Toledo, which gave employment to ten thousand artisans,(6) the curiously-wrought plate of Valladolid,(7) and the fine cutlery and glass manufactures of Barcelona, rivalling those of Venice.(8)

The recurrence of seasons of scarcity and the fluctuation of prices, might suggest a reasonable distrust of the excellence of the husbandry under this reign.(9) The turbulent condition of the

(1) Hist. del Luxo, tom. i. p. 170.—“Tiene muchas ovejas,” says Marineo, “cuya lana es tan singular, que no solamente se aprouchea della en España, mas tambien se lleva en abundancia a otras partes.—(Cosas Memorables, fol. 3.) He notices especially the fine wool of Molina, in whose territory 400,000 sheep pastured, fol. 19.

(2) Mem. de Barcelona, tom. iii. pp. 338, 339.—“Or if ever exported,” he adds, “it was at some period long posterior to the discovery of America.”

(3) Pragmáticas del Reyno, passim.—Many of them were designed to check impositions, too often practised in the manufacture and sale of goods, and to keep them up to a fair standard.

(4) L. Marineo, Cosas Memorables, fol. 11.

(5) Ibid. fol. 19.—Navagiero, Viaggio, fol. 26.—The Venetian minister, however, pronounces them inferior to the silks of his own country.

(6) “Proueyda,” says Mariuco, “do todos officios, y artes mecánicas que en ella se exercitan mucho; y principalmente en lanor, y exercicio de lanas, y sedas. Por las quales dos cosas bien en esta ciudad mas de diez mil personas. Es de mas desto la ciudad muy rica, por los grandes tratos de mercaderias.”—Cosas Memorables, fol. 12.

(7) Ibid. fol. 15.—Navagiero, a more parsimonious eulogist, remarks, nevertheless, “Sono in Valladolid assai artefici di ogni sorte, e se vi lavora benissimo de tutte le arti, e sopra tutto d’argenti, e vi son tanti argenterieri quanti non sono in due altre terre.”—Viaggio, fol. 35.

(8) Geron. Paulo, a writer at the close of the fifteenth century, cited by Capmany, Mem. de Barcelona, tom. i. part 3, p. 23.

(9) The twentieth illustration of Señor Clemencin’s invaluable compilation contains a table of prices of grain, in different parts of the kingdom, under Ferdinand and Isabella. Take, for example, those of Andalusia. In 1488, a year of great abundance, the *fanega* of wheat sold in Andalusia for 50 maravedis; in 1489, it rose to 100; in 1505, a season of great scarcity, to 375, and

country may account for this pretty fairly during the early part of it. Indeed, a neglect of agriculture to the extent implied by these circumstances, is wholly irreconcilable with the general tenor of Ferdinand and Isabella's legislation, which evidently relies on this as the main spring of national prosperity. It is equally repugnant, moreover, to the reports of foreigners, who could best compare the state of the country with that of others at the same period. They extol the fruitfulness of a soil which yielded the products of the most opposite climes; the hills clothed with vineyards and plantations of fruit-trees, much more abundant, it would seem, in the northern regions than at the present day; the valleys and delicious vegas, glowing with the ripe exuberance of southern vegetation; extensive districts, now smitten with the curse of barrenness, where the traveller scarce discerns the vestige of a road or of a human habitation, but which then teemed with all that was requisite to the sustenance of the populous cities in their neighbourhood.(1)

The inhabitant of modern Spain or Italy, who wanders amid the ruins of their stately cities, their grass-grown streets, their palaces and temples crumbling into dust, their massive bridges choking up the streams they once proudly traversed, the very streams themselves, which bore navies on their bosoms, shrunk into too shallow a channel for the meanest craft to navigate,—the modern Spaniard who surveys these vestiges of a giant race, the tokens of his nation's present degeneracy, must turn for relief to the proud and earlier period of her history, when only such great works could have been achieved; and it is no wonder that he should be led, in his enthusiasm, to invest it with a romantic and exaggerated colouring.(2) Such a period in even 600; in 1503, it was at 306; and in 1509, it had fallen to 85 maravedis.—*Mém. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. pp. 551, 552.

(1) Compare, for example, the accounts of the environs of Toledo and Madrid, the two most considerable cities in Castile, by ancient and modern travellers. One of the most intelligent and recent of the latter, in his journey between these two capitals, remarks, "There is sometimes a visible track, and sometimes none; most commonly we passed over wide sands. The country between Madrid and Toledo, I need scarcely say, is ill peopled, and ill cultivated; for it is all a part of the same arid plain that stretches on every side around the capital, and which is bounded on this side by the Tagus. The whole of the way to Toledo I passed through only four inconsiderable villages; and saw two others at a distance. A great part of the land is uncultivated, covered with furze and aromatic plants; but here and there some corn-land is to be seen."—(Ingles, Spain in 1830, p. 366.) What a contrast does all this present to the language of the Italians Navagiero and Marineo, in whose time the country around Toledo "surpassed all other districts of Spain in the excellence and fruitfulness of the soil;" which, "skillfully irrigated by the waters of the Tagus, and minutely cultivated, furnished every variety of fruit and vegetable produce to the neighbouring city." While, instead of the sunburnt plains around Madrid, it is described as situated "in the bosom of a fair country, with an ample territory, yielding rich harvests of corn and wine, and all the other aliments of life."—*Cosas Memorables*, fol. 12, 13.—*Viaggio*, fol. 7, 8.

(2) Capmany has well exposed some of these extravagances.—(*Mém.* c

Spain cannot be looked for in the last, still less in the seventeenth century, for the nation had then reached the lowest ebb of its fortunes;(1) nor in the close of the sixteenth, for the desponding language of cortes shows that the work of decay and depopulation had then already begun.(2) It can only be found in the first half of that century, in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, and that of their successor Charles the Fifth; in which last, the state, under the strong impulse it had received, was carried onward in the career of prosperity, in spite of the ignorance and mismanagement of those who guided it.

There is no country which has been guilty of such wild experiments, or has showed on the whole, such profound ignorance of the true principles of economical science, as Spain under the sceptre of the family of Austria. And, as it is not always easy to discriminate between their acts and those of Ferdinand and Isabella, under whom the germs of much of the subsequent legislation may be said to have been planted, this circumstance has brought undeserved discredit on the government of the latter. Undeserved, because laws, mischievous in their eventual operation, were not always so at the time for which they were originally devised; not to add, that what was intrinsically bad, has been aggravated tenfold under the blind legislation of their successors.(3) It is also true, that many

Barcelona, tom. iii. part 3, cap. 2.) The holdest of them, however, may find a warrant in the declarations of the legislature itself: "En los lugares de obrages de lanas," asserts the cortes of 1594, "donde se solian labrar yehute y trémita mill arobas, no se labran hoy seis, y donde habia señores de ganado de grandísima cantidad, han disminuido en la misma y mayor proporción, acacciendo lo mismo en todas las otras cosas del comercio universal y particular. Lo cual hace que no haya abundancia de las principales destas rēnos ni lugar ninguno, de donde no falte notable vecindad como se echaba bien de ver en la muchedumbre de cascas que estan cerradas y despobladas, y en la baja que han dado los arrendamientos de las pocas que se arriendan y habitan."—Apud Mein. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. p. 394.

(1) A point which most writers would probably agree in fixing at 1700, the year of Charles II.'s death, the last and most imbecile of the Austrian dynasty. The population of the kingdom at this time had dwindled to 6,000,000.—See Laborde (Itinéraire, tom. vi. pp. 125, 143, ed. 1830), who seems to have better foundation for this census than for most of those in his table.

(2) See the unequivocal language of cortes, under Philip II. (supra). With every allowance, it infers an alarming decline in the prosperity of the nation.

(3) One has only to read, for an evidence of this, the lib. 6, tit. 18, of the "Nueva Recopilación," on "cosas prohibidas;" the laws on gilding and plating, lib. 5, tit. 24; on apparel and luxury, lib. 7, tit. 12; on woollen manufactures, lib. 7, tit. 14—17; et leges al. Perhaps no stronger proof of the degeneracy of the subsequent legislation can be given than by contrasting it with that of Ferdinand and Isabella in two important laws. 1. The sovereigns, in 1492, required foreign traders to take their returns in the products and manufactures of the country. By a law of Charles V. in 1552, the exportation of numerous domestic manufactures was prohibited; and the foreign trader, in exchange for domestic wool, was required to import into the country a certain amount of linen and woollen fabrics. 2. By an ordinance, in 1500, Ferdinand and Isabella prohibited the importation of silk thread from Naples, to encourage its production at home. This appears, from the tenor of subse-

of the most exceptionable laws sanctioned by their names are to be charged on their predecessors, who had ingrafted their principles into the system long before; (1) and many others are to be vindicated by the general practice of other nations, which authorised retaliation on the score of self-defence. (2)

Nothing is easier than to parade abstract theorems,—true in the abstract, in political economy; nothing harder than to reduce them to practice. That an individual will understand his own interests better than the government can, or, what is the same thing, that trade, if let alone, will find its way into the channels on the whole most advantageous to the community, few will deny. But what is true of all together, is not true of any one singly: and no one nation can safely act on these principles, if others do not. In point of fact, no nation has acted on them since the formation of the present political communities of Europe. All that a new state, or a new government in an old one, can now propose to itself is, not to sacrifice its interest to a speculative abstraction, but to accommodate its institutions to the great political system of which it is a member. On these principles, and on the higher obligation of providing the means of national independence in its most extended sense, much that was bad in the economical policy of Spain, at the period under review, may be vindicated.

It would be unfair to direct our view to the restrictive measures of Ferdinand and Isabella, without noticing also the liberal tenor of their legislation in regard to a great variety of objects. Such, for example, are the laws encouraging foreigners to settle in the country; (3) those for facilitating communication by internal improvements, roads, bridges, canals, on a scale of unprecedented magnitude; (4) for a similar attention to the wants of navigation, by constructing moles, quays, lighthouses

quent laws, to have perfectly succeeded. In 1552, however, a law was passed interdicting the export of manufactured silk, and admitting the importation of the raw material. By this sagacious provision, both the culture of silk and the manufacture were speedily crushed in Castile.

(1) See examples of these in the reigns of Henry III. and John II.—(Recop. de las Leyes, tom. ii. fol. 180, 181.) Such also were the numerous tariffs fixing the prices of grain, the vexatious class of sumptuary laws, those for the regulation of the various crafts, and, above all, on the exportation of the precious metals.

(2) The English statute-book alone will furnish abundant proof of this, in the exclusive regulations of trade and navigation existing at the close of the fifteenth century. Mr. Sharon Turner has enumerated many, under Henry VIII., of similar import with, and, indeed, more partial in their operation, than those of Ferdinand and Isabella.—History of England, vol. iv. pp. 170 et seq.

(3) Ordenanzas Reales, lib. 6, tit. 4, ley 6.

(4) Archivo de Simancas; in which most of these ordinances appear to be registered. Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Ilust. 11.—See also Col. de Céd. tom. ii. p. 443; tom. iv. Nos. 33, 38.

along the coast, and deepening and extending the harbours, "to accommodate," as the acts set forth, "the great increase of trade;" for embellishing and adding in various ways to the accommodations of the cities;(1) for relieving the subject from onerous tolls and oppressive monopolies;(2) for establishing a uniform currency and standard of weights and measures throughout the kingdom,(3) objects of unwearied solicitude through this whole reign; for maintaining a police, which, from the most disorderly and dangerous, raised Spain, in the language of Martyr, to be the safest country in Christendom;(4) for such equal justice as secured to every man the fruits of his own industry, inducing him to embark his capital in useful enterprises; and finally, for enforcing fidelity to contracts,(5) of which the sovereigns gave such a glorious example in their own administration as effectually restored that public credit which is the true basis of public prosperity.

While these important reforms were going on in the interior of the monarchy, it experienced a greater change in its external condition, by the immense augmentation of its territory. The most important of its foreign acquisitions were those nearest home, Granada and Navarre; at least, they were the ones most capable, from their position, of being brought under control, and thoroughly and permanently identified with the Spanish monarchy. Granada, as we have seen, was placed under the sceptre of Castile, governed by the same laws, and represented in its cortes; being, in the strictest sense, part and parcel of the kingdom. Navarre was also united to the same crown; but its constitution, which bore considerable analogy to that of Aragon, remained substantially the same as before. The government, indeed, was administered by a viceroy; but Ferdinand made as few changes as

(1) "Ennoblescense los cibdades é villas en tener casas grandes é bien fechas en que fagan sus ayuntamientos é concejos," &c.—(Ordenanças Reales, lib. 7, tit. 1, ley 1.) Señor Clemenein has specified the nature and great variety of these improvements, as collected from the archives of the different cities of the kingdom.—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. iv. Ilustracion 11. Col. de Cédulas, tom. iv. No. 9.

(2) Col. de Cédulas, tom. i. Nos. 71, 72.—Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 63, 91, 93.—Recop. de las Leyes, lib. 5, tit. 11, ley 12.—Among the acts for restricting monopolies may be mentioned one, which prohibited the nobility and great landholders from preventing their tenants opening inns and houses of entertainment without their especial license.—(Pragmáticas del Reyno, 1492, fol. 96.) The same abuse, however, is noticed by Mad. d'Aulnoy, in her "Voyage d'Espagne," as still existing, to the great prejudice of travellers, in the seventeenth century.—Dunlop, Memoirs of Philip IV. and Charles II. vol. ii. chap. 11.

(3) Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 93—112.—Recop. de las Leyes, lib. 5, tit. 21, 22.

(4) "Ut nulla unquam per se tuta regio, tutiorem se fuisse jactare possit."—Opus Epist. epist. 31.

(5) For various laws tending to secure this, and prevent frauds in trade, see Ordenanças Reales, lib. 3, tit. 8, ley 5; Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 45, 60, 67, et alibi; Col. de Céd. tom. i. No. 63.

possible, permitting it to retain its own legislature, its ancient courts of law, and its laws themselves. So the forms, if not the spirit of independence, continued to survive its union with the victorious stato.(1)

The other possessions of Spain were scattered over the various quarters of Europe, Africa, and America. Naples was the conquest of Aragon; or, at least, made on behalf of that crown. The queen appears to have taken no part in the conduct of that war, whether distrusting its equity or its expediency, in the belief that a distant possession in the heart of Europe would probably cost more to maintain than it was worth. In fact, Spain is the only nation, in modern times, which has been able to keep its hold on such possessions for any very considerable period; a circumstance implying more wisdom in her policy than is commonly conceded to her. The fate of the acquisitions alluded to forms no exception to the remark; and Naples, like Sicily, continued permanently ingrafted on the kingdom of Aragon.

A fundamental change in the institutions of Naples became requisite to accommodate them to its new relations. Its great offices of state and its legal tribunals were reorganised. Its jurisprudence, which, under the Angevin race, and even the first Aragonese, had been adapted to French usages, was now modelled on the Spanish. The various innovations were conducted by the Catholic king with his usual prudence; and the reform in the legislation is commended by a learned and impartial Italian civilian, as breathing a spirit of moderation and wisdom.(2) He conceded many privileges to the people, and to the capital especially, whose venerable university he resuscitated from the decayed stato into which it had fallen, making liberal appropriations from the treasury for its endowment. The support of a mercenary army, and the burdens incident to the war, pressed heavily on the people during the first years of his reign. But the Neapolitans, who, as already noticed, had been transferred too often from one victor to another to be keenly sensible to the loss of political independence, were gradually reconciled to his administration, and testified their sense of its beneficent character by celebrating the anniversary of his death, for more than two centuries, with public solemnities, as a day of mourning throughout the kingdom.(3)

(1) The fullest, though a sufficiently meagre account of the Navarrese constitution is to be found in Capmany's collection, "*Práctica y Estilo*" (pp. 250—258), and in the "*Diccionario Geográfico-Hist. de España*" (tom. ii. pp. 140—143). The historical and economical details in the latter are more copious.

(2) "*Queste furono*," says Giannone, "*le prime leggi che ci diedero gli Spagnuoli: leggi tutte provvide e savie, nello stabilir delle quali furono veramente gli Spagnuoli più d'ogni altra nazione avveduti, e più esatti imitatori de' Romani.*"—*Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 30, cap. 5.

(3) Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4; lib. 30, cap. 1, 2, 5.—*Signo-*

But far the most important of the distant acquisitions of Spain were those secured to her by the genius of Columbus and the enlightened patronage of Isabella. Imagination had ample range in the boundless perspective of these unknown regions; but the results actually realised from the discoveries, during the queen's life, were comparatively insignificant. In a mere financial view, they had been a considerable charge on the crown. This was, indeed, partly owing to the humanity of Isabella, who interfered, as we have seen, to prevent the compulsory exaction of Indian labour. This was subsequently, and immediately after her death, indeed, carried to such an extent, that nearly half a million of ounces of gold were yearly drawn from the mines of Hispaniola alone.(1) The pearl-fisheries,(2) and the culture of the sugar-cane, introduced from the Canaries,(3) yielded large returns under the same inhuman system.

Ferdinand, who enjoyed by the queen's testament, half the amount of the Indian revenues, was now fully awakened to their importance. It would be unjust, however, to suppose his views limited to immediate pecuniary profits; for the measures he pursued were, in many respects, well contrived to promote the nobler ends of discovery and colonisation. He invited the persons most eminent for nautical science and enterprise, as Pinzon, Solis, Vespucci, to his court, where they constituted a sort of board of navigation, constructing charts, and tracing out new routes for projected voyages.(4) The conduct of this department was intrusted to the last-mentioned navigator, who had the glory, the greatest which accident and caprice ever granted to man, of giving his name to the new hemisphere.

Fleets were now fitted out on a more extended scale, which might vie, indeed, with the splendid equipments of the Portu-

relli, *Cultura nelle Sicilie*, tom. iv. p. 84. Every one knows the persecutions, the exile, and long imprisonment which Giannone suffered for the freedom with which he treated the clergy in his philosophical history. The generous conduct of Charles of Bourbon to his helms is not so well known. Soon after his accession to the throne of Naples, that prince settled a liberal pension on the son of the historian, declaring that "It did not comport with the honour and dignity of the government to permit an individual to languish in indigence, whose parent had been the greatest man, the most useful to the state, and the most unjustly persecuted, that the age had produced." Noble sentiments, giving additional grace to the act which they accompanied.—See the decree, cited by Corniani, *Scogli della Letteratura Italiana* (Brescia, 1804-1813), tom. ix. art. 15.

(1) *Herrera, Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 6, cap. 18. According to Martyr, the two mints of Hispaniola yielded 300,000 lbs. of gold annually.—*De Rebus Oceanicis*, dec. 1, lib. 10.

(2) The pearl-fisheries of Cubagua were worth 75,000 ducats a year.—*Herrera, Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 7, cap. 9.

(3) Oviedo, *Historia Natural de las Indias*, lib. 4, cap. 8.—Gompez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 165.

(4) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, tom. iii. documentos 1—13.—*Herrera, Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 7, cap. 1.

guesse, whose brilliant successes in the East excited the envy of their Castilian rivals. The king occasionally took a share in the voyage, independently of the interest which of right belonged to the crown.(1)

The government, however, realised less from these expensive enterprises than individuals; many of whom, enriched by their official stations, or by accidentally falling in with some hoard of treasure among the savages, returned home to excite the envy and cupidity of their countrymen.(2) But the spirit of adventure was too high among the Castilians to require such incentive, especially when excluded from its usual field in Africa and Europe. A striking proof of the facility with which the romantic cavaliers of that day could be directed to this new career of danger on the ocean, was given at the time of the last-meditated expedition into Italy under the Great Captain. A squadron of fifteen vessels, bound for the New World, was then riding in the Guadalquivir. Its complement was limited to one thousand two hundred men; but, on Ferdinand's countermanding Gonsalvo's enterprise, more than three thousand volunteers, many of them of noble family, equipped with unusual magnificence for the Italian service, hastened to Seville, and pressed to be admitted into the Indian armada.(3) Seville itself was in a manner depopulated by the general fever of emigration, so that it actually seemed, says a contemporary, to be tenanted only by women.(4)

In this universal excitement, the progress of discovery was pushed forward with a success, inferior, indeed, to what might have been effected in the present state of nautical skill and science, but extraordinary for the times. The winding depths of the Gulf of Mexico were penetrated, as well as the borders of the rich but rugged isthmus which connects the American continents. In 1512, Florida was discovered by a romantic old knight, Ponce de Leon, who, instead of the magical fountain of health, found his grave there.(5) Solis, another navigator,

(1) Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viajes*, tom. iii. pp. 48, 134.

(2) Bernardin de Santa Clara, treasurer of Hispaniola, amassed, during a few years' residence there, 96,000 ounces of gold. This same *nouveau riche* used to serve gold dust, says Herrera, instead of salt, at his entertainments.—(*Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 7, cap. 3.) Many believed, according to the same author, that gold was so abundant, as to be dragged up in nets from the beds of the rivers!—Lib. 10, c. 14.

(3) Ante, Part II. vol. ii. chapter 25.—Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 10, cap. 6, 7.

(4) "Per esser Sevilla nel loco che è, vi vanno tanti di loro alle Indie, che la città resta mal popolata, e quasi in man di donne."—(Navagiero, *Viaggio*, fol. 15.) Horace said, fifteen centuries before,

"Impiger extremos curris mercator ad Indos,

Per mare pauperiem fugiens, per saxa, per ignes."—*Epist.* i. 1.

(5) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 9, cap. 10.—Almost all the Spanish expeditions in the New World, whether on the northern or southern continent, have a tinge of romance beyond what is found in those of other European nations. One of the most striking and least familiar of them is that



who had charge of an expedition, projected by Ferdinand, (1) to reach the South Sea by the circumnavigation of the continent, ran down the coast as far as the great Rio de la Plata, where he also was out off by the savages. In 1513, Vasco Nunez de Balboa, penetrated, with a handful of men, across the narrow part of the Isthmus of Darien; and from the summit of the Cordilleras, the first of Europeans was greeted with the long-promised vision of the southern ocean. (2)

The intelligence of this event excited a sensation in Spain inferior only to that caused by the discovery of America. The great object which had so long occupied the imagination of the nautical men of Europe, and formed the purpose of Columbus's last voyage, the discovery of a communication with these far western waters, was accomplished. The famous Spioe Islands, from which the Portuguese had drawn such countless sums of wealth, were scattered over this sea; and the Castilians, after a journey of a few leagues, might launch their barks on its quiet bosom, and reach, and perhaps claim, the coveted possessions of their rivals, as falling west of the papal line of demarcation. Such were the dreams, and such the actual progress of discovery, at the close of Ferdinand's reign.

Our admiration of the dauntless heroism displayed by the early Spanish navigators in their extraordinary career is much qualified by a consideration of the cruelties with which it was furnished; too great to be either palliated or passed over in silence by the historian. As long as Isabella lived, the Indians found an efficient friend and protector; but "her death," says the venerable Las Casas, "was the signal for their destruction." (3) Immediately on that event, the system of *repartimientos*, originally authorised, as we have seen, by Columbus, who seems to have had no doubt, from the first, of the crown's absolute right of property over the natives, (4) was carried to its full extent in the colonies. (5) Every Spaniard, however humble, had his proportion of slaves; and men, many of them not only incapable of estimating the awful responsibility of the

of Ferdinand de Soto, the ill-fated discoverer of the Mississippi, whose bones bleach beneath its waters. His adventures are told with uncommon spirit by Mr. Baneroff, vol. i. chap. 2, of his History of the United States.

(1) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 2, lib. 1, cap. 7.

(2) The life of this daring cavalier forms one in the elegant series of national biographies by Quintana, "*Vidas de Españoles Célebres*" (tom. ii. pp. 1—82), and is familiar to the English reader in Irving's "*Companions of Columbus*." The third volume of Navarrete's laborious compilation is devoted to the illustration of the minor Spanish voyagers, who followed up the bold track of discovery between Columbus and Cortes.—*Colección de Viages*.

(3) Las Casas, *Mémoire, Œuvres*, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 189.

(4) "Y crean (Vuestras Altezas) questa isla y todas las otras son así suyas como Castilla, que aquí no falta salvo asiento y mandarles hacer lo que quisieren."—*Primera Carta de Colon*, apud Navarrete, *Colección de Viages*, tom. i. p. 93.

(5) Herrera, *Indias Occidentales*, dec. 1, lib. 8, cap. 9.—Las Casas, *Œuvres*, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. pp. 228, 229.

situation, but without the least touch of humanity in their natures, were individually intrusted with the unlimited disposal of the lives and destinies of their fellow-creatures. They abused this trust in the grossest manner; tasking the unfortunate Indian far beyond his strength, inflicting the most refined punishments on the indolent, and hunting down those who resisted or escaped, like so many beasts of chase, with ferocious bloodhounds. Every step of the white man's progress in the New World may be said to have been on the corpse of a native. Faith is staggered by the recital of the number of victims immolated in these fair regions within a very few years after the discovery; and the heart sickens at the loathsome details of barbarities, recorded by one, who, if his sympathies have led him sometimes to overcolour, can never be suspected of wilfully misstating facts of which he was an eyewitness.(1) A selfish indifference to the rights of the original occupants of the soil is a sin which lies at the door of most of the primitive European settlers, whether papist or puritan, of the New World. But it is light in comparison with the fearful amount of crimes to be charged on the early Spanish colonists; crimes that have, perhaps, in this world, brought down the retribution of Heaven, which has seen fit to turn this fountain of inexhaustible wealth and prosperity to the nation into the waters of bitterness.

It may seem strange that no relief was afforded by the government to these oppressed subjects. But Ferdinand, if we may credit Las Casas, was never permitted to know the extent of the injuries done to them.(2) He was surrounded by men in the management of the Indian department, whose interest it was to keep him in ignorance.(3) The remonstrances of some

(1) See the various Memorials of Las Casas, some of them expressly prepared for the council of the Indies. He affirms that more than 12,000,000 lives were wantonly destroyed in the New World within thirty-eight years after the discovery, and this in addition to those exterminated in the conquest of the country.—(Œuvres, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 187.) Herrera admits that Hispaniola was reduced, in less than twenty-five years, from 1,000,000 to 14,000 souls.—(Indias Occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 10, cap. 12.) The numerical estimates of a large savage population must, of course, be in a great degree hypothetical. That it was large, however, in these fair regions, may readily be inferred from the facilities of subsistence, and the temperate habits of the natives. The minimum sum in the calculation, when the number had dwindled to a few thousand, might be more easily ascertained.

(2) Œuvres, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 228. \*

(3) One resident at the court, says the bishop of Chiapa, was proprietor of 800, and another of 1,100 Indians.—(Œuvres, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 238.) We learn their names from Herrera. The first was Bishop Fonseca, the latter the comendador Conchillos, both prominent men in the Indian department.—(Indias Occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 9, cap. 14.) The last-named person was the same individual sent by Ferdinand to his daughter in Flanders, and imprisoned there by the archduke Philip. After that prince's death, he experienced signal favours from the Catholic king, and amassed great wealth as secretary of the Indian board. Oviedo has devoted one of his dialogues to him.—Quincunagenas, MS. bat. 1, quine. 3, dial. 9.

zealous missionaries led him, (1) in 1501, to refer the subject of the *repartimientos* to a council of jurists and theologians. This body yielded to the representations of the advocates of the system, that it was indispensable for maintaining the colonies, since the European was altogether unequal to labour in this tropical climate; and that it moreover afforded the only chance for the conversion of the Indian, who, unless compelled, could never be brought in contact with the white man. (2)

On these grounds, Ferdinand openly assumed for himself and his ministers the responsibility of maintaining this vicious institution; and subsequently issued an ordinance to that effect, accompanied, however, by a variety of humane and equitable regulations for restraining its abuse. (3) The license was embraced in its full extent; the regulations were openly disregarded. (4) Several years after, in 1515, Las Casas, moved by the spectacle of human suffering, returned to Spain, and pleaded the cause of the injured native in tones which made the dying monarch tremble on his throne. It was too late, however, for the king to execute the remedial measures he contemplated. (5) The efficient interference of Ximenes, who sent a commission for the purpose to Hispaniola, was attended with no permanent results; and the indefatigable "protector of the Indians" was left to sue for redress at the court of Charles, and to furnish a splendid, if not a solitary example there, of a bosom penetrated with the true spirit of Christian philanthropy. (6)

(1) The Dominican and other missionaries, to their credit be it told, laboured with unwearied zeal and courage for the conversion of the natives, and the vindication of their natural rights. Yet these were the men who lighted the fires of the Inquisition in their own land. To such opposite results may the same principle lead, under different circumstances.

(2) Las Casas concludes an elaborate memorial, prepared for the government in 1542, on the best means of arresting the destruction of the aborigines, with two propositions. 1. That the Spaniards would still continue to settle in America, though slavery were abolished, from the superior advantages for acquiring riches it offered over the Old World. 2. That, if they would not, this would not justify slavery, since "*God forbids us to do evil that good may come of it.*" Rare maxim from a Spanish churchman of the sixteenth century! The whole argument, which comprehends the sum of what has been since said more diffusely in defence of abolition, is singularly acute and cogent. In its abstract principles it is unanswerable; while it exposes and denounces the misconduct of his countrymen, with a freedom which shows the good bishop knew no other fear than that of his Maker.

(3) Recop. de Leyes de las Indias, August 14th; 1509, lib. 6, tit. 8, ley 1.—Herrera, Indias Occidentales, dec. 1, lib. 9, cap. 14.

(4) The text expresses nearly enough the subsequent condition of things in Spanish America. "No government," says Heceren, "has done so much for the aborigines as the Spanish."—(Modern History, Bancroft's trans. vol. i. p. 77.) Whoever peruses its colonial codes may find much ground for the eulogium. But are not the very number and repetition of these humane provisions sufficient proof of their inefficacy?

(5) Herrera, Indias Occidentales, dec. 2, lib. 2, cap. 3.—Las Casas, Mémoire, apud Cénvres, éd. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 239.

(6) In the remarkable discussion between the doctor Sepúlveda and Las Casas, before a commission named by Charles V., in 1550, the former vindicated the

I have elsewhere examined the policy pursued by the Catholic sovereigns in the government of their colonies. The supply of precious metals yielded by them eventually, proved far greater than had ever entered into the conception of the most sanguine of the early discoverers. Their prolific soil and genial climate, moreover, afforded an infinite variety of vegetable products, which might have furnished an unlimited commerce with the mother country. Under a judicious protection, their population and productions, steadily increasing, would have enlarged to an incalculable extent the general resources of the empire. Such, indeed, might have been the result of a wise system of legislation.

But the true principles of colonial policy were sadly misunderstood in the sixteenth century. The discovery of a world was estimated, like that of a rich mine, by the value of its returns in gold and silver. Much of Isabella's legislation, it is true, is of that comprehensive character which shows that she looked to higher and far nobler objects. But with much that is good there was mingled, as in most of her institutions, one germ of evil, of little moment at the time indeed, but which, under the vicious culture of her successors, shot up to a height that overshadowed and blighted all the rest. This was the spirit of restriction and monopoly, aggravated by the subsequent laws of Ferdinand, and carried to an extent under the Austrian dynasty that paralysed colonial trade.

Under their most ingeniously perverse system of laws, the interests of both the parent country and the colonies were sacrificed. The latter, condemned to look for supplies to an incompetent source, were miserably dwarfed in their growth; while the former contrived to convert the nutriment which she exported from the colonies into a fatal poison. The streams of wealth which flowed in from the silver quarries of Zacatecas and Potosí were jealously locked up within the limits of the Peninsula. The great problem proposed by the Spanish legislation of the sixteenth century, was the reduction of prices in the kingdom to the same level as in other European nations. Every law that was passed, however, tended, by its restrictive character, to augment the evil. The golden tide, which, permitted a free vent, would have fertilised the region through which it poured, now buried the land under a deluge which blighted every green and living thing. Agriculture, commerce, manufactures, every branch of national industry and improvement, languished and fell to decay; and the nation, like the

persecution of the aborigines by the conduct of the Israelites towards their idolatrous neighbours. But the Spanish Fenelon replied, that "the behaviour of the Jews was no precedent for Christians; that the law of Moses was a law of rigour, but that of Jesus Christ one of grace, mercy, peace, goodwill, and charity."—(*Œuvres*, ed. de Llorente, tom. i. p. 374.) The Spaniard first persecuted the Jews, and then quoted them as an authority for persecuting all other infidels.

Phrygian monarch who turned all that he touched to gold, cursed by the very consummation of its wishes, was poor in the midst of its treasures.

From this sad picture let us turn to that presented by the period of our History, when, the clouds and darkness having passed away, a new morn seemed to break upon the nation. Under the firm but temperate sway of Ferdinand and Isabella, the great changes we have noticed were effected without convulsion in the state. On the contrary, the elements of the social system, which before jarred so discordantly, were brought into harmonious action. The restless spirit of the nobles was turned from evil faction to the honourable career of public service, whether in arms or letters. The people at large, assured of the security of private rights, were occupied with the different branches of productive labour. Trade, as is abundantly shown by the legislation of the period, had not yet fallen into the discredit which attached to it in later times.(1) The precious metals, instead of flowing in so abundantly as to palsy the arm of industry, served only to stimulate it.(2)

The foreign intercourse of the country was every day more widely extended. Her agents and consuls were to be found in all the principal ports of the Mediterranean and the Baltic.(3)

(1) It is only necessary to notice the contemptuous language of Philip II.'s laws, which designate the most useful mechanic arts, as those of blacksmiths, shoemakers, leather-dressers, and the like, as "*oficios viles y bajos*;"—corresponding, probably, with the epithet *βαρβαροι* (illiberal arts) of the Greeks, among whom various menial and mechanic occupations fell into disrepute, from their being engrossed by the slaves.—(See Aristotle, *Polit. lib. 3.*) A whimsical distinction prevails in Castile, in reference to the more humble occupations. A man of gentle blood may be a coachman, lacquey, scullion, or any other menial, without disparaging his nobility, which is said to *sleep* in the mean while. But he fixes on it an indelible stain if he exercises any mechanical vocation. "Hence," says Capmany, "I have often seen a village in this province, in which the vagabonds, smugglers, and hangmen even, were natives, while the farrier, shoemaker, &c., was a foreigner."—(Mem. de Barcelona, tom. i. part 3, p. 40; tom. iii. part 2, pp. 317, 318.) See also some sensible remarks on the subject by Blanco White, the ingenious author of *Dobla-do's Letters from Spain*, p. 44.

(2) "The interval between the acquisition of money, and the rise of prices," Hume observes, "is the only time when increasing gold and silver are favourable to industry."—(Essays, part 2, essay 3.) An ordinance of June 13th, 1497, complains of the scarcity of the precious metals, and their insufficiency to the demands of the trade. (*Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 93.) It appears, however, from Zúñiga, that the importation of gold from the New World began to have a sensible effect on the prices of commodities from that very year.—*Anales de Sevilla*, p. 415.

(3) Mr. Turner has made several extracts from the Harleian MSS., showing that the trade of Castile with England was very considerable in Isabella's time.—(History of England, vol. iv. p. 90.) A pragmatic of July 21st, 1494, for the erection of a consulate at Burgos, notices the commercial establishments in England, France, Italy, and the Low Countries. This tribunal, with other extensive privileges, was empowered to hear and determine suits between merchants; "which," says the plain-spoken ordinance, "in the hands of lawyers are never brought to a close; porque se presentaban escritos y libelos de letrados de manera que por mal pleyto que fuesse le sostenian los letrados

The Spanish mariner, instead of creeping along the beaten track of inland navigation, now struck boldly across the great western ocean. The new discoveries had converted the land trade with India into a sea trade; and the nations of the Peninsula, who had hitherto lain remote from the great highways of commerce, now became the factors and carriers of Europe.

The flourishing condition of the nation was seen in the wealth and population of its cities, the revenues of which, augmented in all to a surprising extent, had increased in some, forty and even fifty fold beyond what they were at the commencement of the reign: (1) the ancient and lordly Toledo; Burgos, with its bustling, industrious traders; (2) Valladolid, sending forth its thirty thousand warriors from its gates, where the whole population now scarcely reaches two-thirds of that number; (3) Cordova, in the south, and the magnificent Granada, naturalizing in Europe the arts and luxuries of the East; Saragossa, "the abundant," as she was called from her fruitful territory; Valencia, "the beautiful;" Barcelona, rivalling in independence and maritime enterprise the proudest of the Italian republics; (4) Medina del Campo, whose fairs were already the great mart for the commercial exchanges of the Peninsula; (5)

*de manera que los hazian immortales.*"—*Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 146—148.) This institution rose soon to be of the greatest importance in Castile.

(1) The sixth volume of the Memoirs of the Academy of History contains a schedule of the respective revenues afforded by the cities of Castile in the years 1477, 1482, and 1504; embracing, of course, the commencement and close of Isabella's reign. The original document exists in the archives of Simancas. We may notice the large amount and great increase of taxes in Toledo particularly, and in Seville; the former thriving from its manufactories, and the latter from the Indian trade. Seville, in 1504, furnished near a tenth of the whole revenue.—*Illustracion* 5.

(2) "No ay eu ella," says Marineo of the latter city, "gente ociosa, ni baldia, sino que todos trabajan, asi mugeres como hombres, y los chicos como los grandes, buscando la vida con sus manos, y con sudores de sus carnes. Unos exercitan las artes mecanicas: y otros las liberales. Los que tratan las mercaderias, y hazen rica la ciudad, son muy fieles, y liberales."—(*Cosas Memorables*, fol. 16.) It will not be easy to meet, in prose or verse, with a finer-coloured picture of departed glory than Mr. Slidell has given of the former city, the venerable Gothic capital, in his "Year in Spain," chap. 12.

(3) Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.* tom. i. p. 60.

(4) It was a common saying in Navagiero's time, "Barcelona la rica, Saragossa la harta, Valencia la hermosa."—(*Viaggio*, fol. 5.) The grandeur and commercial splendour of the first-named city, which forms the subject of Capmany's elaborate work, have been sufficiently displayed in Part I. chapter 2, of this History.

(5) "*¿gunos suponen,*" says Capmany, "*que estas serias eran ya famosas en tiempo de los Reyes Católicos,*" &c.—(*Mem. de Barcelona*, tom. iii. p. 356.) A very cursory glance at the laws of this time will show the reasonableness of the supposition. See the *Pragmáticas*, fol. 146, and the ordinances from the archives of Simancas, apud *Mem. de Acad.* tom. vi. pp. 249, 252, providing for the erection of buildings and other accommodations for the "great resort of traders." In 1520, four years after Ferdinand's death, the city, in a petition to the regent, represented the losses sustained by its merchants in the recent fire as more than the revenues of the crown would probably be able to meet for several years.—(*Ibid.* p. 264.) Navagiero, who visited Medina some six years

and Seville,(1) the golden gate of the Indies, whose quays began to be thronged with merchants from the most distant countries of Europe.

The resources of the inhabitants were displayed in the palaces and public edifices, fountains, aqueducts, gardens, and other works of utility and ornament. This lavish expenditure was directed by an improved taste. Architecture was studied on purer principles than before, and, with the sister arts of design, showed the influence of the new connection with Italy in the first gleams of that excellence which shed such lustre over the Spanish school at the close of the century.(2) A still more decided impulse was given to letters. More printing-presses were probably at work in Spain in the infancy of the art, than at the present day.(3) Ancient seminaries were remodelled; new ones were created. Barcelona, Salamanca, and Alcalá, whose cloistered solitudes are now the grave rather than the nursery of science, then swarmed with thousands of disciples, who, under the generous patronage of the government, found letters the surest path to preferment.(4) Even

later, when it was rebuilt, bears unequivocal testimony to its commercial importance. "Medina è buona terra, e piena di buone case, abbondante assai se non che le tante ferie che se vi fanno ogn' anno, e il concorso grande che vi è di tutta Spagna, fanno pur che il tutto si paga più di quel che si farà. \* \* \* \* La feria è abbondante certo di molte cose, ma sopra tutto di specularie assai, che vengono di Portogallo; ma le maggior faccende che se vi facciano sono cambij."—Viaggio, fol. 36.

- (1) "Quien no vió á Sevilla  
No vió maravilla."

The proverb, according to Zuñiga, is as old as the time of Alonso XI.—*Annals de Sevilla*, p. 183.

(2) The most eminent sculptors were for the most part foreigners; as Miguel Florentin, Pedro Torregiano, Felipe de Borgoña,—chiefly from Italy, where the art was advancing rapidly to perfection in the school of Michael Angelo. The most successful architectural achievement was the cathedral of Granada, by Diego de Siloe.—Pedraza, *Antigüedad de Granada*, fol. 22.—*Mém. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi. *Ilust.* 16.

(3) At least so says Clemencin, a competent judge. "Desde los mismos principios de su establecimiento fue mas comun la imprenta en España que lo es al cabo de trescientos años dentro ya del siglo decimonono."—*Elogio de Doña Isabel*, *Mém. de la Acad. de Hist.* tom. vi.

(4) Ante, introduction, Sect. 2; Part I. vol. i. chapter 19; Part II. vol. ii. chapter 21.—The "Pragmáticas del Reyno" comprises various ordinances, defining the privileges of Salamanca and Valladolid, the manner of conferring degrees, and of election to the chairs of the universities, so as to obviate any undue influence or corruption. (Fol. 14—21.) "Porque," says the liberal language of the last law, "los estudios generales donde las ciencias se leen y aprenden cifuerzan las leyes y hacen a los nuestros subditos y naturales sabidores y honrados y acrecientan virtudes: y porque en el dar y assignar de las cátedras salariales dene azer toda libertad porque sean dadas á personas sabidores y cientes."—(Perafona, October 5th, 1495.) If one would see the totally different principles on which such elections have been conducted in modern times; let him read Doblado's Letters from Spain, pp. 103—107. The university of Barcelona was suppressed in the beginning of the last century. Laborde has taken a brief survey of the present dilapidated condition of the others, at least as it was in 1830, since which it can scarcely have mended.—*Itinéraire*, tom. vi. p. 144, et seq.

the lighter branches of literature felt the revolutionary spirit of the times, and, after yielding the last fruits of the ancient system, displayed new and more beautiful varieties, under the influence of Italian culture.(1)

With this moral development of the nation, the public revenues, the sure index, when unforced, of public prosperity, went on augmenting with astonishing rapidity. In 1474, the year of Isabella's accession, the ordinary rents of the Castilian crown amounted to 885,000 reals;(2) in 1477, to 2,390,078; in 1482, after the resumption of the royal grants, to 12,711,591; and, finally, in 1504, when the acquisition of Granada(3) and the domestic tranquillity of the kingdom had encouraged the free expansion of all its resources, to 26,283,334; or thirty times the amount received at her accession.(4) All this, it will be remembered, was derived from the customary established taxes, without the imposition of a single new one. Indeed, the improvements in the mode of collection tended materially to lighten the burdens on the people.

The accounts of the population at this early period are, for the most part, vague and unsatisfactory. Spain, in particular, has been the subject of the most absurd, though, as it seems, not incredible estimates, sufficiently evincing the paucity of authentic data.(5) Fortunately, however, we labour under no

(1) See the concluding note to this chapter. Erasmus, in a lively and elegant epistle to his friend Francis Vergara, Greek professor at Alcalá, in 1527, lavishes unbounded panegyric on the science and literature of Spain, whose palmy state he attributes to Isabella's patronage, and the co-operation of some of her enlightened subjects. "— Hispania vestre, tanto successu, priscam eruditionis gloriam sibi postliminio vindicanti. Quæ quum semper et regionis amenitate fertilitatæque, semper ingentium eminentium ubere proventu, semper bellicæ laude floruerit, quid desiderari poterat ad summam felicitatem, nisi ut studiorum et religionis adjungeret ornamenta, quibus aspirante Deo sic paucis annis effloruit ut cæteris regionibus quamlibet hoc decorum genere præcellentibus vel invidiæ queat esse vel exemplo. \* \* \* Vos istam felicitatem secundum Deum debetis laudatissimæ Reginarum Elisabethæ, Francisco Cardinali quondam, Alonso Fonsecæ nunc Archiepiscopo Toletano, et si qui sunt horum similes, quorum autoritas tuctur, benignitas alit fovetque bonas artes."—Epistolæ, p. 978.

(2) The sums in the text express the *real de vellon*; to which they have been reduced by Señor Clemencin, from the original amount in *maravedis*, which varied very materially in value in different years.—Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. llist. 5.

(3) The kingdom of Granada appears to have contributed rather less than one-eighth of the whole tax.

(4) In addition to the last-mentioned sum, the extraordinary service voted by cortes, for the dowry of the infantas, and other matters, in 1504, amounted to 16,113,014 reals de vellon; making a sum total, for that year, of 42,396,348 reals. The bulk of the crown revenues was derived from the *alcavalas*, and the *tercias*, or two-ninths of the ecclesiastical tithes. These important statements were transcribed from the books of the *escribanía mayor de rentas*, in the archives of Simancas.—Ibid. ubi supra.

(5) The pretended amount of population has been generally in the ratio of the distance of the period taken, and, of course, of the difficulty of refutation. A few random remarks of ancient writers have proved the basis for the wildest hypotheses, raising the estimates to the total of what the soil, under the



such embarrassment as regards Castile in Isabella's reign. By an official report to the crown on the organisation of the militia, in 1492, it appears that the population of the kingdom amounted to 1,500,000 *vecinos* or householders; or, allowing four and a half to a family (a moderate estimate), to 6,750,000 souls.(1) This census, it will be observed, was limited to the provinces immediately composing the crown of Castile, to the exclusion of Granada, Navarre, and the Aragonese dominions.(2) It was taken, moreover, before the nation had time to recruit from the long and exhausting struggle of the Moorish war, and twenty-five years before the close of the reign, when the population, under circumstances peculiarly favourable, must have swelled to a much larger amount. Thus circumscribed, however, it was probably considerably in advance of that of England at the same period.(3) How have the destinies of the two countries since been reversed!

highest possible cultivation, would be capable of supporting. Even for so recent a period as Isabella's time, the estimate commonly received does not fall below eighteen or twenty millions. The official returns, cited in the text, of the most populous portion of the kingdom, fully expose the extravagance of preceding estimates.

(1) These interesting particulars are obtained from a memorial, prepared by order of Ferdinand and Isabella, by their *contador*, Alonso de Quintanilla, on the mode of enrolling and arming the militia, in 1492; as a preliminary step to which, he procured a census of the actual population of the kingdom. It is preserved in a volume entitled *Relaciones tocantes á la junta de la Hermandad*, in that rich national repository, the archives of Simancas.—See a copious extract, apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist. tom. vi. Apend. 12.

(2) I am acquainted with no sufficient and authentic data for computing the population at this time, of the crown of Aragon, always greatly below that of the sister kingdom. I find as little to be relied on, notwithstanding the numerous estimates, in one form or another, vouchsafed by historians and travellers, of the population of Granada. Marinco enumerates fourteen cities and ninety-seven towns (omitting, as he says, many places of less note), at the time of the conquest; a statement obviously too vague for statistical purposes.—(Cosas Memorables, fol. 179.) The capital swelled by the influx from the country, contained, according to him, 200,000 souls at the same period.—(Fol. 177.) In 1506, at the time of the forced conversions, we find the numbers in the city dwindled to fifty, or, at most, seventy thousand.—(Comp. Bleda, Corónica, lib. 5, cap. 23; and Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 159.) Loose as these estimates necessarily are, we have no better to guide us in calculating the total amount of the population of the Moorish kingdom, or of the losses sustained by the copious emigrations during the first fifteen years after the conquest, although there has been no lack of confident assertion, as to both, in later writers. The desideratum, in regard to Granada, will now probably not be supplied; the public offices in the kingdom of Aragon, if searched with the same industry as those in Castile, would doubtless afford the means for correcting the crude estimates so current respecting that country.

(3) Hallam, in his "Constitutional History of England," estimates the population of the realm, in 1485, at 3,000,000.—(Vol. i. p. 10.) The discrepancies, however, of the best historians on this subject prove the difficulty of arriving at even a probable result. Hume, on the authority of Sir Edward Coke, puts the population of England (including people of all sorts) a century later, in 1588, at only 900,000. The historian cites Lodovico Guicciardini, however, for another estimate, as high as 2,000,000, for the same reign of Queen Elizabeth.—History of England, vol. vi. Append. 3.

The territorial limits of the monarchy, in the mean time, went on expanding beyond example;—Castile and Leon, brought under the same sceptre with Aragon and its foreign dependencies, Sicily and Sardinia; with the kingdoms of Granada, Navarre, and Naples; with the Canaries, Oran, and the other settlements in Africa; and with the islands and vast continents of America. To these broad domains, the comprehensive schemes of the sovereigns would have added Portugal; and their arrangements for this, although defeated for the present, opened the way to its eventual completion under Philip the Second.<sup>(1)</sup>

The petty states, which had before swarmed over the Peninsula, neutralising each other's operations, and preventing any effective movement abroad, were now amalgamated into one whole. Sectional jealousies and antipathies, indeed, were too sturdily rooted to be wholly extinguished; but they gradually subsided under the influence of a common government and community of interests. A more enlarged sentiment was infused into the people, who, in their foreign relations at least, assumed the attitude of one great nation. The names of Castilian and Aragonese were merged in the comprehensive one of Spaniard; and Spain, with an empire which stretched over three quarters of the globe, and which almost realised the proud boast that the sun never set within her borders, now rose, not to the first class only, but to the first place, in the scale of European powers.

The extraordinary circumstances of the country tended naturally to nourish the lofty, romantic qualities, and the somewhat exaggerated tone of sentiment, which always pervaded the national character. The age of chivalry<sup>(2)</sup> had not

(1) Philip II. claimed the Portuguese crown in right of his mother and his wife, both descended from Maria, third daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, who, as the reader may remember, married King Emanuel.

(2) Old Caxton mourns over the little honour paid to the usages of chivalry in his time; and it is sufficient evidence of its decay in England, that Richard III. thought it necessary to issue an ordinance, requiring those possessed of the requisite 40*l.* a year, to receive knighthood.—(Turner, History of England, vol. iii. pp. 391, 392.) The use of artillery was fatal to chivalry; a consequence well understood, even at the early period of our history. At least, so we may infer from the verses of Ariosto, where Orlando throws Cimosco's gun into the sea.

“Lo toise e disse: Acciò, più non istea  
Mai cavalier per te d'essere arditò,  
Nè quanto il buono val, mai più si vanti  
Il rio per te valer, quì giù rimanti.”

Orlando Furioso, canto 9, st. 90.

Don Quixote is loud in his maledictions on “the diabolical invention,” as he terms it, so fatal to knight-errantry; and makes little doubt that the soul of the inventor is paying the penalty in hell, for thus putting it in the power of any coward to take away the life of a brave cavalier.—Part i. cap. 38.

faded away in Spain, as in most other lands. It was fostered in time of peace by the tourneys, jousts, and other warlike pageants which graced the court of Isabella.(1) It gleamed out, as we have seen, in the Italian campaigns under Gonsalvo de Cordova, and shone forth in all its splendours in the war of Granada. "This was a right gentle war," says Navagiero, in a passage too pertinent to be omitted, "in which, as firearms were comparatively little used, each knight had the opportunity of showing his personal prowess; and rare was it that a day passed without some feat of arms and valorous exploit. The nobility and chivalry of the land all thronged there to gather renown. Queen Isabella, who attended with her whole court, breathed courage into every heart. There was scarce a cavalier who was not enamoured of some one or other of her ladies, the witness of his achievements, and who, as she presented him his weapons, or some token of her favour, admonished him to bear himself like a true knight, and show the strength of his passion by his valiant deeds.(2) What knight so craven, then," exclaims the chivalrous Venetian, "that he would not have been more than a match for the stoutest adversary; or who would not sooner have lost his life a thousand times, than return dishonoured to the lady of his love! In truth," he concludes, "this conquest may be said to have been achieved by love, rather than by arms."(3)

(1) *Quien podrá contar,* exclaims the old curate of Los Palacios, "la grandeza, el concierto de su corte, la cavallería de los Nobles de toda España, Duques, Maestres, Marqueses é Ricos homes, los Galanes, las Damas, las Fiestas, los Torneos, la Multitud de Poetas é trovadores," &c.—*Reyes Católicos*, MS. cap. 201.

(2) Oviedo notices the existence of a lady-love, even with cavaliers who had passed their prime, as a thing of quite as imperative necessity in his day, as it was afterwards regarded by the gallant knight of La Mancha. "Costumbre es en España entre los señores de estado que venidos á la corte, aunque no estén enamorados ó que pasen de la mitad de la edad fingir que aman por servir y favorecer á alguna dama, y gastar como quien son en fiestas y otras cosas que se ofrecen de tales pasatiempos y amores, sin que les dé pena Cupido."—*Quincuagenas*, MS. bat. 1, quinc. 1, dial. 28.

(3) *Viaggio*, fol. 27. Andrea Navagiero, whose itinerary has been of such frequent reference in these pages, was a noble Venetian, born in 1483. He became very early distinguished, in his cultivated capital, for his scholarship, poetical talents, and eloquence, of which he has left specimens, especially in Latin verse, in the highest repute to this day with his countrymen. He was not, however, exclusively devoted to letters, but was employed in several foreign missions by the republic. It was on his visit to Spain, as minister to Charles V., soon after that monarch's accession, that he wrote his *Travels*; and he filled the same office at the court of Francis I., when he died, at the premature age of forty-six, in 1529.—(Tiraboschi, *Letteratura Italiana*, tom. vii. part 3, p. 228, ed. 1785.) His death was universally lamented by the good and the learned of his time, and is commemorated by his friend Cardinal Bembo, in two sonnets, breathing all the sensibility of that tender and elegant poet.—(Rime, Son. 109, 110.) Navagiero becomes connected with Castilian literature by the circumstance of Boscan's referring to his suggestion the innovation he so successfully made in the forms of the national verse.—*Obras*, fol. 20, ed. 1543.

The Spaniard was a knight-errant, in its literal sense, (1) roving over seas on which no bark had ever ventured, among islands and continents where no civilised man had ever trodden, and which fancy peopled with all the marvels and drear enchantments of romance; courting danger in every form, combating everywhere, and everywhere victorious. The very odds presented by the defenceless natives among whom he was east, "a thousand of whom," to quote the words of Columbus, "were not equal to three Spaniards," was in itself typical of his profession; (2) and the brilliant destinies to which the meanest adventurer was often called, now earving out with his good sword some "El Dorado" more splendid than fancy had dreamed of, and now overturning some old barbaric dynasty, were full as extraordinary as the wildest chimeras which Ariosto ever sang, or Cervantes satirised.

His countrymen who remained at home, feeding greedily on the reports of his adventures, lived almost equally in an atmosphere of romance. A spirit of chivalrous enthusiasm penetrated the very depths of the nation, swelling the humblest individual with lofty aspirations, and a proud consciousness of the dignity of his nature. "The princely disposition of the Spaniards," says a foreigner of the time, "delighteth me much, as well as the gentle nurture and noble conversation, not merely of those of high degree, but of the citizen, peasant, and common labourer." (3) What wonder that such sentiments should be found incompatible with sober, methodical habits of business, or that the nation indulging them should be seduced from the humble paths of domestic industry to a brilliant and bolder career of adventure? Such consequences became too apparent in the following reign. (4)

(1) Fernando de Pulgar, after enumerating various cavaliers of his acquaintance, who had journeyed to distant climes in quest of adventures and honourable feats of arms, continues, "E oi decir de otros Castellanos que con ánimo de Caballeros fueron por los Reynos estraños á facer armas con qualquier Caballero que quisiere facerlas con ellos, é por ellas ganaron honra para sí, é fama de valientes y esforzados Caballeros para los Fijosdalgos de Castilla."—*Claros Varones*, tit. 17.

(2) "Son todos," says the Admiral, "de ningún ingenio en las armas, y muy cobardes, que mil no agudarian tres!"—(*Primer Viage de Colon*.) What could the bard of chivalry say more?

"Ma quel ch' al timor non diede albergo,  
Estima laevil turba e l' arme tante  
Quel che dentro alla mandra ail' aer cupo,  
Il numer dell' agnelle estimi il lupo."

Orlando Furioso, canto 12.

(3) L. Marinco, *Cosas Memorables*, fol. 30.

(4) "I Spagnoli," says the Venetian minister, "non solo in questo paese di Granata, ma in tutto 'l resto della Spagna medesimamente, non sono molto industriosi, ne piantano, ne lavorano volentieri la terra; ma se danno ad altro, e più volentieri vanno alla guerra, o alle Indie ad acquistarsi facultà, che per tal vic."—(*Viaggio*, fol. 25.) Testimonies to the same purport thicken, as the

In noticing the circumstances that conspired to form the national character, it would be unpardonable to omit the establishment of the Inquisition, which contributed so largely to counterbalance the benefits resulting from Isabella's government; an institution which has done more than any other to stay the proud march of human reason; which, by imposing uniformity of creed, has proved the fruitful parent of hypocrisy and superstition; which has soured the sweet charities of human life,(1) and settling like a foul mist on the goodly promise of the land, closed up the fair buds of science and civilisation ere they were fully opened. Alas! that such a blight should have fallen on so gallant and generous a people! That it should have been brought on it too by one of such unblemished patriotism and purity of motive as Isabella! How must her virtuous spirit, if it be permitted the departed good to look down on the scene of their earthly labours, mourn over the misery and moral degradation entailed on her country by this one act! So true is it, that the measures of this great queen have had a permanent influence, whether for good or for evil, on the destinies of her country.

The immediate injury inflicted on the nation by the spirit of bigotry in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, although greatly exaggerated,(2) was doubtless serious enough. Under

stream of history descends.—See several collected by Capmany (Mem. de Barcelona, tom. iii. pp. 358 et seq.), who certainly cannot be charged with ministering to the vanity of his countrymen.

(1) One may trace its immediate influence in the writings of a man like the curate of Los Palacios, naturally, as it would seem, of an amiable, humane disposition; but who complacently remarks, "They [Ferdinand and Isabella] lighted up the fires for the heretics, in which, with good reason, they have burnt, and shall continue to burn, so long as the soul of them remains!"—(Reyes Catolicos, MS. cap. 7.) It becomes more perceptible in the literature of later times, and, what is singular, most of all in the lighter departments of poetry and fiction, which seem naturally devoted to purposes of pleasure. No one can estimate the full influence of the Inquisition in perverting moral sense, and infusing the deadly venom of misanthropy into the heart, who has not perused the works of the great Castilian poets, of Lope de Vega, Ercilla, above all Calderon, whose lips seem to have been touched with fire from the very altars of this accursed tribunal.

(2) The late secretary of the Inquisition has made an elaborate computation of the number of its victims. According to him, 12,000 were publicly burned by the several tribunals of Castile and Aragon, and 191,413 suffered other punishments, between 1481, the date of the commencement of the modern institution, and 1518.—(Hist. de l'Inquisition, tom. iv. chap. 45.) Lorenzo appears to have come to these appalling results by a very plausible process of calculation, and without any design to exaggerate. Nevertheless, his data are exceedingly imperfect; and he has himself, on a revision, considerably reduced, in his fourth volume, the original estimates in the first. I find good grounds for reducing them still further. 1. He quotes Mariana for the fact that 2,000 suffered martyrdom at Seville in 1481, and makes this the basis of his calculations for the other tribunals of the kingdom. Marinco, a contemporary, on the other hand, states that, "in the course of a few years they burned nearly 2,000 heretics;" thus not only diffusing this amount over a greater period of time, but embracing all the tribunals then existing in the country.—(Cosas

the otherwise beneficent operation of their government, however, the healthful and expansive energies of the state were sufficient to heal up these and deeper wounds, and still carry it onward in the career of prosperity. With this impulse, indeed, the nation continued to advance higher and higher, in spite of the system of almost unmingled evil pursued in the following reigns. The glories of this later period, of the age of Charles the Fifth, as it is called, must find their true source in the measures of his illustrious predecessors. It was in their court that Boscan, Garcilasso, Mendoza, and the other master-spirits were trained, who moulded Castilian literature into the new and more classical forms of later times.(1) It was under

Memorables, fol. 164.) 2. Bernaldez states that five-sixths of the Jews resided in the kingdom of Castile.—(Reyes Católicos, MS. cap. 110.) Llorente, however, has assigned an equal amount of victims to each of the five tribunals of Aragon with those of the sister kingdom, excepting only Seville. One might reasonably distrust Llorente's tables, from the facility with which he receives the most improbable estimates in other matters, as, for example, the number of banished Jews, which he puts at 800,000.—(Hist. de l'Inquisition, tom. i. p. 201.) I have shown, from contemporary sources, that this number did not probably exceed 100,000, or, at most, 170,000.—(Part I. vol. i. chapter 17.) Indeed, the cautious Zurita, borrowing, probably, from the same authorities, cites the latter number.—(Anales, tom. v. fol. 9.) Mariana, who owes so much of his narrative to the Aragonese historian, converting, as it would appear, these 170,000 individuals into families, states the whole, in round numbers, at 800,000 souls.—(Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 1.) Llorente, not content with this, swells the amount still further, by that of the Moorish exiles, and by emigrants to the New World (on what authority?) to 2,000,000; and, going on with the process, computes that this loss may fairly infer one of 8,000,000 inhabitants to Spain at the present day!—(Ibid. ubi supra.) Thus the mischief imputed to the Catholic sovereigns goes on increasing in a sort of arithmetical progression, with the duration of the monarchy. Nothing is so striking to the imagination as numerical estimates; they speak a volume in themselves, saving a world of periphrasis and argument; nothing is so difficult to form with exactness, or even probability, when they relate to an early period; and nothing more carelessly received, and confidently circulated. The enormous statements of the Jewish exiles, and the baseless ones of the Moorish, are not peculiar to Llorente, but have been repeated, without the slightest qualification or distrust, by most modern historians and travellers.

(1) In the two closing chapters of Part I. of this History, I have noticed the progress of letters in this reign; the last which displayed the antique colouring and truly national characteristics of Castilian poetry. There were many circumstances which operated, at this period, to work an important revolution, and subject the poetry of the Peninsula to a foreign influence. The Italian Muse, after her long silence, since the age of the *trecentisti*, had again revived, and poured forth such ravishing strains as made themselves heard and felt in every corner of Europe. Spain, in particular, was open to their influence. Her language had an intimate affinity with the Italian. The improved taste and culture of the period led to a diligent study of foreign models. Many Spaniards, as we have seen, went abroad to perfect themselves in the schools of Italy; while Italian teachers filled some of the principal chairs in the Spanish universities. Lastly, the acquisition of Naples, the land of Sannazaro, and of a host of kindred spirits, opened an obvious communication with the literature of that country. With the nation thus prepared, it was not difficult for a genius like that of Boscan, supported by the tender and polished Garcilasso, and by Mendoza, whose stern spirit found relief in images of pastoral

Gonsalvo de Cordova, that Leyva, Pescara, and those great captains with their invincible legions were formed, who enabled Charles the Fifth to dictate laws to Europe for half a century. And it was Columbus who not only led the way, but animated the Spanish navigator with the spirit of discovery. Scarcely was Ferdinand's reign brought to a close, before Magellan completed (1520) what that monarch had projected, the circumnavigation of the southern continent; the victorious banners of Cortes had already (1518) penetrated into the golden realms of Montezuma; and Pizarro, a very few years later (1524), following up the lead of Balboa, embarked on the enterprise which ended in the downfall of the splendid dynasty of the Incas.

Thus it is, that the seed sown under a good system continues to yield fruit in a bad one. The season of the most brilliant results, however, is not always that of the greatest national prosperity. The splendours of foreign conquest in the boasted

tranquillity and ease, to recommend the more finished forms of Italian versification to their countrymen. These poets were all born in Isabella's reign. The first of them, the principal means of effecting this literary revolution, singularly enough, was a Catalan, whose compositions in the Castilian prove the ascendancy which this dialect had already obtained as the language of literature. The second, Garcilasso de la Vega, was son of the distinguished statesman and diplomatist of that name, so often noticed in our History; and Mendoza was a younger son of the amiable count of Tendilla, the governor of Granada, whom he resembled in nothing but his genius. Both the elder Garcilasso and Tendilla had represented their sovereigns at the papal court, where they doubtless became tinctured with that relish for the Italian which produced such results in the education of their children. The new revolution penetrated far below the superficial forms of versification; and the Castilian poet relinquished, with his *redondillas* and artless *asonantes*, the homely but heartfelt themes of the olden time; or, if he dwelt on them, it was with an air of studied elegance and precision, very remote from the Doric simplicity and freshness of the romantic minstrelsy. If he aspired to some bolder theme, it was rarely suggested by the stirring and patriotic recollections of his nation's history. Thus, nature and the rude graces of a primitive age gave way to superior refinement and lettered elegance; many popular blossoms were softened down, a purer and nobler standard was attained, but the national characteristics were effaced; beauty was everywhere, but it was the beauty of art, not of nature. The change itself was perfectly natural. It corresponded with the external circumstances of the nation, and its transition from an insulated position to a competent part of the great European commonwealth, which subjected it to other influences and principles of taste, and obliterated, to a certain extent, the peculiar features of the national physiognomy. How far the poetic literature of Castile was benefited by the change, has been matter of long and hot debate between the critics of the country, in which I shall not involve the reader. The revolution, however, was the growth of circumstances, and was immediately effected by individuals belonging to the age of Ferdinand and Isabella. As such, I had originally proposed to devote a separate chapter to its illustration; but I have been deterred from it by the unexpected length to which the work has already extended, as well as by the consideration, on a nearer view, that these results, though prepared under a preceding reign, properly fall under the domestic history of Charles V.,—a history which still remains to be written. But who will attempt a pendant to the delineations of Robertson?

reign of Charles the Fifth were dearly purchased by the decline of industry at home, and the loss of liberty. The patriot will see little to cheer him in this "golden age" of the national history, whose outward show of glory will seem to his penetrating eye only the hectic brilliancy of decay. He will turn to an earlier period, when the nation, emerging from the sloth and license of a barbarous age, seemed to renew its ancient energies, and to prepare like a giant to run its course; and glancing over the long interval since elapsed, during the first half of which the nation wasted itself on schemes of mad ambition, and in the latter has sunk into a state of paralytic torpor, he will fix his eye on the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, as the most glorious epoch in the annals of his country.

